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Abstract
This thesis explores the EuroAmerican ‘counterjihad’, a transnational field of anti-
Muslim political action that has grown significantly since it first became visible in the
mid-late 2000s. Its key symptoms have included ‘Defence Leagues’ and ‘Stop Islam-
isation’ groups in various national contexts, grassroots mobilisations against mosques
and minarets, campaigns to ‘ban the burqa’, as well as a very wide network of anti-
Muslim online spaces. The thesis argues that the counterjihad can be seen as a transna-
tional political movement, and its discursive, aesthetic, organisational and tactical
repertoires are all critically explored. It will be shown that the heterogeneous polit-
ical tendencies that constitute the counterjihad are united by a shared narrative of
Western crisis, decline and impending catastrophe; several overlapping conspiratorial
narratives that attempt to explain this predicament; and, finally, a spectrum of com-
pensatory political projects that seek to reinvigorate a sense of Western civilizational
and white ethnic identity in a post-Cold War context where those identities are in-
creasingly contested. The thesis also argues that the counterjihad is one aspect of a
more general phenomenon: the striking reemergence in ‘late’ modernity of a number
of ‘countermodern’ or ‘traditionalist’ political theologies. These new political theolo-
gies overlap with, but are not identical to, the ones that flourished during the long
crisis of ‘classical’ European modernity in the early twentieth century (notably, ‘clas-
sical’ Italian Fascism and German National Socialism). Finally, the thesis considers
the sociopolitical conditions that have fostered the reemergence of such phenomena
today.
iii
Contents
1 Introduction: Fear and Loathing in Fortress Europe 1
I Contexts 19
2 Working in the ‘Grey Zone’: a note onmethodology 20
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3 ‘TheAppeals ofHeredity’: on countermodernisms and political theologies 36
‘A true present’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
‘Eternal land and eternal blood’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
‘Something existentially different and alien’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
‘Only a God can save us’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4 ‘Peoples of theForest,Tribes of theDesert’: countermodern ideologies and
Islam prior to the counterjihad 67
At the ‘Eleventh Hour’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
‘A strategy of euphemism’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
The ‘New Alliance’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
‘The threat that can bring us to power’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
II TheCounterjihad 98
5 ‘Welcome to the Counterjihad’: anatomy of a political movement 99
iv
The European Counterjihad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
The North American Counterjihad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Networking the Counterjihad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
‘Extreme but not fringe’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6 ‘AlmostMidnight in theWest’: the Eurabian cultural apocalyptic 142
‘The Second Fall of Rome’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
‘A stranger in my own country’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
‘The demographic timebomb’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
‘A recipe for cultural suicide’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
7 The ‘Red-Green Axis’: on counterjihadist demonology 177
‘A global Dark Ages’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
‘A house burned down’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
‘The Eurabia Code’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
‘Civilization Jihad’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
‘They were to a man, Jewish’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
8 ‘Our Ancient Heritage’: the new political theology 214
‘Taking care of your own’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
‘Holger Awakens’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
On ‘Hallowed Ground’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
‘A declaration of pre-emptive war’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
III Conclusion 253
9 Conclusion: Fascism, Past and Pending 254
A Appendix: Websites Analysed 266
v
B Appendix: Research Statement 271
Bibliography 273
vi
List of Figures
1.1 Pegida UK demonstration, Birmingham, February 2016. . . . . . . 4
4.1 Hitler meets the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Berlin, 1941. . . . . . . 74
4.2 Cover of Derek Holland’s pamphletThe Political Soldier (1984). . . . 85
4.3 Front cover of National Front News, March 1988. . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.4 British National Party anti-Islam campaign, autumn 2001. . . . . . 89
4.5 Covers of British National Party magazine Identity after 9/11 and 7/7. 95
5.1 The online counterjihad network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.2 The online counterjihad network: key interfaces. . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.3 Donald Trump attends the launch of The United West, March 2011. 140
6.1 Graphic: ‘Stop Islamisation of Europe’. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.2 Leaflet: The Islamic Timebomb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
6.3 Placard: ‘Cultural Enrichment?’. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
6.4 Cartoon: ‘The Other Islamic Bomb’. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
7.1 Graphic: ‘A House Burned Down’. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
7.2 Stills from the film Political Correctness: the Frankfurt School. . . . . . 204
7.3 William Lind and Donald Trump, April 2016. . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
8.1 English Defence League emblem and motto. . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
8.2 White nationalist images produced by the North West Infidels. . . . 244
8.3 Front cover of Anders Breivik’s ‘manifesto’ 2083. . . . . . . . . . . . 249
vii
List of Tables
2.1 Details of research participants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.2 Details of observation sites. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
viii
Note on Referencing
Academic secondary literature and long-form journalistic articles are cited using in-
line references within the text. Fieldwork data, news agency reports, websites and the
like are referenced using footnotes.
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction: Fear and Loathing in
Fortress Europe
It was a cold, grey and wet Saturday afternoon in February. I was standing huddled
underneath a bridge outside Birmingham international rail station, a few miles east of
central Birmingham in the town of Solihull, with perhaps two or three hundred other
bedraggled and shivering people. The occasion was the inaugural demonstration of
Pegida UK, the UK offshoot of the German anti-Muslim protest movement Patri-
otische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (Pegida; Patriotic Europeans
Against the Islamisation of the West), which first came to international attention in
late 2014 when its weekly rallies in central Dresden began to attract crowds of thou-
sands, peaking at around 25,000 in early 2015, shortly after the Paris offices of the
satirical publication Charlie Hebdowere attacked by gunmen pledging allegiance to Al
Qaeda (Dostal, 2015; Virchow, 2016). The UK group was one of a number of affiliates
that had been set up, hoping to emulate the success of the Dresden movement.
Fronting the Pegida UK march were its leader, Paul Weston, head of the tiny far-
right party Liberty GB and frequent contributor to the US-based blogGates of Vienna,
and Anne Marie Waters, director of Sharia Watch UK and former parliamentary
candidate for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), who in September
2017 came second in the contest for that party’s leadership. Joining them in the role
of ‘coordinator’ was Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (‘Tommy Robinson’), former leader of
the English Defence League (EDL), the grassroots anti-Muslim street movement
1
that had organised chaotic and often violent demonstrations in multiethnic towns
and cities across Britain from the summer of 2009 until it went into decline following
Robinson’s departure in late 2013. During its relatively short lifespan, the EDL had
become amodel for similar ‘Defence League’ mobilisations across Europe and beyond,
and had formed important alliances with American Tea Party activists and other parts
of the dissident US right (Copsey, 2010; Jackson, 2011).
At just after 2pm, the small crowd, made up mostly but not exclusively of young
white men, began a ‘silent walk’ of a few hundred yards to a purpose-built stage in
the adjacent industrial estate where they gathered to hear speeches by the Pegida UK
organisers. Many marchers wore pre-printed stickers with the Pegida logo and the
words ‘Save Us’ over their mouths as a symbol of their silence. Somewhat incongru-
ously a rainbow flag, the symbol of LGBT emancipation, and an Israeli flag, the Star
of David on a white and blue background, fluttered in the wind alongside the red cross
of St George, a symbol associated with both English nationalism and the medieval
crusades against Islam. The incongruity would, however, be familiar to anyone who
had witnessed demonstrations by the EDL, whose attempts to forge a multiethnic
and multiconfessional alliance against the ‘Islamisation’ of Britain had involved the
creation of LGBT and Jewish ‘divisions’, the latter of which had links to the far-right
Jewish Defence League and Jewish Task Force (Bhatt, 2012; Jackson, 2011).
Many of those joining the Birmingham demonstration carried placards with slo-
gans such as ‘Nazism = Islamism’, “‘Rape culture” is being imported’, ‘Protect our
children’, and an image of the British-born ISIS fighter Mohammed Emwazi (‘Jihadi
John’) brandishing an evil-looking knife with the ironic caption ‘Cultural Enrich-
ment?’.1 One popular placard bore the image of the then-Republican US presidential
candidate, now President, Donald Trump, with the words ‘Trump is Right’. The ref-
erence was to Trump’s December 2015 call for a ban on Muslim migration to the US,
which Trump justified at the time by citing a poll of American Muslims conducted
for the Washington D.C. ‘think tank’ the Center for Security Policy, that purported
to show significant support for replacing the US Constitution with Sharia law.2 3
1Fieldnotes, February 2016.
2https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2015/06/23/nationwide-poll-of-us-muslims-shows-
thousands-support-shariah-jihad/ [Last accessed 21st September 2017].
3http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2015/12/survey-company-trump-is-misusing-our-survey.html
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The Pegida UK event in Birmingham was part of a coordinated ‘Day of the
European Patriots’ organised by Pegida and affiliated groups across Europe.4 A few
days before, on 23rd January 2016, members of Pegida Dresden had met in Roz-
toky in the Czech Republic with grassroots movements and political parties from
across the continent to form the Festung Europa (‘Fortress Europe’) network, which
included theCzechUsvit (Dawn) party and theBlok proti islámu (Bloc Against Islam),
one of whose events had been addressed by the Czech President, Miloš Zeman; the
Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond (Conservative People’s Party of Estonia; EKRE);
the Polish Ruch Narodowy (RN; National Movement); the Italian Lega Nord (LN;
Northern League); and Pegida offshoots from Austria, Bulgaria and the Netherlands.
These groups became co-signatories to the ‘Prague Declaration’, the text of which
prophesied the imminent end of ‘the thousand-year history of Western Civilization’
through an ‘Islamic conquest of Europe’, one that had been brought about by an act of
betrayal on the part of the ‘European central government’ and the ‘global elites’.5 The
Declaration asserted the need to protect ‘our common European roots, traditions and
values’ and ‘our common way of life’, speaking in quasi-religious terms of a ‘sacred
right’ of European citizens to protect their borders and describing an ‘obligation to
future generations’.6
The speeches at the Birmingham rally, held under leaden skies, rehearsed similar
themes. The future of the UK was prophesied to be ‘very grim’, with one speaker
painting an apocalyptic picture of impending ‘civil unrest’ and intercommunal ‘war’
betweenMuslims and non-Muslims.7 Islamwas emphatically ‘not a religion of peace’,
and figured within Pegida UK’s rhetoric as a conquering, totalitarian political ideology
indistinguishable from Nazism, whose very name means ‘submission’, and which was
routinely associated with violence, especially sexual violence against white women. A
recurring theme was that all Muslims are bound by fate to act out the literal word of
the Koran, and to emulate the actions of the prophet Mohammed, ‘the perfect man
[Last accessed 21st September 2017].
4http://www.dw.com/en/pegida-meets-with-european-allies-in-the-czech-republic/a-19000895
[Last accessed 21st September 2017].
5http://gatesofvienna.net/2016/01/tatjana-festerling-in-dresden-the-prague-declaration/ [Last
accessed 21st September 2017].
6Ibid.
7Fieldnotes, February 2016.
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Figure 1.1: Paul Weston speaks at the inaugural Pegida UK demonstration, Solihull,
6th February 2016. Anne Marie Waters is standing to the left of Weston, partially
obscured. Stephen Lennon (‘Tommy Robinson’) is standing to the right of Weston,
in the foreground. Photo © the author.
in Islam’. Key targets for all the speakers were a series of enemies within, including
the ‘lefty multicultural morons that run our media’, ‘leftist councils’ and the estab-
lished Church among other purveyors of ‘political correctness’. But also accused were
politicians of the centre right such as German Chancellor AngelaMerkel, condemned
for allowing into Europe ‘one and a half million young, fighting age, war-hardened...
Muslim men’, and former British Prime Minister David Cameron, alleged to have
decided ‘that strangers from faraway lands are more important than we are’, and to be
committed to ‘importing people who hate us... who want to destroy us, our way of
life, our ancient heritage, our beautiful Britain’.8 Hanging over the entire event was a
palpable sense of anxiety, dread and foreboding.
* * *
The foregoing paragraphs, which implicate a heterogeneous set of actors ranging from
ephemeral street protest movements, to political parties, bloggers, professionalised ad-
8Ibid.
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vocacy groups, and even European and North American heads of state, might serve
as the briefest topographical sketch of the ‘counterjihad’, a transnational field of anti-
Muslim political action that has expanded significantly since it first became visible in
the mid-to-late 2000s. Important early symptoms of this tendency were the emer-
gence of specifically anti-Muslim political movements in various national contexts,
the growth of grassroots mobilisations against mosques and minarets, campaigns to
‘ban the burqa’, and the proliferation of numerous anti-Muslim online spaces. Many,
but not all, of the figures described above would view themselves as part of an or-
ganised transatlantic ‘counterjihad movement’, whilst others form part of a broader
political milieu that has nurtured the movement and fertilised the soil within which
it has grown. Today, many of the discursive repertoires incubated within the coun-
terjihad are routinely mobilised by politicians fromMarine le Pen of the French Front
National (FN; National Front), to Geert Wilders of the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid
(PVV; Party for Freedom), to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, and, not
least, Donald Trump.
The political geography of the counterjihad is primarily EuroAmerican, although
its wider political networks extend as far as Israel and Australia. The European and
North American ‘wings’ of the movement are somewhat distinct entities in terms
of their political genealogies and organisational repertoires, yet they are also densely
interrelated phenomena that exist in a symbiotic relationship with one another. The
counterjihad began to coalesce as a transnational political movement in the late 2000s,
when important international connections were formed through the ‘Stop Islamisa-
tion’ network, the International Free Press Society (IFPS) and the International Civil
Liberties Alliance (ICLA), which sponsored a series of international counterjihad
conferences between 2007 and 2013 in Copenhagen, Vienna, Zurich, London, Brus-
sels and Warsaw. However, the European and North American wings had formed
independently of one another some years before this.
During its roughly decennial existence, the European counterjihad movement has
encompassed ‘Defence Leagues’ in England, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden,
Germany, Greece, Italy and Poland, among other countries, and ‘Stop Islamisation’
campaigns in various national contexts including England, Denmark, Sweden and
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Norway, as part of a pan-European umbrella group (Stop Islamisation of Europe)
(Bhatt, 2012). These mobilisations were modelled on, respectively, the English De-
fence League (founded 2009) and Stop Islamiseringen af Danmark (SIAD; Stop Islam-
isation of Denmark) (founded 2005) (Bhatt, 2012; Denes, 2012; Sedgwick, 2013).
More recently, Pegida has usurped these older groups to become the most import-
ant counterjihad street protest movement in Europe, and also functions as an inter-
national activist network. Other groups that have been operative at various points
have included Counterjihad Europa,Mission Europa Netzwerk Karl Martell and Cit-
ies Against Islamisation (Bhatt, 2012). European political parties that have been
actively involved with the movement include the Sverigedemokraterna (SD; Sweden
Democrats), the Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP; Swiss People’s Party) which led the
successful 2009 referendum campaign against building minarets in Switzerland, and
the Flemish-secessionist Vlaams Belang (VB; Flemish Interest) (ibid.). GeertWilders
has long been its key political figurehead.
The European counterjihad groups form part of a wider continental resurgence of
far-right political activity, which has taken a number of different organisational and
ideological forms (for a recent survey see Fekete, 2016b). In some contexts, there
has been a revival of political forms that openly associate themselves with ‘classical’
Italian Fascism and German National Socialism. However, avowedly fascist and Nazi
organisations remain politically marginal, perhaps with the exception of the Greek
Chrysí Avgí (Golden Dawn) (ibid.). More important are parties, often dating from
the 1970s and 1980s, that have historical associations with fascism, Nazism or their
wartime collaborators, but which have prospered electorally since the 1990s, in part by
moderating their rhetoric, dissociating themselves from interwar fascism and work-
ing within the framework of parliamentary democracy. The British National Party
(BNP), which enjoyed sporadic electoral success at the local and European levels dur-
ing the 1990s and 2000s, and the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ; Freedom Party
of Austria), whose candidate for president, Norbert Hofer, was narrowly defeated in
a re-run election in 2016, both exemplify this tendency. However, by far the most
important example is the French Front National (FN; National Front), whose leader
Marine le Pen’s progression to the second round of the French presidential election
6
in May 2017 was more keenly anticipated than that of her father, Jean-Marie, to the
same stage in 2002.
Finally, other parties have evolved in relative organisational and ideological isol-
ation from neo-fascism yet seemingly share considerable philosophical space with it.
For instance, the political platforms of the Dutch Party for Freedom, the Alternative
für Deutschland (AfD; Alternative for Germany), the UK Independence Party and the
Scandinavian ‘Progress’ parties are deeply illiberal and inegalitarian, but the majority
of their members and supporters do not have backgrounds in organised fascism or
violent neo-Nazism. Together, all of these parties are dedicated to, as Geoff Eley has
put it, ‘simultaneously maintaining boundaries both national and European - of de-
fending the nation from inside the larger battlements of fortress Europe’ (Eley, 2016,
pp. 109-10).
The electoral ascent of the far right should not detract attention from its extra-
parliamentary forms, which eschew party politics altogether in favour of more in-
formal and less hierarchical modes of organisation. Of importance here is the ‘identit-
arian’ movement exemplified by the French youth organisation Génération Identitaire
(GI; Generation Identity) and associated groups such as the German Identitäre Be-
wegung Deutschland (IBD; Identity Movement of Germany). The identitarian move-
ment is, in part, the activist wing of the originally French but now pan-European
Nouvelle Droite (ND; New Right), an intellectual movement that has since the late
1960s been engaged in a far-reaching project to rethink the fascist political vision,
drawing on minority strands of the interwar far right, especially the Weimar ‘con-
servative revolutionary’ movement. There is today a dense network of think tanks,
publishing houses and online spaces linked to these movements, with offshoots in the
US (the North American New Right) and Russia (‘neo-Eurasianism’).
European counterjihad groups have, for the most part, evolved outside the organ-
isational and ideological spaces of neo-fascism and neo-Nazism. Whilst the EDL
and Pegida have both included activists with pre-existing links to these milieux, a key
source of recruits for both were football hooligan ‘firms’, whose primarily local (club)
allegiances and changing demographic make-up means they have complex, shifting
and sometimes antagonistic relationships with organised neo-Nazism. Many grass-
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roots activists and supporters seem to have been relatively apolitical prior to their in-
volvement with the counterjihad. Moreover, the Dresden Pegida movement (but
not the EDL) was successful in attracting support from ordinary members of the
lower middle-classes, without which its rallies would have been considerably smal-
ler (Dostal, 2015; Grabow, 2016). The understandable desire of journalists and anti-
racist activists to highlight evidence of neo-Nazi personnel and symbols at EDL or
Pegida demonstrations (which is not hard to find) should not distract us from the
more important point: the demonstrable potential for anxieties about ‘Islam’ to serve
as a unifying agenda around which elements of the provincial middle classes, working-
class whites and the football hooligan fraternity can coalesce (de Genova, 2015).
Such is the fluidity of the situation at the time of writing, and such is the velocity
of ideational and personnel exchange across organisational and national boundaries,
that taxonomic categorisation can seem a futile exercise. For most of its lifespan,
however, the European counterjihad movement has been marked out from other far-
right tendencies not only by the extent of its preoccupation with Islam and Muslims,
but also by its Atlanticist orientation, professed philo-Zionism and its disavowal of
historical fascism and biological racism. This has distinguished it, for instance, from
neo-Nazism, which would consider support for Israel and political alliances with con-
servative Jews to be anathema. It has also distinguished the counterjihad from the
New Right, which has tended to follow its conservative revolutionary forebears in
viewing Europe as a geopolitical bulwark against both Russia and America. Finally,
it distinguishes the counterjihad from parts of the extreme right that are sympathetic
to (and in some cases materially linked with) the authoritarian regime that inhabits
post-Soviet Russia, and which tend to take a dim view of ‘American-Zionist imperi-
alism’. The boundaries between these movements have, however, always been blurred
and have become increasingly so over time.
In contrast to the European counterjihadmovement, its North American sibling is
dominated by professionalised and often well-resourced advocacy groups, rather than
ephemeral protest movements or marginal political parties. Key right-wing ‘think
tanks’ aligned with the movement include the Center for Security Policy (CSP), the
organisation whose polling data was used by Trump in support of his ‘Muslim ban’,
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and the David Horowitz Freedom Center, which supports the website Jihad Watch, a
key site of the counterjihad. At a grassroots level, the most important group is ACT
for America, which is little known outside the US, but gained some international
media attention when it organized a ‘March Against Sharia’ in twenty-eight US cities
in June 2017.9 Many prominent American counterjihad activists have backgrounds
in the national security establishment, the ‘counterterrorism’ industry and, especially,
the (Christian and Jewish) religious right, rather than the organised white nationalist
movement. A formative moment for the American wing of the counterjihad came
with the 2010 protests against the so-called ‘Ground Zero Mosque’ in New York,
organised by the activist group Stop Islamization of America (SIOA), addressed by
Geert Wilders and attended by international supporters including a contingent from
the EDL.10
TheUS counterjihad movement is one of a number of heterodox right-wing polit-
ical tendencies to have emerged from the post-Cold War ferment of American con-
servatism (the discussion here of American conservatism and its discontents draws es-
pecially on Hawley, 2016). Themodern American conservative movement took shape
in the mid-twentieth century as a coalition of religious traditionalists, national secur-
ity hawks and free marketeers, a fortuitous political alliance that was held together
for half a century by a shared opposition to Soviet Communism. The philosophical
underpinnings of the movement were provided by intellectuals such as Russell Kirk
and William F. Buckley, who aspired to turn conservatism into a coherent political
ideology, in part by excluding some of the more avowedly nativist, anti-Semitic and
isolationist tendencies that had often characterised the pre-war ‘old right’. The Re-
publican party became the electoral vehicle of post-war conservatism, which coalesced
around the 1964 presidential campaign of Barry Goldwater, before reaching the peak
of its political power with the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980.
From the 1970s onwards, the movement became home to the so-called ‘neocon-
servatives’, dissident liberals who had accepted the New Deal but were more sceptical
of Lyndon Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ programmes and of the 1960s New Left. Many
9https://www.adl.org/education/resources/profiles/act-for-america [Last accessed 31st July 2017].
10http://afdi.us/historic-911-stop-the-mosque-at-ground-zero-rally/ [Last accessed 31st July
2017].
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of these political refugees were Jewish, and a number of them had studied under the
Chicago-based political philosopher Leo Strauss. Neoconservatism, a vague political
phenomenon whose defining feature is perhaps a hawkish attitude towards foreign
policy, had come to dominate the US right by the early twenty-first century. Neo-
conservatives were prominent advocates of US military interventionism after 9/11,
ostensibly for purposes of global democracy promotion. Consequently, and especially
in contemporary Europe, the US political right is often regarded as synonymous with
support for American military adventurism and imperialism. However, this elides
a long tradition of isolationism and deep scepticism towards international entangle-
ments that has often predominated on the American right. Moreover, the acquies-
cence by the post-war US conservative movement in relatively high levels of public
spending and the expansion of governmental bureaucracy are perhaps best seen as
contingent responses to the perception of an existential threat from the Soviet Union,
rather than as permanent ideological realignments (ibid.).
In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, heterodox right-wing tend-
encies - some new, some very old - have emerged to challenge the conservative move-
ment from the right. These include Buchananite ‘paleoconservatism’, far-right-wing
libertarianism, the ‘Tea Parties’, the Patriot and armed militia movements and re-
surgent forms of white nationalism (not mutually exclusive categories) (Berlet and
Lyons, 2000; Hawley, 2016). Especially since the 2016 US presidential campaign,
media and political discourses have used the term ‘Alt-Right’ in an expansive sense to
refer to various of these tendencies, often without differentiation. However, the term
‘Alt-Right’ also has a more specific meaning, having been coined by white nationalist
Richard Spencer to refer to a specific white separatist political project, heavily influ-
enced by the European New Right and its North American offshoots, that seeks to
foster a ‘white racial consciousness’ and eventually to create a white ‘ethno-state’ in
North America (Nagle, 2017). The more expansive usage of the term is analytically
limiting insofar as it conflates a diverse set of political actors engaged in divergent and
sometimes incompatible political projects, but it does usefully foreground the coales-
cence of these forces around the 2016 presidential campaign of Donald Trump. The
NorthAmerican counterjihad can be viewed as one current within this new right-wing
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political milieu.
During the 2016 US election campaign, figures associated with the US counterji-
hadmovement worked in an advisory capacity on the campaigns of several Republican
presidential candidates, including that of Donald Trump, but also those of Ted Cruz
and Ben Carson. Since the inauguration of Trump in January 2017, counterjihadist
ideas have been influential on administration policy, mediated through key admin-
istration figures such as former Chief Strategist Steve Bannon, former National Se-
curity Advisor Mike Flynn, Attorney General Jeff Sessions and Trump’s speechwriter
Steven Miller, amongst others, all of whom have links to US counterjihad groups.
Trump’s inauguration address and his July 2017 speech in Warsaw belong to the
same discursive formation as Fortress Europe’s ‘Prague Declaration’ and the speeches
I heard at the Pegida UK demonstration in Solihull. In his inaugural speech, Trump
spoke in apocalyptic terms of ‘American carnage’, of ‘mothers and children trapped
in poverty in our inner cities,’ of ‘rusted out factories scattered like tombstones across
the landscape of our nation,’ and of a nation blighted by ‘the crime and the gangs and
the drugs’, whilst also pledging to ‘unite the world against radical Islamic terrorism’
which he vowed to ‘eradicate from the face of the Earth’.11 A few months later, in
front of a large crowd in Warsaw, Trump claimed that the ‘fundamental question of
our time is whether the West has the will to survive’, urging the need to ‘celebrate our
ancient heroes, embrace our timeless traditions and customs’, because ‘[o]ur freedom,
our civilization, and our survival depend on these bonds of history.’12
The influence of counterjihadist ideas on Trump’s presidency is evident in the
January 2017 executive order banning travel from seven Muslim-majority countries
(a slightly, but not very watered-down version of the campaign proposal) and the
mooted designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist entity (an idea
that seemed to be in abeyance at the time of writing, probably due to the enormous
diplomatic and logistical problems that would need to be overcome). Both of these
measures have long been advocated by US counterjihad groups like the Center for
11https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/20/donald-trumps-full-
inauguration-speech-transcript-annotated/ [Last accessed 21st September 2017].
12http://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/06/politics/trump-speech-poland-transcript/index.html [Last
accessed 21st September 2017].
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Security Policy and ACT for America. Neither measure makes any sense as coun-
terterrorism policy, and they can only be understood in the context of counterjihadist
narratives of the Islamic ‘conquest’ of the West, and conspiracy theories concerning
Brotherhood inflitration of the US government. Arguably, the counterjihad has been
a more important influence on administration policy than have the avowed white na-
tionalists of the ‘Alt-Right’, notwithstanding Trump’s August 2017 description of the
latter as including ‘some very fine people’.13
This thesis seeks to apprehend the counterjihad as it has evolved over the past ten-to-
fifteen years, viewing it as one of several tributaries of what I term the ‘new political
theology’. By this I mean the sacralization of collective identities, group boundaries,
political institutions and forms of social authority, across a spectrum of geographical
and cultural spaces, in a context of rapid sociopolitical change. In a EuroAmerican
context, the new political theology encompasses ‘Judeo-Christian civilizationism’ and
‘Christian nationalism’ as well as avowed forms of ‘white nationalism’. Moreover,
these coexist with a multiplicity of regionalist and secessionist tendencies, and het-
erogeneous national and local cults of tradition. Outside EuroAmerica the term
could equally apply to, for instance, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) that has governed India since 2014, and its associated paramilitia organisation,
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), an organisation founded in 1925 that con-
sciously sought to emulate interwar European fascist movements. ‘Political theology’
(sometimes also ‘political religion’) could similarly apply to the salafi-jihadi paramilitia
groups such as Al Qaeda and Daesh (Islamic State; IS) against which the counterjihad
nominally defines itself.
More specifically, it will be argued that the counterjihad exemplifies the striking
reemergence in ‘late’ modernity of various ‘countermodern’ political theologies. The
defining characteristic of these phenomena is their reactionary inflection of the tem-
porality of modernity, in which a mythic past becomes the basis for a future-oriented
political project. Symptomatic of this tendency is the fusion of technological mod-
ernity with forms of political premodernity, faith, superstition and anti-rationalism,
13https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/trump-defends-white-nationalist-
protesters-some-very-fine-people-on-both-sides/537012/ [Last accessed 21st September 2017].
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a synthesis evident across a number of political movements today. These are emphat-
ically not forms of conservatism, if by ‘conservatism’ we mean a form of politics ori-
ented towards the preservation of what ‘is’. Instead, they are counterrevolutionary in
the temporal sense: they aim at the reversal of an existing tendency or state of affairs
(Osborne, 1995). Hence, contrary to the taxonomic approaches of EuroAmerican
political science, I will argue that it is not some shared ideological belief (however
defined) that unites such diverse political phenomena as ‘classical’ Italian Fascism,
Nazism, the ‘New Right’, the ‘Alt-Right’ and the counterjihad movement, and which
justifies their collective characterisation as ‘far right’. Rather, it is their common tem-
poral structure. Today, this counterrevolutionary temporal structure is inscribed in
such popular slogans as ‘take back control’ and ‘make America great again’.
The parallel emergence of these phenomena across a range of national contexts has
given rise to heated public and academic debates concerning the applicability of ‘fas-
cism’ as a generic term, and the nature of the ‘fascism-producing crisis’ (Eley, 2016).
These debates have divided those who see important continuities between today’s in-
surgent ultra-right and interwar European fascist movements, from those who want
to insist on the exceptional nature of ‘classical’ Fascism and, especially, German Na-
tional Socialism. They have also divided those who wish to draw parallels between
the cleansing nation-statisms of mid-twentieth-century Europe and the cleansing vi-
olence of contemporary religious paramilitia groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS, from oth-
ers for whom neologisms such as ‘Islamofascism’ are yet further evidence of fascism’s
increasingly debased coinage. Finally, they have divided those who, influenced by
a long Marxian sociological tradition that views fascism as the product of capitalist
economic crises, theorise resurgent EuroAmerican racism as a by-product of white
working class economic distress, from those who argue that such economistic explan-
ations amount to evasions of glaring structural racism and white supremacism. I do
no more than register these debates here, as I will return to them in the conclusion to
the thesis.
Broadly, however, I want to insist on the need to apprehend both the continuit-
ies between contemporary and historical forms of countermodern political theology
on the one hand, and the ‘conjunctural specificities’ (Eley, 2016) of the present on
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the other. It will be argued that there are indeed important affinities between the
countermodern political theologies of the early twentieth century and those of the
early twenty-first. These stem from a shared diagnosis of their respective historical
presents as moments of crisis, decline and impending catastrophe, which leads to
strikingly similar survivalist logics of bordering, boundary-making and cultural puri-
fication. However, the nature of these ‘crises’, which, contrary to Marxian theories of
fascism are always discursively constituted and never structurally ‘given’, are in many
respects quite different.
One obvious difference between interwar fascist movements and contemporary
xenophobic and nativist forces, is that today much far-right hatred and bigotry is dir-
ected towards Muslims specifically. This has led to important debates on the causes
of anti-Muslim hatred, and the extent to which contemporary bigotry and violence
towards Muslims can be understood on the analogy of historical racisms and classical
anti-Semitism. However, what sometimes gets lost in these debates is the broader
point that the external enemy in fascism has a very specific function: that of gener-
ating group unity and identity through hostile polarisation against a third party. The
invocation of such an enemy is, by implication, typically symptomatic of an unresolved
‘endogenous’ social conflict. Moreover, fascist enmity need not be strictly ‘racial’ in the
classical sense of that term (although it often is) and religious or cultural antagonisms
can also become the basis for fascistic solidarity. As it was famously put by the Nazi
legal theorist Carl Schmitt, the enemy is simply ‘the other, the stranger; and it is
sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something
different and alien’ (Schmitt, 2007b, p. 27).
In the tumultuous context of interwar Germany, Adolf Hitler and the Nazi move-
ment radicalised the conservative revolution against the ‘Spirit of 1789’ (and, by im-
plication, that of 1776) and its animating principles of liberté, égalité and fraternité,
turning it into a specifically anti-Jewish revolution (Mosse, 1998, p. 292). Drawing
on, but also going beyond, a long history of European anti-Semitism and Christian
hatred of Jews, Nazism declared that all the things conservatives complained about
- liberalism, democracy, socialism, feminism, pacifism - were products of a ‘world-
Jewish conspiracy’. In this way, the guilt for a range of concrete sociopolitical prob-
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lems - German military defeat, economic crisis, and Weimar political paralysis - was
transferred onto the collective body of the Jews, whose extirpation from the face of
the Earth was taken to be the condition of possibility for the restoration of peace
and normality. Hence, in the specific sociohistorical context of interwar Europe, the
invocation of a ‘world-Jewish conspiracy’ served to generate the affective energies ne-
cessary for a violent counterrevolution against the ‘Spirit of 1789’ and its political
offspring.
In a similar way, I will argue, the invocation of an Islamic enemy and a ‘red-green
axis’ today, in a quite different sociohistorical context, functions to generate the re-
quisite affective energies for a colossal international counterrevolutionary assault on
the ‘Spirit of ’68’ and the political legacy of the New Left. Throughout what fol-
lows we will encounter the same theme repeated with monotonous regularity: that
the ‘Islamisation of the West’ is consequent upon a crisis of Western civilizational
confidence that has been brought about by the erosion of traditional group identit-
ies, territorial boundaries and forms of social authority, through ‘cultural relativism’,
‘political correctness’, feminism, anti-racism, ‘globalism’ and a range of other political
catastrophes. Hence, for many on the political far right today, the real enemies are
not so much the ones allegedly threatening to storm the gates of Fortress Europe from
without, but rather those within who stand accused of leaving the gates unlocked.
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part I constitutes the methodological, theoretical
and contextual framework for the thesis. In chapter 2 I describe how I came to this
topic and how I have gone about researching such a vast, complex and rapidly-evolving
phenomenon. The chapter sets out the research design and the methods used, and
discusses the ethical decisions that I have made during the course of the project.
The literature review that follows is divided into two parts. In chapter 3, I set out
my theoretical and conceptual framework, and develop my core concepts of ‘counter-
modernism’ and ‘political theology’. To do this, I contrast a classic expression of the
‘attitude of modernity’ in the political philosophy of Immanuel Kant with three exem-
plary ‘countermodern’ thinkers: Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt and Martin Heide-
gger. The chapter argues that the ‘attitude of countermodernity’ expressed in their
writings constitutes a contingent affective response to what the historian of religion,
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Mircea Eliade, has called the ‘terror of history’ (Eliade, 1954). Using the writings of
Spengler, Schmitt and Heidegger, I try to show how their reactionary inflection of the
temporality of modernity involves a conception of time as governed by fate, insofar
as the exercise of human agency in the present is subordinated to determinations of
the future (the site of imminent disaster) and the past (mythologised as one of safety
and security). Building on Emmanuel Levinas’ seminal writings on the ‘philosophy of
Hitlerism’ (Levinas, 1990b), the chapter also argues for an indissociable link between
temporal fatalism and political particularism, wherein Kantian universalism, cosmo-
politanism and the idea of the ‘abstract subject’ are displaced in favour of conception
of the subject as bound by fate to a particular culture.
In chapter 4, I use a genealogical approach, in the Foucauldian sense of that
term (Foucault, 1991a), to explore how Islam and Muslims have figured in various
countermodern political theologies prior to the counterjihad, the better to illustrate
the specificity of the latter. The aim of the chapter is not to provide an exhaust-
ive history of far-right orientations towards Islam and Muslims, but rather to show
how such orientations have been historically contingent and often fiercely contested.
Tendencies considered within the chapter include neo-Nazism, the European New
Right, international ‘third positionism’ and white racial nationalism. The chapter also
serves as an occasion for considering some broader trends within the EuroAmerican
far right, including increasing transnationalisation and the diversification of political
strategies (Griffin, 2000). Furthermore, the chapter seeks to unsettle a key assumption
of Anglophone ‘fascism studies’: that a definitive extrahistorical ‘essence’ of fascism
(the ‘fascist minimum’) can be isolated based primarily on comparative study of inter-
war European fascisms (e.g. Griffin, 1993; Eatwell, 1996).
In Part II, I apply the conceptual and theoretical framework developed in the
first part to the specific case of the counterjihad movement. Chapter 5 draws on
online social network analysis, analysis of key websites and organisational literatures,
interview data and scholarly literature to provide an overview of the counterjihad,
its political geography, its key organisational and tactical repertoires, and its main
international networks. The chapter argues that the counterjihad can be viewed as
a transnational social movement, with a division of labour between its intellectual,
16
political and activist ‘wings’. The chapter examines first the European and then the
North American sides of themovement, before turning to consider the political spaces
in which activists from different national backgrounds have encountered one another.
Finally, the chapter discusses the political influence that the movement has been able
to wield. Throughout the chapter, the organisational and political eclecticism of the
movement are emphasised.
The following three chapters explore the shared narratives that have enabled the
heterogeneous group of organisations and individuals described in chapter 5 to view
themselves as part of a common political project.
Chapter 6 explores the dystopian narrative of Western civilizational crisis, decline
and impending capitulation to ‘Islamisation’ that has come to be shared across a broad
spectrum of groups in Europe andNorth America. First, the key intellectual resources
for this narrative are critically explored, as is the sociopolitical context within which
it has emerged. The chapter goes on to discuss the key elements of the narrative, in-
cluding its apocalyptic visions of ethnoreligious civil war, and its diagnoses of cultural
capitulation to ‘Islamisation’ and of demographic submersion under a rising ‘green
tide’. In the language of social movement theory, this chapter corresponds to the task
of ‘diagnostic framing’ that is a necessary component of all collective political action
(Benford and Snow, 2000): before blame can be attributed or solutions proposed,
a political problem must first be identified (although the priority involved here is a
logical and not necessarily a temporal one).
Chapter 7 explores the conspiratorial narratives that seek to explain the predic-
ament diagnosed in the previous chapter. It will be argued that there are at least
three, overlapping conspiracy theories circulating within the counterjihad: the trans-
formation of Europe into ‘Eurabia’ as a deliberate project of European elites and the
Arab-Muslim world; the idea of a Muslim Brotherhood ‘Project’ to infiltrate major
US political institutions through a ‘stealth jihad’; and finally the discourse of ‘cultural
Marxism’, which alleges leftist infiltration of key cultural institutions including the
mass media and the academy. The first two of these are specific to the counterji-
had, whilst the third, which is derivative of the Nazi idea of Kulturbolschewismus or
‘cultural Bolshevism’, is shared much more widely within the far right. Moreover,
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these narratives circulate within a wider, extremely fertile conspiracist milieu that in-
cludes, for instance, ‘birtherism’, but also theories of greater longevity such as the ‘New
World Order’. The chapter situates the counterjihadist narratives within a broader US
conspiracist tradition: what Richard Hofstadter famously termed the ‘paranoid style’
(Hofstadter, 1996). In the language of the social movement literature, this chapter
corresponds to the task of problem ‘attribution’: of identifying those responsible for
the political predicament that has been diagnosed (Benford and Snow, 2000).
Chapter 8 examines the compensatory political imperatives to which these dia-
gnoses and attributions give rise. The chapter argues that the counterjihad is engaged
in a novel ‘countermodern’ political project, one that has affinities with older coun-
termodern philosophies (classical Fascism, Nazism, Revolutionary Conservatism, the
New Right) but is not a simple continuation of any of these. The chapter examines
the logic of this political project: its mobilising myths, its main performative reper-
toires and its potentiality for violence. In the language of social movement theory,
this chapter corresponds to the tasks of ‘prognostic’ and ‘motivational’ framing: of ar-
ticulating solutions and mobilising people for ameliorative action (Benford and Snow,
2000).
The concluding chapter, chapter 9, returns to consider the question raised earlier
in this introduction, of the meaning and relevance of the term ‘fascism’ in times and
spaces remote from the interwar European regimes andmovements for which the term
was originally coined. It will be argued that both Marxist (structuralist) and liberal
(culturalist) approaches to ‘fascism’ are analytically insufficient, and that neither is
capable of apprehending the complex political realignments unfolding on the far right
today. A new approach will be proposed, and the salience of ‘fascism’ and the nature
of the ‘fascism-producing crisis’ will be reconsidered in this context.
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Part I
Contexts
19
Chapter 2
Working in the ‘Grey Zone’: a note on
methodology
The world described in the introduction to this thesis seems very different to the one
in which I began this research project in October 2013. At that time, America’s first
black president, Barack Obama, was a few months into his second term, having won a
convincing victory over the Republican Mitt Romney in November the previous year.
Donald Trump was best known as a reality TV star who occasionally used his media
profile to amplify ‘Birtherist’ scepticism about the legitimacy of Obama’s presidency,
and was hardly considered a viable political candidate even by conservatives. Very
few people had heard of a movement called the ‘Alt-Right’. On the other side of the
Atlantic, David Cameron governed the UK as part of a coalition with the Europhile
Liberal Democrats, and the prospect of the UK holding a referendum on its mem-
bership of the European Union, much less voting to leave, seemed fanciful. The acute
phase of the so-called ‘migrant crisis’ stemming from the increased flow of refugees
from Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Eritrea and elsewhere seeking sanctuary in Europe, still lay
nearly two years in the future. Narendra Modi, who had spent his formative political
years in the Hindu fundamentalist RSS, was still some months away from becoming
primeminister of India. AlQaedawas in retreat, much of its leadership in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, including its founder Osama bin Laden, having been killed. ISIS had
yet to lay claim to leadership of the international salafi-jihadist movement by declaring
a global ‘caliphate’. Moreover, the threat of anti-civilian violence by these groups in
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Europe and North America had seemed to be receding. Whilst the impetus for un-
dertaking this research was, in part, a vague sense that something ugly was bubbling
away beneath the surface of liberal democratic politics, the political realignments that
have unfolded during the research process have been rapid and difficult to anticipate.
I first became interested in this area whilst studying for an MA at Birkbeck Col-
lege, University of London, between 2011 and 2013. As part of that course in Culture,
Diaspora and Ethnicity, I read several articles on the English Defence League, at that
time a comparatively new phenomenon. Struck by the visible presence of Israeli and
rainbow flags on EDL demonstrations, symbols that sat somewhat awkwardly with
characterisations of the group as ‘fascist’, I decided to make the EDL’s engagement
with queer politics the subject of my MA thesis. During the course of that research,
it quickly became clear that the presence of an LGBT division within the EDL was
not solely propagandistic as I had first suspected, even if the EDL’s understanding
of queer politics was rather different to that of the mainstream LGBT movement.
Whilst it was not the focus of my research, it was clear that the same was true of the
Jewish division. These divisions were among the EDL’s most active, especially online.
Moreover the volume of discussion of ideas, tactics and strategies in non-public-facing
online spaces made it very unlikely that they existed purely for show.
What also struck me during the course of that research was the extent to which
the EDL and groups like it were networked across national borders, and the extent
to which they were making use of new media technologies such as blogs, Facebook
and Twitter. These tendencies had been documented by academic observers of the far
right for some time (e.g. Back, Keith, and Solomos, 1996; Back, 2002b), and they only
seemed to be growing. However, it also became clear that there was a large and im-
portant gap in the literature. Discussions of growing ‘Islamophobia’ tended to operate
at a discursive or ideological level, with the growth of organised anti-Muslim activ-
ism featuring only tangentially, if at all (e.g. Allen, 2010; Runnymede Trust, 1997).
Moreover, where the literature did discuss organised anti-Muslim activism, it tended
to do so either at an organisational or national level, with an individual group (the
EDL) or a single country (the UK) taken as the unit of analysis (e.g. Allen, 2011).
Strikingly absent was a developed literature on what, it seemed to me, we were seeing:
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the emergence of a transnational anti-Muslim social movement. Consequently, there
was a dearth of analysis of the emergent political networks, or the intellectual and
material resources being mobilised. This has changed somewhat over the interven-
ing years (see e.g. Berntzen and Sandberg, 2014; Bhatt, 2012; Denes, 2012; Ekman,
2015; Gardell, 2014; Hafez, 2014), although I would argue that it is still a relatively
understudied area. Consequently, I decided that I wanted to pursue this line of re-
search further, and enrolled on the doctoral programme in Sociology at the London
School of Economics.
This thesis, which is the product of my doctoral research, moves away from the
narrow focus of my earlier interest in the EDL, and seeks to explore the broader ‘coun-
terjihad’ movement of which the EDL was an important, but relatively short-lived,
part. The thesis explores the shared narratives that have enabled a heterogeneous group
of organisations and activists from quite different national contexts to view themselves
as part of a common political project. It examines the movement’s key discursive, aes-
thetic, organisational and tactical repertoires. In doing so, it seeks to answer a core
research question: how should we understand the transnational ‘counterjihad’ in so-
ciological terms? In particular, I wanted to explore whether the tempting analogies
with historical racisms and fascisms were genuinely useful ones, or whether theymight
limit our understanding of important ideological and organisational transformations
that are better theorised in their own terms.
To attempt to understand the complex realignments unfolding within the con-
temporary EuroAmerican political right is inevitably to enter what the sociologist
Les Back has called ‘the grey zone’, borrowing a phrase from the Italian chemist and
Auschwitz survivor, Primo Levi (Levi, 1988; Back, 2002a). It might be argued that
since the publication of Back’s stimulating reflections on his experience of interview-
ing former British National Party (BNP) leader Nick Griffin during the early 1990s,
some of the ‘greyness’ has in fact dissipated and been replaced by starker polarities
of black and white. For instance, one important recent development is undoubtedly
the reassertion of avowedly racist and anti-Semitic ideologies, ones that openly associ-
ate themselves with interwar fascism and Nazism. However, in other respects things
have, if anything, become even murkier. For instance, one quite different but equally
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striking tendency has been the disavowal of ‘classical’ fascism and biological racism
by some parts of the far right, and their appropriation of the languages of secularism,
democracy, human rights, womens’ rights and gay rights, of which the EDL’s LGBT
division is a prime example.
The complexities of the contemporary terrain for researchers as well as for anti-
racist activists are perhaps best illustrated by way of some specific examples, drawn
from the UK context. When the EDL mobilised against the East London Mosque,
parts of the British anti-fascist movement mobilised counterdemonstrations in sup-
port of the mosque, which is linked to the Islamic Forum of Europe (IFE) and the
far-right Jamaat-e-Islami, a political party implicated in war crimes in Bangladesh
during the Liberation War (Bhatt, 2012). Much of the street-level opposition to the
EDL was mobilised by Unite Against Fascism (UAF), which has close links to the
Socialist Workers Party (SWP), an organisation considered anathema by many on
the British political left, not least for its recent failure to adequately investigate alleg-
ations of rape made by a member against one of its senior officials. UAF’s leadership
has included a number of figures who have histories of association with the Islamic
religious far right, and the group has co-organised events with the IFE. On one oc-
casion, a small number of UAF supporters joined a counterdemonstration organised
by the now-proscribed Islamist group Muslims Against Crusades, against the secu-
larist group One Law For All (OLFA). OLFA was formed in 2008 by the Iranian-
born huam rights activist Maryam Namazie to oppose gender-based discrimination
in Sharia and other religious courts. OLFA claims to have received no reply to a letter
sent to UAF demanding an explanation, a silence that OLFA took to mean ‘that UAF
is willing to ally itself with Islamists if Muslims are threatened by the EDL’ (Miller,
2013, p. 56).
More recently, in 2015, the British anti-fascist organisationHope notHate, which
is distinct from and sometimes critical of UAF, published a report on the counterjihad
movement. Among other things, the report drew attention to the presence within
counterjihad networks of some heterodox Muslim figures, who variously described
themselves as ‘ex’, ‘former’, ‘secular’, ‘non-observant’ Muslims, ‘apostates’ and the
like. Hope not Hate was subsequently accused by Maajid Nawaz of the Quilliam
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Foundation of conflating anti-Muslim racism with legitimate criticism of Islam, and
of endangering reformist Muslim voices (many of them, Nawaz noted, non-white
and female) by associating them with the anti-Muslim far right.1 Quilliam, a self-
described ‘counter-extremism organisation’, had in 2013 facilitated the departure of
Stephen Lennon from the EDL, along with his deputy Kevin Carroll, despite its ex-
pertise lying in the area of Islamism and its lack of previous experience working with
ex-members of the far right. It later transpired that Quilliam had made a number
of financial contributions to Lennon in the context of his departure from the EDL,
despite it quickly becoming clear that he had not changed his political beliefs. In re-
sponse to Nawaz’s criticisms, Hope not Hate removed one of the individuals named
in the report, but otherwise rejected his accusations as disingenuous.
Both examples raise important terminological and methodological issues: how,
in a rapidly changing and contentious area of politics, where terminology is fiercely
contested, can we begin to define the object of study or delimit the boundaries of a
research project? One of the issues at stake is the meaning and relevance of the term
‘fascism’ when applied to phenomena remote in time and space from Mussolinian
Italy, Hitlerite Germany and the other interwar European regimes and movements
that the term historically described. OLFA’s charge against UAF was essentially that
it had a narrow, Eurocentric understanding of ‘fascism’ and the ‘far right’, and that
its ‘anti-fascism’ was consequently of a highly selective variety, as evidenced by UAF’s
willingness to form alliances with authoritarian and anti-democratic representatives of
theMuslim community to whom the term ‘fascism’ might at least arguably be applied.
In contrast, the charges levelled at Hope not Hate illustrate the potential risks of
more expansive understandings. One of the criticisms made of their report was that
their criteria for defining the ‘counterjihad movement’ or the ‘anti-Muslim far right’
were highly subjective, and that the reasons for including certain organisations and
individuals (especially heterodox Muslim figures) were unclear.2
The approach I have taken in this thesis began from an ‘emic’ perspective, by try-
ing to identify the boundaries of the counterjihad network that were perceived as real
1http://www.thedailybeast.com/the-lefts-witch-hunt-against-muslims [Last accessed 26th
September 2017].
2Ibid.
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by movement participants. Scott (2013) describes this as a ‘realist’ approach to ap-
prehending a social network, as opposed to a ‘nominalist’ one where the boundaries
are defined using a formal criterion pre-determined by the researcher. I started the
research online, using social network analysis to map out the online counterjihad mi-
lieu. This is an approach that has increasingly been found to be useful in studies of
the far right (and other communities) online (see e.g. Caiani and Wagemann, 2009;
Caiani and Parenti, 2013; Lee, 2015). From an initial ‘seed set’ of known counterjihad
websites, web crawler software was used to map outbound hyperlinks to other sites,
thereby discovering new online spaces and new organisations. As the online social
network analysis progressed, I conducted a qualitative analysis of the sites thus dis-
covered. In parallel, I approached an initial set of known counterjihad activists for
interview. Qualitative interviewing has been an effective approach in the study of
far-right movements, allowing participants to explain their beliefs and motivations in
their own terms (e.g. Blee, 2002; Goodwin, 2011). In addition, these knowledgeable
informants were asked to identify other movement participants and further potential
interviewees (‘snowballing’).
As the research progressed, I shifted to more of an ‘etic’ perspective. In order
not to privilege the perspective of counterjihad movement insiders, I also approached
movement antagonists for interview, including anti-racist and anti-fascist activists.
At the same time, I immersed myself in the academic secondary literature on the
contemporary and historical far right, looking for both continuities and discontinu-
ities between the counterjihad and other movements. I also conducted archival re-
search at the archives of the anti-fascist magazine Searchlight, based at the University
of Northampton,3 to better understand how Islam and Muslims had figured in far-
right discourses prior to the emergence of the counterjihad. These archives include
historical issues of Searchlight, as well as literatures produced by far-right parties and
movements. Throughout the research process, I developed my analysis in an iterat-
ive and dialogical way, testing my interpretations and constructions against those of
people active within the field.
The resulting thesis is a historically and comparatively informed qualitative case
3http://library.northampton.ac.uk/archive/?p=collections/controlcard&id=14
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study of the counterjihad movement. A quantitative approach, using a statistically
representative survey of counterjihadists would not have been possible because the
‘population’ is not known. The counterjihad is a loose and evolving network of organ-
isations and individuals spanning multiple countries across several continents. Many
of the organisations that are part of the movement are non-membership organisations
with transient, ephemeral and overlapping support bases, and grassroots organisations
often have a relatively short life-cycle. In addition, due to the contentious nature of
the field of political action in which they are engaged, some activists choose not to
disclose their identities or the nature of their involvement with the movement.
The remainder of this chapter elaborates in more detail on the methods used, the
characteristics of the research participants and field sites, and the ethical decisions I
have made.
The online social network analysis, which formed the starting point for my analysis,
was developed in an iterative process over a period of two years. After experimenting
with a number of different software applications, I eventually selected VOSON4 for
the webcrawl. VOSON (Virtual Observatory for the Study of Online Networks) is
a web-based data collection and processing service developed by the Research School
of Social Sciences at The Australian National University. The VOSON service com-
prises a web crawler that crawls ‘seed sites’ entered by the user, discovering hyperlinks
between these and other sites. Whilst VOSON offers some in-built network analysis
functions, it also allows data to be exported to more powerful external network ana-
lysis software. I found VOSON to be superior to many similar applications, because
it can crawl to a greater page ‘depth’ and because it is compatible with a wide range of
third-party social network analysis tools.
Peer-reviewed secondary literature was used to select relevant counterjihad seed
sites. Given the contentious nature of the research area, I deliberately avoided using
partisan sources to identify seed sites, such as activist reports by movement parti-
cipants or antagonists. I restricted the selection to peer-reviewed articles from aca-
demic journals, and only included organisations and web spaces that were mentioned
in more than one article. However, due to the length of the academic peer-review
4http://www.uberlink.com/
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and publication process, some new organisations had emerged since these articles had
been written. Consequently, a small number of additional seed sites were added at my
discretion. These included, for instance, websites of splinter groups that had formed
in the interim, but also included one major new organisation, Pegida. This resulted in
an initial seed set of 37 sites.
These seed sites were inputted to VOSON, and an exploratory crawl was initiated
on 28th July 2016 and completed the same day. The new sites discovered through
the crawl were analysed in order to identify further potential seed sites for a second
iteration of the crawl (‘snowballing’). In the first instance, new sites that had fewer
than two links to one of the sites in the initial seed set were excluded. This was done to
ensure that potential additional seed sites were considered valid by a minimum of two
of the original seed sites. Further sites were removed that would clearly be unsuitable
as seeds, for instance websites of software providers such as Adobe, online retailers
such as Amazon, and major news outlets like the BBC or CNN. The remaining new
sites, 34 in total, were added to the 37 original seeds, and the expanded seed set of 71
sites was used as the basis for a second iteration of the webcrawl.
The second and final crawl, with the expanded seed set of 71 sites, was launched on
31st July 2016 and completed the same day. This resulted in a network of 5,645 sites,
which would have been too large for a single researcher to analyse and would have been
likely to suffer from ‘topic drift’ (Ackland, 2011). In order to arrive at a network of a
size that could be realistically analysed, the results were again filtered to exclude sites
that had fewer than two links to sites in the (expanded) seed set, resulting in 4,558
sites being excluded. Each of the remaining 1,087 sites was then individually and
manually inspected. Non-English-language websites were excluded from the analysis
unless they could be positively identified from counterjihadmovement sources or from
secondary academic literature. Other websites were placed in one of three categories:
1. Counterjihad movement actors. Entities for whom resisting ‘Islamisation’ (or
‘creeping sharia’, the ‘stealth jihad’ or the like) is their sole or major reason for
being.
2. Counterjihad supporters, enablers and sympathisers. Entities for whom res-
isting ‘Islamisation’ is not their sole or principal reason for being, but which
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have supported counterjihad organisations, for example by providing resources,
platforms or sympathetic commentary.
3. Other. Entities not falling into either of the above categories.
Various factors were taken into account in placing entities within one of these cat-
egories: the entity’s self-described purpose (the ‘about us’ or ‘who we are’ section on
its website); the perception of the entity by other movement participants and ant-
agonists; the volume of counterjihad-related material on its website; the presence of
‘friendly’ links to other counterjihad websites; and, if the entity also has an offline
presence, whether it has been active in key movement networks, events and the like.
Data from interviews with counterjihad movement participants and antagonists were
considered alongside the website analysis during the classification process.
Counterjihad movement actors (i.e. entities placed in category 1 above) were fur-
ther classified by organisational type (political parties, research and advocacy organisa-
tions, political movements, blogs and other online spaces, and individuals). The sup-
porters, enablers and sympathisers category (i.e. category 2 above) has been further
disaggregated according to their field of activity (the main ones being: conservative
media, heterodox Muslims, national security and counterterrorism, pro-Israel, reli-
gious right, nativist and anti-immigrant, white nationalist and far right, right-wing
blogs, and conspiracy theorists). Organisations placed in category 3 were excluded
from the analysis at this stage. A complete list of websites analysed can be found at
Annex A. Category 1 organisations (counterjihad) are listed in table A.1 and category
2 entities (supporters, enablers and sympathisers) are listed in table A.2.
The resulting network was analysed using NodeXL, an open-source plugin for
Microsoft Excel.5 NodeXL is a data mining, analysis and visualization tool, which
enables users to calculate various social network analysis metrics for any set of re-
lational data. Key metrics calculated included measures of network cohesion (e.g.
‘density’ and ‘average distance’) and measures of importance or prestige for different
sites within the network (e.g. ‘indegree’ and ‘betweenness centrality’). These metrics,
their significance, and how they should be interpreted are discussed in more detail in
chapter 5, where the results of the social network analysis are presented.
5https://nodexl.codeplex.com/
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The online social network analysis was used as the basis for an analysis of coun-
terjihad movement literature. Organisations and online spaces placed in category 1
as described above were accessed and their ‘canonical’ materials (party manifestos,
mission statements, aims and objectives, etc.) were downloaded. Blogs and similar
online spaces did not always have a manifesto, mission statement or equivalent, but
most identified key entries or webpages that described the agenda, purpose or ideology
of that particular online space. In the few cases that did not, the site’s homepage was
taken as the unit of analysis. In total, 418 web pages were downloaded and analysed
from 97 separate sites.
The materials downloaded from online spaces were imported into NVIVO,6 a
qualitative data analysis software package. Within NVIVO, the data were analysed
using thematic analysis to identify key themes. Initial codes were generated by looking
for words or phrases indigenous to the counterjihad discourse, for instance ‘Islamisa-
tion’, as well as recurring topics and ideas. These initial codes were then aggregated
into higher level ‘themes’. Emerging themes were kept under review as the research
progressed, and their number gradually winnowed down through the development of
‘integrative’ and ‘overarching’ themes as recommended by Saldana (2016).
The qualitative interviews add depth and richness to my analysis of political net-
works and organisational literatures. Since the aim was not to construct a represent-
ative sample of counterjihadists or their political opponents (something that would
in any case be impossible, since, as I have already noted, in neither case do we know
the ‘population’), I purposively selected an initial ‘seed set’ of interviewees who were
involved in organising or networking within counterjihad circles. Some of these had
also been involved in grassroots activism. These interviewees were asked to suggest
additional participants (‘snowballing’), which most, but not all, did. Further inter-
viewees were also identified using emerging data from the online social network ana-
lysis. Similarly, when recruiting interviewees from within anti-racist and civil rights
communities, I purposively selected people with specific experience of monitoring or
organising against counterjihad groups. Again, these interviewees were asked to sug-
gest other prospective interviewees.
6http://www.qsrinternational.com/product
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Before interviews could commence, I had to seek approval from the LSEResearch
Ethics Committee in line with the School’s Research Ethics Policy. As part of this,
I had to consider the process for obtaining informed consent from research parti-
cipants, how to minimise potential risks associated with the research, and processes
for ensuring confidentiality. I prepared a short, one-page research statement with in-
formation about the project in non-technical language (included as Annex B). This
included details of the project funding body and some brief biographical information.
Due to the contentious nature of the research area, and the possibility that potential
participants might be reluctant to engage with an academic researcher, I considered
it of paramount importance to ensure that interviewees felt confident about particip-
ating in the research and able to speak freely to me. Consequently, I decided to offer
interviewees the choice of speaking to me ‘on’ or ‘off ’ the record. I also decided to
allow interviewees to choose the interview medium and setting that they were most
comfortable with (in person, Skype, phone, email). Interviews took place in public
settings, workplaces and interviewees’ homes. Interviews (except those conducted by
email) were recorded with the interviewee’s consent. Consent was obtained either
in writing or verbally and, if given verbally, recorded and included in the interview
transcript.
The initial approach to interviewees was made by email. I introduced myself as
a doctoral student researching the emergence and development of anti-Jihad, anti-
Sharia and anti-halal movements in Europe and North America. I explained that the
purpose of the research was to explore how these newmovements can be understood in
sociological terms, and that I was particularly interested in: their aims and objectives,
activists’ and supporters’ motivations for getting involved, how groups are organised
and the relations between them, and how their political and ideological orientations
might be characterised. A copy of the research statement was appended to the email.
These approaches were met with mixed responses. In general, I was surprised at
how willing people were to speak to me, although some prospective interviewees were
(understandably) keen to know more about the research before agreeing to take part.
Several people were quite generous with their time, and a couple went out of their
way to assist me, for instance by sending me resources or putting me in touch with
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other activists, despite clearly realising that I did not share their political beliefs. In
only one case did someone (a very prominent counterjihad activist) take the trouble
to write back and explain in no uncertain terms why he would not be taking part in
my research project: because it was inevitable, in his view, that I would try to smear
him as a ‘racist’ and a ‘fascist’. More often, if people did not want to take part, they
simply did not respond.
Interviews were semi-structured and based on a topic guide. I wanted to give my
interviewees latitude to discuss their beliefs and motivations, but there was also some
core information that I wanted to get out of each interview. Core topics covered with
all interviewees included:
• their organisational or group affiliations;
• their role within their organisation or group;
• their motivations for getting involved;
• the aims and objectives of their activism;
• who they saw as the key actors within the area of study; and
• who else they would recommend that I speak to as part of the research.
Given the heterogeneity of the individual research participants and the organisations
they represented, questions had to be adapted to make them relevant.
Getting interviewees to talk freely was not as difficult as I had feared, and the
interview data I have collected are very rich. This is likely to be in part because I am
white and male, and it would have been much harder to conduct this research had I
been non-white or female. The main barrier I had to overcome was suspicion of me
as an academic researcher. As we will see in subsequent chapters, there is a strong
anti-intellectualist current within the far right and a deep suspicion of universities,
perceived as left-leaning institutions. These suspicions were occasionally articulated
by interviewees, as will be seen in the interview data presented in later chapters.
Interviews were transcribed, imported into NVIVO, and analysed using the same
approach (thematic analysis) applied to the movement literature. Although many in-
terviewees had been happy to speak ‘on the record’, I eventually took the decision
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Description Location Gender Interviewmedium
1 Counterjihad street movement activist and organiser UK Female Phone
2 Party political activist UK Male Phone
3 Counterjihad blogger and activist US Male Email
4 Counterjihad blogger and activist US Female Email
5 Counterjihad street movement activist and organiser UK Male In person
6 Counterjihad activist and politician UK Female Phone
7 Party political activist (counterjihad sympathiser) UK Male In person
8 Politician (counterjihad enabler) UK Female In person
9 Anti-fascist activist UK Male In person
10 Counterjihad blogger UK Male Phone
11 Counterjihad blogger US Male Email
12 Anti-fascist activist UK Male In person
13 Civil rights activist US Male Skype
14 Anti-fascist activist UK Male In person
15 Civil rights activist US Male Skype
16 Counterjihad activist / group spokesperson US Male Skype
17 Blogger (non-counterjihad) US Male Skype
18 Muslim civil rights activist US Male Phone
Table 2.1: Details of research participants.
during the writing-up process to anonymise all the interview data. This decision was
taken in the context of a changing political climate, especially over the final twelve
months of the project. I felt that the risks associated with participating in the research
may potentially have changed, but it would not have been practicable to re-contact
all interviewees to confirm how their data should be used. Since some interviewees
had requested anonymity in any case, I decided that the simplest approach was to an-
onymise all of the interview data. In addition to being anonymised, transcript excerpts
quoted in the thesis have also been lightly edited for readability.
Information about the interviewees is set out in table 2.1. Of the eighteen people
interviewed, nine were actively involved in counterjihad organisations and can there-
fore be unambiguously placed in category 1 as described in the previous section (in-
terviewees 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11 and 16). Three might best be described as supporters,
enablers or sympathisers of the counterjihad and therefore belong in category 2 above
(interviewees 7, 8 and 17). The remaining six can be characterised as movement ant-
agonists (interviewees 9, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 18). Due to the decision to anonymise
all interview data, and the relatively small and tight-knit nature of some of the groups
and networks within the field of study, I have had to be selective with the information
included in table 2.1.
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Description Location Date
1 English Defence League demonstration Dudley 7th February 2015
2 Pegida UK demonstration Newcastle 28th February 2015
3 Britain First High Court injunction hearing London 26th June 2015
4 Britain First demonstration Luton 27th June 2015
5 Pegida UK ‘silent walk’ Birmingham 6th February 2016
6 Britain First counterprotest, UN Anti-Racism Day London 19th March 2016
7 English Defence League demonstration London 16th July 2016
Table 2.2: Details of observation sites.
The combination of social network analysis, thematic analysis of organisational lit-
eratures, and qualitative interviews with activists reflects my primary research interest
in the counterjihad as a transnational political movement and the shared narratives
that hold together heterogeneous actors from a variety of different national and or-
ganisational backgrounds. Whilst I have not set out to produce an ethnography of
grassroots counterjihad activism, I did take the opportunity to observe a limited num-
ber of public events by UK counterjihad organisations in order to explore the possible
connections between the thematic content of organisational literatures and interview
transcripts, and the forms of political action, modes of congregation, routines and
rituals of grassroots activist groups. I have compared my own observations and field-
notes with published ethnographies of grassroots counterjihad activism (e.g. Busher,
2016; Pilkington, 2016).
Themain grassroots counterjihad organisations active in the UK during the period
of study were the English Defence League and the UK Pegida movement. A third
organisation, the political party and activist movement Britain First, has also been
active within the same political space, but, as we will see in later chapters, Britain
First is somewhat distinct as it has organisational and ideological links to the Brit-
ish neo-Nazi milieu and is considered ‘fringe’ or ‘too far right’ by other parts of the
counterjihad movement. However, the discourse and activities of Britain First offer
a useful point of comparison and contrast with those of the EDL and Pegida UK. I
carried out overt observation of seven public events by these groups between February
2015 and July 2016. Six of these events were public protests. The seventh was a court
hearing relating to a police application to ban a proposed event by one of the groups.
Information about the events observed is set out in table 2.2.
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‘Overt’ observation in this context does not mean that I could disclose my identity
as a researcher to everyone present in the public spaces where these events were held.
In some cases, the events took place in spaces with thousands of people in them, in-
cluding demonstrators, counterdemonstrators, police and members of the public. In-
stead, I have taken ‘overt’ demonstration to mean two things. First, I confined myself
to recording data concerning the ‘primary action’ (modes of congregation, speeches,
group rituals, organisational symbols) and aggregate data (numbers of protestors, the
age, gender and ethnicity of the crowd, modes of dress), all of which can be considered
part of the public performance. I did not record any potentially identifying data about
individual participants. Secondly, where I interacted with event participants, I en-
sured that I disclosed my identity as an academic researcher early on in the conver-
sation, so that the person could make an informed decision about whether they were
willing to speak to me. Some were, but many were not. ‘I don’t want to speak to
anyone from a university’, was a response that I had on more than one occasion.
Finally, I spent several days in the Searchlight archives at the University of
Northampton. The reason for doing this was to better understand how the far right (in
a UK context at least) was oriented towards Islam and Muslims in the years immedi-
ately prior to the emergence of the counterjihad. The main far-right organisation act-
ive at that time was the British National Party whose key publications, the magazines
Identity and Spearhead, I read from the late 1990s until the mid-to-late 2000s. The
material obtained from these archives is interwoven with secondary literature as part
of the genealogy presented in chapter 4.
One of the key limitations of the research is a linguistic one. Contemporary anti-
Muslim mobilisations inherently transcend national and linguistic boundaries, and I
am not competent in all of the languages spoken by activists within these movements.
Whilst this has resulted in an inevitable bias towards the Anglophone counterjihad
movement (the US and the UK) the restriction of my research to English-language
materials is not as much of a limitation as it might first seem. English is the lingua
franca of the counterjihad movement, and many websites outside the US and the UK
have English-language versions, or at least have key materials translated into Eng-
lish. Consequently, whilst the interview data is Anglo-American, and the observa-
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tions are confined to the UK, the online research partly offsets this bias. In total, I
have examined counterjihad websites from fourteen different countries (the UK, US,
Canada, France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Den-
mark, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Australia).
Conclusion
The subject of this thesis - the contemporary transnational mobilisation against Islam
and Muslims - is a vast, amorphous and complex one that has evolved significantly
over the period of study, and I cannot claim to have apprehended all aspects of it.
However, the approach I have taken, starting with online social network analysis, has
enabled me to identify the key organisational and individual actors operating within
this field and the relationships between them, whilst the qualitative interviews and
analysis of movement literature has enabled me to identify the key ideological and
discursive repertoires being mobilised.
Before we turn to the results of my analysis of the counterjihad in Part II of this
thesis, the next two chapters set out the theoretical framework and historical context
within which it should be viewed. It is to the theoretical framework that we turn first.
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Chapter 3
‘The Appeals of Heredity’: on
countermodernisms and political
theologies
In this chapter I develop the key theoretical concepts of ‘countermodernism’ and
‘political theology’ that I will later use to apprehend the counterjihad movement.
Countermodern political theologies aremodern in the full temporal sense of that term,
inasmuch as they involve a critical or reflective relationship towards a present, typic-
ally seen as a moment of crisis and decline, that they seek to transform and overcome
in a revivified future. They are countermodern inasmuch as their image of that future
is based on a mythic past that may be partly real or wholly imagined. Hence, what
is involved is a specific reactionary inflection of the temporality of modernity. Coun-
termodernism is therefore distinct from antimodernism: what is involved is not so
much a return to a premodern past, as a recourse to (what are taken to be) its guiding
values and ideals, which become the basis for a future-oriented politics. A key char-
acteristic of countermodernism is the fusion of technological modernity with forms
of political premodernity, faith, superstition and anti-rationalism. Implicit in this is
a (re-)sacralisation or (re-)mythologisation of politics.
The term ‘political theology’ is consequently used to designate phenomena that
confound the conceptual distinction and practical separation of ‘religion’ and ‘politics’
that is typically assumed by democratic politics and secular social science. There is
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now a growing literature that seeks to apprehend fascism, Nazism and related phe-
nomena as ‘political religions’ (e.g. Gentile, 1990, 2005; Vondung, 2005). I prefer the
term ‘political theology’ to the alternative ‘political religion’ for two reasons. First, the
separation of ‘religion’ from ‘politics’, and the relegation of the former to the private
or personal sphere, are specific to Western modernity and consequences of Enlight-
enment secularism and rationalism. The hybrid term ‘political religion’ may seem to
imply that it is their fusion in some political movements that is anomalous and which
calls for explanation, when from a broader historical perspective it is their assumed
separation that may seem unusual. Second, as will become clear, my usage of the
term is heavily influenced by the work of Carl Schmitt, so I retain his term in order to
make this debt explicit. Specifically, I am indebted to Schmitt’s thesis of a structural
correspondence between a society’s theological and metaphysical image of the world
on the one hand, and its characteristic forms of political organisation on the other
(Schmitt, 1985).
In this chapter I will argue that the reactionary inflection of the temporality of
modernity inherent to countermodern political theologies involves a conception of
time as governed by fate, insofar as the exercise of human agency in the present is
subordinated to determinations of the future (the site of imminent disaster) and the
past (mythologised as one of safety and security). For Emmanuel Levinas, writing
in 1934, the notion of fate - ‘a burning feeling of natural powerlessness... in the face
of time’ - was central to understanding what he called the ‘philosophy of Hitlerism’
(Levinas, 1990b, p. 65). Nazism was, for Levinas, a resurgent form of pagan religi-
osity that threatened both liberal and Christian universalism. Crucially, for Levinas,
the opposition between liberal or Christian universalism and the racist particularism
of Nazism was not fundamental, but rather the derived form of a deeper opposition
between two different conceptions of the temporal structure of reality. The basic form
of paganism, according to Levinas, is the intuition that time is governed by imper-
sonal fate. The basic form of monotheism (of which Levinas regarded liberalism as
a modern, secularised form) is the intuition that time is governed by subjective free-
dom. In the first conception, the individual subject is bound by fate to a particular
culture and particular territory, whereas the second conception anticipates the eman-
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cipation of the subject from ties of tradition and kinship and its entry into a universal,
cosmopolitan political order.
Building on Levinas’ argument, I will argue that the ‘attitude of countermodern-
ity’, of which the racial paganism of Nazism was an especially radical form, constitutes
a specific affective response to what the historian of religion, Mircea Eliade, has called
the ‘terror of history’ (Eliade, 1954). I will develop this idea with special reference to
three exemplary ‘countermodern’ thinkers: Oswald Spengler, Martin Heidegger and
Carl Schmitt. They are in many ways quite different thinkers, although considera-
tion of their specific differences can also help to foreground their affinities. Schmitt
and Spengler were closely associated with the ‘conservative revolution’, an intellectual
movement that flourished in Weimar Germany and whose key characteristic was, ac-
cording to Jeffrey Herf, ‘the embrace of modern technology by German thinkers who
rejected Enlightenment reason’ and ‘the political values of the French Revolution’ (the
‘Spirit of 1789’) (Herf, 1984, p. 1). As against the then-prevailing antimodernism of
the German right, exemplified by the völkischmovement, the conservative revolution-
aries argued thatGermany could not be culturally strongwhilst also remaining techno-
logically backward. Their key achievement, claims Herf, was to transpose technology
from the semantic world of an alien, Western Zivilization (associated with Enlight-
enment rationalism, universalism, egalitarianism and scientism), into an organic com-
ponent of GermanKultur (associated with uniqueness, spontaneity and individuality),
a fusion encapsulated in Joseph Goebbels’ phrase, ‘steellike romanticism’. Hence, the
conservative revolution was instrumental in laying the political ground for Nazism by
effecting a reconciliation of technology and unreason (Herf, 1984, pp. 2-3).
Besides Schmitt and Spengler, other key figures of the conservative revolution in-
cluded Hans Freyer, Ernst Jünger, Werner Sombart, Edgar Julius Jung, and Arthur
Moeller van den Bruck, who coined the phrase ‘The Third Reich’. Heidegger was
a more ambiguous figure. He did not share the conservative revolutionaries’ enthu-
siasm for modern technology, but he did share their view that the existing society
was not worth conserving, that what needed to be ‘conserved’ had already been lost
and must be created anew, and he consequently shared their hopes for a Germanic
spiritual rebirth. One thing that unites the three figures considered in this chapter,
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and which they also share with Hitler and the Nazis, is an apocalyptic vision of the
world-historical situation as one of crisis, decline and impending catastrophe.
Schmitt and Heidegger both joined the Nazi party in May 1933. Schmitt became
president of the National Socialist Jurists Association in November that year and pub-
lished a number of works supportive of Nazism (Strong, 2005). Heidegger enthusi-
astically supported National Socialism during his rectorship of Freiburg University
from April 1933 to February 1934, and made a number of speeches supporting Hitler
during this time, most famously his ‘Rectorship Address’ of 27th May 1933 entitled
‘The Self Assertion of the German University’ (Heidegger, 1993b). Heidegger later
became disillusioned with Nazism and eventually came to see it as one of the symp-
toms of the modernist disease to which he had thought it was the antidote, although
he was never moved to apologise for his political entanglement. Spengler, by contrast,
had an antagonistic relationship with the Nazi party due to his undiluted elitism and
open disdain for mass movements, and died in 1936 long before the Second World
War and the Holocaust.
My thesis is of a fundamental interrelationship between the affective, the tem-
poral, the ontological and the political. This argument can in part be stated in terms
derived from the three countermodern figures discussed in this chapter. Schmitt’s
political theology, with its thesis of a homologous relationship between a society’s
metaphysical image of the world and its forms of political organisation, forces us to
reckon with an overfamiliarity between the ontological and the political. Heidegger,
in turn, subordinates the ontological (and by implication the political) to the tem-
poral: ‘whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being, it
does so with time as its standpoint’ (Heidegger, 1962, p. 39). To their arguments
I add my own: that there is in all three cases an overdetermination of the temporal
by the affective. This occurs in a general way in Spenglerian pessimism and in the
apocalyptic visions of crisis and decline shared by all three figures. However, it also
occurs in more specific ways. One example is the privileged disclosive role accorded
by Heidegger to anxiety in bringing the subject to awareness of its mortality, which
awareness, he argues, is the condition of possibility for any form of temporalisation
(and, by implication, any form of ontologisation) whatsoever. Another example is
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the generative role attributed by Schmitt to hatred as the ontological ground of ‘the
political’ (Schmitt, 2007b).
To make this argument, I will contrast the countermodern philosophies of Spen-
gler, Schmitt and Heidegger with a paradigmatic figure of philosophical modern-
ity: Immanuel Kant. What follows should not be read as an unqualified defence of
Enlightenment rationalism and universalism. Rather Kant is used here simply as a
representative of philosophical and political modernism, in order to bring the spe-
cific phenomenon of ‘countermodernism’ into sharper view. The chapter begins with
a brief outline of Kant’s political philosophy, relating it to a specific form of time-
consciousness. The chapter then turns to consider first Spengler, then Schmitt and
finally Heidegger.
‘A true present’
‘Modernity’, as Michel Foucault has argued, is best understood as an ‘attitude’ rather
than a period of history: it is a ‘mode of relating to contemporary reality’, a ‘voluntary
choice made by certain people’, a ‘way of thinking and feeling... of acting and be-
having’ (Foucault, 1991b, p. 39). This ‘attitude’ is characterised by Foucault, drawing
on Baudelaire, as a ‘heroization’ of the present that is ‘indissociable from a desper-
ate eagerness to imagine it... otherwise than it is’ (ibid., pp. 40-41). ‘Modern man’,
by consequence, ‘is not the man who goes off to discover himself, his secrets and his
hidden truth; he is the man who tries to invent himself ’ (p. 42). Moreover, Foucault
notes, ‘the attitude of modernity, ever since its formation, has found itself struggling
with attitudes of “countermodernity”’, one example of which is those painters, who
Baudelaire made fun of, ‘who, finding nineteenth-century dress excessively ugly, want
to depict nothing but ancient togas’ (pp. 39-40).
Kant’s 1784 essayWas ist Aufklärung? (‘What is Enlightenment?’) (Kant, 1970a)
is seen by Foucault as an inaugural gesture in the philosophical discourse of modernity.
‘Enlightenment’ is, for Kant, ‘mankind’s exit from its self-incurred immaturity... the
inability to make use of one’s own understanding without the guidance of another’
(ibid., p. 54). The idea of a sovereign free reason that creates its own laws and norms
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without the guidance of history or tradition is encapsulated in Kant’s motto of the
Enlightenment: ‘Sapere aude! Have the courage to use your own understanding!’. As
Peter Osborne observes inThe Politics of Time, Kant’s ‘conception of the autonomy of
reason... is internal to the time-consciousness of a self-transcending present which
cuts itself off, in principle, from the determinations of the past’ (Osborne, 1995, p.
21). Alternatively, in Levinas’ more poetic formulation, ‘true freedom’ requires ‘a true
present, which, always at the peak of a destiny, forever recommences that destiny’
(Levinas, 1990b, p. 65).
The time-consciousness of a pure present that severs itself from all determinations
by the past is not, in Levinas’ view, an invention of the eighteenth century, but had
been prefigured in both Christian and Jewish theological metaphysics. The ideas of
repentence and redemption in Judaism and of salvation in Christianity constitute a
‘rebellion’ against the idea of sin, one that brings about a paradoxical subordination of
the past to the present (Levinas, 1990b, p. 65). Here freedom triumphs ‘by tearing
up the bedrock’ of natural and historical existence (ibid., p. 65). The power attributed
to the Christian soul to detach itself from the determinations of nature and history,
confers on it an abstract and noumenal nature which is the ‘ultimate foundation of the
individual’ (ibid., p. 65). It is also the basis of egalitarianism, the ‘equal dignity of each
and every soul’ (ibid., p. 66), whose condition of possibility is the power attributed to
the soul to free itself from what has been.
The classical idea of the ‘abstract’ subject, whether as the Cartesian ego cogito or
the Kantian autonomy of reason, can be seen as a secularised version of the Christian
notion of the soul. As Levinas puts it, whilst modern political liberalism ‘evades the
dramatic aspects’ of the soul’s liberation through repentence and redemption, ‘it does
retain one of its essential elements in the form of the sovereign freedom of reason’
(Levinas, 1990b, p. 66). Hence modern philosophical and political thought ‘replaces
the blind world of common sense with the world rebuilt by idealist philosophy, one
that is steeped in reason and subject to reason’ (ibid., p. 66). ‘Liberalism is the trans-
lation, the political-theological translation, of the Judeo-Christian heritage’, claims
Simon Critchley, summarising Levinas’ argument. ‘In the world of liberalism we’re
no longer weighed down by history, we’re free’ (Critchley and Dianda, 2015, p. 37).
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The radical freedom imputed by Kant to the human subject gives rise to a unilinear,
progressive theory of history in which ‘the free exercise of the human will on a large
scale’ promises ‘a steadily advancing but slow development of man’s original capacities’
(Kant, 1970b, p. 41), which ‘opens up the comforting prospect of a future in which
we are shown from afar how the human race eventually works its way upwards into
a situation in which all the germs implanted by nature can be developed fully, and in
which man’s destiny can be fulfilled here on earth’ (ibid., p. 52). This is recognisably a
secularised version of Christianity’s eschatological theory of history, one involving an
immanentised eschatology that can be brought about through human agency ‘here on
earth’. Kant foresaw the emergence of a universal and cosmopolitan political order,
one that would be embodied in ‘a federation of peoples in which every state, even
the smallest, could expect to derive its security and rights not from its own power or
its own legal judgement, but solely from this great federation (Fœdus Amphictyonum),
from a united power and the law-governed decisions of a united will’ (Kant, 1970b,
p. 47).
This conception of human nature and history has, of course, long been contested.
Levinas claims that the first doctrine to do so was Marxism. Marxism denies the
sovereign freedom of reason proclaimed by idealist liberalism, subordinating it to ma-
terial determinations. In the Marxian view, Being determines consciousness, rather
than the reverse. However, Levinas suggests, Marxism’s break with liberalism ‘is not
a definitive one’, insofar as the individual subject still retains the power to shake off
false consciousness. ‘To become conscious of one’s social situation is, even for Marx,
to free oneself of the fatalism entailed by that situation.’ (Levinas, 1990b, p. 67)
Levinas’s claim that Marxism was the first doctrine in Western history to contest
the idea of ‘human spirit as pure freedom’ (ibid., p. 66) is contentious. Kant’s uni-
versalism and cosmopolitanism was assailed in his own lifetime by Johann Gottfried
Herder, who might serve here as a representative of romantic antimodernism (Reiss,
1970). Herder criticised Enlightenment rationalism, and opposed Kantian univer-
salism with a particularistic conception of humanity as divided into distinct cultures,
each expressing a unique ‘folk-spirit’ (Volksgeist). It was this tradition of romantic,
volkisch nationalism, that the conservative revolutionaries would later seek to marry
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with an embrace of modern technology. As we will see, there are strong echoes of
Herder’s conception of cultures as natural organisms in Spengler’s theory of history.
Although neither Kant, nor Foucault commenting on Kant, say so explicitly, one
of the conditions of possibility for Kantian ‘universal history’ was the eschewal of
Christian apocalypticism in which the future is already filled with presentiments of
the imminent end of the world. As Osborne observes, ‘[o]nly at this point was a
conceptual space available for an abstract temporality of qualitative newness which
could be of epochal significance, because it could now be extrapolated into an oth-
erwise empty future, without end, and hence without limit’ (Osborne, 1995, p. 11).
Indeed, the only limit on the extrapolation was the finitude of the human popula-
tion; consequently, humanity’s exit from the ‘self-incurred immaturity’ of its reliance
on custom and tradition, and its entry into a universal, cosmopolitan political order
governed by human reason, was, for Kant, only a matter of time (Kant, 1970b).
It is true that the attitude ofmodernity has been confronted with attitudes of coun-
termodernity ‘ever since its formation’, as Foucault put it. However, I want to argue
that attitudes of countermodernity have flourished especially in times and spaces that
are filled with apocalyptic forebodings and presentiments of doom, contexts in which
the condition of possibility for universal history has been more difficult to fulfil. One
of the most dramatic flourishings of countermodern political theologies occurred in
Europe in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, notably in Germany and
Italy, where the traumatic experience of modern warfare intersected with a range of
social anxieties related to those countries’ experience of modernisation and (in com-
parative historical terms) belated unification. The remainder of this chapter focuses
on the specific articulations of the ‘attitude of countermodernity’ contained in the
writings of Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger.
‘Eternal land and eternal blood’
Oswald Spengler’s Der Untergang des Abendlandes (The Decline of the West) is un-
doubtedly the most famous expression of interwar European cultural pessimism. In-
deed, as JeffreyHerf notes, Spengler’s ‘dubious judgments on the causes of the rise and
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decline of civilizations’ are far more important as an index of the contemporaneous
mood of ‘impending disaster and possible salvation... than for any serious insights into
the past they might provide’ (Herf, 1984, p. 52). The Decline of the West is permeated
throughout by Spengler’s personal despair at Germany’s military defeat in 1918, and
a sense of foreboding that Germany would decline and collapse like imperial Rome.
For Spengler, writing in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, linear and
progressive theories of history were ‘becoming more and more preposterous with each
century’. A deep sense of fatalism is evident in his claim that the war was not ‘a mo-
mentary constellation of casual facts due to national sentiments, personal influences
or economic tendencies... but the type of a historical change of phase occurring within a
great historical organism of definable compass at the point preordained for it hundreds
of years ago’ (Spengler, 1938, vol. 1, p. 47).
Spengler’s historical pessimism was not only an immediate and reflexive response
to Germany’s military defeat, however. It also expressed a more general disdain for
modern mass society, and especially urbanism, which he saw as destructive of tradi-
tional identities, ways of life and forms of social authority:
In place of a world, there is a city, a point, in which the whole life of broad
regions is collecting while the rest dries up. In place of a type-true people,
born of and grown on the soil, there is a new sort of nomad, cohering
unstably in fluid masses, the parasitical city dweller, traditionless, utterly
matter-of-fact, religionless, clever, unfruitful, deeply contemptuous of the
countryman and especially that highest form of countryman, the country
gentleman. (Spengler, 1938, vol. 1, p. 32)
Hence, for Spengler, the war of 1914-18 was merely one of a number of symptoms of
what he called ‘the great crisis of the present’ (ibid., p. 34).
Spengler’s view that this crisis, including Germany’s catastrophic military defeat,
was ‘preordained’ is bound up with his conception of human history as governed by
fate and destiny rather than by human volition. Spengler draws an analogy with the
natural world to link the notions of fate and destiny with that of ‘form’:
No one, looking at the oak, with its millennial life, dare say that it is at
this moment, now, about to start on its true and proper course. No one as
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he sees a caterpillar grow day by day expects that it will go on doing so for
two or three years. In these cases we feel, with an unqualified certainty, a
limit, and this sense of the limit is identical with our sense of the inward
form. (Spengler, 1938, vol. 1, p. 21)
Because history is governed by fate and not by human volition, all human societies are
destined to pass through the same developmental phases, just as all oaks and cater-
pillars do. Consequently, the modern West figures in Spengler’s account not as ‘the
highest point of an ascending straight line of world history’ that signifies ‘a limitless
tending upwards and onwards for all time’, but as a ‘transitional phase which occurs
with certainty under particular conditions’, and as ‘a single phenomenon of history,
strictly limited and defined as to form and duration, which covers a few centuries and
can be viewed and, in essentials, calculated from available precedents’ (Spengler 1938,
vol. 1, p. 39).
Spengler contrasts two possible modes of comprehending the world (‘morpholo-
gies’), the one ‘organic’ or ‘physiognomic’, the other ‘mechanical’ or ‘systematic’ (Spen-
gler, 1938, vol. 1, p. 100). The latter is associated with systems, laws, causal relations,
abstractions, formulas and science, whilst the former is associated with aesthetics,
historicity, vitality, intuition, analogical reasoning, destiny and form. Key terms here
are ‘destiny’ and ‘form’: ‘destiny’ expresses an inward necessity of development which
reaches its fulfilment in the final ‘form’ of a thing, whereas ‘causality’ has connotations
of external, law-governed relationships. The ‘mechanical’ or ‘systematic’ mode of un-
derstanding has been in the ascendancy in the modern West but is fated to decline,
whilst the time of the physiognomic has yet to come. Spengler regarded his own spec-
ulations on the rise and decline of civilizations as providing a map of world history
from a ‘physiognomic’ perspective (Herf, 1984, p. 53).
Consequently, for Kantian universal history, Spengler sought to substitute a ‘mor-
phology of world history’ which would subsume all domains of knowledge within ‘a
single vast Physiognomic of all things human’. In this organic conception of history,
a particularistic political ontology based on the division of humanity into distinct ‘cul-
tures’ is indissociably linked with a cyclical theory of time in which each ‘culture’ passes
through analogous age-phases (birth, childhood, adulthood, old age) to those of the
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individual human organism:
I see, in place of that empty figment of one linear history which can be
kept up only by shutting one’s eyes to the overwhelming multitude of the
facts, the drama of a number of mighty Cultures, each springing with
primitive strength from the soil of a mother-region to which it remains
firmly bound throughout its whole life-cycle; each stamping its mater-
ial, its mankind, in its own image; each having its own idea, its own pas-
sions, its own life, will and feeling, its own death. Here indeed are colours,
lights, movements, that no intellectual eye has yet discovered. Here the
Cultures, peoples, languages, truths, gods, landscapes bloom and age as
the oaks and the pines, the blossoms, twigs and leaves - but there is no
aging “Mankind.” (Spengler, 1938, vol. 1, p. 21)
In abandoning universal history, Spengler also eschews the ‘ideal abstract “man” of
Kant’, that ‘new sort of nomad, cohering unstably in fluid masses, the parasitical city
dweller, traditionless, utterly matter-of-fact, religionless, clever, unfruitful’ individual
whom Spengler so derided. In the place of the abstract subject there is ‘actual man as
he has inhabited the earth during historical time, grouped... by peoples’, and ‘stamped’
in the image of the culture into which he was fated to have been born (Spengler, 1938,
vol. 1, p. 23). Each culture has ‘its own peculiar “Nature” which no other sort of man
can possess in exactly the same form’, which pre-determines the nature of its individual
members, ‘who are separated only by minor distinctions’ (ibid., p. 131).
Within this deeply fatalistic worldview, Kant’s liberal individualism and human-
ism is displaced by a mystical, unanimistic conception of cultures as externalised forms
of a concealed collective ‘soul’ or ‘life force’, each of which remains rooted within a par-
ticular landscape. ‘A culture is born in the moment when a great soul awakens out of
the proto-spirituality of ever-childish humanity, and detaches itself, a form from the
formless, a bounded and mortal thing from the boundless and enduring’:
It blooms on the soil of an exactly definable landscape, to which plant-
wise it remains bound. It dies when this soul has actualized the full sum
of its possibilities in the shape of peoples, languages, dogmas, arts, states,
sciences, and reverts into the proto-soul. (Spengler, 1938, vol. 1, p. 106)
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In Spengler’s ‘physiognomic’ conception, the visible artefacts of a culture - its political
and cultural institutions, forms of social and economic organisation - are comprehen-
ded as externalisations of its collective ‘soul’ or ‘life-force’. Hence ‘[t]here is not one
sculpture, one painting, one mathematics, one physics, but many, each in its deepest
essence different from the others, each limited in duration and self-contained, just as
each species of plant has its peculiar blossom or fruit, its special type of growth and
decline’ (Spengler, 1938, vol. 1, p. 21). Such is the force of individuals’ fatalistic at-
tachment to their unique cultures that it effectively rules out meaningful intercultural
understanding: ‘it is quite impossible for us to penetrate completely... a soul that is
quite differently constituted from our own’ (Spengler, 1938, vol. 1, p. 131).
‘Civilization’ figures in Spengler’s historical schema not as the ultimate and most
advanced stage of a common human history, but as the final, most external and arti-
ficial form of each unique ‘culture’:
The aim once attained - the idea, the entire content of inner possibilit-
ies, fulfilled and made externally actual - the Culture suddenly hardens, it
mortifies, its blood congeals, its force breaks down, and it becomes Civil-
ization, the thing which we feel and understand in the words Egypticism,
Byzantinism, Mandarinism. (Spengler, 1938, vol. 1, p. 106)
It is this ‘inward and outward fulfilment, the finality, that awaits every living Culture’
that, for Spengler, ‘is the purport of all the historic “declines,”’ including the unfolding
‘decline of the West’ that he prophesied would ‘occupy the first centuries of the new
millennium’, although it is ‘heralded already and sensible in and around us today’
(Spengler, 1938, vol. 1, pp. 106-107).
A key symptom of that decline, for Spengler, was urbanisation, which he regarded
as an ‘uprooting’ force. He writes with great feeling about the countryside with its
‘woodland rustlings’, its ‘meadows and... copses’, the village ‘with its quiet hillocky
roofs, its evening smoke, its wells, its hedges, and its beasts’, which ‘lies completely
fused and embedded in the landscape’ (Spengler, 1938, vol. 2, p. 94). He is particu-
larly enamoured of the peasant, that ‘son of the soil’ who has a ‘profound affinity’ with
the earth, and the farmhouse, that ‘great symbol of settledness’ and of property ‘in
the most sacred sense of the word’ (Spengler, 1938, vol. 2, pp. 90-91). By contrast,
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Spengler associated the city with intellectualism, rationalism, science and commerce.
The city represents resistance to the feudal powers of ‘blood and tradition’, it ‘up-
sets thrones and limits old rights in the name of reason’ and advances the cause of
democracy (Spengler, 1938, vol. 2, pp. 96-97). After the village came the country
town, then the city, and finally the ‘megalopolis’ or ‘world city’, the ‘monstrous sym-
bol and vessel of the completely emancipated intellect’ (ibid. p. 98). Compared to
the world city, even other cities seem provincial, hence a new social cleavage is en-
gendered between ‘cosmopolitans’ and ‘provincials’, which comes to eclipse all other
social antagonisms.
The most important agent of the rationalisation of the world was, according to
Spengler, money. The idea of money ‘as distinct from goods’ represented ‘the ab-
straction of values from things’. Whereas ‘the earth is actual and natural... money
is abstract and artificial, a mere “category” - like “virtue” in the imagination of the
Age of Enlightenment’ (Spengler, 1938, vol. 2, p. 98). The ‘dictatorship of money’
threatened to subject the natural rhythms of life and the intrinsic values of specific
goods to an abstract and artificial logic that has no end other than its own perpetu-
ation. Urbanisation and monetisation were indissociably linked in Spengler’s mind:
‘The City means not only intellect, but also money’ (ibid. p. 97).
Urban life and the dictatorship of money lead directly to cultural demise, in Spen-
gler’s view, insofar as they contribute to the ‘sterility of civilized man’ (Spengler, 1938,
vol. 2, p. 103). Whereas the peasant was ‘rooted’ in his house and his family not as a
‘temporary connexion of person and thing for a brief span of years’, but as ‘an endur-
ing and and inward union of eternal land and eternal blood’,modern urban life severs
these roots and ‘eliminates the terror of death’ (ibid. p. 104). Consequently, the
cosmopolitan inhabitant of the world city takes pleasure in recreation, relaxation and
temporary distractions (examples of which include ‘cinema’, ‘boxing contests’, ‘nigger
dances’, ‘poker’ and ‘racing’ (ibid. p. 103)):
That which strikes the true peasant with a deep and inexplicable fear, the
notion that the family and the name may be extinguished, has now lost
its meaning. The continuance of the blood-relation in the visible world is
no longer a duty of the blood, and the destiny of being the last in line is
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no longer felt as a doom. Children do not happen, not because children
have become impossible, but principally because intelligence at the peak
of intensity can no longer find any reason for their existence. (p. 104)
The defiance of natural necessity and organic logic leads to depopulation and ‘race
suicide’, the dying out of the old noble families and the elimination of the ‘best and
oldest’ stock (ibid. p. 106). Hence, modern, cosmopolitan and urban existence ‘sac-
rifices first the blood and soul of its creators to the needs of its majestic evolution,
and then the last flower of that growth to the spirit of Civilization - and so, doomed,
moves on to final self-destruction’ (ibid. p. 107).
Despite Spengler’s political romanticism, he must ultimately be seen as a
countermodern and not an antimodern thinker. As Herf observes, The Decline of the
West ‘does not end on a note of despair and resignation’:
It is a call to action, the manifesto of a flawed modernism. Politics, blood,
and tradition must rise up to defeat the power of Geist [spirit] and Geld
[money]. Democracy and liberalism, about which Spengler wrote not a
single favorable word, brought with them the ‘triumph of money’ over the
deeper forces of blood and instinct. (Herf, 1984, p. 57)
But the ‘battle of Kultur against Zivilisation cannot be won by German Luddites
spouting the clichés of völkisch ideology. Preservation of “blood and tradition” re-
quires the most modern technological resources’ (ibid., p. 58).
‘Something existentially different and alien’
Carl Schmitt’s apocalyptic visions of a coming ‘global civil war’ (Weltbürgerkrieg) were
linked to the collapse of European international law (the jus publicum Europaeum) in
the aftermath of the First World War, and its attempted replacement with univer-
salist institutions such as the League of Nations (Palaver, 2007). Whereas Kant had
considered the elimination of antagonisms between states a necessary precondition
for the elimination of political disorder within states, and had foreseen ‘a federation
of peoples in which every state, even the smallest, could expect to derive its security
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and rights not from its own power or its own legal judgement, but solely from this
great federation (Fœdus Amphictyonum), from a united power and the law-governed
decisions of a united will’ (Kant, 1970b, p. 47), Schmitt took the opposite view. For
him, political order within states was contingent on the ever-present possibility of
conflict between states. Hence, far from sharing Kant’s conception of ‘a universal cos-
mopolitan existence’ as ‘the highest purpose of nature’ and ‘the matrix within which
all the original capacities of the human race may develop’ (ibid., p. 51), Schmitt feared
that this would be destructive of traditional international law and traditional forms of
political authority, and would unleash violent and anarchic forces on a global scale.
As is well known, Schmitt saw the ontological ground of ‘the political’ as the dis-
tinction between friend and enemy, where ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ are to be understood
‘in their concrete and existential sense’ and not as derivative of moral, aesthetic, soci-
ological or biological categories (Schmitt, 2007b, pp. 27-28). The political enemy is
simply ‘the other, the stranger’:
it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existen-
tially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts
with him are possible. (ibid., p. 27)
Any form of social antagonism - religious, moral, economic, ethnic, cultural and so
on - can become political ‘if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively
according to friend and enemy’ (p. 37). Consequently, the concept of ‘the political...
does not describe its own substance, but only the intensity of an association or dis-
sociation of human beings whose motives can be religious, national (in the ethnic or
cultural sense), economic, or of another kind and can effect at different times dif-
ferent coalitions and separations’ (p. 38). In Schmitt’s political existentialism, the
power to determine the enemy is indissociably linked with the existence of a people
as a sovereign body politic and cannot be delegated: only ‘the actual participants’ are
‘in a position to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent’s way of
life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one’s own form of
existence’ (p. 27).
The naturalisation of hatred as the foundation of collective identity that is im-
plied in Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction is a primary example of the overfamiliarity
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between the affective, the ontological and the political. It is the ‘distinction of friend
and enemy’, a distinction that expresses ‘the utmost intensity of a union or separation,
of an association or dissociation’ (2007b, p. 26), that constitutes the body politic:
The enemy is not merely any competitor or just any partner of a conflict in
general. He is also not the private adversary whom one hates. An enemy
exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people
confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy,
because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men,
particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a rela-
tionship. The enemy is hostis, not inimicus in the broader sense… (ibid.,
p. 28)
Hence hatred has a generative function for Schmitt insofar as everything held in com-
mon by a national (or other political) community, everything that unites it, comes into
existence through its individual members standing in the same relationship to a shared
enemy (Sokoloff, 2015).
Schmitt’s insistence that the ‘ever-present possibility of combat’ is inherent to the
‘enemy’ concept, and that the friend-enemy distinction finds its meaning in ‘the real
possibility of physical killing’ (2007b, pp. 32-33) does not express a desire for interstate
wars, as Palaver has emphasised (Palaver, 2007, p. 74). War ‘does not have to be
common, normal, something ideal, or desirable’, yet ‘it must nevertheless remain a real
possibility’ (Schmitt, 2007b, p. 33). Rather, as was recognised by Schmitt’s admirer,
the political philosopher Leo Strauss, the ever-present threat of lethal conflict with an
external enemy was necessary to overcome the internal conflicts that are latent within
any society:
The ultimate foundation of the Right is the principle of the natural evil
of man; because man is by nature evil, he therefore needs dominion. But
dominion can be established, that is, men can be unified, only in unity
against - against other men. Every association of men is necessarily a sep-
aration from other men. The tendency to separate (and therewith the
grouping of humanity into friends and enemies) is given with human
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nature; it is in this sense destiny, period. (cited in Palaver, 2007, at p.
73; emphasis mine)
Starting from the premise of ‘the natural evil of man’, the separation of humanity into
antagonistic groups becomes inevitable: it is ‘destiny, period’, and not a temporary
state of immaturity that can be overcome by the collective exercise of human reason.
As Strauss’ comments imply, the difference between Schmittian particularism and
Kantian universalism stems from their contrary views of human nature. Schmitt ac-
knowledges that a universal, cosmopolitan political order of the kind envisaged by
Kant would liberate people from the authority of national governments, but notes that
what precisely it would free them to do depends on one’s conception of human nature
(Schmitt, 2007b, pp. 57-58). Indeed, Schmitt goes so far as to claim that people’s
inclinations towards authoritarianism or libertarianism are essentially consequences
of ‘whether they consciously or unconsciously presuppose man to be by nature evil or
by nature good’ (ibid., p. 58). Liberalism and anarchism assume in different degrees
that people are essentially good: this is the basis of the (radical) anarchist view that
national states and governments should be abolished, and the (less radical) liberal de-
sire to subordinate states and governments to a self-regulating socioeconomic sphere
(ibid., pp. 60-61; see also 1985, pp. 56 ff.).
The ‘rationalism of the Enlightenment’, of which Kant is a paradigmatic example,
came down on the libertarian side of the divide: ‘man was by nature ignorant and
rough, but educable’ (1985, p. 56). Schmitt leaves his reader in no doubt about which
side of the debate he comes down on, citingMachiavelli, Hobbes, Fichte and others to
support his claim that ‘all genuine political theories presuppose man to be evil’ (2007b,
p. 61). Moreover, he notes that in the cases of the Catholic political philosophers of
the Counter-Enlightenment, Bonald, de Maistre and Donoso Cortés, their theories
were often closely bound up with the theological dogma of man’s essential sinfulness
(1985, p. 58). ‘Because the sphere of the political is in the final analysis determined by
the real possibility of enmity,’ Schmitt argues, ‘political conceptions and ideas cannot
very well start with an anthropological optimism’ (2007b, p. 64), a sentiment that may
seem reminiscent of Spengler’s famous dictum, ‘optimism is cowardice’.
Herein lies the core of the Schmittian critique of liberalism. Liberalism has at-
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tempted to neutralise and depoliticise all political conceptions, transforming the polit-
ical notions of battle and enmity into economic competition, intellectual discussion
and endless parliamentary debate. Consequently, the united body politic is dissolved
into a culturally interested public on the one hand, and a mass of producers and con-
sumers on the other, whilst ‘the political’ is subordinated to abstract laws and norms
(2007b, pp. 69-72). Especially disastrous are the individualist premises of liberal
thought, which eliminate any rationale for political sacrifice:
In case of need, the political entity must demand the sacrifice of life. Such
a demand is in no way justifiable by the individualism of liberal thought.
No consistent individualism can entrust to someone other than to the
individual himself the right to dispose of the physical life of the individual.
(ibid., p. 71)
Because liberalism views any compulsion for the individual to fight against his will as
a form of repression and a denial of individual liberty, it assigns to the state a tightly
circumscribed role of securing the conditions for freedom and preventing any curtail-
ment of liberty. But a universal, cosmopolitan order could not be brought about ‘by
evading every political decision’: ‘If a people no longer possesses the energy or the will
to maintain itself in the sphere of politics, the latter will not thereby vanish from the
world. Only a weak people will disappear’ (ibid., p. 53).
For Schmitt, liberal modernity, ‘the age of neutralizations and depoliticizations’,
is a consequence of the process that Max Weber called ‘the disenchantment of the
world’ (Weber, 2009): a de-sacralization brought about by the progressive elimination
of miracles, mystery and magic from the modern worldview, creating a lawful and
predictable cosmos and a polity. Weber’s narrative of ‘disenchantment’ supported his
claim for the exceptional nature of Western modernity, which alone has transcended
a superstitious and primitive pre-modernity. According to Robert Yelle (2010), this
claim of the exceptional nature of Western modernity is predicated on its supposed
disbelief in the possibility of ruptures in natural law through miracles and magic, its
alleged supersession of tradition, and the myth of an original ‘event’ (the Enlighten-
ment) when all of this purportedly came about. Yet it is unclear whether these claims
do any more than re-encode traditional Christian (and especially Protestant) myths of
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a release from history and tradition, and a transcendence of pagan superstition (ibid.).
At a descriptive level, the key thesis of Schmitt’s ‘political theology’, a thesis with
which I concur, is of a structural correspondence between a society’s theological and
metaphysical image of the world on the one hand, and its forms of political organ-
isation on the other. ‘All significant concepts of the modern theory of state’, Schmitt
claimed, are merely ‘secularized theological concepts’ (1985, p. 36). For instance,
‘juridic formulas of the omnipotence of the state are, in fact, only superficial seculariz-
ations of theological formulas of the omnipotence of God’ (2007b, p. 42). The evolu-
tion of modern liberalism and the tendential elimination of sovereign power through
its subordination to abstract laws and norms are related by Schmitt to developments in
the European worldview, in which Christian theology was displaced by the scientific
worldview of the seventeenth century, which was itself succeeded first by Enlighten-
ment rationalism, then by the economism of the nineteenth century, and finally in
the twentieth century by a technological worldview and a quasi-religious faith in the
existence of technical solutions to every problem (Schmitt, 2007a).
Forms of political organisation have mirrored these changes:
The idea of the modern constitutional state triumphed together with
deism, a theology and metaphysics that banished the miracle from the
world. This theology and metaphysics rejected not only the transgression
of the laws of nature through an exception brought about by direct inter-
vention, as is found in the idea of a miracle, but also the sovereign’s direct
intervention in a valid legal order. The rationalism of the Enlightenment
rejected the exception in every form. (Schmitt, 1985, pp. 36-37)
Hence Schmitt shared Weber’s view that modern liberal democratic politics involved
the routinization of charisma, the replacement of traditional and charismatic forms
of authority with legal-rational authority and bureaucracy, and the attempted subjec-
tion of the political and legal orders to rational control. One effect of this was that
whereas previous eras had great leaders and decision-makers, in the twentieth-century
bureaucratic and technological society everyone had become interchangeable (Strong,
2005).
Where the Catholic Schmitt differed from the Protestant Weber, however, was
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that he tended to see ‘disenchantment’ as a powerful political myth rather than as
a neutral description of modern liberal-democratic politics. Liberalism’s attempt to
subject the political and legal orders to rational control was doomed to fail because
the law cannot interpret itself, so there will always been a need for some sovereign
authority to decide between competing interpretations; moreover, legislators cannot
envision all possible future circumstances and codify them in advance. Hence, over
time, abnormal or extraordinary circumstances were bound to arise that cannot be re-
solved by reference to the existing legal order, what Schmitt calls a ‘state of exception’:
The exception, which is not codified in the existing legal order, can at best
be characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the
state, or the like. But it cannot be circumscribed factually and made to
conform to a preformed law. (1985, p. 6)
In a state of exception, the locus of sovereignty is revealed through the suspension
of the entire existing order in the moment of decision. Hence the famous opening
sentence of Schmitt’s PoliticalTheology: ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’
(ibid., p.5). To the extent that Schmitt’s ‘exception’ is ‘analogous to the miracle in
theology’, as he claims it is, it corresponds closely toMircea Eliade’s conception of ‘the
Sacred’ as a rupture in ordinary, profane experience (Eliade, 1959). ‘In the exception
the power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid
by repetition’ (Schmitt, 1985, p. 15).
The essence of the sovereign decision in the state of exception consists in the de-
termination of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’. Because the existence of a law-governed polit-
ical order presupposes a ‘normal’ rather than an ‘exceptional’ situation, the sovereign
must be able to guarantee ‘total peace within the state and its territory’. This is the ‘pre-
requisite’ for legal norms to be valid, whereas ‘no norm can be valid’ in an ‘abnormal
situation’ (2007b, p. 46). Once the friend-enemy determination has been decided,
secondary forms of politics such as political parties, civil society association and the
like arise. These derivative forms of politics still express the friend-enemy antagonism
even where awareness of its has been suppressed. Only in a state of exception does it
become clear that the political and legal orders ultimately rest on a decision and not
on laws or norms.
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Whilst Schmitt considered himself a Catholic Christian, Wolfgang Palaver has
argued that his friend-enemy distinction can be interpreted as an attempt to resurrect
a form of pagan, sacrificial, culture in order to stem the anarchic and subversive long-
term implications of the biblical revelation and of Christ’s commandment to love one’s
enemies (Palaver, 2007). Tomake this argument, Palaver draws onRenéGirard’s work
on ‘generative scapegoating’, which sees ‘the political’ as a product of the ‘scapegoat
mechanism’, whose name derives from a ritual described in Leviticus whereby a goat
was ‘sent alive into the wilderness, the sins of the people having been symbolically laid
upon it’ (Girard, 1987, p. 73). In Girard’s theory, traditional forms of closed societies
had their origins in such rituals, whereby blame for threats to the safety or harmony
of the community was unconsciously transferred to some arbitrarily chosen victim,
typically a foreigner or outsider who had recently arrived. ‘Even if the scapegoat is
really an insider’, Girard argues, ‘the threat transforms him into an outsider, and the
remaining insiders feel united as they never did before’:
They form a new and tighter inside. The alien threat displaces everything
else; internal quarrels are forgotten. A new unity and comradeship pre-
vails among those who, feeling attacked as a group, also feel they must
defend themselves as a group. [...] Beyond a certain threshold of in-
tensity - all other circumstances being favorable - the hostile polarization
against a victim must empty the group of internal hostility, unifying it so
tightly that a cultural rejuvenation can really occur. (Ibid., pp. 90-91)
The ritual expulsion or sacrifice of the ‘stranger’ served to channel latent, internal con-
flict towards the outside world, transforming open violence into a form of structural
violence that creates conditions of peace within the political community, but which
can be remobilised against internal and external enemies at any time (Palaver, 2007,
pp. 76-78).
ForGirard, the undermining of sacrificial cultures by the biblical revelation had the
effect of destroying traditional, closed societies based on some version of the scapegoat
mechanism, a process that ‘began in the Middle Ages and has now led into what we
call “globalization”’, which he regards as ‘only secondarily an economic phenomenon’
(cited in Palaver, 2007, at p. 84). This process will, in Girard’s view, eventually destroy
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modern nation states in the sameway that it destroyed archaic societies. Consequently,
for Palaver, drawing on Girard, Schmitt’s political theology cannot in the end be seen
as a purely Christian or monotheistic one, but instead expresses a form of pagan or
sacrifical Christianity, whose spirit is aptly expressed in the dictum of the second-
century pagan, Celsus, that ‘the most high God reigns but the national deities govern’
(cited in ibid., at p. 80).
The implications of Schmitt’s political theology for national politics are well sum-
marised byTracy Strong. Against ‘themyth of the creative power of the democratically
equal populace’, whose ‘historical conrete manifestation’ was the French revolution, it
was necessary to oppose a counterrevolutionary myth ‘of a hierarchically ordered and
unified people’, instantiated by the ‘exceptional acts’ of a sovereign who expressed the
Volksbewusstein, the common consciousness of the people (Strong, 2005, pp. xxviii-
xxix). At a geopolitical level, in opposition to Kantian universalism and cosmopolit-
anism, Schmitt favoured a new nomos (law) of the earth predicated on the division of
the globe into a plurality of Großräume (‘great spaces’) as the surest way of preventing
a global civil war (Schmitt, 2006).
‘Only a God can save us’
Heidegger fully shared the conservative revolutionaries’ apocalyptic visions of the
world-historical situation and their diagnoses of crisis, decline and impending cata-
strophe. As late as the 1950s, he claimed:
That people today tend once again to be more in agreement with Spen-
gler’s propositions about the decline of theWest, lies in the fact that (along
with various superficial reasons) Spengler’s proposition is only the neg-
ative, though correct, consequence of Nietzsche’s word, ‘The wasteland
grows.’ We emphasise that this word is thoughtful. It is a true word.
(cited in Zimmerman, 1990, at p. 26)
As Zimmermann notes, the ‘wasteland’ refers here to ‘the devastation of the earth,
the flight of the Gods, and the darkening of the world’ (ibid.). For Heidegger, as
for Schmitt and Spengler, Germany’s military defeat and the ensuing economic and
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political turbulence of theWeimar years were merely symptoms of a much deeper mal-
aise. Heidegger is a more complex thinker than either Spengler or Schmitt, and a full
consideration of his philosophy is beyond the scope of this chapter. Consequently, I
will restrict my attention to those aspects of his thought that situate him as a ‘coun-
termodern’ thinker whilst also highlighting some key differences with the conservat-
ive revolutionaries, in order to illustrate the range and versatility of ‘countermodern’
philosophies.
Heidegger, who had grown up in the provincial Swabian town of Messkirch,
shared Spengler’s political romanticism, his nostalgic attachment to the countryside,
rural life, and the peasantry, and his antipathy towards ‘technology, economics, and
world-commerce... symbolized by the great city that turns against the soul, against
life and smothers it and compels culture to decline and collapse’ (cited in Zimmerman,
1990, at p. 26). However, Heidegger considered the explanations of Western decline
offered by Spengler to be rather superficial. Moreover, as Herf points out, he did not
share the conservative revolutionaries’ conviction that modern technology could be
disembedded from the world of Zivilization and redeployed in defence of the Kul-
turnation and an authentic, völkisch, existence (Herf, 1984, p. 109). Yet Heidegger’s
position overlapped considerably with that of the conservative revolution by virtue of
their common, countermodern temporal structure, notwithstanding the specific dif-
ferences concerning the issue of technology (Osborne, 1995, p. 164).
Heidegger, like Spengler, repudiated the idea of the ‘abstract subject’, and, as in
Spengler’s case, this was indissociably linked with his departure from the ‘vulgar’ un-
derstanding of time as an infinite, linear series of instants. In Heidegger’s early philo-
sophy, most fully developed in Being and Time (Heidegger, 1962), the subject is re-
interpreted as Dasein (literally ‘being there’), a concrete and determinate self that is
bound by fate to a particular culture. Human beings are not, for Heidegger, disem-
bodied consciousnesses or isolated egos (Kant’s sovereign free reason), but forms of
involved agency that are always already dwelling in a lifeworld. Themetaphysics of the
subject, theoretical cognition, and the geometric and chronological understandings of
space and time, are products of modern philosophical abstraction that conceal more
basic and fundamental modes of ‘Being-in-the-world’. Importantly, the situation
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into which Dasein is ‘thrown’ forms the horizon of its possibilities and circumscribes
its potential forms of self-understanding and agency.
Whilst Being and Time claimed to provide a ‘universal phenomenological onto-
logy’ (Heidegger, 1962, p. 62), an account of Dasein as such, it is difficult not to
read it as, at least in part, ‘a negative political evaluation’ of everyday life ‘in the spe-
cific historical circumstances of urban-industrial society’ (Zimmerman, 1990, p. 17).
Heidegger’s phenomenological description of everyday life in Being and Time is strik-
ingly similar to Spengler’s indictment of cosmopolitan, urban life inThe Decline of the
West, especially in the characterisation of the dictatorship of das Man, the ‘they-Self ’
or the ‘anyone-Self ’:
In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information
services such as the newspaper, every Other is like the next. This Being-
with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into the kind of
Being of ‘the Others’, in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distin-
guishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness
and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the ‘they’ is unfolded. We
take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] take pleasure; we read,
see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we
shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we find ‘shocking’
what they find shocking. (Heidegger, 1962, p. 164)
Moreover, a sense of Heidegger’s personal homesickness and alienation is seemingly
conveyed in his description of ‘a new kind of Being of everyday Dasein - a kind in
which Dasein is constantly uprooting itself ’ (Heidegger, 1962, p. 217).
Unlike Spengler’s Decline of the West or Schmitt’s Concept of the Political, Being
and Time does not contain an overt political argument but this does not make it an
‘apolitical’ work. Indeed, as Peter Osborne suggests, such is its permeation by a sense
of (Heidegger’s) personal and (Germany’s) political crisis, not to mention unexamined
and contextually-specific sociological assumptions (the homogenising effects of mod-
ern transportation and communication, the Volk as the natural and inevitable basis of
politics), that it is ultimately impossible to strip the political content out of the text
in order to isolate a purely deconstructive or existential meaning (Osborne, 1995, p.
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169). Moreover, even if Being and Time does not contain an overtly political message,
it nevertheless held out the prospect of an escape from the levelling effects and con-
formist pressures of modern society, and the possibility of a more ‘authentic’ mode of
being, which Heidegger claimed could be brought about through a conscious accept-
ance of one’s mortality revealed by ‘anxiety’.
The privileged disclosive role that Heidegger accords to anxiety is an exemplary
case of the overdetermination of the temporal and the ontological by the affective.
Anxiety for Heidegger is the most basic of all moods, and he characterises it as a
generalised state of dread, an indefinite threat, not to be confused with the fear of a
specific thing (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 230-35). Insofar as anxiety brings Dasein into
awareness of its ownmortality, it removes the possibility of relying on the public world
of the ‘they’, which is revealed as incapable of protecting the individual against death
(Hoffmann, 2006, p. 203). ‘Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of
understanding itself... in terms of the “world” and the way things have been publicly
interpreted.’ (Heidegger, 1962, p. 232) Insofar as Dasein withdraws its assent from
the shared, public interpretation of reality, it is ‘thrown back’ onto the unshakeable
certitude of its own convictions (Hoffmann, 2006, p. 203).
Contrary to Heidegger, however, anxiety is not an essential feature of human ex-
istence but a distinctive psychological state that is produced in specific circumstances.
From a Marxist perspective, for instance, it could be argued that anxiety results from
the commodification of labour within the modern capitalist market and the alienation
of workers from the products of that labour (Zimmerman, 1990, pp. 24-25). I would
suggest that one’s perspective on this issue is crucial to one’s interpretation of Being
and Time. If one concurs with Heidegger’s claim that anxiety is an essential feature of
human existence, then one would tend to see the argument that follows as applying to
all Dasein everywhere. However, if one sees anxiety as a socially and historically spe-
cific phenomenon, and not as a permanent human condition, then what Heidegger
is really describing in Being and Time is a contingent affective response to a specific
set of sociohistorical conditions, not the essential structures of Dasein as such. From
this perspective, the withdrawal of assent from the prevailing public interpretation of
reality and the search for a more ‘authentic’ mode of existence could be seen as a con-
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tingent reaction to the anxieties engendered by life in a modern industrial society, or
more specifically to the mood of anxiety that gripped interwar Germany, or perhaps
even something highly specific to the ‘war generation’.
The anxious anticipation of death is, for Heidegger, the origin of Dasein’s time-
consciousness. Only insofar as human beings understand theselves as finite andmortal
does time matter to them. Dasein’s sense of itself as a finite, mortal being is intim-
ately related to its basic state of ‘care’, with care and mortality being ‘equiprimordial’
in Heidegger’s language. Put simply, it matters to human beings how we lead our
lives because our lives are finite, but conversely, were we indifferent to how we lead
our lives then our mortality would cease to matter to us (Hoffmann, 2006, p. 201).
Hence care is the condition of possibility for Dasein’s agency, its potentiality for act-
ing. Importantly, care is inherently self-directed: ‘the expression “care for oneself ”...
would be a tautology’ (Heidegger, 1962, p. 237). The sense of finitude and mortality,
revealed in anxiety and inscribed in the care structure, confers on Dasein a temporal
structure that is fundamentally different to the instantaneity of the Kantian subject,
one in which the future, rather than the present, becomes determinative.
Anxiety can engender either a ‘resolute’ acceptance of one’s mortality (‘authenti-
city’) or an evasion of it through a flight into everyday distractions (‘inauthenticity’). In
‘inauthenticity’, Dasein surrounds itself with temporary pleasures and material com-
forts, seeks social acceptance above all else, and is indifferent to the past except insofar
as it furthers these goals. (Again, it takes some effort not to read this as an indictment
of life in modern mass society, despite Heidegger’s claims to be engaged in an ex-
ercise of ‘fundamental ontology’.) ‘Inauthentic’ temporality involves a disconnected
temporalisation, in which Dasein lives from one moment to the next rather than un-
derstanding its life as a unified whole. Heidegger associates chronological time with
‘inauthenticity’: “‘time” as ordinarily understood... is derivative. It arises from inau-
thentic temporality’ (Heidegger, 1962, p. 374). The ordinary understanding of time
as a linear series of instants is a product of the public interpretation of the world, and
a form of disconnected temporalisation.
The ‘authentic’ life, by contrast, requires an active response to one’s finitude and
mortality, which thereby brings Dasein into confrontation with its past, and enables
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Dasein to comprehend itself as a unified whole ‘stretched along’ from birth to death.
As Piotr Hoffmann describes, ‘when I anticipate and endure the menace of death I
find myself to be a limited, determinate self, and this means also a self with certain
definite historical roots, a self with a “heritage” and a “fate”’ (Hoffmann, 2006, p. 210).
The ‘authentic’ relationship to the future is one of ‘anticipation’, in whichDasein faces
up to the omnipresent threat of death. The ‘authentic’ present is the ‘moment of vision’
(Augenblick), in whichDasein recognises the public world of the ‘they’ as failing it, and
abandons its pursuit of social acceptance. Finally, ‘authenticity’ involves a conscious
appropriation of one’s heritage, an orientation towards the past that Heidegger calls
‘repetition’. In repetition, Dasein has a personal ‘fate’, inasmuch as its meaningful
existence is bound up with specific values, traditions and history, and a ‘destiny’ that
it shares with a broader historical community (volk) which provides Dasein with a
repertoire of possible role-models (‘heroes’) from which to choose (Heidegger, 1962,
pp. 434-39).
It is in the notion of ‘repetition’ that Peter Osborne locates Heidegger’s reactionary
inflection of the temporality of modernity, since the only ‘authentic’ response to the
‘terror of history’ that Heidegger is willing to entertain is that of repeating the past.
Consequently, he is ultimately unable to sustain ‘a genuine futurity in the face of the
reassurance afforded by the myth of the nation’ (volk) (Osborne, 1995, p. 194). This
circumscribed possibility also contains the key to the highly specific way in which
countermodern temporality is gendered, inasmuch as other possible responses to the
‘terror of history’, such as ‘a bodily response to anxiety, of breaking down and weeping’
(Aho, 2007, p. 148), are either condemned as ‘inauthentic’ or simply elided. As John
Caputo has argued,
The ‘fundamental ontology’ of Dasein, which was supposed to occupy a
place of a priori neutrality, prior to the division between the genders, is
deeply marked and inscribed by the traits of a very masculine subject,
a knight of anticipatory resoluteness, ready for anxiety, a macho, virile
figure out there all alone ‘without its mommy,’ as Drucilla Cornell once
quipped. (cited in ibid., p. 148)
The philosophies of Spengler and Schmitt are similarly permeated with a romantic,
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male warrior ethos, whose guiding ideal is of self-sacrifice in the name of ‘eternal
land’ and ‘eternal blood’. All three value continuity over change, narrative unity over
discontinuity, identity over difference, and ‘authenticity’ over empathy.
Heidegger’s particularistic political ontology of humanity as divided into distinct
Volk and his notion of ‘authentic’ historicality as ‘repetition’ may seem superficially
similar to Spengler’s cyclical theory of the rise and decline of cultures, yet there were
important differences between their conceptions (Zimmerman, 1990, p. 26). Spen-
gler understood the demise of a culture in biological terms, whereas Heidegger under-
stood death in a strictly existential sense as a limit condition and not in physiological
or medical terms as the perishing of an organism (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 284-85).
Death in the existential sense was important for Heidegger, as Hoffmann notes, be-
cause it extinguishes Dasein’s ability to choose its possibilities and consequently puts
to rest the endless process of redefinition of individual and collective identities that
characterises liberal modernity (Hoffmann, 2006, pp. 196-97). Moreover, ‘repeti-
tion’ for Heidegger was a creative process involving the appropriation of an ‘origin’
as the foundation for a new historical beginning. It was not a biological process, and
certainly could not be understood by drawing analogies with trees or caterpillars.
The distance between the two may seem even greater in the light of Heidegger’s
later philosophy, in which he seeks to provide a historical account of the relation-
ship between metaphysics and technology. In the epochal ‘history of Being’, modern
industrial society figures as the final stage of a long process of decline that began two-
and-a-half millennia ago in ancient Greece, in which the ‘original sin’, as it were,
was the abstraction of concepts from things in Plato’s metaphysics. The process of
degeneration had passed through the Christian theological conception of the world
and Enlightenment rationalism, ultimately culminating in the technological society
of today, in which mechanical reproduction has put an end to all originality and au-
thenticity. Heidegger, like Kant, foresaw ‘the beginning of the world civilization that
is based on Western European thinking’, but unlike Kant, he did not welcome ‘the
triumph of the manipulable arrangement of a scientific-technological world and of
the social order proper to this world’ (Eubanks and Gauthier, 2011, p. 133).
From this persective, Spengler’s claim that the decline of the West had begun
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around four hundred years ago seemed narrow and parochial. Furthermore, the ab-
straction of values from goods that is inherent to money, which Spengler had seen
as the motor force driving the rationalisation of the world, is on Heidegger’s account
merely a derivative phenomenon. Moreover, from Heidegger’s point of view, Spen-
gler’s organic and biologistic account of history, far from being an antidote to mechan-
istic and rationalistic ones, expressed a form of metaphysical naturalism that was itself
a symptom of the decline in Western humanity’s understanding of ‘Being’. Heideg-
ger’s disdain for naturalism and biologism distanced him not only from Spengler but
also from the racial theories of ‘official’ Nazism. His personal myth of the Greek ‘ori-
gins’ of Western civilization was borrowed from eighteenth-century Hellenism and
had little in common with the Aryan racial mythology of Alfred Rosenberg and other
Nazi ideologues (Osborne, 1995, 167).
However, the tenability of this distinction between cultural particularism and bio-
logical particularism (or, to put this in Heideggerian terms, between ‘facticity’ and
biological ‘facts’) insisted upon by Heidegger and his apologists is one of the things
that Levinas’ essay on the ‘Philosophy of Hitlerism’ forces us to reconsider (Critchley
and Dianda, 2015). I am less convinced than Levinas that a ‘society based on consan-
guinity immediately ensues’ (my emphasis) from the Heideggerian ‘concretization of
the spirit’ (Levinas, 1990b, p. 69). (Even Spengler’s ‘cultures’ are as much metaphys-
ical and mystical as they are biological.) Nevertheless, to speak of human populations
as distinct ‘cultures’ governed by cycles of birth, life and death, is, at least implicitly
to think sociopolitical change on the model of bio-organic change. Consequently, a
form of ‘organic’ thinking is implied in these countermodern philosophies even where
a strict biological racism is disavowed.
Furthermore, whilst there is clearly some distance between the ‘countermod-
ern’ philosophies discussed in this chapter and Hitlerite biological racism and anti-
Semitism, all three imply a form of nativism. For Levinas, the distinction between
‘natives’ and ‘strangers’ derived from the sense of attachment to place:
One’s implementation in a landscape, one’s attachment to Place, without
which the universe would become insignificant and would scarcely exist,
is the very splitting of humanity into natives and strangers. And in this
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light technology is less dangerous than the spirits [genies] of the Place.
(Levinas, 1990a, p. 232)
From this perspective, ‘the Heideggerian stress on place is inherently cruel because
its demarcation between sacred and profane space reinforces the distinction between
native and foreigner that underlies nationalism’ (Eubanks andGauthier, 2011, p. 138).
Whereas Being and Time can potentially be read as having a practical, activistic
message, and as expressing the hope for an escape into a more ‘authentic’ mode of
existence, Heidegger’s later philosophy is more profoundly fatalistic. In his famous
final interview with Der Spiegel, Heidegger expresses scepticism about the ability of
philosophy to provide any form of political guidance that might help avert the coming
catastrophe, the title of the interview encapsulating his profound pessimism: ‘Only a
God Can Save Us’ (Heidegger, 1993a).
Conclusion
For all the differences between Spengler, Schmitt and Heidegger, their shared ‘at-
titude of countermodernity’ means that the philosophical distance between them is
small compared to the chasm that separates all three from the classical expression of
the ‘attitude of modernity’ that Foucault saw in Kant’s essay on Enlightenment. To
the extent that the immense political problems of the contemporary world ‘lose the
character of being problems that are subject to a solution put forward by a sovereign
free Self ’, which happens in different ways and to different degrees for each of the
three ‘countermodern’ figures, then all become vulnerable to the ‘mysterious urgings
of the blood, the appeals of heredity and the past for which the body serves as an enig-
matic vehicle’ (Levinas, 1990b, p. 69). Herf suggests that Schmitt’s decisionism and
friend-enemy distinction divorced his politics ‘from any normative foundation other
than that of affirmation of the self ’ (Herf, 1984, p. 118), of one’s ‘own’ identity and
cultural heritage, and much the same could be said of Spengler and Heidegger. The
loss of one’s own identity and particularity is the fundamental anxiety animating the
writings of all three.
In subsequent chapters of this thesis, I will use the theoretical framework sketched
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out in this chapter to argue that the counterjihad movement can be viewed as a novel
form of countermodern political theology, stemming from a particular affective re-
sponse to the ‘terror of history’. In the meantime, the next chapter, the final one in
Part I, considers how Islam and Muslims have figured in a variety of countermodern
political theologies prior to the emergence of the counterjihad movement. By explor-
ing the orientations to Islam of Nazism, the Nouvelle Droite, and ‘international third
positionism’ among other far-right political tendencies, we will be in a better position
to understand the continuities and discontinuities that are represented by contempor-
ary counterjihadist mobilisation against Muslims.
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Chapter 4
‘Peoples of the Forest, Tribes of the
Desert’: countermodern ideologies
and Islam prior to the counterjihad
The 11th September, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon fig-
ure within the counterjihad discourse as a singularly traumatic event, a Heideggerian
‘moment of vision’ in which the received truths of the public world seemed to fail. It
was the day that ‘our world changed for ever’ in the words of ACT for America,1 a
key grassroots counterjihad organisation, a profound shock for Americans who were
‘stirred from our slumber’, as the Gates of Vienna blog puts it,2 by the brutal murder
of more than three thousand civilians at the hands of Al Qaeda. If there is reason to
be sceptical of such claims about the singularity of 9/11 - the mass murder of civil-
ians is, after all, hardly a novel or exceptional event in human history - the events of
that day doubtless did shatter some cherished popular myths concerning the distinc-
tion between civilian and military spaces, the prerogative of national governments to
determine between conditions of war and peace, and the ability of national states to
guarantee the security of their citizens.
Whilst much of the country remained in deep shock, for one group of US cit-
izens the attacks were a cause of celebration, not of mourning. For many American
1http://www.actforamerica.org/confronting_terrorism [Last accessed 28th September 2017].
2http://gatesofvienna.net/2010/08/islam-mischief-and-the-right-to-kill/ [Last accessed 28th
September 2017].
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neo-Nazis, representatives of a political tradition that had always considered ‘world
Judaism’ its primary enemy, 9/11 represented an important blow against the ‘Jewnited
States’, its ‘Zionist Occupation Government’ (ZOG) and the globalist ‘New World
Order’ (NWO) proclaimed by former president George H.W. Bush after the end of
the ColdWar. One supporter of the White Aryan Resistance (WAR) recounted how
he had been ‘listening to some white power music’ when news of the attacks began to
filter through:
After the second plane hit the other Jewish tower, I started paying at-
tention with shouts of joy, Seig Heil salutes and white power chants as
Wealthy Race Traitors, Capitalist Elitists and Negro janitors jumped out
of windows. After the third plane hit the pentagon, I was ecstatic! Wow!
The Jews really took a hit today! (cited in Durham, 2003, at p. 98)
A senior member of the National Alliance, the most important far right group in the
US at the time of 9/11, explained the logic:
The enemy of our enemy is, for now at least, our friends. Wemay not want
them marrying our daughter... We may not want them in our societies...
But anyone who is willing to drive a plane into a building to kill jews is
alright by me. I wish our members had half as much testicular fortitude.
(cited in ibid., at p. 100)
One recurrent theme within neo-Nazi discourses on 9/11 was that the attacks were
the inevitable consequence of American support for Israel, and of the subservience of
American foreign policy to ‘Jewish world power’.
The divergent reactions described here might serve as one measure of the polit-
ical distance between the counterjihad and more traditional far-right tendencies de-
rived from German National Socialism. Moreover, 9/11 also exposed some divisions
within the neo-Nazi milieu. For instance, the leader of the National Alliance, Wil-
liam Pierce, echoed his colleague’s sympathy for Al Qaeda’s motives, but nevertheless
stated ‘I am not in favour of killing Americans. Most of the people who got killed are
my people, white people’ (cited in ibid., p. 100; emphasis mine). The Church of the
Creator, an organisation set up in 1996 to prosecute a ‘Racial Holy War’, called for
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an immediate end to Muslim immigration to the US but also declared its opposition
to US military intervention in Afghanistan, demanding ‘No More American Blood
Spilled for Israel’ (cited in ibid., at p. 101).
Similar divisions were evident in a UK context when the newly elected Chairman
of the British National Party (BNP), Nick Griffin, used the opportunity of 9/11 to
launch a public campaign against Islam as part of his ‘modernisation’ programme, with
the aim of capitalising on public anxieties about jihadist violence and dissociating
the BNP from neo-Nazism and anti-Semitism. Griffin’s strategy, whose discursive
and symbolic construction of an Islamic threat prefigured some of the key themes of
counterjihad discourse, involved tentative support for US-led military intervention in
Afghanistan and was strongly opposed by the more orthodox white racial nationalists
loyal to ousted party founder and veteran neo-Nazi John Tyndall, for similar reasons
to those articulated by the American Church of the Creator.
This chapter takes the ideological morphology of the Griffinite BNP as a point
of departure for considering how Islam and Muslims have figured within a variety of
countermodern political theologies prior to the emergence of the counterjihad. The
approach of the chapter is genealogical in the Foucauldian sense of that term. As
developed by Foucault (1991a), drawing on Nietzsche but also under the influence of
the Heideggerian ‘Destruktion’ of metaphysics,3 genealogy is opposed to the metahis-
torical use of ideal significations, teleologies or the search for ‘origins’. Consequently,
the aim of the chapter is not to provide an exhaustive history of far-right orientations
towards Islam and Muslims, or to locate the ‘source’ of a particular set of ideas or
beliefs, but rather to illustrate how such orientations have been the product of highly
specific sets of contingent historical conditions.
The genealogical approach of the chapter can be contrasted with the taxonom-
ical approach that dominates the existing literature on fascism and the far right. In
particular, the chapter works to unsettle the regnant assumption within Anglophone
‘fascism studies’, that a definitive extrahistorical ‘essence’ of fascism (the ‘fascist min-
3The influence of Heidegger on Foucault is perhaps less often remarked. However, Foucault
claimed in his final interview that ‘...Heidegger has always been the essential philosopher ... My entire
philosophical development was determined by my reading of Heidegger’ (cited in Dreyfus, not dated,
not paginated).
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imum’) can be isolated based primarily on comparative study of interwar European
fascist movements (e.g. Griffin, 1993; Eatwell, 1996), and the corollary of this idea,
that contemporary political movements and regimes whose ideologies deviate from
these examplary cases cannot be considered ‘fascist’. Whilst the analytical focus will
be on the figuration of Islam and Muslims within various far right discourses, the
chapter also serves as an occasion for considering some broader trends within the far
right, including growing transnationalisation, the diversification of political strategies
(Griffin, 2000), and the tendency of some far-right political ideologies to ‘disavow
“classical” Italian Fascism and German National Socialism as emblematic of a dan-
gerous modernity and a consequence of the western Enlightenment which they reject
in favour of alternative “countermodern” genealogies of association, tradition, and an-
tiquity’ (Bhatt, 2012, p. 310). Notwithstanding the ideological heterogeneity of the
tendencies discussed in this chapter, which include ‘universal Nazism’, British neo-
Nazism, the ‘New Right’, and ‘international third positionism’ they can all be seen as
historically and contextually specific articulations of the ‘attitude of countermodernity’
described in the previous chapter.
At the ‘EleventhHour’
The party that Nick Griffin was seeking to reform at the time of 9/11 was one that
was steeped in the British neo-Nazi tradition. Its founder, John Tyndall, had formed
the party in 1982 following a long career within the British far right, starting in the
1950s in the League of Empire Loyalists (LEL), an anti-decolonisation lobby group
that aimed to maintain white rule in Britain’s colonies, led by the conspiratorial anti-
Semite A.K. Chesterton (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002, pp. 32-33). Leaving the LEL to
form the National Labour Party (NLP) in 1958, Tyndall came under the influence
of the leading figure in postwar British neo-Nazism, Colin Jordan, who had set up
the White Defence League (WDL) in 1957 in order to ‘keep Britain white’ (Cop-
sey, 2008, p. 9). Jordan was a key architect of postwar ‘Universal Nazism’, which
stripped Nazism of its specifically German content and recast it as a global struggle
for white world supremacy (Griffin, 2000, p. 167). Nazism was, to Jordan, a revolt
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‘against the whole structure of thought of liberalism and democracy, with its cash
nexus; its excessive individualism; its view of man as a folkless, interchangeable unit
of world population; its spiritual justification in a debased Christianity embracing a
sickly “humanitarianism”’ (cited in Goodrick-Clarke, 2002, at p. 39). One import-
ant organisation here was the World Union of National Socialists (WUNS), founded
by Jordan and the leader of the American Nazi Party, George Lincoln Rockwell, in
1962. WUNS established sections in Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark,
Switzerland, the US, Argentina, Chile and Australia (ibid., p. 38).
An organisation called the British National Party had been formed in 1960 under
Jordan’s leadership, through the merger of theWDL and the NLP, both of which had
been instrumental in fomenting racial tensions in Notting Hill during the summer of
1958 (Copsey 2008, p. 9; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002, p. 33). The 1960s BNP was, how-
ever, a different organisation from the one founded by Tyndall in 1982. Within the
1960s BNP, Tyndall headed an elite uniformed paramilitary vanguard group known
as ‘Spearhead’. However, Tyndall and Jordan’s overt neo-Nazism and paramilitarism
caused dissension within the party and they left in 1962, with Jordan forming the Na-
tional Socialist Movement (NSM) on 20th April that year, the anniversary of Hitler’s
birthday. Tyndall subsequently split from Jordan in 1964, going on to form his own
organisation, the Greater Britain Movement (GBM), which remained ideologically
committed to National Socialism, as well as launching his magazine Spearhead. Tyn-
dall went on to become a dominant figure in the 1970s National Front, which was
formed in 1967 through a merger of the BNP and the LEL, serving as NF Chairman
between 1972 and 1974, and then again from 1976 to 1980. Leaving the NF, Tyndall
formed first the New National Front in 1980 and then the BNP in 1982.
The political ideology of Tyndall’s BNP reflected its founder’s Nazi convictions
adapted to the political context of Britain during the 1980s and 1990s. The revival
of Nazism in post-war Britain had occurred in the context of post-colonial migration
from the Commonwealth, starting in the late 1950s, in much the same way as its post-
war development in the US occurred in the context of the extension of civil rights to
African Americans (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002, pp. 33-34). However, whereas Jordan
remained an unreconstructed Nazi to the end, Tyndall’s Nazism was often fused with
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a more traditional British patriotism. Tyndall nevertheless continued to share the
apocalyptic worldview of Hitler and other leading Nazis. For him, Britain’s ‘entire
national life’ was ‘in the grip of degenerative forces’. Tyndall’s commitment to a form
of biological holismwas evident in his description of these forces as being ‘likemaggots
invading a diseased carcass’, with the nation repeatedly figuring in BNP discourse as a
collective body (cited in Copsey, 2008, at p. 83). For Tyndall, the pathology afflicting
the British organism was liberalism:
At the heart of the sickness is the doctrine of liberalism, which has at-
rophied every healthy national instinct for survival and growth. This doc-
trine of decay and degeneration contaminates almost every aspect of our
national life - not only in the field of politics but also in those of religion,
education, philosophy, the arts and much else. (cited in ibid., p. 83)
Claiming that the ‘cancer’ of liberalism was killing the country, Tyndall ominously
stated: ‘We are at the Eleventh Hour: we do not have long left’ (cited in ibid., p. 83).
Tyndall similarly shared Hitler’s manichaean view of history as a struggle against
the Jews, the ‘evil enemy of mankind’ (Vondung, 2005, p. 92). However his version
of the ‘Jewish world conspiracy’ was heavily influenced by that of Chesterton, which
located the headquarters of ‘Jewish world power’ in Wall Street, New York, rather
than in a cemetery in Prague. From Wall Street, according to Chesterton, the Jews
worked to undermine national identity and national sovereignty by spreading interna-
tionalist ideas and creating international institutions such as the European Economic
Community (EEC) with the ultimate aim of bringing about a ‘OneWorld Federation’
(Copsey, 2008, p. 91). In post-war British neo-Nazism, conspiratorial anti-Semitism
was often conjoined to anti-black racism, through the idea that non-white immig-
ration was part of a Jewish conspiracy to undermine British sovereignty and white
identity. According to Tyndall, ‘the Jew cleverly takes advantage’ of the presence of
‘dark-skinned sub-racials’ to ‘propagate the lie of racial equality... with the ultimate
results of inter-marriage and race-degeneration that he knows will follow’ (cited in
ibid., p. 89).
Within the Nazi tradition of biological racism and conspiratorial anti-Semitism,
Islam and Muslims had long occupied an ambiguous position. InMein Kampf, writ-
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ten during the early 1920s whilst he was imprisoned for his role in the 1923 Munich
putsch, Hitler had articulated an expansive form of anti-Semitism, one that applied
primarily to Jews but also extended to Arabs and Muslims (Hitler, 1992). At other
times, however, he and other leading Nazis, including Himmler, had venerated Islam
as a martial religion that contrasted favourably with Christianity’s alleged pacifism,
and that they regarded as a potential ally against the Jews (Herf, 2014, p. 31). In
the Third Reich, the official position was that Arabs and Muslims were considered
different but not inferior, a view arrived at after Egypt threatened to boycott the 1936
Berlin Olympics (Herf, 2009, p. 717). During the SecondWorldWar, moreover, the
Nazi regime launched a massive propaganda campaign directed at Arab and Muslim
countries, in the hope of mobilising popular resentment against the British in the
Middle East and North Africa and ultimately of expanding the Final Solution out-
side Europe, reflecting Hitler’s belief that ‘world Judaism’ constituted the primary and
existential threat to the Aryan race.
In the wartime propaganda campaign, the Nazis gained the enthuasiastic col-
laboration of some ultra-conservative Muslims, most notoriously the virulently anti-
Semitic GrandMufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini. Husseini, who took refuge
in Berlin between 1941 and 1945, having been forced out of the Middle East by the
British, became ‘the most important public face and voice of Nazi propaganda aimed
at Arabs and Muslims’, according to Jeffrey Herf (Herf, 2009, p. 713). Finding com-
mon ground in their hatred of liberal modernity and the Jews, Husseini and others
worked with the Nazi authorities to deliver anti-British, anti-American and anti-
Semitic propaganda to a mass audience across the Middle East and North Africa
using German short-wave radio and printing presses, a prime example of the coun-
termodernist fusion of technological modernism with political anti-liberalism (ibid.,
pp. 711-12). However, Herf ’s work also convincingly debunks the tendentious re-
visionist claim that it was Husseini’s intervention, during a notorious meeting with
Hitler in November 1941, that finally persuaded Hitler to shift from a policy of forced
Jewish emigration to a policy of mass extermination. Whilst Herf is emphatic that
Husseini had no impact on Hitler’s decision to exterminate European Jewry, he does
however argue that the Mufti played an important role in introducing themes from
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Figure 4.1: Adolf Hitler meets with the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-
Husseini, in Berlin, 28th November 1941. Source: German Federal Archive (via
Wikimedia Commons).
European anti-Semitism into an already extant tradition of Arab and Muslim anti-
Zionism (Herf, 2014).
Reflecting its grounding in this same Nazi tradition, and a primary occupation
with anti-Semitism and biological racism, Tyndall’s BNP was not especially preoccu-
pied with Islam per se, although individual Muslims could become de facto targets in
virtue of being Asian or non-white. There were exceptions to this general indifference
to Islam and Muslims however. In June 1989 the BNP organised a demonstration in
Dewsbury, West Yorkshire, in advance of which it had advertised that a copy of the
Koran would be burned. The aim was to exploit anti-Muslim public sentiment in the
context of the February 1989 fatwā against Salman Rushdie by Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini. The demonstration ended in violence and the arrest of around eighty local
Asian youths (Copsey, 2008, pp. 47-48).
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‘A strategy of euphemism’
When Griffin defeated Tyndall in the party’s first leadership election in 1999, he
sought to turn the BNP into a credible electoral force in time to exploit the coming
‘globalist apocalypse’, which Griffin predicted would come about in the early twenty-
first century due to the increased pooling of sovereignty in international institutions,
growing ethnic and religious diversity, and the erosion of physical and material se-
curity due to ‘globalisation’ (cited in Copsey, 2008, p. 101). To capitalise on these
developments, the BNP needed to professionalise its party machinery and make more
effective use of new communications technologies. It would also drop the ‘march
and grow’ strategy used by the 1970s NF and the 1980s BNP, whereby publicity and
new recruits were gained through staging deliberately provocative rallies and marches
(ibid., p. 127).
Perhaps the most important element of Griffin’s modernisation programme, how-
ever, was a transformation in the party’s lexicon. Henceforth the BNP would speak
of ‘identity’ rather than ‘race’, of physical and material ‘security’, of ‘freedom’ from
state and EU bureaucracies, and of ‘democracy’, understood as the prioritisation of
the needs and wishes of the ethnic majority (ibid., p. 103). Griffin was, however,
keen to emphasise to his internal constituency that the rebranding exercise would be
purely cosmetic, and that fascism remained the end goal: ‘Of course, we must teach
truth to the hardcore’, he wrote in Patriot magazine, a key organ of the modernising
faction, in 1999. However, ‘when it comes to influencing the public, forget about
racial differences, genetics, Zionism, historical revisionism and so on’ (cited in ibid.,
p. 102).
The political model for Griffin’s modernisation project was the French Front Na-
tional (FN), founded in 1972 by a former paratrooper and veteran of the Algerian
war, Jean-Marie le Pen (Copsey, 2008, pp. 102-03; Goodwin, 2011, pp. 66-67).
The FN was a coalition of unreconstructed fascists, Catholic intégristes, monarchists,
Poujadistes and supporters of Algerie Française. Following poor electoral performance
during the 1970s, the FN had begun to make ground in the 1980s in the context of
public concern over immigration. Its first electoral breakthrough came in 1983 when
it got 16.7% of the vote in local elections, and it won nearly 11% of the vote in the
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following year’s European elections. The party’s support was concentrated among the
pieds noirs in the south of the country and in areas with large migrant populations in
the north, especially in and around Paris. By the early 1990s, the FN was regularly
polling between 10% and 14% (Eatwell, 2003, pp. 318-24).
The success of the FN may have been partly attributable to the growing sophist-
ication of its lexicon. This in turn was related to the entry into the party of a number
of leading ideologues of the Nouvelle Droite (ND), an intellectual and cultural move-
ment that had emerged in the late 1960s, following the loss of French Algeria, and
in the context of les événements of 1968, to which it was in part a response (Bar-On,
2011; McCulloch, 2006). The term Nouvelle Droite was not a self-appellation, but
was coined in 1978 by a Le Monde journalist, Gilbert Comte, to designate a certain
current that had since the 1960s been engaged in a conscious project to rehabilitate
certain ideas of the interwar extreme right and adapt them to a new social and political
context (McCulloch, 2006, p. 159). A number of leading ND members joined the
FN during the 1980s and 1990s, including Bruno Mégret as delegate general, and
Yvan Blot as a personal adviser to Jean-Marie le Pen (ibid.).
The involvement of some of its members in the FN was controversial within ND
circles since a key part of the movement’s philosophy was the primacy of the ideo-
logical and cultural spheres over that of electoral politics (an orientation sometimes
rather pompously referred to as ‘metapolitics’). This stemmed from theND’s diagnosis
of the political situation both within and outside France in the late 1960s, which it saw
as one of Leftist control of key social and cultural institutions including schools, uni-
versities and the mass media (Bar-On, 2011, p. 204). Especially under the influence
of its intellectual figurehead, Alain de Benoist, the ND pursued a form of ‘Right-
wing Gramscianism’, which sought to contest perceived Leftist ‘cultural hegemony’
in civil society (ibid.). But success could not be achieved through a revival of crude
and discredited ideas associated with the interwar far right, such as the fuhrerprinzip,
Hitler-worship, and and the like.
The ND’s approach has been called a ‘strategy of euphemism’ (Bhatt, 2012; Fer-
raresi, 1987). This operates on a number of levels. On one level, offensive terminology
is deliberately toned down, with terms like ‘race’ being replaced with ones like ‘culture’,
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‘ethnic group’ or ‘Europe’s biocultural heritage’. More subtly, the ideas of the ND’s
political opponents are selectively appropriated for its ‘Gramscianism of the Right’. In
particular, the ND pioneered the selective mobilisation of New Left environmental,
anti-racist, anti-fascist and democratic discursive frameworks, all of which acquired
wholly different connotations to their generally accepted meanings. One character-
istic inversion was ‘anti-French racism’, from which perspective the anti-racist move-
ment was viewed as a conspiracy to undermine French national identity (McCulloch,
2006, p. 168).
The intellectual resources for the ND project were drawn from heterodox strands
of the interwar extreme right, which, notwithstanding the political distance between
them and ‘official’ Fascism and Nazism, ‘gave the ND a distinctly fascist–revivalist
character’ (McCulloch, 2006, p. 162). The writings of the Weimar conservative
revolutionaries were key here, including Spengler and Ernst Jünger but especially
Schmitt and Heidegger. Other key intellectual forebears included Friedrich Niet-
zsche and the esoteric Italian fascist philosopher Julius Evola (of whom more later).
ND ideas were disseminated through its ‘think tank’, the Groupement de Recherche
et d’Études pour la Civilisation Européene (GRECE; Research and Study Group for
European Civilisation), the journal Nouvelle Ecole, and through the colossal literary
output of Alain de Benoist. Moreover, the ND’s strategy of euphemisation has also
reaped benefits, with de Benoist’s work appearing in the prestigious left-wing journal
Telos, and for a time, even in the pages of the French national paper Figaro (Bar-On,
2011).
Some aspects of the ND vision found ready acceptance within the FN. The lan-
guage of ‘anti-French racism’ was readily adopted, as was the idea of ‘national pref-
erence’, which sought to place the ‘defence’ of French culture and identity over other
considerations, such as the civic rights of minority populations (McCulloch, 2006, p.
167). In other areas, there were tensions, however. One key tension was between
the FN’s primary commitment to French nationalism on the one hand, and the ND’s
primary commitment to a pan-European identity on the other. For the ND, the
modern French state, a product of the revolution of 1789, was destructive of local
and regional identities, and should be replaced with a pan-European empire within
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which the identities of rooted and organic ‘ethnies’ would be preserved: a ‘Europe of
a Hundred Flags’ (Bar-On, 2011, p. 208).
Moreover, the ND’s pan-Europeanism is of a decidedly pagan nature, which sat
rather awkwardly with the Catholic intégriste wing of the FN. GRECE, for instance,
has been avowedly pagan and opposed to what leading member Pierre Vial has called
‘monotheist totalitarianism’, viewing the advent of Christianity as a keymoment in the
destruction of Europe’s ‘original’ pagan cultures and the erosion of ‘natural’ differences
and hierarchies. Vial has stated:
Saint Loup made me into a pagan. That is to say, one who knows that
the only real task in two thousand years is to know whether one belongs
mentally to the peoples of the forest or to that tribe of shepherds who
in their desert proclaimed themselves the elect of a bizarre, ‘lying God’.
(cited in McCulloch, 2006, at pp. 169-70)
Elsewhere he has claimed:
Things are in fact very simple: on one side a mondialiste [globalist] ideo-
logy, universalist, cosmopolitan; on the other, a conception of a rooted
world, communitarian and popular... The war of the peoples of the forest
against the tribes of the desert. (cited in ibid., at p. 170)
One force of ‘mondialisme’ opposed by the ND is the technocratic EU, which the ND
wishes to see replaced with its pan-national European empire. However, following
the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the US has come to be seen as the
main force of ‘mondialisme’, hence in a post-ColdWar context theNDhas displaced an
erstwhile anti-communism for a virulent anti-Americanism. Much like the American
neo-Nazis described in the introduction to this chapter, de Benoist viewed 9/11 as a
consequence of the US’s ‘detestable international policy’ (cited in Bhatt, 2012, at p.
317).
The philosophy of the ND has evolved significantly over time, from biological
racism in the early 1970s to so-called ‘differentialism’ in the late 1980s, although par-
ticularism (whether understood in biological or cultural terms) and inegalitarianism
(however expressed) have been consistent themes (McCulloch, 2006, pp. 175-76).
78
‘Differentialism’ claimed to be against ideas of racial superiority, asserting instead
that all cultures should be able to maintain their distinctiveness and that there was a
cultural ‘right to difference’, which needed to be upheld in order to preserve human
diversity. In this context, de Benoist began arguing for political alliances between
European and ‘Third World’ nations as a counterweight to American global hege-
mony, disingenously equating the ND’s project of white racial survival with that of
decolonisation and black emancipation.
His communitarian wing of the ND also argued that non-white migration to
Europe was a fact of life, and that repatriation had become a political impossibil-
ity. Consequently, Moroccan and Algerian communities could remain in France, and
Muslim girls should be allowed to wear the veil in school due to the ‘right to dif-
ference’: what needed to be opposed was cultural intermixing. De Benoist, who has
never ventured into practical politics, expressed his differences from the FN in the
following terms:
The divergences between the extreme (sic) right and the ND appear to
be insurmountable. 1- the FN is impregnated with a Catholic messian-
ism incompatible with our paganist conception. 2- the FN’s doctrine of
identity is summed up in a typically narrow-minded French nationalism,
whereas we are European... before being French. 3- the FN is opposed to
Mosques, muslim veils... We are for the imprescribable right of peoples
to remain the same; on our soil or elsewhere... (cited inMcCulloch, 2006,
at p. 172)
Yet this position has not been universally accepted within the ND, with former
GRECEmember Guillaume Faye criticizing de Benoist and the communitarian wing
of the ND for failing to oppose the ‘massive non-European invasion’ and a ‘conquer-
ing Islam’.4 Viewing Muslim migration as the primary threat to European identity,
Faye no longer regards Jews as the ‘principal enemy in the battle for white survival’,
and has advocated anti-Muslim alliances between white nationalists and Jews. Not-
withstanding these disagreements, however, the ND’s programme remains the most
4https://web.archive.org/web/20120618005659/http://foster.20megsfree.com/468.htm [Last ac-
cessed 1st October 2017].
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sophisticated far-right philosophical challenge to democracy and modernity (Bhatt,
2012).
Today there are outgrowths of the ND across Europe. The German Neue Rechte
is grouped around the paper Junge Freiheit, the magazines Sezession (Secession) and
Blaue Narzisse (Blue Narcissus), and the Institut für Staatspolitik (IfS; Institute for
State Policy) (Salzborn, 2016). The Italian Nuova Destra is primarily associated with
the Florentine political scientist Marco Tarchi, a former youth leader of the neo-
fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI, Italian Social Movement). In Belgium, the
key figure has been Robert Steuckers and his journal Vouloir. The New Right in the
UK, associated with the journalNew Imperium, owes its 2005 foundation to the former
National Front organiser Troy Southgate. There are similar ND-influenced groups in
a variety of other European countries. Metapedia exists as a far-right alternative to
Wikipedia, having been set up by ND supporters in Sweden (Bar-On, 2011, pp. 209-
11). The ND has also influenced the ideologies and programmes of far-right political
parties across Europe besides the FN, including the Belgian Vlaams Belang, the Italian
Lega Nord, and the British National Party. The influence of ND ideas on Griffin’s
modernising project could be seen in the claims being made in party publications by
1999 that the BNP ‘is not a racist party’ but instead leading the ‘political response to
anti-white racism’ (cited in Copsey, 2008, at p. 103).
Offshoots of the ND also exist outside Europe. One such offshoot is the North
American New Right associated with the publisher Counter Currents,The Occidental
Quarterly journal, and the writers Greg Johnson, Michael O’Meara, Tomislav Sunic
and Kevin MacDonald amongst others (Bhatt, 2012, p. 318). The more ‘intellectual’
strands of the ‘Alt-Right’ have also been heavily influenced by Nouvelle Droite ideas.5
Another is Alexander Dugin’s ‘neo-Eurasianism’, a form of Russian supra-nationalism
which regards its key geopolitical enemy as the ‘Atlanticist conspiracy’ headquartered
inWashington. Duginmet de Benoist in Paris in 1990, and invited him toMoscow to
speak at the Academy of the General Staff in April 1992, where de Benoist diagnosed
post-Soviet Russia’s political malaise as being due to its lack of a clearly defined enemy.
Theman who had introduced Dugin to the writings of Carl Schmitt told the audience
5See, for instance, the reading list on Richard Spencer’s altright.com for an indication of the move-
ment’s intellectual influences: https://altright.com/reading-list/ [Last accessed 23rd September 2017].
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of Russian generals: ‘All strategic conceptions are based on the understanding of a
main enemy. Today, who is your enemy?’ (Clover, 2016, pp. 175-204).
The ‘NewAlliance’
Nick Griffin was in many respects an unlikely reformist figure, and his attempted
modernisation of the BNP, using the model of the FN and the theories of the ND,
marked the latest in a series of political self-reinventions. During the 1980s, Griffin
had been a key figure first in the radical ‘Political Soldiers’ faction of the National
Front together with Derek Holland, Graham Williamson and Patrick Harrington,
and then later in the ‘International Third Position’ (ITP), a form of revolutionary
nationalism opposed to both communism and capitalism, with which the US White
Aryan Resistance (discussed in the introduction to this chapter) was also associated.
This radicalisation had come about after the comprehensive failure of the NF’s 1979
election campaign, in which it was routed by Margaret Thatcher’s Tories, and the
subsequent departure of Tyndall as Chairman, who took much of the blame for the
NF’s losses. The NF subsequently underwent a transformation into a ‘revolutionary’
organisation, shorn of ‘armchair nationalists, tin-pot dictators or refugees from old
political parties’, as its magazine Nationalism Today put it in 1985 (cited in Macklin,
2005, p. 304).
Part of the impetus for the radicalisation of the Front came from the arrival in
Britain of fugitive Italian neo-fascist terrorists from the Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari
(NAR; Armed Revolutionary Nuclei), led by Roberto Fiore, who were on the run fol-
lowing the 2nd August 1980 bombing of Bologna railway station (Goodrick-Clarke,
2002, pp. 68-69; Macklin, 2005, p. 303). Under the influence of Italian neo-fascism
rather than the British neo-Nazism of Tyndall and Jordan, the ‘Political Soldiers’
turned away from electoralism and popular racism, becoming increasingly elitist, mil-
itant, anti-capitalist and esoteric. Revolutionary cadres were set up modelled on those
of Corneliu Codreanu’s Romanian Iron Guard, with Griffin running training sessions
at his farm in Suffolk. Griffin’s ‘Smash the Cities’ campaign expressed the ‘back to the
land’ ethos of the Political Soldiers, in which ruralism and feudal values were coun-
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terposed to urbanism and consumerism (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002, pp. 42-43, and pp.
68-69). The radical direction of the Political Soldiers did not find universal support
within the Front, prompting the formation of the breakaway National Front Support
Group.
One of the key philosophical inspirations for the Political Soldiers, introduced to
them by the Italian refugees, was the heretical Italian fascist philosopher Julius Evola.
Evola had been a marginal figure within Mussolini’s Italy but was eulogised by Italian
neo-fascists, including the leader of the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI; Italian So-
cial Movement) Giorgio Almirante who described him as ‘our Marcuse, only bet-
ter’ (cited in Sheehan, 1981, at p. 47). Evola criticised official Fascism, especially
its compromises with modern party politics, the Italian monarchy and the Catholic
church from a position further to the right, although Evola did enjoy the dubious
distinction of having his esoteric racial theories endorsed by Mussolini as the basis
of Italian Fascism’s ‘spiritual racism’ as against Nazi biologism. Evola found Nazism
crude and plebeian but admired the intellectual fascism of the German conservat-
ive revolution. Key influences on his thought included Nietzsche, Spengler (whose
Decline of the West Evola had translated into Italian), the Roman occultist and neo-
pagan Arturo Reghini, theTheosophy of Helena Blavatsky, and the French orientalist
René Guénon, who wrote much on Hinduism but subsequently converted to Islam
(Ferraresi, 1987). Concerning Evola, the theologian and philosopher Thomas Shee-
han (Sheehan, 1981) has written that he knows of no other contemporary European
thinker in whose work the rejection of the modern world is so absolute or so violent.
That Evola consistently dates the beginning of the ‘decline of theWest’ to somewhere
between the eighth and sixth centuries B.C. is a measure of his radicalism, although
it is entirely consistent with his philosophy of ‘Traditionalism’.
Evola’s key thesis, set out in his 1934 workRevolt Against theModernWorld (Evola,
1995), is that Western civilization is in terminal decline because it has become de-
tached from the metaphysical realm of ‘Being’, the ontological arche or ordering prin-
ciple that imparts form and order to the universe. Evola contrasts ‘Traditional’ civil-
izations, ‘characterized by the feeling of what is beyond time, namely by contact with
metaphysical reality that bestows upon the experience of time a very different, “myth-
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ological” form based on rhythm and space rather than on chronological time’, with
the modern, anthropogenic civilization, caught in the ‘illusion’ of continual develop-
ment, change, and ‘progress’ (1995, p. xxxii). Historicity and temporality are specific
to modern civilization, although any society based on them would display the char-
acteristic attitudes, values and social forms found in the modern world. Conversely,
any society based on supra-temporal principles would display the characteristics of a
‘Traditional’ civilization, namely order, hierarchy and stability.
Hence, Evola dates the decline of theWest to the onset of ‘historical time’ in clas-
sical antiquity. There are affinities here with Heidegger, insofar as both agree that
the decline of the West long predates the Enlightenment or the French Revolution.
However, there is also an important difference: whereas for Heidegger the decline of
the West was dramatised as a fall into metaphysics from a more primordial relation-
ship to Being, for Evola it was dramatised as a fall from metaphysics (the world of
‘Being’) into historicity (the world of ‘becoming’). Particularly disastrous according
to Evola was the Socratic elevation of discursive rationality (logos) over intuition and
myth (mythos), which opened the door to scepticism and doubt, and paved the way
for the emancipation of the individual, rational subject from the world of Tradition
(Sheehan, 1981). A second phase of decline corresponds to the birth of Christianity
and the fall of the Roman Empire, with Christianity’s egalitarian universalism being
regarded by Evola as an especially destructive force (Evola, 1995, p. 287 ff.). A third
phase related to the advent of humanism, and from then on the process has accelerated
through the Enlightenment and the French revolution with the consumerist society of
the contemporary United States representing the terminal phase of Western decline.
In Evola’s cyclical historical scheme, we are currently living in an age corresponding
to the Hindu Kali Yuga, a prelude to the apocalypse that will eventually lead to a new
Golden Age where man is once again centred in the realm of ‘Being’.
Fidelity to the realm of ‘Being’ implied, for Evola, an organic, hierarchical so-
cial order in which everyone fills a pre-ordained place according to his or her proper
status. Evola’s major social and political reference points were the Hindu caste sys-
tem, ancient Rome andmedieval Europe. Whilst none of these could be reconstituted
exactly, he nevertheless hoped for a new political order that would approximate the
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characteristic Traditional institutions of divine kingship, warrior aristocracy, and the
caste system, and whose outward form would be that of an empire. All of these insti-
tutions must be oriented ‘upward’ toward the realm of Being; that is, they must have a
sacred and not merely a secular foundation. There were, for Evola, two main ways of
approaching the Sacred: contemplation (the domain of the priestly caste) and heroic
action (the domain of the warrior caste). War, for Evola, must have a sacred function.
One key reference point for him was the Islamic doctrine of jihad or ‘holy war’, which
distinguished between a ‘greater’ and a ‘lesser’ holy war (Evola, 1995, pp. 116-128).
In Evola’s writings, these acquire connotations similar to the Schmittian distinction
between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ enemies: the ‘lesser’ holy war is ‘the material war
waged externally against an enemy population’, whereas the ‘greater’ holy war is ‘of an
inner and spiritual nature’, it is ‘man’s struggle against the enemies he carries within’
(Evola, 1995, p. 118). Importantly, however, the ‘lesser’ holy war could become a
means of carrying out the ‘greater’ one: the fight against the external enemy could be-
come ‘almost a ritual action that expresses and gives witness’ to man’s struggle against
his ‘inferior nature’, his ‘chaotic impulses and all sorts of material attachments’ (ibid.).
The key text of the radical NF faction was Derek Holland’s 1984 pamphlet The
Political Soldier (see figure 4.2),6 which bemoaned the ‘mounting evidence of disin-
tegration and of decay’ in Britain and Europe, of ‘political and economic decline’, and
the ‘spirit of this age, an age which lives for the moment and where the word “instant”
reigns supreme’.7 Channeling the esoteric philosophies of Codreanu and Evola and
citing Oswald Spengler, Holland prophesied that ‘the culture of Europe is going to die
out within our lifetime’, which would ‘signal the end of the White peoples forever’.8
Looking for salvation through a new elite, his pamphlet called for the creation of a
‘New Man’, the ‘Political Soldier’, who would ‘embody or express the spirit that our
nation so desperately needs’.9 The ‘Political Solider’ was the man seized by ‘a spiritual
and religious ideal that totally dominated their lives’, who would ‘live the National-
6Available online at http://www.gornahoor.net/library/PoliticalSoldierA4.pdf [Last accessed 22nd
September 2017].
7Ibid., pp. 6-7.
8Ibid., p. 7.
9Ibid., p. 9.
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Figure 4.2: Front cover of Derek Holland’s pamphlet The Political Soldier. Courtesy:
Searchlight archive, University of Northampton.
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ist way of life every day’.10 Holland looked to the Spartans, Roman centurions and
Christian crusaders, but above all to Codreanu’s Romanian Iron Guard, ‘the most
outstanding example of Political Soldiery’.11
In its search for a neo-fascist ‘third way’ between communism and capitalism, the
radical NF faction followed the Italian tierza positione in supporting anti-Western
national revolutionary movements, including Ruhollah Khomeini’s Iran, Muammar
Gadaffi’s Libya, and the black separatism of Louis Farrakhan’s Nation of Islam (Cop-
sey 2008, pp. 45-46; Macklin, 2005, pp. 303-04). All of these were celebrated on the
front cover of the March 1988 edition of Nationalism Today as part of a ‘new alliance’
(see figure 4.3) against what Holland had called ‘the Slave States of the U.S.S.R. and
the U.S.A.’12. Holland’s Political Soldier eulogised ‘the Islamic Revolutionary Guards
in the Iran of the mullahs’, saluting their ‘courage’ and their ‘contempt for death’. In
September 1988, Griffin, Harrington and Holland travelled to Tripoli for a four-day
visit as guests of the Gadaffi regime. The purpose of the visit, according to a sub-
sequent report in National Front News, was to view at first hand ‘the injustice and
horror of the U.S. terror bombing of Libya’ and to take ‘an in-depth look at the way
in which modern development in industry and retailing is being carried out in keeping
with the Third Position ideology of Muammer Qathafi’s Green Book’.13 If measured
by the number of free copies of the Green Book with which the delegation returned,
the trip could be judged an outstanding success.
These professions of admiration and attempts at alliance-building between pu-
tative racial enemies may seem unusual but they are not exceptional. As Paul Gilroy
has documented, there have been similar associations between white supremacists and
black nationalists in a US context, who have found common ground over their shared
desires for racial purity and spatial segregation (Gilroy, 2000). One such association
was betweenMarcus Garvey, the founder of the Universal Negro Improvement Asso-
ciation (UNIA), and Edward Clarke, the second-in-command of the Ku Klux Klan,
in the early 1920s (ibid., pp. 70-73). Later, Malcolm X would allege that Elijah
10Ibid., pp. 9-10.
11Ibid., p. 10.
12Ibid., p. 13.
13Nation Front News, 111, p. 1.
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Figure 4.3: Front cover of the March 1988 edition of National Front News, showing
the ‘New Alliance’. The figures depicted in the inset are, moving clockwise from top
left to bottom right: Muammar Gadaffi, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and Louis
Farrakhan. Courtesy: Searchlight archive, University of Northampton.
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Muhammad, then leader of the Nation of Islam, had made similar contacts with the
Klan and with Lincoln Rockwell’s Nazis during the early 1960s, with the aim of se-
curing some land in Georgia or South Carolina for a segregated black state (ibid., p.
74). The logic, Gilroy suggests, was that ‘the Nazi and the Klansman are to be pre-
ferred to the liberal because they are open and honest about their racialized beliefs.
At least you know where you are with a Klansman’ (ibid., p. 74).
‘The threat that can bring us to power’
The BNP’s response to the 9/11 attacks reflected a tension between the desire to ex-
ploit public anxieties about jihadist terrorism and the need to respect the ideological
convictions of committed party activists. Within hours of the news of the 9/11 attacks
breaking, the BNP website announced the party’s ‘conditional support’ for retaliatory
strikes by US and British forces against Al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan. The three
‘conditions’ attached to the BNP’s support, none of which was remotely realistic at
the time, were that the US and UK governments should take action ‘to remove the
root causes of the hatred of the Islamic world for Uncle Sam and his faithful British
poodle’, by ending their support for Israel, ending the sanctions regime and bomb-
ing campaign against Iraq, and withdrawing US troops stationed in Saudi Arabia.
At the same time, the BNP launched a national campaign against Islam in Britain,
‘with the aim of alerting our people to the dangers posed by the extremist followers of
this medieval superstition’.14 Thousands of leaflets were printed warning that Britain
was turning into an ‘Islamic Republic’, and on 24th November, BNP activists staged
an anti-Islam demonstration in Parliament Square in London, in which they carried
placards reading ‘Islam out of Britain’ (see figure 4.4). Some demonstrators dressed
up as Crusaders armed with swords and St George Cross shields, and two of these
medieval knights put to the sword an effigy of Prime Minister ‘Tony Bin Blair’, who
was dressed up in robes and a turban for the occasion.15
In a further effort to exploit public anxieties about Islam whilst disavowing its
racist and fascist pedigree, the BNP formed an ‘Ethnic Liaison Committee’ that in-
14Identity, issue 14, October 2001, p. 5.
15Identity, issue 16, December 2001, p. 7. See also Spearhead, no. 395, January 2002, p. 27.
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Figure 4.4: BNP anti-Islam leaflet, October 2001 (top). BNP demonstrators in Par-
liament Square, London, November 2001 (bottom). (Courtesy: Searchlight archive,
University of Northampton.)
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cluded ‘a long-time Sikh activist and aHindu who has made a personal in-depth study
of Islam’.16 The aim was to ‘give the lie’ to accusations that the party was made up of
‘racists’ and ‘haters’. One of the Committee’s projects was to produce a ‘professionally-
wound cassette’ containing ‘the most detailed audio expose of the “Green Menace”
ever produced’. Identity boasted that the ‘Politically Correct lie... that Islam is a re-
ligion of “peace”’, a rhetorical trope rehearsed by both Bush and Blair in the months
after 9/11, ‘is shattered into a thousand pieces by this project’.17 The strategy was con-
tinued during subsequent elections, with one BNP broadcast for the 2004 European
elections introduced by a Sikh, who claimed that the BNP was the only party ‘with
the courage to speak out about the biggest danger facing this country today, Islamic
extremism’ (cited in Goodwin, 2011, at p. 69).
Griffin’s strategy of exploiting public concerns about jihadist violence by trying
to align the BNP with non-Muslim British Asians, and with a US military strategy
whose architects included people with surnames like Wolfowitz, was met with dis-
may among some of the party’s supporters. One reader of John Tyndall’s magazine
Spearhead, wrote in to the November 2001 issue to say that ‘I could hardly believe my
eyes when I clicked onto the British National Party website after the attacks on New
York and Washington’.18 Whilst ‘deploring’ the attacks, the correspondent argued
that nevertheless ‘we should know what led to it - America’s unswerving support of
Israel and her determination to try to order the affairs of the whole world far beyond
her borders’. The letter expressed disbelief that the party could be ‘going along with
Tony Blair in the latest of his demonstrations of servility to the American President’,
and argued that ‘if the Americans are determined to continue in their policies of global
mastery and support of Israel’ then ‘we most certainly should not help them’. The let-
ter concluded by noting that the BNP’s contrived public position on British Islam and
the War on Terror showed ‘that Mr Griffin has done a big about-turn since the days
back in the 1980s when he visited Libya and went cap in hand to Colonel Gadaffi’.19
Griffin sought to explain and defend the BNP’s heretical position in a series of
16Identity, issue 16, December 2001, p. 15.
17Ibid.
18Spearhead, no. 393, November 2001, p. 22.
19Ibid.
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opinion pieces published over the next few months in the official party magazine,
Identity, at that time edited by an up-and-coming young activist named Paul Golding.
The crux of Griffin’s argument was brutally simple: 9/11 demanded in response a
demonstrative act of overwhelming violence against non-whites lest it be interpreted
as a symbol of declining white world power, in the way that, for instance, the British
defeat at Singapore in 1942 had signalled the fundamental weakness of the Empire:
Billions of Third Worlders, who know little or nothing about who (sic)
runs American foreign policy, saw only the White Man’s technology be-
ing turned against him by non-whites armed just with Stanley knives...
The only way to prevent September 11th becoming a lasting lesson in the
weakness of the White World was for the White Man’s military machine
to wreak devastating death and destruction on those held to be respons-
ible. As a matter of fact, for the purposes of symbolism and deterrence, it
didn’t even matter too much whether the right bunch of non-whites were
hit; the important thing was to show the entire world that there is still a
terrible price to pay for pushing the ‘West’ too far.20
However, Griffin explained, the BNP’s public position also reflected ‘more prosaic
but no less important’ political considerations. Firstly, for a party seeking mainstream
credibility, it would not have been politically expedient to be seen to be ‘soft’ on Al
Qaeda, which, after all, represented a genuine national security threat. Secondly, it
was politically useful for a party ‘still falsely accused of being pro-Hitler’ to temporarily
align itself with the US and its Israeli ally.21
The BNP’s campaign against British Islam also re-coded some key themes of ar-
chetypal fascism and anti-Semitism. Identity was quick to transpose one of the main
tropes of classical anti-Semitism into an anti-Muslim key, warning that Muslims
‘show disloyalty’ to their countries of residence, ‘recognise no governments anywhere’
and ‘deplore manmade laws’, urging that it was ‘time to root out the Islamic fifth
column’.22 Evidently alive to criticisms from within, by December 2001 the official
BNP position had shifted somewhat. In a rather tetchy article in that month’s issue of
20Identity, issue 16, December 2001, p. 4.
21Ibid.
22Identity, issue 15, November 2001, p. 3.
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Identity, entitled ‘No British Blood for Afghanistan!’23 Griffin emphasised the short-
term and conditional nature of his support for air strikes against Afghanistan. The
strikes had gone ahead and provided ‘the necessary object lesson to any other Third
World regime which might be tempted... to harbour terrorists who strike against the
West’; consequently ‘[t]he message “Don’t Mess With US” will have been received
loud and clear over the whole planet’. But, Griffin added, ‘that is enough’ and to con-
tinue the war any longer would be a ‘grave mistake’, potentially creating ‘the recipe
for a global conflagration between hundreds of millions of followers of a 7th Century
visionary, and the advocates of the equally irrational and Messianic drive for a 21st
Century NewWorld Order’. Moreover, the BNP did not accept ‘that a single British
soldier should die in Afghanistan’.24
Griffin’s 2001 campaign against Islam was strongly criticised by John Tyndall’s
magazine Spearhead, most notably in an April 2002 article entitled ‘The BNP and
Islam: time to start thinking straight’.25 Whilst the writer, John Morse, noted that
opposition to Islam as an ‘alien force here in Britain’ and to the ‘creeping ethnic cleans-
ing’ of ‘our own people’ by ‘Islamic encroachments’ were things with which all white
nationalists would ‘surely agree’, he nevertheless took issue with Griffin’s emphasis on
Islam ‘as if it were the only threat to our identity and survival as a race and nation’.
His main argument was that this focus ‘misrepresents the real purposes of British
nationalism’:
[O]ur objection is to the occupation of any part of our land by all and any
peoples radically alien to us in blood and race.26
For Morse, cultural or religious ‘alienness’ were just particular aspects of this ‘more
fundamental factor’ of race. Moreover, he claimed, there was a danger in the BNP
giving the impression ‘that it is only the Muslim presence we are worried about’, be-
cause it might send the message ‘that our claims about our own land are limited’, that
Muslims aside ‘otherwise the matter is negotiable’ and that ‘we can thereby somehow
cop out of the thorniest issue of all - that is, race’. Morse also questioned whether ‘it
23Identity, issue 16, December 2001, pp. 4-5.
24Ibid.
25Spearhead, no. 398, April 2002, pp. 18-20.
26Ibid., p. 18.
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would in any way profit us to ally ourselves with Sikhs or others purely for the sake of
a crusade against Islam’.27
In addition to questioning Griffin’s strategic judgment, Morse’s article also poin-
ted out a number of more specific inconsistencies and self-contradictions in Griffin’s
opinion pieces, suggesting that ‘within the chaotic architectural pastiche of Identity’s
argumentation on this issue the drainpipe doesn’t really reach up to the guttering’.
Not only did the official BNP position go against ‘the general view of nationalists
that we should stay out of foreign quarrels’, but deterrence was ‘the last effect likely
to be produced’ by military intervention in Muslim countries. It was equally unlikely
that getting embroiled in a ‘no-win war against Islamic extremists abroad’ would help
to highlight the ‘problems of immigration’ at home, as Griffin had argued: rather,
the geopolitics of the Middle East typically ‘leaves voters cold’. Part of the reason
for Griffin’s strategic confusion, Morse suggested, was that he could not make up his
mind whether the 9/11 attacks expressed an ‘aggressive and fanatical desire for world
domination’ on the part of global Islam or, alternatively, an understandable response
to ‘Zionist imperialism’ and ‘US-sponsored globalism’ on the part of a handful of
Muslims.28 In conclusion, Morse advocated an alternative position for nationalists to
rally around: a new nomos of the earth involving a grand bargain between ‘the West’
and ‘the Muslim world’. This would be based on Western renunciation of support for
Israel and the affirmation of a principle of ‘mutual non-interference in each other’s
respective regions of the world’. In practical terms this would mean Western military
withdrawal from the Middle East and the repatriation of Muslim populations living
in the West.29
There were several other differences between the Griffinite ‘moderniser’ position,
represented by Identity, and the more orthodox racial nationalism of Tyndall’s Spear-
head. For one thing, Spearhead was much stronger and more consistent in its oppos-
ition to British military involvement with the US, in contrast to Identity’s vacillation
on the issue in the months after 9/11. There were also differences in the way the two
magazines portrayed British Muslims. Whereas Identity tended to portray Muslims
27Ibid., p. 18.
28Ibid., p. 20.
29Ibid., p. 20.
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living in Britain as part of an ‘Islamic fifth column’, Spearhead argued strongly that
the ‘real traitors’ are ‘our own multi-racialists’ and that in expressing support for the
Taliban, the Muslim fundamentalist cleric Omar Bakri was ‘no traitor’ but ‘only be-
ing loyal to his own kind’.30 Fidelity to one’s ‘own’ kind is perhaps the fundamental
value of identitarian political philosophies, and one that Spearhead clearly thought
that Griffin and the modernisers had neglected in aligning themselves with America’s
‘globalist wars’.
Griffin’s strategy of exploiting public anxieties about jihadist violence was renewed
with full vigour after the July 2005 London transport bombings. Earlier that year,
during the May general election, the party had already been warning of the ‘creeping
Islamification’ of Britain (cited in Goodwin, 2011, at p. 69). It subsequently tried to
claim that the 2006 local elections were ‘a referendum on Islam’, with campaign leaflets
asking voters ‘Are You Concerned About the Growth of Islam in Britain?’. The issue
had acquired added salience in the lead-in to the elections due to the Danish cartoons
affair, and a subsequent Al Muhajiroun demonstration outside the Danish embassy in
London on 3rd February 2006 in which its supporters carried placards with slogans
such as ‘Behead Those Who Insult Islam’ and ‘Freedom Can Go to Hell’. By this
time, Tyndall had passed away and Spearhead had ceased publication.
By March 2006, Griffin was arguing with increased conviction for an exclusive
focus on the ‘green menace’. Addressing himself to ‘hysterical anti-Semites’, Griffin
argued that the time had come ‘for white nationalists around the world to dump such
paranoid political suicide notes in the historical bin where they belong’:
There is no ‘Jewish conspiracy’ to poison our wells or to turn subway sys-
tems into bombs under our cities. There are, by contrast, a limitless num-
ber of Islamic schemes to do precisely that. This is the factor which is
going to dominate politics for decades to come. This is the enemy that
the public can see and understand. This is the threat that can bring us
to power. This is the Big Issue on which we must concentrate in order to
wake people up andmake them look at what we have to offer all around.31
30Spearhead, no. 397, March 2002, p. 16.
31Identity, issue 64, March 2006, p. 8.
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Conclusion
This chapter has tried to show that, far from being pre-determined at an ideological
level, far-right orientations towards Islam andMuslims have been the product of con-
tingent historical and political conditions, and often fiercely contested. Moreover, the
constraints and opportunities that the contemporary far right faces are fundamentally
different to the ones faced by interwar fascist movements. Reflecting on the debate
between Alain de Benoist and Guillaume Faye, the North American New Rightist,
Michael O’Meara, has written:
There is both a political and a theoretical issue at stake here. In our post-
modern age, when the jus publicum Europaeum has given way to global-
ism’s anti-European order, nationalists confront a situation where they are
obliged to fight a multi-front, asymmetrical war: Against an external en-
emy, the non-white hordes replacing Europeans, and against an internal
enemy, those liberal elites, Jewish and otherwise, who promote and make
possible this replacement. Faye and the reformists focus on the external
enemy, his critics... on the internal enemy. And, as in every multi-front
war, the question inevitably arises: Who is the principal enemy, the gate
keepers or the gate crashers?32
As we will see in the next part, this question continues to divide the far right, and it
is a faultline that is carried over into the counterjihad movement.
In Part II of this thesis, I will argue that the counterjihad is, like the political
tendencies discussed in this chapter, a historically and contextually specific articu-
lation of the ‘attitude of countermodernity’. It shares the apocalyptic visions of the
various countermodern political theologies discussed in this chapter, as well as their
Schmittian reduction of politics to a friend-enemy distinction. However, its dramat-
ization of Western crisis and decline is somewhat different to those encountered in
this chapter, and its configuration of the internal and external enemies is also differ-
ent. Importantly, its prioritisation of an Islamic enemy is not a matter of short-term
32https://www.counter-currents.com/2011/08/the-new-jewish-question-of-guillaume-faye/ [Last
accessed 30th September 2017].
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political tactics, as it had been for the BNP under Nick Griffin, but one born of deep
conviction. However, as we move on to consider the counterjihad, a number of key
themes will be continued: apocalypticism, conspiracism, particularism and an aes-
thetic repertoire that evokes the archaic, the antiquarian and the mythological. The
four chapters contained in Part II of this thesis look in detail at the counterjihad, its
discursive, aesthetic, organisational and tactical repertoires. In the first instance, we
turn to an organisational analysis of the counterjihad movement and its international
political networks.
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Part II
TheCounterjihad
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Chapter 5
‘Welcome to the Counterjihad’:
anatomy of a political movement
Well, basically the counterjihad movement’s something new... in the
sense that this is the first time that street protest movements, or
what’s being tagged as the ‘far right’, actually all support Israel... like
even if you look at Marine le Pen now she’s moving towards Israel,
know what I mean?
Former senior EDL activist, interview, Sept. 2015
The counterjihad first became visible as a specific activist and political tendency, or-
ganisationally and ideologically distinct from those discussed in the previous chapter,
during the late 2000s. Symptomatic at that time were the proliferation of ‘Defence
Leagues’ and ‘Stop Islamisation’ groups in various national contexts including Eng-
land, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Serbia,
and the USA. Also symptomatic were a number of campaigns to ‘ban the burqa’, as
well as political mobilisations against mosques and minarets, one of which achieved
success when in 2009 Switzerland imposed a ban on the construction of minarets fol-
lowing a popular referendum. A number of key online spaces were also set up during
the 2000s, including Jihad Watch, Atlas Shrugs, Gates of Vienna, Fjordman (the pseud-
onym of a Norwegian blogger, Peder Jensen), and the 1389 blog, whose homepage
greets visitors ‘Welcome to the counterjihad!’. During the late 2000s and early 2010s,
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activists from different countries increasingly began to encounter one another, in part
through these online spaces, resulting in the formation of a number of international
networks such as the International Civil Liberties Alliance (ICLA), the International
Free Press Society (IFPS), and umbrella groups such as Stop Islamisation of Europe
(SIOE) and the federation of European Defence Leagues. A series of international
counterjihad conferences took place between 2007 and 2013 in Copenhagen, Vienna,
Zurich, London, Brussels and Warsaw.
The political geography of the movement that emerged from these interactions is
primarily transatlantic, although its wider networks extend as far as Israel and Aus-
tralasia. The European and North American ‘wings’ of the counterjihad are some-
what different in terms of their organisational forms and ‘repertoires of contention’
(Tarrow, 2011). In a European context, political parties and disruptive street protest
movements have tended to predominate, whereas the US counterjihad is dominated
by professionalised and often well-resourced advocacy groups. The counterjihad’s or-
ganisational infrastructure and support base is not, for the most part, a direct product
of the European neo-Nazi or American white nationalist milieux. Much of its Amer-
ican leadership has come from conservative or neo-conservative backgrounds, as well
as from the religious right and in some cases from backgrounds in the national secur-
ity establishment and the ‘counterterrorism’ industry. Whilst a few of the political
parties associated with the European counterjihad have histories of association with
neo-Nazism, others do not, and much of its grassroots support in Europe has come
from the football hooligan fraternity rather than from organised neo-Nazism.
Key intellectual resources for the counterjihad include the ‘Eurabia’ literature as-
sociated with the British writer Gisele Littmann (‘Bat Ye’Or’ (Daughter of the Nile))
and the late Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci (see Ye’Or, 2005; Fallaci, 2001, 2006),
and popularised by counterjihad bloggers such as Robert Spencer of Jihad Watch and
Peder ‘Fjordman’ Jensen. The ‘clash of civilizations’ literature associated with Amer-
ican conservative academics such as Bernard Lewis (1990) and Samuel Huntington
(1993 and 1996) has also been important. There is now an enormous literature draw-
ing on ‘Eurabia’, the ‘clash of civilizations’ and related discursive frameworks in the
writings of ultraconservative academics, journalists and polemicists such as Daniel
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Pipes, Mark Steyn, Melanie Phillips, DouglasMurray, Caroline Cox, Steve Emerson,
Brigitte Gabriel, Robert Spencer, Pamela Geller, Bruce Bawer and Lars Hedegaard,
besides many others.
This chapter argues that the counterjihad can be understood as a social move-
ment, with a division of labour between its intellectual, political and activist ‘wings’.
The analysis of the movement presented in this chapter is based on online social net-
work analysis, analysis of key websites and organisational literatures, interview data
and scholarly literature. The chapter also necessarily has a historical dimension, since
the movement has evolved considerably over its lifetime, including over the period
of study. The chapter examines first the European and then the North American
counterjihad, before turning to the transnational networks that have brought them
together. Finally, the chapter concludes with a consideration of the political influ-
ence that the movement has been able to wield.
TheEuropean Counterjihad
The European counterjihad movement comprises a wide range of right-wing political
parties, street movements and grassroots mobilisations across the continent. Polit-
ical parties that have been active within counterjihad networks include the Belgian
Vlaams Belang (VB; Flemish Interest), the Sverigedemokraterna (SD; Sweden Demo-
crats), the Italian LegaNord (LN; Northern League) and the Schweizerische Volkspartei
(SVP; Swiss People’s Party). The two most important cases of sustained mass mobil-
isation against the ‘Islamisation of Europe’ (lasting months or years rather than days
or weeks, and being influential outside the specific national or local context in which
they first emerged) are the English Defence League (EDL) between 2009 and 2013,
and the Pegida movement since 2014. Both will be explored in detail in this chapter.
Other key grassroots groups have included Stop Islamiseringen af Danmark (SIAD;
Stop Islamisation of Denmark) and the Czech Blok proti islámu (Bloc Against Islam).
Themost important political figurehead for the European counterjihad movement
has been the Dutch politician Geert Wilders, whose Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV;
Party for Freedom) is perhaps the closest thing to an electorally successful single-issue
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anti-Islam party in Europe. Formed in 2006, following Wilders’ departure from the
centre-right Volkspartij for de Vrijheid enDemocratie (VVD; People’s Party for Freedom
and Democracy) two years earlier, the PVV is in many ways an exceptional organisa-
tion (Vossen, 2011). As a result of a moratorium on new membership declared by
Wilders immediately after the party was established, he remains its sole member, act-
ing as both party chair and leader. Consequently, there is no membership to exercise
control over the party’s programme, and little in the way of local or regional party
infrastructure. Wilders presides over the selection and training of PVV parliamentary
candidates, who tend to remain personally loyal to him once elected (de Lange and
Art, 2011). Effectively, Wilders is the PVV and the PVV is Wilders.
Since 2006, Wilders and his party have occupied a political space first opened up
within Dutch politics by Pim Fortuyn (Vossen, 2010, p. 22). Openly gay, Fortuyn
was one of the first European politicians to achieve electoral success by invoking the
spectre of ‘Islamisation’ as a threat to ‘Western’ values such as sexual freedom, gender
equality and free speech. The policy platform of his party, the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF;
Pim Fortuyn List), combined socially liberal positions on sexuality, abortion and eu-
thanasia with restrictionist policies on (especially Muslim) immigration, a distinct-
ive blend whose novelty was widely remarked at the time although it may now seem
quite familiar. Just a few days after Fortuyn was murdered by a left-wing activist on
6th May 2002, the LPF, which had only been established in February that year, won
17% of the vote in the Dutch general election. This translated into 26 seats in the
Dutch parliament and the party subsequently entered a coalition with the VVD and
the Christen Democratisch Appe‘l (CDA; Christian Democratic Appeal). When the
government collapsed three months later, the party proved unable to sustain this level
of support in the elections that followed. By 2004 the LPF, deprived of its figurehead,
had effectively become a spent force (Akkerman, 2005, p. 344), and it was officially
dissolved in 2008 (de Lange and Art, 2011, p. 1234).
Whereas Fortuyn was a political novice who had made a career as an academic
sociologist, Wilders is a professional politician who started his political career in the
VVD during the 1990s, first as a parliamentary assistant and later as an MP. He was
seen as close to party leader Frits Bolkestein, who had criticised multiculturalism and
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invoked Islam as a threat to liberal democracy in speeches as early as 1991 (Vossen,
2011, p. 181; Fekete, 2009, p. 80). While still a member of the VVD in the early
2000s, Wilders gained notoriety for his outspoken support of the ‘War on Terror’
and advocacy of punitive measures such as detention without trial and deportation of
terror suspects. Following his departure from the VVD in September 2004, and the
murder of the film director Theo van Gogh in November that year, Wilders has been
living under permanent police protection (de Lange and Art, 2011, p. 1235). He
is nonetheless regarded as having played an instrumental role in securing the Dutch
rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty in a referendum in June 2005, before
going on to found the PVV in February 2006. Over the following decade, the PVV
has become an enduring presence within Dutch politics and due to the nature of the
country’s proportional voting system, has sometimes played the role of power broker.
In the first general election after it was founded, the PVV secured 5.9% of the vote and
nine seats in parliament. In the 2010 general election, this increased to 15.5% of the
vote and 25 seats in parliament, and the party subsequently concluded a confidence-
and-supply arrangement with Mark Rutte’s minority VVD government. The PVV
subsequently lost seats in the 2012 general election, before regaining some ground
in the most recent set of elections in March 2017. The PVV group in parliament
currently consists of 20 members, led by Wilders.
Wilder’s blend of social liberalism, political authoritarianism and anti-Muslim
nativism is more radical than Fortuyn’s. Particularly since he left the VVD, his polit-
ical discourse has made extensive use of key counterjihad topoi such as Eurabia, often
implying that Muslim migration is part of a deliberate conspiracy by liberals and left-
ists to bring about the ‘Islamisation’ of Europe. Wilders has taken liberal positions
on abortion, euthanasia and the minimum wage, and disassociated himself from neo-
fascist politicians such as Jean-Marie le Pen and Jorg Haider. At the same time, he
has cast doubt on the loyalties of Dutch parliamentarians with dual nationality, cam-
paigned for a prohibition on the Koran, proposed a ‘headrag tax’ and advocated a
complete cessation of Muslim migration to Europe. Dutch-speaking commentators
have also remarked on the coarsening of Wilders’ language over time (Vossen, 2011,
pp. 185-86).
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Wilders has built extensive networks in Europe, the United States and Israel. He
has travelled internationally to promote his 2008 short film, Fitna, which features se-
lected Koranic verses superimposed over graphic scenes of jihadist violence. In Feb-
ruary 2009, he was famously denied entry to the UK after he flew there to attend a
screening of the film in the House of Lords at the invitation of the cross-bench peer
Caroline Cox and the UKIP peer and future leader Malcolm Pearson, although the
travel ban was subsequently overturned. His 2012 autobiography, Marked for Death:
Islam’s War Against the West and Me, is heavily promoted on counterjihad blogs, with
links to online retailers where it can be purchased.
The grassroots of the European counterjihad revolves around a number of street-
level protest movements. One of the earliest and, despite its small size, arguably most
influential was Stop Islamiseringen af Danmark (SIAD; Stop Islamisation of Den-
mark). SIAD was founded in 2005 by Anders Gravers, a former member of Den
Danske Forening (DDF; The Danish Association), a nativist organisation formed by
Søren Krarup and Jesper Langballe in 1987 to oppose the liberal Law on Foreigners
of 1983, which Gravers left because he had come to see it as no more than a talking
shop. SIAD has since held occasional and sparsely-attended demonstrations in pro-
vincial Danish cities such as Aarhus andAalborg, which have often been outnumbered
by anti-fascist counterdemonstrations and have sometimes turned violent (Sedgwick,
2013, p. 220). Despite its marginal importance in the Danish context, SIAD gave rise
to a number of mimetic ‘Stop Islamization of...’ groups and a pan-European group,
‘Stop Islamization of Europe’ (SIOE) in 2007, led by Gravers and an English activist,
Stephen Gash (Denes, 2012, pp. 298-99). It also formed important links with US
counterjihadists early in the next decade, which will be discussed in more detail later
in this chapter. In terms of its grassroots mobilising power, however, SIAD has long
since been eclipsed by other organisations.
The first case of sustained mass mobilisation against the ‘Islamization’ of Europe,
which provided a template for similar mobilisations in other countries, began in the
English town of Luton, around thirty miles north of London, in 2009. The Eng-
lish Defence League (EDL) emerged in the summer of that year as an evolution of
the United People of Luton (UPL), which had initially mobilised in opposition to a
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protest by offshoots of Anjem Choudary’s Al Muhajiroun. The Al Muhajiroun sup-
porters had been demonstrating against a March 2009 homecoming parade in Luton
by the Royal Anglian Regiment, which was returning from a tour of duty in Iraq, with
placards telling the soliders to ‘go to hell’, and calling them ‘butchers’ and ‘baby killers’.
Following a chaotic protest by UPL in Luton town centre on 24th May, the first of-
ficial event as the English Defence League was a demonstration in East London on
27th June. Further demonstrations were held in Birmingham,Manchester, Leeds and
Nottingham in the second half of 2009 (Allen, 2011; Copsey, 2010; Jackson, 2011).
The British counterjihad movement in fact pre-dated the formation of the EDL
by three years, originating with a ‘March for Free Expression’ in London’s Trafalgar
Square on 25th March 2006 (Bhatt, 2012, p. 314). The march had been called in
the context of the fallout from the 2005 Jyllands Posten cartoons affair and specifically
in response to an Al Muhajiroun demonstration outside the Danish embassy in Lon-
don on 3rd February 2006, in which its supporters carried placards with slogans such
as ‘Behead Those Who Insult Islam’ and ‘Freedom Can Go to Hell’. Some British
activists involved in the March for Free Expression subsequently became involved in
discussions on the US-based Infidel Bloggers Alliance and Gates of Vienna blogs that
led to the formation of the 910 Group, which eventually became the International
Civil Liberties Alliance (ICLA), a key international counterjihad organisation (see
‘networking the counterjihad’ below).
The subsequent emergence of the EDL as the key rallying point for the British
counterjihad reflected circumstances specific to Luton in 2009. The town is ethnically
and religiously diverse, with a white British population of forty-five per cent in the
2011 census, and twenty-five per cent of the town’s residents identifying as Muslim.1
There is a history of activism and recruitment within the town by elements of the
Islamic religious right, especially in the early to mid 2000s (Copsey, 2010; Pilkington,
2016, p. 37). ‘Omar Bakri…AbuHamza, they were all based here,’ one former senior
EDL activist from Luton recalled to me.2 Finally, the Vauxhall car factory, which
had dominated the local economy since the early twentieth century, closed down in
2002. Aside from the obvious effect on the local labour market, this also removed one
1http://ukcensusdata.com
2Interview 05, September 2015. Street movement activist and organiser, male, UK.
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of the key public spaces within which residents from different ethnic and religious
backgrounds had interacted with one another (Pai, 2016).
The organisational infrastructure of the EDL that evolved out of the UPL did so
largely independently of the existing UK far right, although some EDL activists had
histories of involvement in the BNP. Much of the EDL’s initial support was drawn
from football hooligan ‘firms’, through ultra-nationalist and anti-Islamic groups like
March for England and Casuals United, whose declared aim was to ‘Unite the UK’s
football tribes against the Jihadists’ (Copsey, 2010, p. 10). Writing in the anti-fascist
magazine Searchlight in September 2009, shortly after the emergence of the EDL,
Nick Lowles emphasised the complex relationships between football hooligan ‘firms’
and organised fascism, stressing the primarily local rather than national allegiances of
football hooligans, their lack of interest in political activism, and shifts in the demo-
graphic makeup of football ‘firms’ that reflected wider changes in the sport.3 Stephen
Yaxley-Lennon, who emerged as the EDL’s leader by autumn 2009, had been part of
the local Luton town football firm, the Men in Gear (MIGs) in his youth and took
his pseudonym, ‘Tommy Robinson’, from the name of a former MIGs leader. Len-
non had considered joining the BNP in the early 2000s, but decided against it after
learning of their whites-only membership policy, which would have excluded other
members of the Luton MIGs (Pilkington, 2016, p. 38). Under his leadership, the
EDL sought to distance itself from the racial nationalism of the BNP, and to remove
avowed neo-Nazis and anti-Semites from its ranks. This may have partly owed to the
influence of Alan Lake, a wealthy evangelical Christian and early financial backer of
the EDL, who is reported to have made his support of the group conditional on their
disavowing the white, racial nationalism of the BNP (Denes, 2012, p. 299).
Whilst the EDL sought to distance itself from fascism and neo-Nazism, its dis-
cursive, aesthetic and tactical repertoires suggested a philosophical affinity. The EDL’s
name recalled that of the 1950s White Defence League (WDL), which, as we saw in
the previous chapter, was led by influential neo-Nazi Colin Jordan and also included
John Tyndall, who would later become chairman of the National Front before leaving
to found the BNP.The EDL’s emblem, a red templar cross on a black and white back-
3N. Lowles, ‘Hooligans Disunited’, Searchlight, September 2009, pp. 6-7.
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ground, and its motto ‘in hoc signo vinces’ (‘in this sign you will conquer’) also have
complex historical associations. ‘In hoc signo vinces’ was used as a military motto by
the first Christian Roman Emperor, Constantine I, then subsequently by the medieval
Knights Templar, the Spanish King Phillip III who expelled the Moriscos from the
Iberian peninsula in 1609, and later by the Polish king John III Sobieski whose milit-
ary leadership brought about the defeat of the Ottoman Turks at the gates of Vienna
in 1683. However, ‘In Hoc Signo Vinces’ is also the title of the best-known essay by
the leader of the American Nazi Party, George Lincoln Rockwell, who co-founded
theWorld Union of National Socialists (WUNS) with Colin Jordan in 1962 (Gardell,
2014, p. 147).
Similarly, the EDL’s tactical repertoire recalled the spatial strategy of ‘march and
grow’ used effectively by the National Front. As a result, the movement expan-
ded very rapidly during 2009 and 2010 through a series of high-profile and provoc-
ative demonstrations in multiethnic cities across England, including Birmingham,
Leicester, Dudley and Bradford. These were often met by large anti-fascist counter-
demonstrations and frequently turned violent. One interviewee, an anti-fascist activist
who was present for many of these events, recalled that the atmosphere among EDL
supporters at these early demonstrations was ‘wild’:
Everyone was pissed, lots of drug use. It was kind of terrace violence,
you know? If you think about the big Leicester ones and the Bradford
ones, you’d put on your mask, you’d go along and have a massive fight.
You’d fight the police, you’d fight the Left... Leicester was a very big
one, I remember Leicester being a massive one, and it being like a war
zone, it was wild. They had coaches from all over the country, you had
a huge police presence, you had huge fences being pushed down. And
I remember police helicopters everywhere, [people] rampaging through
the town… and everyone just looking round, this is incredible... how is
this legal?4
At its peak, reached around the time of a ‘homecoming’ demonstration in Luton in
February 2011, the EDL could mobilise up to 3,000 active supporters at a time. Lat-
4Interview 12, anti-fascist activist, male, UK.
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ent support for the group on social media was much higher, with the EDL official
Facebook page having been ‘liked’ around 85,000 times by April 2011 (Allen, 2011,
p. 286).
If the EDL’s discourse, symbols and modes of congregation often had fascistic
or neo-Nazi resonances, then the novelty of the organisation lay in its appropriation
of the political language of official British multiculturalism, its vocal support for Is-
rael, and its professed sympathy for groups historically considered anathema by the
far right, such as Jews and homosexuals, on the basis that they too were victims of Is-
lamic religious ‘intolerance and barbarity’. These themes were reflected in the EDL’s
mission statement, in which it claimed to be ‘a human rights organisation’ set up to
protect both non-Muslim and Muslim citizens from the excesses of ‘radical Islam’.5
They were also reflected in the organisational structure that had emerged by summer
2010. This was based in the first instance on territorially defined local divisions (Birm-
ingham, Plymouth, Essex, Yorkshire, etc.) which were then aggregated into regional
organisations (North West, North East, East Midlands, East Anglia, South West,
South East, and Greater London). Each of these had a Regional Organiser, who
was in turn accountable to the leadership team.6 In addition to these geographical
groupings, however, the EDL also organised different demographic groups including
Hindus, Sikhs, Pakistani Christians, Greeks and Cypriots, disabled people and wo-
men (the EDL ‘Angels’) into separate divisions, although some of these had very few
members. Perhaps the most conspicuous of these groups were an LGBT division and
a Jewish division, the latter being effectively the English wing of the far-right Jewish
Defence League, founded by the Orthodox rabbi Meir Kahane in 1968 (Bhatt, 2012,
p. 311).
The Jewish and LGBTdivisions served as themost importantmarkers of the polit-
ical distance between the EDL and the British neo-Nazi tradition. Whilst the BNP
had tried to appeal to British Sikhs, as we saw in the previous chapter, and the neo-
Nazi British Movement (BM) of the late 1970s had organised women in a separate
5http://gatesofvienna.net/2011/01/edl-mission-statement-the-final-version/ [Last accessed 2nd
October 2017].
6Notwithstanding this attempt to impose some discipline on the organisations, ethnographic re-
search on the EDL stresses the fluidity of the organisational structure and suggests that organisational
hierarchies were honoured more in the breach than the observance.
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division (Durham, 1998, p. 81), the presence of the rainbow flag or the Star of David
at these groups’ public events would have been unimaginable. Nor was the visible
presence of these symbols at EDL events just for show: these divisions were among
the EDL’s more active, including on non-public-facing fora ( Jackson, 2011). It is
also inconceivable that the BNP, NF or BM would have invited an American Rabbi,
Nachum Shifren, to address one of their rallies, as the EDL did in October 2010.
Similarly, traditional neo-Nazi organisations such as the BNP, NF and BM would
have been unlikely to retract an invitation to an American pastor, Terry Jones, on the
basis of his reactionary views on homosexuality and race, as the EDL did in February
2011, still less to send out their Sikh spokesperson, Guramit Singh, to explain the
rationale for the decision in the following terms: ‘The EDL is anti-homophobic and
we are a non-racism organisation’ (cited in Allen, 2011, p. 288). Yet when the Jewish
division’s leader, Roberta Moore, resigned in June 2011 she cited the failure of the
EDL leadership to contain the ‘Nazis within’ as a key part of her rationale.
In addition to its attempts to create a multiethnic and multiconfessional alliance
against the ‘Islamisation’ of Britain, the EDL leadership also embarked on a concer-
ted effort at international networking during 2010 and 2011. The EDL organised
a demonstration in support of Geert Wilders, when he was eventually granted per-
mission to travel to the UK to show his film Fitna at the House of Lords in March
2010.7 Claiming on its website to be ‘leading the counterjihad fight in Europe’, EDL
activists attended events organised by the German Bürgerbewegung Pax Europa (Pax
Europa Citizens Movement) in Berlin in April 2010, by the French Bloc Identitaire
in Lyon in April 2011, and by the Försvarskåren Sveriges Självsförsvar (Swedish Self-
Defence Corps) in Gothenburg in May 2011 (Busher, 2016, p. 127). By this time
the EDL had also become an inspiration for mimetic ‘Defence League’ mobilisations
in other European countries, including Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Germany and
the Netherlands, and attempts were made to launch a European Defence League at
an event in Amsterdam in October 2010. The EDL also forged links with two of
the key figures of the nascent US counterjihad movement, the bloggers Pamela Geller
and Robert Spencer, and sent representatives to an international counterjihad confer-
7http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8551220.stm [Last accessed 2nd October 2017].
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ence organised by the ICLA in Zurich in June 2010. The transnational networks that
emerged from these interactions are considered in more detail later in this chapter (see
‘networking the counterjihad’).
Unlike the BNP and theNF, the EDLnever seriously engaged in electoral politics,
the candidacy of Robinson’s cousin and deputy, Kevin Carroll, in the 2012 Police and
Crime Commissioner election in Bedfordshire notwithstanding (Pilkington, 2016, p.
45). In 2011, the EDL endorsed the British FreedomParty (BFP), which had been set
up by disenchanted ex-BNPmembers. The party was at that time led by PaulWeston,
a former UKIP parliamentary candidate and a writer for the Gates of Vienna blog.
Lennon became his deputy in April 2012. However, Weston and others left the BFP
at the start of 2013 to found a new party, Liberty GB, with an explicit counterjihad
agenda.8 The party contested three constituencies in the May 2015 general election:
Luton South, LewishamWest and Penge, and Birmingham Ladywood, finishing last
in all three cases. In October 2016 its Press Officer, Jack Buckby, a former BNP
member, stood in the Batley and Spen by-election triggered by the murder of Labour
MP Jo Cox, finishing sixth with 1.1% of the vote.
The EDL’s long-term decline since its 2010-11 peak partly reflects its internal ten-
sions and contradictions, but also the external constraints and pressures that the group
faced. Key sources of tension included the extent to which the EDL should invest
time and resources participating in international counterjihad networks, the merits
or otherwise of engaging in electoral politics, the prominence given to activists from
minority backgrounds such as Roberta Moore and Guramit Singh, and the prioritisa-
tion of issues that were not directly related to ‘English defence’ against ‘Islam’, such
as support for Israel (Busher, 2016, p. 123 ff.). These philosophical and ideological
tensions intersected with a growing north-south divide within the organisation and a
growing disconnect between the leadership and some of the grassroots members, re-
flected in the formation of splinter groups such as the ‘Infidels’9 by early 2011 ( Jackson,
2011, pp. 29-30). These internal problems were compounded by changes in policing
strategies, which increasingly pushed EDL events to areas outside town centres and
often far away from anti-fascist counterprotestors. Combined with a crackdown on
8Interview 2, party political activist, male, UK.
9Discussed in more detail below.
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alcohol and drug consumption at demonstrations, motivated by the leadership’s de-
sire to professionalise the organisation and be taken more seriously, this meant that
the ‘buzz’ of early demonstrations disappeared. Finally, by late 2011 ‘demonstration
fatigue’ (Busher, 2016, p. 131) had set in, not least because the EDL had run out of
new towns and cities to visit. As one of my informants in the anti-fascist movement
observed, ‘[t]here’s only so many times people will come out, again and again, and
do the same thing, listen to the same speech from the same person in the same car
park’.10
By early 2012, attendance at EDL demonstrations could be measured in the hun-
dreds rather than the thousands. The organisation enjoyed a brief revival of support
and activity during the summer of 2013, following the murder of Fusillier Lee Rigby
in Woolwich in south east London in May that year. However, Lennon and Carroll
subsequently announced their departure from the EDL in October 2013, at a press
conference organised by the Quilliam Foundation. Since then, the organisation has
been in what one of Lennon’s many successors as leader described as a ‘state of flux’
(cited in Pilkington, 2016, p. 37). In addition to the frequent changes of leadership
a process of fragmentation into splinter groups, long underway, has accelerated. By
July 2016, an EDL demonstration that I observed in Hyde Park in London attracted
barely one hundred supporters.11
The second case of sustained mass mobilisation against the ‘Islamization’ of
Europe began in the town of Dresden in the former East Germany around a year
after the EDL was terminally weakened by the departure of its most visible lead-
ers. The circumstances of Pegida’s founding are reminiscent of the way that the EDL
began, but its modes of congregation and the profile of its supporters make it a some-
what different organisation. The immediate trigger for Pegida was its founder Lutz
Bachmann’s observation of an anti-ISIS rally by supporters of the proscribed Kurd-
ishWorkers’ Party (PKK) in Dresden city centre, which he saw as symptomatic of the
importation of ‘foreign religious wars’ into Germany (Dostal, 2015; de Genova, 2015;
Virchow, 2016). Following this, Bachmann set up a Facebook page on 11th Octo-
ber 2014, and the first rally against ‘Islamisation’ was held nine days later on 20th
10Interview 12, anti-fascist activist, male, UK.
11Fieldnotes, July 2016.
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October, attracting around 350 participants. The size of the demonstrations grew
very rapidly from thereon in, reaching an estimated 17,500 just before Christmas,
and peaking at around 25,000 in January 2015, shortly after the Paris offices of the
satirical publication Charlie Hebdo were attacked by gunmen pledging allegiance to Al
Qaeda (Virchow, 2016, p. 544). As recently as summer 2016, the weekly Dresden
demonstrations were still attracting crowds of up to 3,600 (Virchow, 2016, p. 552).
Most of Pegida’s organisers were political novices drawn from Bachmann’s social
circles in the local football and party scenes. Some, such as Siegfried Däbritz, had
reported links to the German Defence League as well as to motorcycle gangs and
football hooligan groups. On 26th October, shortly after Pegida was founded, Dab-
ritz travelled to Cologne to take part in a demonstration by the improbably-named
Hooligans Against Salafists (Hooligans gegen Salafisten; HoGeSa), in which around
4,500 marched through the town shouting slogans such as ‘Germany for the Ger-
mans!’ and ‘Foreigners out!’ before the event ended in a riot (de Genova, 2015, p.
2). Pegida’s spokespeople included Götz Kubitschek, editor of the Neue Drecht (ND;
New Right) magazine Sezession (Secession) and general manager of the Institut für
Staatspolitik (IfS; Institute for State Policy) a key intellectual site of the German New
Right (Grabow, 2016, p. 176). Splits within the leadership team emerged in Janu-
ary 2015 after the DresdenMorgenpost revealed private Facebook messages by Bach-
mann in which he referred to immigrants as ‘cattle’, ‘scumbags’ and ‘trash’, as well as a
photo of him posing with a side parting and ‘Hitler’ moustache. Bachmann was forced
to step down temporarily, but was reinstated the following month after reports that
the moustache had been added after the photo was taken. In the meantime, several
cofounders had left Pegida including its spokeswoman Kathrin Oertel, who went on
to found her own project, Direkte Demokratie für Europa (DDfE; Direct Democracy
for Europe), in February 2015 (Virchow, 2016, p. 544).
From October 2014, Pegida supporters gathered once a week on Monday nights
for an ‘evening stroll’ in the centre of Dresden, in a manner reminiscent of the historic
‘Monday demonstrations’ against the East German regime in late 1989. Pegida’s ap-
propriation of the related slogan ‘Wir sind das Volk’ (‘We are the People’) consciously
evoked these events. In a post on the Pegida Facebook wall in October 2014, Däbritz
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had written:
Let us take to the streets and show our region that WE ARE THE
PEOPLE and that we are tired of paternalism, political correctness, Is-
lamization and the constant insulting of us as Nazis just because we stand
up for our country and for Europe! (cited in de Genova, 2015, p. 5)
The speeches at the Monday rallies incorporated similar themes, including the loss
of German identity, distrust of the political classes and the press, and criticisms of
‘multiculturalism’ and ‘political correctness’. Some of their key discursive tropes -
‘volk’, ‘lugenpresse’ (‘lying press’) - had obvious historical resonances with the Nazi
era. Over time, various group rituals evolved such as a Pegida anthem, a regular one
minute’s silence for victims of jihadist terror attacks, and the conclusion of each event
with an announcement of the number of participants (Virchow, 2016, p. 545). Viol-
ence has mostly been confined to the margins of these events, such as the March 2nd
2015 incident when a breakaway group of 300 Pegida supporters attacked the Refugee
Struggle protest camp in central Dresden (de Genova, 2015, p. 9).
The relatively genteel style of Pegida’s rallies compared to, say, the disorderly
protests of the EDL or SIAD, enabled the group to attract considerable support from
‘respectable’ lower middle-class residents of Dresden. Academic research has identi-
fied the typical Pegida supporter as male, between 30 and 60, with a regular income
and above-average education. Male pensioners are also well represented. Most self-
identified as being on the centre right, but not far right, of the political spectrum
(Dostal, 2015; Grabow, 2016). To the extent that public and journalistic comment-
ary has emphasised the neo-Nazi currents within Pegida, it has arguably missed the
movement’s greater significance: the demonstrable potential for anxieties about Islam
to serve as a unifying agenda around which elements of the parochial middle classes,
the football hooligan fraternity and more traditional far-right forces can coalesce (de
Genova, 2015, p. 4).
The success of the Dresden rallies had a demonstrative effect and, starting in early
December 2014, protest groups in other German cities affiliated themselves with Pe-
gida, including Bragida (Braunschweig), Legida (Leipzig), Dugida (Dusseldorf ) and
Mugida (Munich). However, in only a very few cases, such as Leipzig, did these
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mobilisations attract crowds of more than a thousand (Virchow, 2016, p. 547), and
many of the mobilisations outside Dresden attracted a relatively higher proportion
of neo-Nazis, Identitarians and football hooligans. Mimetic Pegida mobilisations
also occurred in countries across Europe, including Austria, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK, with varying degrees of success, but nowhere
did they approximate the mobilising power of the Dresden movement (Berntzen and
Weisskircher, 2016). The Pegida UK demonstration described in the introduction to
this thesis marked the second attempt to establish a UK affiliate, following a chaotic
launch event in Newcastle in February 2015 led by an inexperienced organising team,
which saw significant neo-Nazi attendance and the visible display of swastikas and
white pride banners.12
The comparative failure of Pegida mobilisations elsewhere in Germany and across
Europe foregrounds the specificity of Dresden in late 2014, just as the comparative
failure of Defence League mobilisations outside England had shown the particularity
of Luton in the summer of 2009. Several studies have emphasised the conservative
political culture of Saxony (see e.g. Dostal, 2015; Virchow, 2016). The CDU in Sax-
ony is on the conservative wing of the party, and prominent CDU politicians in the
state have complained about ‘the destruction of our society caused by the cultural re-
volution by the ’68 movement’ and the ‘dominance of the ’68 movement in the media,
in academia, and in school’ and argued that Islam has no place in Saxony (cited in
Virchow, 2016, pp. 548-49). There is a long history of activism in the state by violent
far-right groups like Skinheads Sächsische Schweiz and Sturm 34, while the neo-Nazi
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD; National Democratic Party of Ger-
many) has been represented in the regional parliament. Far right groups active in the
region have oftenmobilisedmemories of the firebombing of Dresden in 1945 to create
narratives of German victimhood and Allied aggression. By deliberately echoing the
Monday demonstrations of 1989, Pegida rallies sought to stir similar local memories
of Cold War anti-communism. Finally, Saxony today has open borders with Poland
and the Czech Republic, two former Eastern Bloc countries. It is notable that, to the
extent that Pegida has mobilised successfully in Germany outside of Dresden, it has
12Fieldnotes, February 2015.
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done so primarily in the east of the country.
Pegida, like the EDL, has been reticent about entering the electoral arena, except
at a local level in Saxony where it achieved a modest 9.6% of the vote in the Dresden
mayoral election of June 2015. This may partly owe to the occupation of similar polit-
ical space by the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD; Alternative for Germany), with
which Pegida has long had an ambivalent relationship. The AfD was founded in
April 2013 as an anti-Euro party (Grabow, 2016) and as an explicit riposte to Angela
Merkel’s claim that there was ‘no alternative’ to the pro-Euro, pro-bailout Germanic
political consensus (Berbuir et al., 2015, pp. 162-63). Since its founding, the party
has been divided between a Eurosceptic wing loyal to party founder Bernd Lucke and
a nationalist wing around Frauke Petry, Björn Höcke, Marcus Pretzell, Alexander
Gauland, and others (Grabow, 2016). The relationship between the AfD and Pegida
has evolved over time, reflecting internal power struggles in the AfD that have seen
the steady ascendence of the nationalist wing, symbolised by election of Petry as party
co-leader in July 2015 and the subsequent departure of Lucke, who claimed that the
party was becoming increasingly ‘Islamophobic and xenophobic’ (Grabow, 2016).13
Latterly, there have been signs of convergence between Pegida and the AfD, with
members sharing platforms at each others’ events (Grabow, 2016). Moreover, at its
2016 party conference, the AfD adopted an official position that ‘Islam is not part
of Germany’.14 What will become of the Freiheitlich Direktdemokratische Volkspartei
(FDDV; Liberal Direct Democratic People’s Party), founded by Bachmann in July
2016, remains to be seen.
At the periphery of the European counterjihad movement are a number of neo-
Nazi-influenced, often violent groups that are considered ‘fringe’ or ‘too far right’ by
most counterjihad activists. Some of these have emerged from within the counterji-
had movement itself and subsequently evolved into much more traditional neo-Nazi
organisations. For instance, the aforementioned ‘Infidel’ groups emerged as distinct
factions within the EDL in late 2010 and early 2011 reflecting a north-south di-
13https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-politics-eurosceptics-idUSKCN0PI25720150708
[Last accessed 31st July 2017].
14https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/alternative-for-germany-anti-immigrant-
afd-says-muslims-are-not-welcome-in-germany-a7009531.html [Last accessed 31 Jul. 2017].
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vide within the organisation as well as discontent with the Lennon-Carroll leader-
ship ( Jackson, 2011). The North West and North East Infidels subsequently broke
away to form splinter groups with their own organisational identities and infrastruc-
tures. Whilst opposition to ‘Islamisation’ remains a key focus for the Infidel groups,
this coexists with an avowed white racial nationalism, anti-Zionism, militant anti-
Communism and a glorification of political violence, all traditional themes of British
neo-Nazism.
Other groups have emerged from within the neo-Nazi milieu to occupy political
space opened up by the counterjihad movement, showing that the flow of ideas and
personnel operates in both directions. For instance, Britain First (BF) is a political
party and direct action group formed in 2011 by former BNP activists Jim Dowson
and Paul Golding, the latter of whom we met in the previous chapter as the editor of
the BNP’s Identity magazine in the early 2000s during the early days of the Griffin
modernisation programme. Britain First has made opposition to ‘Islamisation’ a key
theme of its political discourse and activities (Allen, 2014). These activities have in-
cluded ‘mosque invasions’, which involve entering mosques without permission to
confront worshippers and distribute Bibles, and ‘Christian patrols’, themost notorious
of which involved BF activists driving ex-army landrovers into the London borough
of Tower Hamlets, an area with a largeMuslim population, in 2014. Superficially, BF
may seem to be just another counterjihad group like the EDL or Pegida. However, it
is not just the party’s historical links to the neo-Nazi BNP that mark it out as distinct
from the core counterjihad network. The group is animated by a form of Christian
apocalypticism in which the end of civilization follows a ‘holy war’ between Christians
and Muslims. This Christian identity politics likely reflects the influence of Dowson,
a former BNP fundraiser, ex-Calvinist minister and evangelical Protestant with links
to militant pro-life networks across Europe. BF’s Christian identity politics differ-
entiates it from patriotic street groups like the EDL, and in many ways has greater
affinities with the North American counterjihad movement.
116
TheNorth American Counterjihad
The North American wing of the counterjihad is somewhat different to its European
counterpart in terms of its organisational and tactical repertoires. This may partly be
due to the nature of the US electoral system, which offers few opportunities for new
political parties at a national level, but it also reflects a perception that ‘Islamisation’
has not gone as far in the US as it has in Europe. Consequently the American coun-
terjihad is currently being waged primarily in the ‘information battle space’ and the
legislative arena. Hence often well-resourced and professionalised advocacy groups
tend to predominate, rather than ephemeral protest movements or marginal polit-
ical parties. However, there has also been a proliferation of grassroots mobilisations
against mosque developments since the mid-late 2000s and, more recently, against
the resettlement of Syrian refugees. Much of the organisational infrastructure of the
US counterjihad movement dates from the early-to-mid 2000s and the presidency of
George W. Bush, when a number of key online spaces and activist groups were estab-
lished. However, the intellectual seeds of the movement were planted much earlier
and especially in the writings of conservative authors such as Daniel Pipes, Samuel
Huntington and Bernard Lewis. The movement began to acquire greater momentum
in the late 2000s, during theObama administration, and in the context of moral panics
about the new president’s nationality and religious beliefs, the growth of ‘homegrown
terrorism’, and public opposition to the so-called ‘Ground Zero Mosque’.
Two important early counterjihad activist organisations in the US were the Free-
dom Defense Initiative (FDI) and Stop Islamization of America (SIOA), both led by
the bloggers Pamela Geller and Robert Spencer, the latter of whom is also a prolific
author. Geller, who grew up in a Jewish family in Long Island, worked as a journalist
in New York before launching her blog, Atlas Shrugs, in 2004. She first came to public
attention in 2007 as a supporter of ‘Stop the Madrassa’, a campaign against a secular
English-Arabic dual-language elementary school in Brooklyn (Bail, 2015, p. 118).15
Spencer, a Catholic whose grandparents migrated to the US from Turkey in the early
twentieth century, is a university graduate with a master’s degree in religion, although
his specialism was early Christian history rather than Islamic studies. Spencer set up
15See also Kumar (2012, pp. 171-71).
117
his blog, JihadWatch, in 2003, the same year that his first book came out, entitled Islam
Unveiled: Disturbing Questions about the World’s Fastest-Growing Faith. Since then he
has published numerous books, including Stealth Jihad: How radical Islam is subverting
America without guns or bombs (Spencer, 2008), which has become a canonical text of
the counterjihad movement.
Spencer’s Jihad Watch blog is supported by the David Horowitz Freedom Center
(DHFC) founded in 198816 by former New Leftist David Horowitz, who edited the
radical magazine Ramparts before embarking on an ideological journey to the hard
right in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Ashbolt, 1985). Besides sponsoring Jihad
Watch, the DHFC also publishes an online magazine, FrontPage. FrontPage is ed-
ited by Jamie Glazov, another key figure in the transnational counterjihad movement
whose online TV show, The Glazov Gang, regularly broadcasts interviews with key
counterjihad figures. The DHFC has also sponsored several ‘Islamo-Fascism Aware-
ness Weeks’ and runs a number of programmes, such as ‘Discover the Networks’ and
‘Truth Revolt’ that monitor the political Left and perceived leftist bias in the media.17
Its annual ‘Restoration Weekends’ gather together conservative politicians, activists
and authors from the US and elsewhere.
TheFDIwas launched by Spencer andGeller in February 2010 at theConservative
Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Washington, D.C. (Lean, 2012, p. 54). Its
stated aim was to act against
the treason being committed by national, state, and local government
officials, the mainstream media, and others in their capitulation to the
global jihad and Islamic supremacism, the ever-encroaching and uncon-
stitutional power of the federal government, and the rapidly moving at-
tempts to impose socialism and Marxism upon the American people. 18
The FDI would work
through the existing Atlas Shrugs and Jihad Watch websites (which had a
combined 22 million page views in the last twelve months) to raise aware-
16The DHFC was originally known as the Center for the Study of Popular Culture.
17http://www.horowitzfreedomcenter.org/about [Last accessed 31st July 2017].
18http://afdi.us/freedom-defense-initiative-inaugural-event/ [Last accessed 31st July 2017].
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ness of pertinent issues, using our base ( Jihad Watch 30,000 page views
per day, Atlas 25,000 page views per day, combined page views two mil-
lion per month) to build a movement.19
Joining Spencer and Geller on the FDI board were John Joseph Jay, a gun rights
advocate and owner of the blog Summer Solider, Winter Patriot; Richard Davis, a mil-
itary veteran and blogger; and Anders Gravers of SIAD and SIOE (Lean, 2012, pp.
55-56).
Shortly after founding the FDI, Spencer and Geller assumed the leadership of
SIOA, which had been set up by Anders Gravers and Stephen Gash as an outgrowth
of their European ‘Stop Islamisation’ groups, but which had ‘not developed in the
direction we wanted’, according to Gravers:
There are groups enough who just write about the danger of Islam, but
very few groups that actually do something to try to stop the Islamisation
of the Western civilization. SIOA was meant to be a group that should
take action, staging demonstrations, happenings and events against the
Islamisation of the U.S. 20
In April 2010, Gravers announced that ‘we have now— after working for a long time
to persuade them to take this on — gotten a yes from both Pamela Geller and Robert
Spencer to become the leaders of SIOA’, adding that he considered them ‘the right
people to bring SIOA to the forefront in the fight against the Islamisation of the U.S.’.
He and Gash remained as the other two board members.21
One key area of activity for the two groups was opposing new mosque develop-
ments. SIOA gained notoriety through its role in opposing the Park 51 development,
a proposedMuslim community centre that was to be located in lowerManhattan near
the site of the World Trade Centre, popularly and pejoratively known as the ‘Ground
Zero Mosque’. In May 2010, Geller penned a now-notorious blog entry entitled
‘Monster Mosque Pushes Ahead in Shadow of World Trade Center Islamic Death
19Ibid.
20http://afdi.us/pamela-geller-and-robert-spencer-named-new-leaders-of-stop-the-islamization-
of-america/ [Last accessed 31st July 2017].
21Ibid.
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and Destruction’22 and, together with Spencer, intervened in public meetings held to
discuss the project. Protests against the project were organised under the auspices of
SIOA, in June and September 2010. The September event was addressed by Geert
Wilders, with video addresses by George W. Bush’s former ambassador to the UN,
John Bolton, and the late journalist Andrew Breitbart, founder of Breitbart News.23
A small contingent from the EDL was also in attendance.24
Another key area of activity related to raising public awareness about the perceived
threat of Islam. For instance, the SIOA and FDI have sponsored a series of advert-
isements on public transport systems in cities across the US. One campaign, entitled
‘Leaving Islam?’, which was placed on buses in San Francisco, Miami and New York
in 2010, read: ‘Fatwa on your head? Is your family or community threatening you?
Leaving Islam? Got questions? Get answers!’.25 Another one, which ran onNewYork
City buses in 2012, stated: ‘In Any War Between the Civilized Man and the Savage,
Support the Civilized Man. Support Israel. Defeat Jihad.’26 In May 2015, Geller
again made international headlines as the organiser of an FDI-sponsored ‘Draw Mo-
hammed’ cartoon contest in Dallas, Texas. The event, which featured Geert Wilders
as its keynote speaker and offered a $10,000 prize for the best likeness of the Prophet,
was attacked by two Islamic State sympathisers who were subsequently shot dead by
police.27 28 Whilst the FDI and SIOA remain active, and Geller and Spencer con-
tinue to be prolific authors and popular public speakers, they do not dominate the US
counterjihad scene in the way that they arguably did in the early 2010s. One of my
informants, who works for a US civil rights organisation, observed that Geller and
22http://pamelageller.com/2010/05/monster-mosque-pushes-ahead-in-shadow-of-world-trade-
center-islamic-death-and-destruction.html/ [Last accessed 31st July 2017].
23http://afdi.us/historic-911-stop-the-mosque-at-ground-zero-rally/ [Last accessed 31st July
2017].
24http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/sep/12/english-defence-league-mosque-protest [Last ac-
cessed 31st July 2017].
25http://afdi.us/sioa-nationwide-ad-campaign-kicks-off-in-miami-leaving-islam-bus-ads-hits-
the-streets/ [Last accessed 31st July 2017].
26http://afdi.us/the-free-speech-battle-begins-pro-freedom-geller-vs-pro-sharia-mta/ [Last
accessed 31 July 2017].
27http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/04/us/gunmen-killed-after-firing-on-anti-islam-groups-
event.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=first-column-region&region=top-
news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0 [Last accessed 31st July 2017].
28http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/06/world/middleeast/isis-texas-muhammad-cartoons.html
[Last accessed 31st July 2017].
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Spencer never seemed to have had ‘any kind of grand plan in terms of getting things
done’ beyond writing, public speaking and organising occasional protests and other
public provocations. Consequently, he suggested, they had been eclipsed by more
professionalised organisations that ‘literally have a strategy for success’, one that far
exceeds ‘just banning or getting a mosque development stopped’.29
Perhaps the most important of these professionalised advocacy organisations is the
Centre for Security Policy (CSP), a Washington, D.C. think tank. Founded in 1988
by Frank Gaffney, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administra-
tion, the CSP is notionally concerned with a variety of national security threats. In
practice, however, it is almost entirely focused on anti-Jihad and anti-Sharia activit-
ies. It is especially concerned with countering what it sees as Muslim Brotherhood
infiltration of the US government, and the CSP is one of the key forces behind a re-
cent campaign to have the Brotherhood designated a terrorist organisation. Its ideas
are disseminated through professionally-produced policy documents, research papers,
media appearances and Gaffney’s Secure Freedom Radio show.
One of theCenter’s key publications is a 2010 document entitled Sharia: TheThreat
to America (Boykin et al., 2010). The document was the product of a group that styled
themselves as ‘Team B II’, in homage to a group of experts known as ‘Team B’, who
were commissioned in 1976 by then-CIA Director George H.W. Bush to produce
an assessment of the Soviet threat to America. ‘Team B II’ was led by Lieutenant
General William G. ‘Jerry’ Boykin, a former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
Intelligence and a decorated military veteran,30 while other contributors to the report
included Gaffney, former Assistant US Attorney Andrew McCarthy, and Stephen
Coughlin, a former senior advisor in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Over
nearly four hundred pages, Sharia: The Threat describes in detail ‘the Muslim Broth-
erhood’s multi-phased plan of operations for the destruction of Western civilization’
(Boykin et al., 2010, p. 27), drawing heavily on Robert Spencer’s notion of the ‘stealth
jihad’. The document recommends a series of measures to enable the US to ‘survive
29Interview 13, civil rights activist, male, US.
30Some officials within the GeorgeW. Bush administration had dissociated themselves from Boykin
due to his tendency to speak of the ‘War or Terror’ in religious terms and to portray it as one dimension
of a larger, civilizational struggle (Lean, 2012, p. 133). Boykin, who retired in 2007, is also a prominent
figure in the religious right.
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sharia’s onslaught’, including the education of key decision-makers about the ‘true’
nature of sharia, the cessation of any official engagement with Brotherhood ‘front’ or-
ganisations, the proscription of sharia-based finance, the de-funding of schools whose
religious textbooks are deemed to be ‘promoting sharia’, and the vetting of Muslim
migrants to filter out those with ‘seditious’ ideological and theological beliefs (pp. 33-
35). Copies of the report were distributed to key officials at federal, state and local
levels, including members of Congress, state governors, police chiefs and city mayors
(Lean, 2012, pp. 155-16). In addition to its lobbying efforts, the CSP has also en-
gaged in some public outreach activities. In February 2016 it launched a public coun-
terjihad campaign, which aimed to create ‘a movement of American citizen-activists
dedicated to safeguarding the country from the danger posed by Islamic Suprem-
acists’.31 The campaign included a three-minute educational film and an accompany-
ing website, counterjihad.com.
Inarguably the most important grassroots counterjihad organisation in the US is
ACT for America, founded in 2007 by Brigitte Gabriel, who was born Hanan Qah-
waji in 1964 in southern Lebanon, near the border with Israel (Noriega, 2016, not pa-
ginated). A Maronite Christian, Gabriel views the civil war that raged in the country
during her childhood as a ‘religious war, declared by the Muslims against the Chris-
tians’, one that ‘tore my country and my life apart’ (Gabriel, 2008 [2006], p. 68). In
1984, she moved to Jerusalem, where she worked as a news anchor for Middle East
Television (MET), a news channel owned by American televangelist Pat Robertson’s
Christian Broadcasting Network, using the screen name of Nour Saman (Noriega,
2016; Lean, 2012, p. 102). During her time at MET, Gabriel met and married an
Americanman and later moved to the US, where she built a career for herself as a pub-
lic speaker and author. In her 2006 book, Because They Hate (Gabriel, 2008 [2006]),
she recalled how, on 9/11, she was ‘struck by the same fear’ that she had experienced
during her childhood in Lebanon: ‘As I watched, words instinctively came from my
mouth as I spoke to the TV screen: “Now they are here.”’ (Ibid., p. 69)
ACT for America was founded in 2007 as an outgrowth of Gabriel’s existing non-
profit, the American Congress for Truth, which she used to promote her books and
31http://counterjihad.com/ [Last accessed 31st July 2017].
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speaking engagements (Noriega, 2016). ACT experienced rapid income and mem-
bership growth under its first executive director, Guy Rodgers, a veteran of the reli-
gious right who was the national field director for Pat Robertson’s Christian Coalition
during the early 1990s (Noriega, 2016; Lean, 2012, pp. 104-06). By 2016, ACT had
an annual budget of over $1 million and claimed to have 300,000 members organ-
ised in 1,000 ‘chapters’ across the US (Noriega, 2016), although these membership
figures are vigorously contested. One of my informants within the US civil rights
sector described the figures as ‘very, very inflated’32 whilst another suggested that the
arithmetic behind them was ‘absurd’.33 The Southern Poverty Law Center claims
that as of March 2017, fewer than fifty ACT chapters were engaged in ‘some type
of real world activity like hosting a meeting or representing the chapter in an inter-
view for a newspaper or television’.34 However, whilst some interviewees expressed
doubts about ACT’s membership figures, none questioned its political influence. As-
piring to be ‘the NRA of national security’,35 ACT’s annual conference (ACTCON)
has been addressed by legislators such as 2016 Republican presidential contender Ted
Cruz and former Republican congressmanMike Pompeo. At a more local level, ACT
has provided the grassroots ‘muscle’ for various state-level anti-sharia initiatives and
in June 2017 it organized a ‘March Against Sharia’ in twenty-eight US cities.36
ACT, the CSP and the FDI have all worked closely with the American Free-
dom Law Centre (AFLC), a legal firm, and the Society of Americans for National
Existence (SANE), an advocacy group, both founded by the activist lawyer David
Yerushalmi. Yerushalmi is general counsel at the CSP,37 where he also contributed
to Team B II’s report Sharia: The Threat to America, and has represented the AFDI in
lawsuits relating to its transport advertisements as well as defending Pamela Geller in
32Interview 13, civil rights activist, male, US.
33Interview 15, civil rights activist, male, US.
34https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/03/12/act-america-deletes-its-map-1000-chapters-
heres-what-it-really-looks [Last accessed 31st July 2017].
35http://www.actforamerica.org/aboutact [Last accessed 31 July 2017]. From ACT’s professional
public-facing website, it may not be immediately obvious that it is a counterjihad group, as it presents
itself as a national security advocacy organisation. Its counterjihadist character is more evident from
the websites of local chapters. One might also cite its founder’s use of key counterjihad topoi such as
‘Eurabia’ and the ‘clash of civilizations’ in her speeches and writings, and the group’s sponsorship of
speaking tours and other public events with key international counterjihad activists.
36https://www.adl.org/education/resources/profiles/act-for-america [Last accessed 31st July 2017].
37https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/about-us/staff/ [Last accessed 31 July 2017].
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a defamation case (Elliott, 2011; Lean, 2012, p. 125). One of SANE’s key initiatives
was a project called ‘Mapping Sharia’,38 sponsored by the CSP and based on covert
observation of a hundred American mosques. The amateur ethnography was under-
taken by David Gaubatz, author of Muslim Mafia: Inside the Secret Underworld That’s
Conspiring to Islamize America, who worked on the project for eighteen months with
the aid of two research assistants.39 Whilst the methodology40 is rather opaque, the
Jewish daily Forward reported that key indicators of sharia-adherence and extrem-
ism measured by Gaubatz and his assistants included ‘the length of the imam’s beard’,
‘whether he wore a watch on his right wrist’ and ‘the percentage of worshippers wear-
ing hats’, as well as the nature of the reading materials on offer (Berger, 2011, not
paginated). A write-up of the study’s findings, co-authored by Yerushalmi and Mor-
dechai Kedar, a professor at Bar Ilan University, was published in 2011 in theMiddle
East Quarterly, the journal of Daniel Pipes’ Middle East Forum (Kedar and Yerush-
almi, 2011). Before this, in 2009, Yerushalmi had drafted model legislation entitled
‘American Laws for American Courts’ (ALAC) which was designed to halt ‘creeping
sharia’. The stated intention for the legislation was ‘to prohibit the application of for-
eign law when it would violate fundamental constitutional rights such as due process
and equal protection’,41 but its ultimate purpose was, according to Yerushalmi, ‘heur-
istic’: it aimed ‘to get people asking this question, “What is Shariah?”’ (Elliott, 2011).
Starting in Oklahoma in 2010, Yerushalmi’s model legislation served as the basis for
a concerted anti-Sharia drive at the state level, for which ACT operated as a ‘force
multiplier’ in Frank Gaffney’s phrase (cited in Elliott, 2011, not paginated).42 As of
June 2017, ALAC provisions had been adopted by twelve US states: Alabama, Ari-
zona, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Tennessee and Texas.43
38http://mappingsharia.com/ [Last accessed 31st July 2017].
39This was not the first time that Gaubatz had employed ethically dubious research methods: much
of thematerial forMuslimMafiawas based on documents stolen from the Council on American Islamic
Relations by his son, Chris Gaubatz, who had posed as an intern there. (See Berger, 2011.)
40http://mappingsharia.com/?page_id=175 [Last accessed 31st July 2017].
41http://www.americanfreedomlawcenter.org/press-release/american-laws-for-american-courts-
public-policy-initiative-advances-in-state-legislatures-as-aflc-leads-citizens-awareness-drive/ [Last
accessed 31st July 2017].
42See also Lean 2012, p. 126.
43https://www.adl.org/education/resources/profiles/act-for-america [Last accessed 31st July 2017].
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Other notable US-based groups include the UnitedWest, founded by ‘Team B II’
member Tom Trento as an outgrowth of the Florida Security Council, Daniel Pipes’
Middle East Forum and the Clarion Project (formerly the Clarion Fund), which has
been linked to the Jewish fundamentalist organisation Aish HaTorah (‘Fire of the
Torah’) (Goldberg, 2008; Lean, 2012). Copies of Clarion’s film Obsession: Radical
Islam’s War Against the West,44 were distributed to more than 28 million people in
swing states ahead of the 2008 presidential election. Subsequent Clarion-produced
films include The Third Jihad: Radical Islam’s Vision For America (2009) and Iranium
(2011).
As will be evident from the foregoing pages, the US counterjihad movement is
closely intertwined with both the religious right and the more ‘hawkish’ elements of
the national security establishment. Other key intersections and overlaps are with
parts of the counterterrorism industry, notably Steve Emerson’s Investigative Pro-
ject on Terrorism, and with organised nativist and anti-immigrant groups such as the
Center for Immigration Studies and the blogRefugee ResettlementWatch. One distinct
sphere of activity involves running training programmes for law enforcement officials.
A key organisation here is Understanding theThreat (UTT), run by an ex-FBI agent,
JohnGuandolo. UTT claims to provide ‘threat-focused strategic and operational con-
sultation, training, and education for federal, state, and local leadership... about the
Global Islamic Movement and the jihadi networks in communities around the na-
tion’,45 but the Southern Poverty Law Center claims that its training events ‘instead
serve as anti-Muslim witch-hunts, often times targeting and vilifying local Muslim
leaders.’46
Networking the Counterjihad
Whilst the North American and European counterjihad movements are somewhat
distinct from one another in terms of their organisational and tactical repertoires,
they are nevertheless closely interrelated political phenomena. Subsequent chapters
44http://www.obsessionthemovie.com/ [Last accessed 31st July 2017].
45https://www.understandingthethreat.com/about/ [Last accessed 31st August 2017].
46https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/03/01/disgraced-ex-fbi-agent-john-guandolo-train-
louisiana-law-enforcement-next-week [Last accessed 31st August 2017].
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will explore the shared narratives and the common discursive, aesthetic and affective
repertoires that have enabled organisations and individuals from such diverse national
backgrounds as the US, Canada, the UK, France, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Po-
land, Hungary, Israel and Australia increasingly to view themselves as part of a com-
mon political project. In the meantime, the remainder of this chapter will focus on
the structural characteristics of these transnational networks and the political impact
the movement has had.
Transnational networking within the counterjihad has taken various forms, dif-
ferentiated in terms of their degrees of formality or informality, and materiality or
virtuality. Formal networks exist in the form of transnational organisations estab-
lished specifically to foster cross-national collaboration and learning between differ-
ent groups. A number of ‘travelling evangelists’ engage in more informal modes of
association by touring various countries and organisations proselytising on behalf of
the movement. Finally, there is a dense virtual network of online spaces linked to the
movement. These different forms of networking are overlapping and mutually rein-
forcing, as, for instance, when material networks and interactions have emerged as a
result of prior encounters within online counterjihad spaces.
One important early effort at transnational networking was the International Civil
Liberties Alliance (ICLA). Initially formed in 2006 as the ‘910 Group’ (referring to
the day before September 11th) in a comments thread on the Gates of Vienna blog,47
the group subsequently changed its name to the Centre for Vigilant Freedom (CVF)
before eventually becoming the ICLA. One of the first organisations set up with a
specific goal of fostering international networks and alliances between counterjihad
groups, the ICLA’s founders described its objectives and organisational structure as
follows:
From its inception the purpose of the organisation that eventually became
ICLA was to facilitate alliances among existing groups. Its mission is
to be a ‘network of networks’: to promote communication and common
action among the various organisations that have sprung up since 9-11 to
47See the original post here: http://gatesofvienna.net/2006/09/the-emperor-is-naked/ and the
retrospective account here: http://gatesofvienna.net/2011/11/a-brief-history-of-the-transatlantic-
counterjihad-part-i/ [Both last accessed 31st July 2017].
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combat sharia and resist the Islamization of Western Culture.48
Accordingly, one of the ICLA’s key activities was sponsoring a series of international
counterjihad conferences that took place between 2007 and 2013, and which brought
together some of the key activists and organisations for the first time.
The first of these international conferences took place in Copenhagen, Denmark,
in April 2007, under the auspices of Anders Gravers’ SIAD. Copenhagen was con-
sidered ‘the obvious choice’ since the ‘Mohammed Cartoon Crisis had brought Den-
mark into prominence’.49 A larger, two-day event was convened in Brussels in Oc-
tober that same year hosted by the Vlaams Belang, which had secured rooms in the
European and Flemish parliament buildings for the purpose. Bat Ye’Or and Robert
Spencer gave the keynote speeches,50 while other speakers included Ye’Or’s husband,
David Littman; Arieh Eldad, a Knesset member and leader of the Kahanist Otzma
LeYisrael (Strength for Israel) party; and Andrew Bostom, the American author of
The Legacy of Jihad and Sharia Versus Freedom. In addition, short, ten-minute coun-
try reports were presented by ‘anti-islamisation experts and activists from the four-
teen European countries… on the current state of Islamisation and jihadism in their
nations, and citizen efforts to mount a defense of constitutional liberties and na-
tional sovereignty’. Rapporteurs included the Austrian counterjihad activist Elisabeth
Sabbaditsch-Wolff, VB leader Filip Dewinter and Brussels Journal editor Paul Belien
for Belgium, the Danish author and journalist Lars Hedegaard (of whom more later),
Ken Sikorski of the Tundra Tabloids blog for Finland, Stefan Here of the Politically
Incorrect blog for Germany, the Sweden Democrats’ Ted Ekeroth, and UKIP MEP
Gerard Batten for the UK. Other country reports were given by representatives from
the Czech Republic, France, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Romania and Switzer-
land. Subsequent international counterjihad conferences were held in Vienna (May
2008), Copenhagen (May 2009), Zurich ( June 2010), London (September 2011),
Brussels ( July 2012) and Warsaw (September 2013).51
48http://gatesofvienna.net/2011/11/a-brief-history-of-the-transatlantic-counterjihad-part-ii/ [Last
accessed 31st July 2017].
49http://gatesofvienna.net/2011/11/a-brief-history-of-the-transatlantic-counterjihad-part-ii/ [Last
accessed 31st July 2017].
50The papers for the 2007 Brussels conference are available online (with some redactions) at ht-
tps://counterjihadeuropa.wordpress.com/2007/10/28/39/ [Last accessed 31st July 2017].
51http://gatesofvienna.net/2011/11/a-brief-history-of-the-transatlantic-counterjihad-part-ii/ [Last
127
It seems that these events, which often included social and touristic activities,
helped to foster the sense of a common identity and a shared set of political interests.
For instance, immediately prior to the London conference, a number of international
delegates were taken on a tour of Luton by the EDL’s Tommy Robinson.52 Over
time there appears to have been a shift from rapport-building and diagnosis-sharing
to more focussed discussion of practical issues such as movement strategy and tac-
tics. For instance, the 2009 conference in Copenhagen ‘took the form of facilitated
discussion groups held in the plenary’, with a focus on ‘helping different groups im-
prove their organizational skills, suggesting different techniques that could be adapted
for the unique circumstances found in individual countries’. The 2010 conference in
Zurich ‘followed up on Copenhagen with a continuing emphasis on intensifying co-
operation and sharing of information among different groups and networks’. Practical
issues covered in these meetings included ‘media operations’, ‘use of the internet’, ‘in-
ternational coordination’, and ‘strategies for proposed legislation’.53
In the early 2010s, the EDL, as ‘the only significant grassroots anti-sharia move-
ment in Europe’ at that time, was a key focus for organisational and tactical learning.54
At the 2010 conference in Zurich, an EDL representative gave a presentation entitled
‘The Anatomy of an EDLDemo’, which ‘used the recent demonstration at Newcastle
as a case study of street level activism’:
The presentation included organisational dynamics, deployment, logist-
ics and transportation, the importance of having productive working rela-
tions with the police, the stewarding system, divisional structure, inclus-
ivity of all those who have a stake in or interest in opposing sharia to cre-
ate a diverse, varied and effective organisation, the networking and social
possibilities that are created by demonstrations, opposition tactics, and
the issue of merchandising and its relationship to the creation of group
identity and organisational presence.55
accessed 31 July 2017].
52http://gatesofvienna.net/2011/10/slouching-towards-london/ [accessed 31 July 2017].
53http://gatesofvienna.net/2011/11/a-brief-history-of-the-transatlantic-counterjihad-part-ii/ [ac-
cessed 31 July 2017].
54http://gatesofvienna.net/2011/11/a-brief-history-of-the-transatlantic-counterjihad-part-ii/ [ac-
cessed 31 July 2017].
55See the cached page available at https://web.archive.org/web/20100619132942/-
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Similarly, at the same conference, a representative of the SVP gave a presentation on
‘his party’s successful referendum campaign that imposed a ban on the building of new
minarets’.56
Another important transnational organisation, the International Free Press Soci-
ety (IFPS), was established byDanish journalist and author LarsHedegaard in 2009 as
an outgrowth of theDanish Free Press Society (DFPS;Trykkefrihedsselskabet), formed
by Hedegaard, Krarup and Langballe in 2004. The founding of the DFPS followed
Hedegaard’s expulsion from the Danish section of PEN, the international writers as-
sociation for freedom of speech, after the publication of a co-authored book, In the
House of War: Islam’s Colonization of the West, which drew on the writings of Lewis,
Huntington and Ye’Or. Freedom of speech became a particularly salient issue in Den-
mark the following year (2005) as a result of the Jyllands Posten cartoons affair. The
DFPS and its magazine, Sappho, established an annual free speech prize, which has
since been awarded to Daniel Pipes, Melanie Phillips, Mark Steyn, the cultural editor
of Jyllands Posten, FlemmingRose, and the Jyllands Posten cartoonist KurtWestegaard,
whose famous ‘turban bomb’ cartoon the DFPS has made available for purchase. The
DFPS also sponsored lectures by Bat Ye’Or and Geert Wilders (Sedgwick, 2013, pp.
226-31). In addition to Hedegaard, who became its President, IFPS board members
included the American author Diana West; the Centre for Security Policy’s then-
Chief Operating Offer, Christine Brim; Ned May of Gates of Vienna; and Paul Belien
of the Brussels Journal. A wider advisory committee included Frank Gaffney of the
Center for Security Policy and ‘Team B II’ members Stephen Coughlin, Clare Lopez
and AndrewMcCarthy. Also represented on the advisory groups were Ye’Or, Bostom,
Gabriel, Pipes, Spencer, Steyn and Wilders, amongst numerous others.57
Other transnational networks emerged in the late 2000s and early 2010s as out-
growths of existing national organisations. For instance, Stop Islamization of Nations
http://englishdefenceleague.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=213:english-
defence-league-edl-attend-international-conference-in-zurich&catid=42:feature-stories [Last
accessed 31 July 2017].
56http://gatesofvienna.net/2011/11/a-brief-history-of-the-transatlantic-counterjihad-part-ii/ [ac-
cessed 31 July 2017].
57See the cached pages at https://web.archive.org/web/20111025105150/http://www.trykkefrihed.dk-
/the-international-free-press-society-policy-statement.htm and https://web.archive.org/web/-
20120322162810/http://www.ifpscanada.com/about-ifps-international/board-of-advisors/ [Both last
accessed 31st July 2017].
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(SION) was set up in 2012 to unite the American and European ‘Stop Islamization’
groups, with a ‘President’s Council’ that included Gravers, Robinson, Carroll, Spen-
cer and Geller. Around the same time, there were efforts to form a federation of
European Defence Leagues, launched at a rally in Aarhus, Denmark, in March 2012,
following earlier abortive attempts. A ‘Global Counter Jihad rally’ sponsored by SION
was held in Stockholm, Sweden, in August that year, which was addressed by Geller,
Spencer, Lennon, Carroll and Gravers, as well as by representatives of the Finnish,
Norwegian and Swedish Defence Leagues. Another speaker was Debbie Robinson,
founder of the Q Society of Australia, which exists as an Antipodean affiliate of the
Stop Islamisation network.58 More recently, the Pegida movement has emerged as
a pan-European political network, although as with the earlier network of Defence
Leagues, Pegida exists more as a political franchise than as a formal organisational
structure.
A more informal but very important mode of transnational networking exists in
the form of international speaking tours by prominent counterjihad authors and activ-
ists. One key figure here is the Austrian counterjihad activist Elisabeth Sabbaditsch-
Wolff, who has toured the US extensively, attending ACT for America’s annual con-
ferences and speaking at meetings of its local chapters. Others active on the counterji-
had speaking circuit include the IFPS’s Lars Hedegaard and Paul Weston of Liberty
GB and Pegida UK, both of whom took part in a 2016 Conservative Political Ac-
tion Conference (CPAC) panel on ‘The Global Jihad Movement in America and the
Counterjihad Campaign’, sponsored by the CSP and moderated by Gaffney. The flow
of these ‘travelling evangelists’ is mostly from Europe to North America, rather than
the other way round. However, there are some examples of US activists travelling
outside North America: for example, Robert Spencer went on a five-city speaking
tour of Australia, sponsored by the Q Society, in late 2011.
The online counterjihad network has played an important role in fostering many
of these transnational links, as well as constituting a distinct sphere of interaction and
exchange in its own right. The results of the hyperlink network analysis described
in chapter 2 can be used to describe the key internal characteristics of the online
58http://afdi.us/freedom-march-first-worldwide-counter-jihad-action-stockholm-august-4th/
[Last accessed 31 July 2017].
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counterjihad network as well as the external relationships between the counterjihad
network and other online sectors. Starting with the internal characteristics, the core
counterjihad network (i.e. category 1 sites only) as mapped through the hyperlink
analysis is shown in figure 5.1 overleaf. From the diagram it will be evident that this
is quite a heterogeneous and diffuse network, comprising quite different organisation
types with varying levels of affinity and disaffinity. One measure of network cohe-
sion is overall ‘density’, which can take a value between 0 (representing a hypothetical
situation where there are no links between any sites within the network) and 1 (repres-
enting a hypothetical situation in which all possible links have been effectuated). By
this measure, the online counterjihad network is very loose indeed, with only about
1.8% of all possible ties effectuated. Another measure of network cohesion tells a dif-
ferent story, however. The ‘average distance’, which describes how far, on average,
each site is away from the other sites in the network, is just 2.4, suggesting that or-
ganisations not directly connected may still be close to each other through sharing a
‘mutual friend’.
The online counterjihad network, as might be expected, is dominated by blogs
and other dedicated online spaces. The personal webpages of prominent counterjihad
activists, and the websites of advocacy organisations and political parties, play a lesser
but in some cases still important role. The simplest way of measuring the importance
of a site within a hyperlink network is its ‘indegree’, the number of inbound links
the site is receiving from other sites in the network. By this metric, Robert Spencer’s
blog Jihad Watch (indegree 26) is by some distance the most important site in the
network, followed by the Horowitz Freedom Center’s Frontpage magazine (indegree
16) and the Religion of Peace blog (indegree 14). Pamela Geller’s old blog, Atlas Shrugs
(indegree 11) and her new site, pamelageller.com (indegree 9) are other key sites, as
are the Danish website Europe News (indegree 9) and the blogs Vlad Tepes, Politically
Incorrect and Tundra Tabloids (all indegree 8). Similarly ranked is Gates of Vienna,
another site that has moved server since being set up (original server indegree 8; new
server indegree 7). Themost highly ranked personal homepages are those of Raymond
Ibrahim (indegree 8) who is a fellow at the Horowitz Freedom Center, Daniel Pipes
(indegree 7) and the American author Andrew Bostom (indegree 6). The most highly
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ranked advocacy organisations are the Center for Security Policy and theMiddle East
Forum (both indegree 6), with ACT, the Clarion Project and the Horowitz Freedom
Center following close behind (all indegree 5). Of the street protest movements, the
English Defence League has by far the most linked-to website (indegree 6), and one
has to go quite a long way down the list to find the first political party, Liberty GB
(indegree 3).
Popularity or prestige within the network, which is what the ‘indegree’ effect-
ively measures, is only one gauge of importance, however. Another way of meas-
uring a site’s influence is its ‘betweenness’ centrality, a metric based on the shortest
paths between the sites in the network. Sites with high ‘betweenness’ scores may
act as important bridges or communication channels between other parts of the net-
work. By this metric, two blogs that are less prestigious than, say, Jihad Watch or Atlas
Shrugs, nonetheless seem to play key roles as information conduits within the net-
work: the Counterjihad Report (betweenness 6233) and the 1389 blog (betweenness
5634). Other sites that are more important in terms of their ‘betweenness’ than in
terms of their raw popularity include the blogs Bare Naked Islam (betweenness 3097)
and Creeping Sharia (betweenness 1565), and the website of the political party Liberty
GB (betweenness 1153). The oldGates of Vienna server (betweenness 4378),TheReli-
gion of Peace blog (betweenness 3261) and the Horowitz Freedom Center’s Frontpage
magazine (betweenness 2404) remain important by this metric. By contrast, Jihad
Watch (betweenness 853) and Atlas Shrugs (betweenness 170) are less important as
network bridges than they are in terms of raw popularity.
The online counterjihad network is extremely heterogeneous in terms of the kinds
of actors and online spaces it comprises. It includes everything from the highly profes-
sional websites of resource-rich advocacy organisations to amateurish blogs run by lone
individuals from their bedrooms. A comprehensive analysis of these online spaces and
the activities taking place within them is beyond the scope of this thesis, so a few illus-
trative examples of unusual or creative uses of online space will have to suffice. One
site that occupies a unique niche within the network is The Religion of Peace blog,59
perhaps accounting for its high rank on both the ‘indegree’ and ‘betweenness’ met-
59http://www.thereligionofpeace.com/ [Last accessed 31st July 2017].
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rics. TROP, whose name is an ironic allusion to George W. Bush’s characterisation
of Islam as a ‘religion of peace’, shortly after the September 11th attacks, compiles
a daily list of jihadist attacks from around the world, which are then displayed in a
‘counter’ showing the number of deadly attacks since September 11th. The TROP at-
tacks counter is available as a widget that can be embedded into other websites, and it
can frequently to be found in the sidebar of other counterjihad blogs. Another of the
more innovative sites is 4Freedoms, an online ‘library’ of counterjihad resources and
information set up in 2009 by EDL financier Alan Lake. Based on the Ning social
network platform, 4Freedoms eschews the ‘ant heap storage model’ common to blogs,
‘where new news and views are piled on top of the old’ in favour of ‘a hierarchical
model, where information is stored by category and sub-category, so that relevant in-
formation is retrieved by successive drill down.’60 The site is divided into interactive
‘rooms’ based on different counterjihad-related activities and themes.
A final example of online innovation is the ‘Rosetta Stone Project’, a ‘streamlined
system for the translation of texts and the subtitling of videos’. The Gates of Vienna
blog, one of the sites involved in this project, explains the mechanism and rationale as
follows:
When an important article, essay, or speech is published, a move is initi-
ated among the various Counterjihad groups to have it translated into as
many languages as possible. The influence of the text can be greatly ex-
tended if it is spread in multiple languages, and gives the author a much
wider audience.61
Key Rosetta Stone projects have included Geert Wilders’ film Fitna and the launch
of Geller and Spencer’s Freedom Defense Initiative, which have been translated into
languages as diverse as Albanian, Arabic, Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, Finnish,
French, German, Hebrew, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Norwegian, Polish, Por-
tuguese, Romanian, Russian, Serbian, Spanish, Swedish, and Welsh. The ring of
sites involved in producing these translations includes Europe News, Gates of Vienna,
60http://4freedoms.com/ [Last accessed 31st July 2017].
61http://gatesofvienna.net/2011/11/a-brief-history-of-the-transatlantic-counterjihad-part-iv/
[Last accessed 31st July 2017].
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the ICLA website, Politically Incorrect, Snaphanen, Tundra Tabloids, Uriasposten, and
Vlad Tepes.
The counterjihad virtual network forms part of a wider online right-wing milieu,
as can be seen from figure 5.2, which includes entities in both category 1 (core coun-
terjihad) and category 2 (supporters, enablers and sympathisers). Turning now to
the counterjihad network’s external relationships, figure 5.2 shows that the most im-
portant online interfaces are with the broader (non-counterjihad-specific) right-wing
blogosphere, major commercial conservative news outlets, parts of the national secur-
ity and counter-terrorism industries, the religious right, pro-Israeli advocacy groups,
heterodox Muslim organisations and individuals, nativist and anti-immigrant groups,
and, to a lesser extent, with the white nationalist, neo-Nazi and conspiracist fringe.
Taking each of these in turn, sites within the broader right-wing blogosphere that
are sympathetic to the counterjihad include the daily political blog American Thinker,
which has published counterjihad writers including Geller, Spencer and Weston, and
the monthly online magazineNewEnglish Review, which has published essays by An-
drew Bostom and Bat Ye’Or. Among the major commercial right-wing media outlets,
Breitbart has published Geller, Spencer and Gaffney, as well as providing sympath-
etic coverage of the CSP’s counterjihad campaign. Also represented in the network
is National Review, the bastion of Buckleyite conservatism, which has given column
inches to Spencer and Gaffney.
Another set of online links is with right-leaning research and advocacy organisa-
tions in the foreign policy, national security and counterterrorism sectors. One key
organisation here is the Gatestone Institute, chaired by George W. Bush’s former
ambassador to the UN, John Bolton. Gatestone hosts regular events with major con-
servative and neoconservative figures such as Alan Dershowitz and Charles Krau-
thammer, as well as with Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Geert Wilders, but its website has also
carried articles by Fjordman and Bat Ye’Or. One key site linked to the religious right
is the Christian evangelical website Answering Islam. Pro-Israeli organisations repres-
ented within the online network include the religious-Zionist Israel National News
and the orthodox Aish HaTorah (Fire of the Torah), as well as a number of smaller
blogs and websites. Among the heterodox Muslims can be found the self described
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former PLO terrorist turned Christian convert, Walid Shoebat. Also represented
here is Faith Freedom, an organisation of ex-Muslims set up by an Iranian-born Ca-
nadian, Ali Sina, with contributors including Amil Imani and linked to the website
Islam Watch.
Nativist and anti-immigrant organisations that show up within the online network
include Refugee Resettlement Watch, a website run by Ann Corcoran, as well as the
more established Center for Immigration Studies. Within the conspiracist part of the
right-wing online milieu, World Net Daily has heavily promoted ‘birtherism’, while
the better-known Info Wars, run by the radio host Alex Jones, disseminates a wide
range of conspiracy theories including the ‘New World Order’. Finally, the online
counterjihad network has a few links to openly white nationalist, neo-Nazi and other
far-right organisations. These include the Alt-Right website VDARE, run by the
white nationalist Peter Brimelow, and the Neue Drecht magazine Sezession, published
by the Pegida spokesman Götz Kubitschek.
‘Extreme but not fringe’
‘Extreme but not fringe’ was how my informants within the antifascist and civil rights
movements typically characterised the counterjihad.62 One measure of the impact of
counterjihad street movements in Europe is the violence they have directed towards
Muslims and others who ‘look Muslim’, the disruption they have caused to the com-
munities they have targeted, and the costs of policing their protests. These groups have
sometimes also had specific local impacts, for instance where they have played an in-
strumental role in campaigns against mosque developments. Their impact on wider
public and political discourse is harder to assess, but it is unlikely to have been a coin-
cidence, for example, that former UK Prime Minister David Cameron chose to give
a major speech criticising ‘state multiculturalism’ on the day of a large ‘homecoming’
demonstration in Luton by the EDL. Key counterjihad topoi such as the ‘Islamisation
of Europe’ and ‘Eurabia’ are also now routinely mobilised by right-wing politicians
across the continent, especially Eastern European politicians such asHungarian prime
62Interview 15, civil rights activist, male, US.
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minister Viktor Orbán and Czech President Miloš Zeman. One of my interviewees
in the anti-fascist movement observed that as recently as 2009, if you wanted to hear
someone tell you that Europe was being invaded by Muslims, ‘you’d have to go to that
car park in Leicester’ where the EDL was demonstrating, whereas now ‘you can go to
the European Parliament and hear the President of Hungary saying it’:
You can go to stand at a demonstration [in Prague] and hear the President
of the Czech Republic, President Zeman, speaking to an audience that
includes Tommy Robinson and Pegida. You can go to sit in Congress and
hear Ted Cruz and eight or nine congressman and senators stand there
and address ACT for America, a designated hate group by the SPLC, in
a way that would not have happened in 2008, 2009.63
The political influence of the US counterjihad movement far exceeds that of its
European counterpart. During the 2016 US presidential election, the Center for Se-
curity Policy supplied advisors to the campaigns of Republican candidates including
Ted Cruz and Donald Trump. As we saw in the introduction, when Trump an-
nounced his support for a ban on Muslim immigration to the US he did so citing
a poll published by the CSP.64 The links between the Trump administration and the
US counterjihad movement are too numerous to document here, so a few examples
will have to suffice. Trump’s Attorney General Jeff Sessions, whose 1986 nomination
for federal judge was publicly opposed by Martin Luther King’s widow Coretta Scott
King due to Sessions’ voting record on civil rights issues, has received awards from
Frank Gaffney’s Center for Security Policy and David Horowitz’s Freedom Center.
Sessions also spoke at one of the latter’s ‘Restoration Weekends’ in 2003.65 Given
the opportunity to publicly distance himself from Horowitz and Gaffney during his
senate confirmation hearings, Sessions declined to do so. Steven Miller, a senior ad-
visor and speechwriter to Trump who is reported to have been a key architect of the
Executive order banning travel from seven Muslim-majority countries as well as the
63Interview 12, anti-fascist activist, male, UK.
64http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2015/12/survey-company-trump-is-misusing-our-survey.html
[Last accessed 21st September 2017].
65http://imagine2050.newcomm.org/2016/12/23/jeff-sessions/ [Last accessed 30th September
2017].
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author of Trump’s infamous ‘American carnage’ inauguration speech, is a former con-
gressional aide to Sessions, to whom he was reportedly introduced by Horowitz.66
Miller also knew Alt-Right leader Richard Spencer during their days as students at
Duke University, although he has since dissociated himself from Spencer.67
Retired Lt. Gen. Mike Flynn, Trump’s first national security advisor who was
forced to resign in February 2017 after misleading the Vice President about the nature
of his conversations with the Russian ambassador, was at the time of his appointment
a sitting board member of ACT for America.68 Another senior administration figure
known to be close to ACT is CIA Director Mike Pompeo, a former Republican con-
gressman from Kansas, who has spoken at ACT’s annual conference and sponsored
events for the group inside the Capitol building. Pompeo has also spoken at CSP
events and has regularly appeared as a guest on Frank Gaffney’s Secure Freedom Ra-
dio. Shortly after Trump’s victory, ACT boasted in an email to supporters that it
had ‘a direct line to President-elect Trump through our allies such as … Rep. Mike
Pompeo.’69
A figure who has fewer direct connections to counterjihad groups but is clearly
sympathetic to their ideas is Kansas Secretary of State and gubernatorial candidate
Kris Kobach. HisMay 2017 appointment as vice chair of Trump’s Presidential Advis-
ory Commission on Election Integrity was seen by civil rights groups as a clear signal
that the commission would be an exercise in mass disenfranchisement, given Kobach’s
extensive record of implementing strict voter ID laws in Kansas and his long history of
support for nativist and anti-immigrant advocacy groups. Kobach was one of the key
architects of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), a re-
gistry programme for non-citizens launched under the Bush administration after the
September 11, 2001 attacks. Kobach appeared on Gaffney’s Secure Freedom Radio
in 2014, where he spoke about ‘an effort going on below the radar to insert Shariah
66http://imagine2050.newcomm.org/2016/12/16/stephen-miller/ [Last accessed 30th September
2017].
67http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/12/stephen-miller-31-year-old-senior-adviser-
behind-donald-trumps/ [Last accessed 30th September 2017].
68http://imagine2050.newcomm.org/2016/12/17/michael-flynn/ [Last accessed 30th September
2017].
69http://imagine2050.newcomm.org/2016/12/19/mike-pompeo/ [Last accessed 30th September
2017].
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Figure 5.3: Screenshot of Gates of Vienna blog, recording Trump’s attendance at the
launch of The United West.
law-based defenses into court cases.’70
Steve Bannon, the former White House chief strategist, gave column space to
Geller, Spencer, Gabriel and Horowitz during his time as head of Breitbart News, and
hosted Gaffney on his radio programme.71 In 2007, Bannon penned the script for
a documentary film entitled Destroying the Great Satan: The Rise of Islamic Facism in
America, which in the event was never produced. The film was to have opened with a
shot ofOldGlory flying over the USCapitol building, except with the stars and stripes
replaced by stars and crescents, and with a soundtrack of the Islamic call to prayer and a
caption reading ‘The Islamic States of America’. The film proposal identified a number
of potential ‘experts’ who might be interviewed, including Robert Spencer of Jihad
70http://imagine2050.newcomm.org/2016/12/23/kris-kobach/ [Last accessed 30th September
2017].
71http://imagine2050.newcomm.org/2016/12/17/steve-bannon/ [Last accessed 30th September
2017].
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This  screenshot  of  the  Gates  of  
Vienna  blog  has  been  removed  as 
the  copyright  is  owned  by  another  
organisation.
Watch.72 Bannon also appears to have personal relationships with some counterjihad
movement leaders. Two weeks before Bannon was named as chairman of Trump’s
campaign, the investigative journalist David Noriega attended a speech by Brigitte
Gabriel to the local ACT chapter in Twin Falls, Idaho, and afterwards overheard a
Breitbart reporter saying to the local chapter leader: ‘Tell her [Gabriel] that Steve
Bannon says hello’ (cited in Noriega, 2016, not paginated).
Finally, Trump himself has some direct connections to the US counterjihad move-
ment. Trump attended the launch of TomTrento’s group,TheUnitedWest, inMarch
2011, where he posed for a photograph with Frank Gaffney and Austrian counterji-
had activist Elisabeth Sabbaditsch-Wolff (see figure 5.3). Trump has also been pho-
tographed with ACT for America’s Brigitte Gabriel at his Mar a Lago resort.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the counterjihad can be viewed as a transnational so-
cial movement with intellectual, political and activist ‘wings’. As we have seen, the
counterjihad groups and networks have, for the most part, evolved outside the or-
ganisational and ideological spaces of neo-fascism and neo-Nazism. The movement’s
political ascent has been rapid: when I began this research project in October 2013,
counterjihad groups existed on the margins of European and North American so-
cieties; now their ideas are influencing the political discourses of right-wing politi-
cians across Europe, and the policies of the Trump White House. The next three
chapters turn to consider the discursive, aesthetic, affective and performative reper-
toires that unite the heterogeneous group of organisations and individuals discussed
in this chapter. In the first instance, we turn to consider their shared diagnosis of
Western crisis, decline and impending catastrophe.
72https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/bannon-film-outline-warned-us-could-turn-into-
islamic-states-of-america/2017/02/03/f73832f4-e8be-11e6-b82f-687d6e6a3e7c_story.html [Last
accessed 2nd October 2017].
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Chapter 6
‘AlmostMidnight in theWest’: the
Eurabian cultural apocalyptic
A Klee painting named ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel looking as
though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly
contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are
spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is
turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees
one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage
and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken
the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is
blowing in from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such
violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm
irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned,
while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is
what we call progress.
Walter Benjamin
The heterogeneous group of organisations and individuals described in the previous
chapter is united in the first instance by an apocalyptic narrative of Western crisis,
decline and capitulation to Islamic conquest. The counterjihad discourse is haunted
by dystopian visions of Europe’s descent into ethno-religious civil war, and the re-
duction of its population to the status of second-class citizens (‘dhimmis’) as Europe
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becomes a colony of the Arab-Muslim world. A key intellectual resource for this nar-
rative is the ‘Eurabia’ literature associated most closely with the British writer Gisèle
Littmann (‘Bat Ye’Or’), although she borrowed the term from the late Italian journal-
ist Oriana Fallaci (The Rage and the Pride (Fallaci, 2001); The Force of Reason (Fallaci,
2006)). The Eurabia thesis is ‘in essence, the apocalyptic threat of the Islamization
of Europe’ (Sedgwick, 2013, p. 224). Ye’Or’s Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis (2005)
is perhaps the ‘standard’ work of the genre (Bangstad, 2013, p. 371), however the
Eurabia narrative has since been popularised by conservative writers and journalists
such as the Canadian Mark Steyn (American Alone: The End of the World As We Know
It (Steyn, 2006); After America: Get Ready for Armageddon (Steyn, 2011)), the Brit
Melanie Phillips (Londonistan: How Britain is Creating a Terror State Within (Phil-
lips, 2006)), the Dane Lars Hedegaard (In the House of War: Islam’s Colonization of the
West), and the American-Norwegian Bruce Bawer (While Europe Slept: How Radical
Islam is Destroying the West from Within (Bawer, 2006); Surrender: Appeasing Islam,
Sacrificing Freedom (Bawer, 2010)).
Versions of the narrative have been propagated by conservative academics such as
Niall Ferguson and Martin Gilbert, as well as by untenured polemicists like Ye’Or’s
disciples Robert Spencer (Stealth Jihad: How Radical Islam is Subverting America
Without Guns or Bombs (Spencer, 2008)) and the blogger Peder Nøstvold Jensen
(‘Fjordman’). Resonances of the Eurabia theme can be found in the writings of Wal-
ter Laqueur (The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an old continent (Laqueur, 2007)),
Christopher Caldwell (Reflections OnTheRevolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam and
the West (Caldwell, 2010)) and, most recently, Douglas Murray (The Strange Death of
Europe: Immigration, identity, Islam (Murray, 2017)). The Eurabian apocalyptic ima-
ginary is also evident in the names of key counterjihad street movements such as the
‘Stop Islamization’ groups and ‘Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the
West’ (Pegida), and of online spaces such as A New Dark Age is Dawning and Almost
Midnight in the West.
Whilst the dystopian fantasy of cultural and demographic submersion under a
rising ‘green tide’ is specific to the Eurabia literature and to the counterjihad dis-
course, the fears and anxieties expressed in this narrative are shared far more widely.
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The late twentieth and early twenty first centuries have seen a dramatic flourishing of
millenarian fantasies, presentiments of doom, and eschatological anticipation, from
anxieties about the ‘millennium bug’ to the proliferation of new and sometimes violent
religious fundamentalisms. If, as John Hall (2009) has argued, the apocalyptic ima-
gination can be stimulated not only by calendrical shifts such as ‘Y2K’ (the year 2000)
or the end of the Mayan calendar (2012), but also by traumatic experiences and by so-
cial or economic dislocation, then the tectonic global realignments that have followed
the breakup of the bipolar Cold War political order have surely provided ample raw
material. In his book Fear of Small Numbers: An essay on the geography of anger (Ap-
padurai, 2006), Arjun Appadurai emphasises the exacerbation of social uncertainty
by the complex and uneven processes of political, economic and cultural integration
sometimes grouped together under the heading of ‘globalisation’, in particular the
further blurring of already fuzzy identities and boundaries, and the destabilization of
weighty political institutions and social arrangements founded upon them.
These profound shifts, Appadurai argues, have exposed many of the myths and
fantasies of the ‘classical national project’: that the world is naturally divided into
territorially-bounded nations, and that each national state presides over a sovereign
economic space and a containable and countable population. Moreover, cherished as-
sumptions about the distinction between ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ spaces and the power
of sovereign states to determine conditions of war and peace, may seem increasingly
untenable in the context of transformations in military technology and the forms
of contemporary anti-civilian violence popularly referred to as ‘terrorism’, for which
‘9/11’ often stands in metonymically. Perhaps any of these tendencies might suffice
to stimulate apocalyptic speculation, but together they can generate a powerful sense
that this is - to borrow the subtitle of Mark Steyn’s 2006 book - ‘the end of the world
as we know it’.
If this is the broad sociohistorical context within which the contemporary apo-
calyptic imagination has flourished, then the specific occasion for the articulation of
‘Eurabian’ anxieties about the ‘Islamization’ of Europe and the ‘death of theWest’ were
the refusal of ‘Old Europe’ (France and Germany) to participate in the 2003 US-led
invasion of Iraq, and European criticism of Israel’s 2002 ‘Operation Defensive Shield’
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(Sedgwick, 2013, p. 224). For Ye’Or, in a seminal article published in the Horowitz
Freedom Center’s FrontPage Magazine, the ‘pro-Saddam Hussein’ anti-war protests
of February 15th, 2003, were symptomatic of growing European anti-Semitism, the
progressive detachment of the continent from its Atlantic ally, its ‘profound cultural
Islamization’ and transformation into the ‘heart of Arabism’.1 Eurabian speculations
about the ‘death of the West’ can, then, be seen in part as a symptom of growing per-
plexity about the meaning of a sociopolitical entity, ‘the West’, that had for several
decades defined itself against the Communist ‘East’, as well as the relevance of the
collective security arrangements (NATO) premised on the bipolar Cold War political
order. As the historian Riccardo Bavaj has observed of the anxieties concerning the
fragmentation of the ‘Atlantic alliance’ that were engendered by the Iraq war: ‘Two
“Wests”... are one too many, and may indicate that none exists at all. Not for the first
time, “the West” is in decline. Or so it seems.’ (Bavaj, 2011, not paginated)
That famous prophet ofWestern decline, Oswald Spengler, is cited by some intell-
ectually-oriented cultural pessimists (e.g. Ferguson, 2004; Laqueur, 2007), and Spen-
glerian pessimism is also evident in the proper name of one key counterjihad group,
Patriotische Europäer Gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (Pegida), usually trans-
lated as ‘Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of theWest’. The word ‘Abend-
land’, which translates literally as ‘evening lands’ or the ‘land of the setting sun,’ is the
same term used by Spengler in hisUntergang des Abendlandes, usually translated asThe
Decline of the West (de Genova, 2015, p. 10). Intellectualised versions of the Eura-
bia narrative also draw on a wider repertoire of cultural pessimism. Ferguson, for
instance, suggests that ‘Spenglerian talk has gained credibility since 9/11’ (2004, not
paginated) but also invokes Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,
whilst the subtitle of Caldwell’s book, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, recalls
the title of a key text of the counter-Enlightenment, Edmund Burke’s Reflections on
the Revolution in France.
This chapter outlines the main themes of what I call the ‘Eurabian cultural apo-
calyptic.’ Whilst there have been a number of academic discussions of the ‘Eurabia
thesis’ (Carr, 2006), ‘the political discourse of the counterjihad movement’ (Bhatt,
1http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=19633 [Last accessed 25th August
2017].
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2012), or the ‘Islamophobic thesis of European decline’ (Denes, 2012), it has not to
my knowledge been treated specifically as a form of the secular apocalyptic. TheGreek
work apokálypsismeans, literally, a ‘revelation’ or ‘disclosure’, usually about the way the
world (or some part of it) will end; hence it is marked by a specific temporality in-
volving an interpolation of the future into the present. The counterjihad discourse is
replete with the language of revelation, disclosure and uncovering, and metaphors of
sight and visuality. The first chapter of Ye’Or’s foundational text is entitled ‘Eurabia
Revealed ’, whilst revelation is also evoked in the names of online spaces such as Sharia
Unveiled. We are urged to ‘see through the illusion of permanence and imagine the fu-
ture... for non-Muslim Europeans’,2 to ‘look several decades ahead’.3 These prophetic
abilities are contrasted with the ‘short-sightedness’ or ‘blindness’ of liberals and left-
ists, although recent anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim mobilisations are sometimes
taken as signs that ‘the blinkers are coming off ’. One of the main modes of argument-
ation is the ‘slippery slope’, or cognate terms such as the ‘thin end of the wedge’ or the
‘domino effect’.
The apocalyptic vision of Western crisis, decline and capitulation to Islam is by no
means homogeneous. There are stronger andweaker versions, intellectual and demotic
forms, as well as many local variations. Toby Archer well describes the spectrum of
despair:
At one end are the shrillest voices, with their dystopian fantasies of may-
hem and civil war enveloping Europe as the continent becomes incorpor-
ated into a new Caliphate. They resemble the writers of the American
neo-fascist militia movement, forever waiting for the beginning of the
race-war and the chance to fight the ‘New World Order’. At the other
end of the scale are mainstream writers and politicians whose views are
not dissimilar. (Archer, cited in Fekete, 2012, at p.33)
The apocalyptic narrative fulfils slightly different functions for Europeans and Amer-
icans. For Europeans it is primarily a melancholic lamentation for a lifeworld already
2https://libertygb.org.uk/news/immigration-altruism-and-national-suicide [Last accessed 25th
August 2017].
3https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/08/will-muslim-immigration-trigger-wars.html [Last ac-
cessed 25th August 2017].
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transformed, whereas the US political right invokes the spectre of ‘Eurabia’ as a
portent of things to come, a glimpse into America’s future, and a powerful rhetor-
ical weapon against domestic political opponents. Scandinavia occupies an important
place within the imaginations of both European andNorth American counterjihadists
as a dire warning of the consequences of social democracy and state welfare, exem-
plified in the titles of blog entries such as ‘The Myth of the Scandinavian Model’,4
‘Swedish Welfare State Collapses as Immigrants WageWar’5 and ‘Islamohell in Nor-
way’.6
‘The Second Fall of Rome’
TheEurabian dystopia expresses an overwhelming fear of a descent into anarchy, chaos
and civil war, one that ultimately threatens to spill out from Europe and engulf the
entire world. Already ‘[t]he state is dead’, there is ‘no law and order’ in much of
Europe, and the continent’s major cities have become ‘powder kegs of ethnic and
religious tensions’.7 The ‘Eurabian civil war’, when it comes, will be a conflict of
‘unimaginable proportions’ and ‘unimaginable carnage’, ‘the most destructive war in
human history’, during which ‘[m]any of our cultural treasures will burn’.8 Due to
the ‘borderless nature’ of the EU, any civil conflict within Europe ‘could spiral out of
control and spread tomuch of the continent’, perhaps even igniting a ‘global civil war’.9
That ‘the continent has simply lost control over its own borders’ means that France
could become ‘a new Lebanon’.10 ‘People think we could never witness the atrocities
of Syria, Iraq or Libya in the rolling hills of rural Europe, but why not?’11 That the
state has become incapable of protecting its citizens, that the unwritten contract that
4https://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/510 [Last accessed 25th August 2017].
5https://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/938 [Last accessed 25th August 2017].
6https://theenglishdefenceleagueextra.blogspot.co.uk/2010/08/islamohell-in-norway-sign-of-
things-to.html [Last accessed 25th August 2017].
7https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/08/will-muslim-immigration-trigger-wars.html [Last ac-
cessed 2nd October 2017].
8https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/11/second-fall-of-rome.html [Last accessed 2nd October
2017].
9Ibid.
10https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/10/second-night-of-rioting-in-paris.html [Last accessed
2nd October 2017].
11https://libertygb.org.uk/news/immigration-altruism-and-national-suicide [Last accessed 2ndOc-
tober 2017].
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‘gives the state a monopoly on violence in return for its protecting its citizens... has
been broken’,12 is a recurrent theme.
One post on the Gates of Vienna blog imagines in some detail ‘The Danish Civil
War’,13 a fictional scenario which the blog is at some pains to stress is intended to
be ‘descriptive’ and not ‘normative’. Written in 2007, the essay envisages Denmark’s
descent into civil war in 2013, following several years of intermittent suicide bomb-
ings,Muslim religious-political assertion and attempts at ‘appeasement’ by theDanish
government. The state’s authority wanes asMuslims increasingly segregate themselves
into ‘Autonomous Cultural Zones’ and non-Muslims, no longer trusting that the state
will protect its citizens, start to stockpile weapons. Attempts to control the flow of ‘Is-
lamic radicals’ are hindered by ‘the open borders of the EU’, whilst attempts to deport
Muslims without Danish citizenship are hindered by ‘EU Human Rights legislation’
and by ‘domestic and international human rights organizations’. The civil war is even-
tually sparked when a ‘native Danish couple’ is attacked by ‘four or five youngMuslim
men’, the man ‘knocked unconscious’ and the girl ‘dragged off into a nearby alley and
gang raped’.14
These presentiments of civil war may in part be an expression of the social un-
certainties generated by contemporary terrorism, a reading that is suggested by the
prominent figuration of suicide bombings within the ‘Danish Civil War’ and which
may seem to be supported by the following exchange I had with one of my inter-
viewees, a former senior English Defence League activist:
Me: If I’m not reading too much into what you’re saying, you think we’re
heading for a kind of civil war scenario?
Interviewee: I think we’re heading to it, I do, yeah... I don’t think it’s a
civil war that we’re gonna start, I think we’re heading for a civil war that –
see the 2,000 people who’ve flown out to join ISIS? – it’s one that they’ll
start. And there’ll be a lot more than 2,000 of ’em. 2,000 may become
20,000 in twenty years. 20,000’s a small army of willin’ people to die for
their cause... I saw a university poll said thirty percent of muslims believe
12http://gatesofvienna.net/2009/07/drawing-the-line/ [Last accessed 2nd October 2017].
13http://gatesofvienna.net/2007/11/the-danish-civil-war/ [Last accessed 2nd October 2017].
14Ibid.
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that it’s acceptable to kill for Islam. That’s kids at uni. That’s kids at
uni. Thirty percent. Fuckin’ ’ell, what’s that? One million people! That’s
fuckin’ mad!
Me: And when do you think this is all going to come to a head?
Interviewee: Within thirty years.
Me: As soon as that?
Interviewee: Yeah.15
Insofar as contemporary terrorism ‘opens the possibility that anyone may be a soldier
in disguise, a sleeper among us, waiting to strike at the heart of our social slumber’,
as Appadurai has put it (2006, p. 92), it can encourage speculation about the agents
of terror - who they are, where they are, how numerous they are - a tendency that is
evident in the foregoing exchange, in which 2,000 fighters rapidly becomes 20,000
and eventually a million.
It would, however, be reductive to read these apocalyptic visions of civil war and
social breakdown as simply an expression of contemporary anxieties about ‘terrorism’.
They also express, among other things, an ultraconservative preoccupation with law
and order, as suggested by the anticipation of increasingMuslim self-segregation, eth-
nicised violence and waning state authority in theDanish civil war scenario. Eurabia is
tormented not only by suicide bombings and jihadist violence - the ‘violence, murder,
rape and mayhem carried out by Muslims’16 - but also by ‘aggressive gangs of Muslim
youngsters’,17 ‘ethnic gangs’, ‘immigrant-related organized crime’,18 and ‘[t]attooed,
pierced Pakistani skinhead gangs’.19 It is not just that it is ‘practically impossible now
in Europe to control Islamic terrorism either from within or without’,20 but also that
the state’s writ no longer extends to parts of its own territory, the ‘Muslim ghettoes’
15Interview 5, counterjihad activist and organiser, male, UK.
16https://libertygb.org.uk/news/immigration-altruism-and-national-suicide [Last accessed 2ndOc-
tober 2017].
17https://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/938 [Last accessed 2nd October 2017].
18https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/05/norwegian-inquisition-sunset-in-land.html [Last ac-
cessed 2nd October 2017].
19http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3620861/Early-skirmish-in-the-Eurabian-
civil-war.html [Last accessed 2nd October 2017].
20http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=19633 [Last accessed 2nd October
2017].
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(or perhaps ‘immigrant ghettos’) that are becoming ‘no-go zones’ (or perhaps ‘no go
areas for white people’). The tendency of the discourse to slide from a religious to an
ethnic (and, as we will see later, ultimately racial) register is already implicit in the
term ‘Eur-Abia’ (not ‘Eur-slam’ or ‘Isl-ope’), and from Ye’Or and others’ occasional
slippages from ‘Islamization’ to ‘Arabization’ or even ‘Pakistanization’.
One key moment that figures prominently in these narratives is the Parisian ban-
lieu riots of 2005, described at the time by Mark Steyn in the pages of the Telegraph
as ‘an early skirmish in the Eurabian civil war’.21 For Melanie Phillips, in an article
entitled ‘Eurabia on the rampage’,22 the disturbances had not been ‘caused by depriva-
tion and race’ but were instead ‘Muslim riots’, tendentious journalistic diagnoses that
were repeated and amplified by counterjihad bloggers such as Fjordman:
As Mark Steyn points out, the Jihad in the streets of France looks in-
creasingly like the early skirmishes of an impending Eurabian civil war,
brought on by massive Muslim immigration and multicultural stupidity.
And it is by no means limited to France. Law and order is slowly breaking
down in major and even minor cities across the European continent, and
the streets are ruled by aggressive gangs of Muslim youngsters.23
What Fjordman calls the ‘French intifada’24 signals that France is a country ‘where
the state is no longer able to protect the property and safety of its taxpaying citizens’,
one that is in danger of ‘becoming a new Lebanon’.25
The Eurabian apocalyptic is replete with historical analogies both ancient and
modern. However, the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, described in detail
in Edward Gibbon’s monumental history of that name published between 1776 and
1789, figures especially prominently:
21http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3620861/Early-skirmish-in-the-Eurabian-
civil-war.html [Last accessed 2nd October 2017].
22https://web.archive.org/web/20051107021623/http://www.melaniephillips.com/diary/archives/00
1474.html [Last accessed 2nd October 2017].
23https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/11/eurabian-civil-war-no-taxation-without.html [Last ac-
cessed 25th August 2017].
24https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/11/second-fall-of-rome.html [Last accessed 25th August
2017].
25https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/11/eurabian-civil-war-no-taxation-without.html [Last ac-
cessed 25th August 2017].
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The Jihad-riots in France look more like the fall of the Roman Empire...
when the barbarians immigrated in huge numbers and caused the now
weakened civilization to collapse in large parts of Western Europe.26
In the Eurabian imaginary there are already ‘barbarians at the gates of Paris’27 and the
‘second fall of Rome’ seems imminent.
The fusion of apocalyptic futurity with ancient history cannot but remind British
readers of the prophecy of racial civil war made in 1968 by the former Conservative
politician Enoch Powell, who, ‘like the Roman’ seemed to see ‘the River Tiber foaming
with much blood.’ Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech is an explicit reference point for
some British counterjihadists, for instance one of the speakers at the February 2016
Pegida UK demonstration in Solihull:
I wanna say this. If this problem continues and the Islamic community
does not take heed. I want the [police] officers to hear this. We will
have the same problem as we did in Ireland, when the IRA went on the
offensive. The Protestants said, we need to kill, we need to strike back.
So you have the war between the two communities... If MI5 are not able
to contain this, and the extremists get through, you will have the far right
- and I mean the far right, not us, the far right - will go on the offensive,
and they will attack, and we will have a war, a civil unrest on the streets of
Britain. The late MP Enoch Powell made a speech about this. The Rivers
of Blood speech. That will come true if this is not contained.28
Memories of theNorthern Ireland conflict are also frequently invoked by British coun-
terjihadists as a warning about the future state of Europe, including by my EDL in-
terlocutor: ‘I just think that when you ’ad the Irish conflict, the UDA formed and
the UVF formed in response to the republican terrorists, I think that unfortunately in
Europe that’s what you will see.’29
26https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/07/second-fall-of-rome.html [Last accessed 25th August
2017].
27https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/11/eurabian-civil-war-no-taxation-without.html [Last ac-
cessed 2nd October 2017].
28Fieldnotes, February 2016.
29Interview 5, counterjihad activist and organiser, male, UK.
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The ‘second fall of Rome’ is temporally indeterminate, as is evident from some of
the speculative timescales described in online counterjihad spaces and by interviewees:
‘within the coming generation’,30 ‘[w]ithin thirty years’,31 ‘twenty years from now’.32
Others openly wonder: ‘In twenty years? Ten years? Five? Today even?’.33 For some,
‘the European catastrophe isn’t hypothetical, but already under way’ (Steyn, 2005). In
the words of ACT for America’s Brigitte Gabriel, ‘Europe will no longer be Europe
by 2050. Europe has already become Eurabia. Europe is Eurabia right now.’34 As
early as 2006, the Belgian blogThe Brussels Journal claimed that ‘[o]ne does not have
to be prophetic to predict... that Europe is becoming Islamic... Today Mohammed
is already the most popular name for new-born boys in Brussels, Amsterdam, Rot-
terdam, and other major European cities.’35 From this perspective, the ‘future is here
now: It’s not about “predictions”.’36
That we have essentially departed from linear, chronological time is evident not
only from such claims as ‘the future is here now’, but also from the aesthetic repertoire
of the counterjihad movement. For instance, the first thing that greets visitors to the
website of Anders Gravers and Stephen Gash’s group ‘Stop Islamisation of Europe’
is an image of a stopped clock, shown in figure 6.1. The clock face is superimposed
on a map of Europe, with the continent encircled by a ring of star and crescent sym-
bols, which recall the flag of the Ottoman Empire but today have come to serve more
generally as a symbol of ‘Islam’. Writing to the left of the clock face associates ‘Is-
lam’ with: ‘slaughter’, ‘cruelty’, ‘barbarism’, ‘tyranny’, ‘fascism’ and ‘hate’ among other
things. To the right of the clock face is a list of ‘European’ values threatened by ‘Islam’:
‘democracy’, ‘freedom’, ‘equality’ and ‘peace’, along with a plea to ‘save our childrens
future’, a pervasive and important theme whose significance will become evident later
30https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/11/second-fall-of-rome.html [Last accessed 25th August
2017].
31Interview 5, counterjihad activist and organiser, male, UK.
32https://enzaferreri.blogspot.co.uk/2013/03/france-will-be-40-percent-muslim-in-2030.html
[Last accessed 25th August 2017].
33https://theenglishdefenceleagueextra.blogspot.co.uk/2010/08/islamohell-in-norway-sign-of-
things-to.html [Last accessed 25th August 2017].
34https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/09/01/meet-extremists-attending-act-america-
conference [Last accessed 25th August 2017].
35https://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/1609 [Last accessed 25th August 2017].
36https://www.steynonline.com/7428/it-still-the-demography-stupid [Last accessed 25th August
2017].
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Figure 6.1: Banner graphic from the SIOE homepage: ‘Stop Islamisation of Europe’.
Source: sioeeu.wordpress.com.
in the thesis. ‘Enough!’, the graphic proclaims in eight different European languages:
‘Stop Islamisation of Europe’. The same graphic is reproduced in slightly different
forms on other websites, sometimes with variations on the map and text. On Gates
of Vienna, for instance, the map is of the whole world, and the caption reads ‘Stop
the Sharia Clock! Join the Counterjihad’. Significantly, wherever and whenever the
image appears the clock always shows five minutes to midnight. And that’s the point:
in the Eurabian imaginary it is always five minutes to midnight, the catastrophe is
always just around the corner, disaster is always imminent but never quite arrived.
More often, the imagery is of timebombs rather than clock faces, signalling an
even more fundamental departure from linear, chronological time. Unlike clocks,
fuses do not have minute or second marks on them: one can see that the explosion is
imminent, but can never be certain when precisely it will occur. For instance, at the
chaotic Pegida UK launch event inNewcastle in February 2015, a year before themore
disciplined re-launch led by Stephen Lennon in Solihull described in the introduction,
a BNP organiser pushed a leaflet into my hand that depicted ‘Islam’ as a timebomb
primed to explode (reproduced as figure 6.2). The bomb’s fuse is lit and it is poised
to explode over a map of Great Britain. The caption reads: ‘Time for Action: Save
Your Country’. The back of the flyer shows a picture of Enoch Powell together with a
quote from him to the effect that ‘It’s never (sic) too late to save your country!’: again,
disaster imminent but perpetually deferred. One heavily circulated image in online
counterjihad spaces is Kurt Westergaard’s famous cartoon of the prophet Mohammed
with a bomb in his turban, which was considered one of the most provocative of the
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cartoons published by Jyllands-Posten in 2005.
One striking feature of the discourse is an overwhelming sense of fatalism. For
some Eurabian pessimists, it is ‘late in the day, but Europe still has time’.37 For oth-
ers, Eurabia ‘cannot change direction’, it has an ‘inevitable trajectory’, its ‘destiny’ has
already been ‘sealed’.38 The fictional account of ‘The Danish Civil War’ is descriptive,
not normative: some such scenario will inevitably come to pass, whether one wills it
or not. When I asked my EDL interlocutor whether there was anything that could
be done to avoid a descent into civil war, the sense of inevitability hung heavy over his
response:
Well I think we should do everything we can to avoid that. But I don’t
think we are. I think we’ve seen all the warning signs are there. The warn-
ing signs across Europe are there. In Sweden. In France. Everywhere.
[...] I think that inevitably that’s where we’re gonna head to, civil conflict.
And erm... I don’t want it, I’ve always said like, when those problems kick
off it’s gonna be just on the streets here. It’s gonna be neighbours turning
on neighbours, and I don’t really see another outcome for it. Something
will spark that will cause that.39
In these stronger versions of the narrative, civil war is ‘inevitably... where we’re gonna
head to... I don’t really see another outcome for it’. Here the future becomes determ-
inative, and human agency in the present is at best of secondary importance, or even
wholly impotent, as in Fallaci’s mining of ancient Roman history to describe Europe’s
tragic predicament: ‘What could Seneca do? [...] He knew it would end that way -
with the fall of the Roman Empire. But he could do nothing’ (cited in Varadarajan,
2005, not paginated; emphasis mine).
37http://4freedoms.com/group/gays/forum/topics/douglas-murray-what-are-we-to-do-about-
islam [Last accessed 25th August 2017].
38https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/11/second-fall-of-rome.html [Last accessed 25th August
2017].
39Interview 5, counterjihad activist and organiser, male, UK.
155
‘A stranger in my own country’
The overwhelming impression conveyed in the Eurabia literature and in my conver-
sations with counterjihad activists is of a profound cultural estrangement, an invasion
of the lifeworld by the ‘foreign’, the ‘alien’ and the ‘inauthentic’. Recurring themes are
of ‘sharia law... creeping into our daily lives’,40 of the ‘stealthy incursion of halal meat
into the food industry’,41 of the ‘establishment of Muslim-only neighbourhoods’, of
‘untold numbers of new mosques’ being ‘built throughout the West’.42 Yet ‘Islamisa-
tion’, as will be evident from the foregoing paragraphs, is not strictly coextensive with
the presence of Muslims or visible symbols of ‘Islam’, but stands in metonymically for
a much wider set of processes of social, cultural, demographic and political change.
Hence the erosion of ‘indigenous’ traditions and demographic ‘inundation’ are other
key themes, along with narratives of abandonment by political parties and the Left.
As Nick Denes has observed, in the Eurabia literature, ‘Islamist conquest’ is some-
times ‘weirdly “evidenced” with laments over “satanists in the Royal Navy”... “party
drugs”, “hip-hop music”... or “chav-hoods”’ (Denes, 2012, p. 296)
A signal theme is of alienation, of estrangement from one’s ‘authentic’ self, of
feeling like a foreigner in one’s own country, exemplified in this anecdote offered by
an interviewee from the political party Liberty GB:
I feel profoundly - as many other people do - profoundly uneasy when
I’m walking in areas of London and I can’t see or hear any other English
people. I was in Edgware [a district in north London] over the weekend
and I walked a long way through the town centre and all I heard was
foreign languages, and it fills me with rage that they could do that to my
country, and make me a foreigner in my own country. And that feeling
of rage I suspect is shared by many millions.43
If the language here conveys a sense of ‘rootedness’ and of attachment to place (‘my
40http://www.siotw.org/modules/about/ [Last accessed 29th September 2017].
41http://gatesofvienna.net/2011/01/edl-mission-statement-the-final-version/ [Last accessed 29th
September 2017].
42http://gatesofvienna.net/2009/09/barking-up-the-wrong-tree/ [Last accessed 29th September
2017].
43Interview 2, party political activist, male, UK.
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own country’), then that impression is even more potent elsewhere in the same inter-
view:
[E]verything we hold dear, everything that’s valuable to us, and
everything we want for our children and grandchildren is tied up with
this notion of national identity, of social cohesion, of historical continu-
ity. These kinds of ideas we regard as fundamental to our identity and our
survival as a nation, as a meaningful entity. And those ideas are closely
connected with the kind of anger and frustration we feel at our country
being inundated with people who have no connection with the past, and
very little reason or interest in being here apart from earning money.44
Of importance here is the nature of the objection to immigration: it is not opposed
on economic grounds, but because those ‘inundating’ the country ‘have no connection
with the past, and very little reason... for being here apart from earningmoney’. What
is valued above all is ‘identity’, ‘cohesion’ and ‘continuity’.
The idea that Islam is ‘foreign’ or ‘alien’ to Europe, that the Muslim presence in
Europe constitutes an ‘invasion’ and that the areas where Muslims live are Islamic
‘colonies’ is a recurring theme. The language of ‘conquest’ to describe Muslim mi-
gration to Europe implies an ethnic rather than a civic conception of national and
European identity, one that is territorial (and perhaps also biological) rather than con-
tractarian, or else why would legal migration and acquisition of citizenship byMuslims
(or anyone else) amount to an ‘invasion’? If one’s ‘implementation in a landscape’ (‘the
rolling hills of rural Europe’), one’s fatal ‘attachment to Place’ (Luton, Dresden) is ‘the
very splitting of humanity into natives and strangers’ (Levinas, 1990a) then it should
be unsurprising that the counterjihad discourse is replete with the language of nativ-
ism, indigenism and völkisch nationalism, exemplified by terminology such as ‘native
Danes’, the ‘native English’, ‘indigenous Europeans’, ‘the indigenous peoples of this
continent’, ‘Islamic lands’, ‘Islamic territories’, or ‘our homelands’. The fatalism impli-
cit in such ideas is rendered transparent in Ye’Or’s claim that ‘immigrant communities
will always be bound by emotional, religious and political ties to their countries of ori-
gin’ (cited in Giniewski, 1994, at p. 16). From this perspective, Muslims are fated to
44Ibid.
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be perennial ‘strangers’: they may be in Europe, but they are never really of Europe.
Discourses of impurity, corruption and contamination, of the transgression of bor-
ders and boundaries of all kinds, permeate the counterjihad discourse. A dread of cul-
tural impurity and intermixing is evident in the dystopia of ‘Eurabia’ and its nightmare
topography: ‘Londonistan’, ‘FrArabia’, and the like. A concern with linguistic purity
was similarly evident in the sense of unease felt by the interviewee from Liberty GB
when surrounded by people speaking foreign languages. The concern with linguistic
impurity can alsomanifest in slightly different forms, for instance in the claim byACT
for America that the US is becoming ‘a hyphenated nation’, and that rather than being
‘American first’ or Americans simpliciter, ‘people are now African-American, Asian-
American, or anything else you can put in front of American.’45
One way of apprehending purity discourses is throughMaryDouglas’ classic char-
acterisation of dirt as ‘matter out of place’ and her argument that all social and polit-
ical orders find repellent those things (people, objects, words) that confound their
taxonomic boundaries (Douglas, 1966). Such a reading finds support, for instance,
in an essay entitled ‘An Establishment Conservative’s Guide To The Alt-Right’ by
the former Breitbart journalist Milo Yiannopolous, in which he attributes to the Alt-
Right the view that ‘[a]Mosque next to an English street full of houses bearing the flag
of St. George... is neither an English street nor a Muslim street’ and that ‘separation
is necessary for distinctiveness’.46 However, Douglas’ argument, which explains the
desire for purity in terms of an innate human need for order, has been criticised for its
structuralist bias and its failure to theorise the relationship between purity discourses
and forms of social and political power (see e.g. Duschinsky, 2011).
The Italian writer, chemist and Auschwitz survivor Primo Levi’s stimulating re-
flections on chemical processes of enrichment and purification, whilst not elaborated
as a systematic theoretical account, constitute a powerful corrective and can offer pen-
etrating insights into the connections between purity discourses, regimes of power and
processes of social change:
...the so tender and so delicate zinc, so yielding to acid which gulps it
45http://www.actforamerica.org/preserving_american_culture [Last accessed 5th January 2017].
46http://www.breitbart.com/tech/2016/03/29/an-establishment-conservatives-guide-to-the-alt-
right/ [Last accessed 29th September 2017].
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down in a single mouthful, behaves, however, in a very different fashion
when it is very pure: then it obstinately resists the attack. One could
draw from this two conflicting philosophical conclusions: the praise of
purity, which protects from evil like a coat of mail; the praise of impurity,
which gives rise to changes, in other words, to life. I discarded the first,
disgustingly moralistic, and I lingered to consider the second, which I
found more congenial. In order for the wheel to turn, for life to be lived,
impurities are needed, and the impurities of impurities in the soil, too,
as is known, if it is to be fertile. Dissension, diversity, the grain of salt
and mustard are needed: Fascism does not want them, forbids them, and
that’s why you’re not a Fascist: it wants everybody to be the same, and
you are not. (Levi, 1984, pp. 27-28)
From this perspective, the desire for purity does not reflect an innate human need for
order, but instead represents just one possible affective response to change (Duschin-
sky, 2011). Hence, purity discourses tend to appear in contexts where existing power
structures, social relations and understandings of the world are called into question
and seek to reconsecrate themselves. (Douglas had made a similar observation about
the connection between purity and temporality - that ‘purity is the enemy of change’
(1966, p. 163) - but had not developed the idea theoretically.)
A desire for cultural purity is expressed within the counterjihad discourse through
the leitmotif of ‘cultural enrichment’, an ironic term used to express scepticism about
the cultural ‘value’ of Muslims and other ‘strangers’, as in this excerpt from an entry
on the Gates of Vienna blog:
So imagine that you are a working-class father who just barely gets by. You
go to work, support your family, and do your best to live right. Thirty years
ago your neighborhood was a modest but lawful inner suburb inhabited
by people like yourself and your family.
But cultural enrichment has changed all that, and your twelve-year-old
daughter has just been gang-raped by a group of immigrant thugs. The
police promise to do their best, but their best isn’t much. Statistically
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speaking, there’s less than a 10% chance that the perpetrators of this ab-
omination against you and your family will ever be caught, prosecuted,
convicted, and punished. And then— even if the wheels of justice some-
how turn in your favor — after a year or two the young punks will in all
likelihood be free to roam the streets and repeat their monstrous crimes.47
Again, the theme of rootedness: the ‘working-class father’ figured here, who ‘just
barely gets by’, has lived in the same neighbourhood for thirty years. The past of that
neighbourhood is imagined as one of safety and stability (‘lawfulness’), a condition
linked to its homogeneity and purity, its being inhabited by ‘people like yourself and
your family’. But enrichment (‘diversity, the grain of salt and mustard’) has led to
change, moreover change for the worse: the present is haunted by ‘abominations’ and
‘monstrosities’.
The gendering of this narrative is also important. ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’ are
either gendered as female and often infantilised (‘your twelve-year-old daughter’), or,
if gendered male, then aged, senescent and somewhat vulnerable (‘a working-class
father who just barely gets by’), whilst ‘Islam’ is typically gendered as male and is
frequently youthful and virile:
I think that another thing which is of tremendous concern is over the cur-
rent, what people would describe as immigration crisis, where we’ve seen
a huge amount of men, who are sometimes described as refugees, but they
do predominantly tend to be men in their late teens to early twenties trav-
elling by themselves, that does have a huge concern over destabilisation
of Western Europe, with that amount of people coming in without any
sort of checks really... But I think that influx of people, when the media
try to portray them as being helpless refugees and you see men of fight-
ing age coming across the borders who seem to be pretty well fed and
fit and healthy with mobile phones and new trainers and things, then I
think that’s of huge concern. And they typically seem to be of theMuslim
faith.48
47http://gatesofvienna.net/2009/07/drawing-the-line/ [Last accessed 29th September 2017].
48Interview 7, party political activist, male, UK.
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The leitmotif of ‘cultural enrichment’ also circulates in aesthetic forms, where its
gendering is equally evident, for instance the placard produced by Pegida UK shown
in figure 6.3. This placard, which was carried by some of the protestors at the Birm-
ingham ‘silent walk’ described in the introduction, depicts the British-born ISIS re-
cruit Mohammed Emwazi (‘Jihadi John’) against a blood-red background, masked
and dressed in military fatigues and brandishing a blade with cold menace, while the
caption asks, ironically: ‘cultural enrichment?’. The fixation on purity is also evident
in the Pegida UK logo in the bottom right-hand corner of the image, which shows an
adapted form of the universally-recognisable ‘throw away your trash’ sign, in which a
man (the ‘working-class father’ living in ‘a modest but lawful inner suburb’?) is depic-
ted conscientiously placing in the bin two items of ‘trash’: a swastika and a star and
crescent (which we encountered earlier as a generic symbol of ‘Islam’). A number of
messages might be read into this symbol: that Nazism and Islam are (analogous and
equivalent) forms of dirt, that Europe must be cleansed of both, that Pegida seeks to
cleanse itself of the taint of Nazism.
Grassroots counterjihad groups like Pegida and the EDL frequently associate
both Muslims and anti-racist and anti-fascist counterprotestors with dirt: Muslims
are ‘filth’, Islam is ‘disgusting’, anti-fascist counterprotestors are ‘soap dodgers’ and
‘scum’.49 These sentiments are often reciprocated by anti-fascist protestors, whose
performative repertoire includes such chants as ‘fascist scum, off our streets’. In a UK
context, this is symptomatic of the way that, for both the left and the right, con-
temporary English and British identities are intimately bound up with folk memor-
ies of patriotic resistance against Nazi Germany, and that ‘fascism’ on the streets of
Britain (whether of the kind associated with the EDL (by anti-fascists) or that some-
times associated with jihadist terrorists (by the EDL)) amounts to ‘matter out of place’
(Douglas, 1966).
That purity discourses emerge in the context of anxieties about shifting configura-
tions of social and political power, the implication of Levi’s reflections, finds seeming
confirmation in some of my interviews with counterjihad activists. For instance, the
same activist who had felt ‘profoundly uneasy’ in an area of London where he could
49Fieldnotes, multiple dates.
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Figure 6.3: ’Cultural Enrichment?’ Placard produced by Pegida UK. Source: pe-
gidauk.org.
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This  image  of  the  Pegida  UK 
placard  has  been  removed  as the  
copyright  is  owned  by  another  
organisation.
not ‘see or hear any other English people’, described tome a nightmare future in which
the ‘native English’ would be governed by Muslims and other ‘strangers’:
The notion that English children are going to be minorities in their own
country, presided over and governed by people of different ethnic and ra-
cial and religious backgrounds, fills me with dread because there is simply
no guarantee that those people are going to respect our notions of equal-
ity, and fairness and all the other stuff, and treat those little English kids
with the same respect that we currently treat incomers into the country.
There are many signs that suggest they’ll - once they’re in the position of
power in this country, some of these groups will use it simply to further
strengthen their own position without a care for the native English. The
idea of us becoming a minority in our country presided over by foreigners
is frankly terrifying.50
There are, again, strong resonances of Powellism here. In particular, the fear of a future
in which the ‘native English’ are ‘presided over by foreigners’ is strongly reminiscent
of the claim that ‘in 15 or 20 years’ time the black man will have the whip hand over
the white man’, attributed by Powell to ‘a middle-aged, quite ordinary working man’.51
Oncemore, a powerful sense of rootedness is conveyed by the language of ‘our country’
and ‘native English’.
The intellectualised expression of this fear of being ‘presided over by foreigners’ is
Ye’Or’s concept of ‘dhimmitude’, a neologism derived from the Arabic word dhimmī,
which is a historical term referring to non-Muslim subjects of a state governed ac-
cording to sharia, who were obliged to pay a tax known as the jizya in return for the
protection of the state. For Ye’Or, Europe is being turned into a ‘civilization of dhim-
mitude’, one that is ‘subservient to the ideology of jihad and the Islamic powers that
propagate it’ (Ye’Or, 2005, p. 9). Dhimmitude, for Ye’Or, does not only refer to polit-
ical and economic domination by Muslims (government by sharia, payment of jizya)
but also a state of mind: ‘it is a long process that involves many elements and a specific
50Interview 2, party political activist, male, UK.
51http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/3643823/Enoch-Powells-Rivers-of-Blood-speech.html
[Last accessed 29th September 2017].
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mental conditioning’ (cited in Bangstad, 2013, at p. 372). This carries the implication
that one can be living in a state of dhimmitude ‘without realizing it’, a condition that
necessarily leads to ‘self-destruction’ (ibid., p. 372). Fallaci expresses the same idea in
slightly different terms: ‘the Islamic invasion does not proceed only in a physical sense,
but also in a mental and cultural sense’ (cited in Varadarajan, 2005, not paginated).
Virtually any accommodation of Muslim political claims amounts to ‘dhimmitude’,
the symptoms of which are multifarious: supermarkets selling halal food products,
Jyllands-Posten issuing a qualified apology for publishing cartoons of Mohammed, the
Archbishop of Canterbury suggesting that it may be appropriate for the legal system
to make ‘reasonable accommodation’ for matters of religious conscience,52 including
the religious consciences of Muslims.
The preoccupation with issues to do with cultural identity, social status and polit-
ical power, rather than economic anxiety, is seemingly a consistent feature of all parts
of the counterjihadmovement, including the predominantly working-class and lower-
middle class supporters of street movements. When I asked one of my informants
within the UK anti-fascist movement, who had covertly observed many demonstra-
tions by grassroots counterjihad groups over the years, what were the main grievances
that he had heard their supporters express, he observed that ‘they’re not articulated in
an economic sense’, that ‘there’s a little bit of “jobs taking” sort of stuff ’, but that ‘it’s
identity, you know, in their mind. It’s about identity. It’s about “this isn’t our country
any more”’:
Interviewee: You might describe it in a wider sense as the decline of
white power. And I don’t mean that in a kind of neo-Nazi sense, I mean
a general structural sense.
Me: White hegemony?
Interviewee: Yeah. And they feel that, they’re fearful of that. And
multiculturalism in some senses challenges their traditional position as
the obvious hegemonic societal force. And they’re scared of that, and they
see that coupled with the economic issues, but they would articulate it as
52http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/1135/sharia-law-what-did-the-
archbishop-actually-say [Last accessed 29th September 2017].
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‘the shops round my area don’t look the same anymore, I’m not welcome
here anymore’.53
This is not, of course, to argue that grassroots members of counterjihad street move-
ments may not also occupy conditions of economic precarity. Moreover, economic
grievances are sometimes interwoven with other social fears and anxieties, for instance
in Fjordman’s claim that ‘the state is no longer able to protect the property and safety
of its taxpaying citizens’, or his suggestion that high European tax rates are ‘simply
disguised Jizya paid in the form of welfare to Muslims and our new Eurocrat aristo-
cracy’ and hence should no longer be paid ‘until our authorities restore law and order
and close the borders for Muslim immigration’.54
However, the emphasis placed on cultural identity and social power, as well as the
fact that the ‘Eurabia’ narrative is shared by a wide range of figures from a variety
of class backgrounds, suggests the limitations of an economistic, class-based inter-
pretation and directs our attention towards a moral economy based on honour, es-
teem and prestige. In a speech to the Pim Fortuyn Memorial Conference on Europe
and Islam in February 2006, widely circulated with online counterjihad spaces, the
British neoconservative writer Douglas Murray analogised the reluctance of parts of
Europe to join the US-led war in Iraq with the appeasement of Nazi Germany, quot-
ing Churchill’s words to Chamberlain: ‘You were given the choice between war and
dishonour. You chose dishonour and you will have war.’ Defeat this time ‘will not
look as defeat would have looked last time,’ it will rather ‘consist of a gradual accre-
tion of hurts on our society, a wearying accumulation of often minor humiliations:
death by a thousand cuts’.55 Similarly, one of my interviewees, a female American
counterjihad activist, complained of ‘a cultural failure, a willingness and even eagerness
to self-censor and kowtow in the face of violent intimidation’, which would ‘only in-
vite more violent intimidation’, adding that she was ‘determined not to submit in that
way’ (emphasis mine).56 A recurring theme is that the word Islam literally means ‘sub-
53Interview 12, anti-fascist activist, male, UK.
54https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/11/eurabian-civil-war-no-taxation-without.html [Last ac-
cessed 29th September 2017].
55http://4freedoms.com/group/gays/forum/topics/douglas-murray-what-are-we-to-do-about-
islam [Last accessed 25th August 2017].
56Interview 4. Counterjihad blogger and activist, female, US.
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mission’. Dhimitude, meanwhile, is essentially a byword for dishonour: ‘Europeans
are once again choosing dishonour’, Murray claimed, but the ‘word for dishonour this
time is Dhimmitude’.57
‘The demographic timebomb’
A subtle but important slippage occured in the interview excerpts quoted above, from
feeling like a ‘foreigner’ in one’s own country to feeling like a ‘minority’, conveying
a sense not only of cultural estrangement but also of demographic submersion: ‘the
demographic change in the rise in the Islamic community is just terrifying when you
look into it’, one of my interviewees claimed.58 Whilst it would be wrong to ascribe
the Eurabian apocalyptic to any single fear, the centrality of demographic anxieties is
encapsulated by a much-circulated essay byMark Steyn entitled ‘It’s the Demography,
Stupid’ (Steyn, 2005). The demographic anxieties comprise two interrelated concerns:
migration and fertility. ‘Tens of millions of immigrants pour into Europe’,59 who
‘also reproduce at rates three to four times higher than the indigenous Infidels.’60 For
some the implication is that Europe ‘will soon see a number of our largest cities fall
to Muslim majorities’,61 whereas for others there are already ‘certain parts of Europe
that seem to be beyond hope, or very close to it.’62
There is a basic puzzle, Arjun Appadurai suggests, ‘about why the relatively small
numbers that give the word minority its most simple meaning and usually imply polit-
ical and military weakness do not prevent minorities from being objects of fear and
rage.’ (Appadurai, 2006, p. 49) His answer is that minorities are a constant reminder
of the tiny gap between the condition of being a majority and that of being a totality,
which produces what he calls the ‘anxiety of incompleteness’ (ibid.) To state this in
57http://4freedoms.com/group/gays/forum/topics/douglas-murray-what-are-we-to-do-about-
islam [Last accessed 25th August 2017].
58Interview 5, counterjihad activist and organiser, male, UK.
59https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/08/will-muslim-immigration-trigger-wars.html [Last ac-
cessed 29th September 2017].
60https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/11/eurabian-civil-war-no-taxation-without.html [Last ac-
cessed 29th September 2017].
61http://4freedoms.com/group/gays/forum/topics/douglas-murray-what-are-we-to-do-about-
islam [Last accessed 25th August 2017].
62https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/11/second-fall-of-rome.html [Last accessed 29th Septem-
ber 2017].
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Mary Douglas’ (1966) terms, demographic minorities come to be seen as ‘matter out
of place’, the speck of dirt that sullies the otherwise pure face of the ethnos. The anxiety
of incompleteness, Appadurai argues, is intensified by the velocity of contemporary
population flows, which call into question the idea of a containable and countable
population and the possibility of a reliable census (Appadurai, 2006, p. 6).
Ironically, this may also be compounded by the reluctance of many liberal demo-
cratic governments to collect census data on religious belonging, in part due to the
memory of the Nazi Holocaust. In this context, speculations on how many of ‘them’
there are (or will be) among ‘us’ becomemore tempting as well as difficult to decisively
refute:
Although it’s true that France is prohibited by law from collecting official
statistics about its citizens’ race or religion, it’s possible to make estimates
based on studies calculating the number of people in France originating
from Muslim-majority countries.
Nevertheless, I think that the precise figures should be of less concern
than what will become of France and indeed what is already happening
there. There is no doubt that France is becoming progressively Islamised,
and that Muslims only need to be a 10-20 percent of a country’s popula-
tion (even less) to try to turn it into a sharia state, as it’s evident by just
looking at a map of the world.
[...]
So what will the situation in France look like 20 years from now, since
Islam is a conquering religion that rejects any coexistence with other re-
ligions?63
Of importance in this passage are the ethnicisation of the category of ‘Muslim’, which
quickly becomes ‘people... originating from Muslim-majority countries’, irrespective
of whether they believe in Islam or not, and the fact that the very absence of facts or
data is taken as a licence to speculate. The ‘precise figures’ are less important than the
63http://enzaferreri.blogspot.co.uk/2013/03/france-will-be-40-percent-muslim-in-2030.html
[Last accessed 29th September 2017].
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ability to imagine ‘the situation... 20 years from now’, with the article title confidently
predicting that ‘France Will Be 40 Percent Muslim In 2030’.64
There is a fusion of demographic anxiety and apocalyptic temporality in the idea of
a ‘demographic timebomb’ that is imminently about to explode, a trope that is depicted
in graphical form in figure 6.4. The cartoon is of a skeletal and androgynous figure,
cloaked in a burqa and clutching an enormous timebomb where a pregnant woman’s
belly would be. The light from the burning fuse is reflected in the gleaming metallic
surface of the bomb. The overwhelming visual impression is of something ‘existentially
different and alien’ (Schmitt, 2007b), that might belong in a science-fiction dystopia
but not in ‘the rolling hills of rural Europe’. The message that the cartoon seemingly
tries to convey is that Muslim procreation is ‘jihad’ carried out by other means, hence
the caption ‘The Other Islamic Bomb’.
The fear of demographic submersion under a rising ‘green tide’ is not new. It had
been articulated in the early twentieth century by Lothrop Stoddard, the prominent
American eugenicist and Klansman, who is credited with coining the term Unter-
mensch (underman) and was feted by Nazi racial theorist Alfred Rosenberg. Stoddard
voiced concerns specifically about Muslim birthrates, as Matt Carr describes:
In 1923 Lothrop Stoddard, the president of the American Birth Control
League, described inTheNewWorld of Islam the ‘mighty forces’ represen-
ted by ‘the 250,000,000 followers of the Prophet fromMorocco to China
and from Turkestan to the Congo’. Stoddard attributed ‘the quick breed-
ing tendencies of Oriental peoples . . . not merely to strong sexual appet-
ites but . . . perhaps even more to religious doctrines enjoining early mar-
riage and the begetting of numerous sons’. Themost likely consequence of
this ‘ethnic fusion’ between East and West, in Stoddard’s opinion, would
be ‘a dreary mongrelization from which would issue nothing but degen-
eration and decay’. (Carr, 2006, pp. 16-17)
The tendency of the counterjihad discourse to slip from a cultural to a biological
register is not accidental. As I argued in chapter 3, with reference to Spengler, whilst
64Ibid.
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Figure 6.4: Cartoon: ‘The Other Islamic Bomb’. Source: Twitter.
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cultural pessimism is not quite the same thing as biological fatalism, to speak of a ‘cul-
ture’ or ‘civilization’ as something that can age, decline and ultimately die is, at least
implicitly, to think sociopolitical change on the model of bio-organic change. Con-
sequently, a form of organic thinking is implied, even where a strict biological racism
is disavowed. The counterjihad discourse is in fact replete with organic metaphors:
Muslim migrants inhabit ‘host’ societies, the Islamic problem ‘metastasizes’ and so
forth.
In places, the discourse collapses from a culturalist one concerning the threat posed
by ‘Islam’ to ‘European culture’ into a form of biological holism in which individual
Europeans become fused into a collective body politic:
Muslims will be heavily concentrated in the major cities, and the dhimmi
native population will retreat into the countryside... The old nation states
will thus slowly die, as their major cities, which constitute the brain and
‘head’ of its culture, are cut from the rest of the body.65
From this point on, the ‘Islamisation’ of Europe is no longer a process of cultural
change, but one of biological degeneration. Muslim migration is ‘changing the face of
the continent’,66 Europe is becoming ‘an appendix to the Arab world’,67 Islamisation
is ‘a profound transformation, a mutation’,68 one that results from ‘European spineless-
ness’.69 Again, this collective body politic is typically feminised, for instance in a post
on the website of The Brussels Journal that describes ‘The Rape of Europe’,70 drawing
on the myth of Europa’s abduction by Zeus, which has been the subject of paintings
by Titian and Jean-Baptiste Marie Pierre among others.
If Europe is a collective body, and Islam is something foreign to it, then it will not
be surprising that the Muslim presence is often described in the language of bacteri-
65https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/11/second-fall-of-rome.html [Last accessed 29th Septem-
ber 2017].
66https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/08/will-muslim-immigration-trigger-wars.html [Last ac-
cessed 29th September 2017].
67https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/11/second-fall-of-rome.html [Last accessed 29th Septem-
ber 2017].
68http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=19633 [Last accessed 29th Septem-
ber 2017].
69http://4freedoms.com/group/gays/forum/topics/douglas-murray-what-are-we-to-do-about-
islam [Last accessed 25th August 2017].
70https://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/1609 [Last accessed 29th September 2017].
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ology or virology:
Islam spreads like a virus. It radiates from Muslim countries that are too
diseased to support it and into healthy systems that are that way because
they have had the luxury of developing apart from Islam. Once in the
host system, the Islam virus uses the existing machinery to make replicas
of itself. Over time, the host makes unilateral concessions to the religion,
feeding and appeasing it in the vain hope that this supremacist ideology
can be tamed.
Vital organs are co-opted and eventually shut down as Islam advances.
In a matter of time, the entire system groans to an agonizing death and
assumes the condition of the diseased nations from which Muslims ori-
ginally fled. The virus then looks for new hosts to cannibalize.71
The collapse into biological holism can occur even where care is otherwise taken to
avoid racialised language. The Religion of Peace blog, from which the above quotation
is taken, goes to enormous lengths to distinguish between Islam as a religion and
Muslims as a people, arguing that because Islam is a religion and not a race antipathy
towards Islam is definitionally not racist (a corollary of which would presumably be
that Hitler was not ‘racist’ because Judaism is a religion).72
In a few cases, however, the discourse becomes avowedly racial, for instance in this
passage from an article by Mark Steyn:
Can these trends continue for another 30 years without having con-
sequences? Europe by the end of this century will be a continent after
the neutron bomb: The grand buildings will still be standing, but the
people who built them will be gone. We are living through a remarkable
period: the self-extinction of the races who, for good or ill, shaped the
modern world.73
71http://thereligionofpeace.com/pages/site/what-to-do.aspx [Last accessed 29th September 2017].
72http://thereligionofpeace.com/pages/site/racism.aspx [Last accessed 29th September 2017].
73https://www.steynonline.com/7428/it-still-the-demography-stupid [Last accessed 29th Septem-
ber 2017].
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‘A recipe for cultural suicide’
Whilst there is broad agreement that the patient is sick and dying, there is no con-
sensus about the precise nature of the pathology, ‘the underlying disease of theWest’.74
This is not because there is a shortage of potential culprits. ‘Secularism’, ‘relativism’,
‘political correctness’, ‘multiculturalism’, ‘feminism’, ‘the welfare state’, ‘the bureau-
cratic state’, ‘suicidal liberalism’, ‘socialism’: all of these and more have been offered
as potential diagnoses. In intellectualised versions of the discourse ‘the primary dis-
ease - the AIDS of the West’ might be ‘the philosophies of the ’68’ers and the French
nihilists’ (Derrida and Foucault),75 whereas in demotic versions it could be ‘the Left’,
‘multiculturalism’ or ‘political correctness gonemad’. The Vlad Tepes blog, for instance,
lists a number of pathologies: ‘multiculturalism’, ‘political correctness’, ‘human rights’,
‘irrational leftism’ and ‘moral and cultural relativism’, adding that ‘I would call this a
recipe for cultural suicide.’76 To the extent that there is agreement, it is with Arnold
Toynbee’s dictum that ‘civilizations die from suicide, not by murder’:
Islam isn’t destroying Europe, Europe has destroyed itself. Just as a pa-
tient with AIDS may formally die from flu or even a common cold, the
real cause is the long, slow decay of his immune system. It resembles eu-
thanasia on an entire civilization: Europe is tired of living. Islam just puts
it out of its misery.77
The Eurabian narrative of Western crisis and capitulation to ‘Islamisation’ belongs,
then, to the literary genre of tragedy. The hero of the story (‘Europe’ or ‘the West’) is
undone not by the actions of the ostensible villain (‘Islam’) but by its own tragic char-
acter flaw: ‘Western Civilization carries within it the seeds of its own destruction’;78
hence, ‘if you give the West a nudge in the right direction it’ll finish the job for you
74http://4freedoms.com/group/gays/forum/topics/douglas-murray-what-are-we-to-do-about-
islam [Last accessed 25th August 2017].
75http://4freedoms.com/group/gays/forum/topics/douglas-murray-what-are-we-to-do-about-
islam [Last accessed 25th August 2017].
76https://vladtepesblog.com/the-agenda-and-views-of-this-site/ [Last accessed 25 August 2017].
77https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/11/second-fall-of-rome.html [Last accessed 25th August
2017].
78http://gatesofvienna.net/2009/07/drawing-the-line/ [Last accessed 29th September 2017].
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on a kind of auto-self-destruct’.79
In some cases, the West’s suicidal tendencies are attributed to relatively recent
developments stemming from the ‘revolution of ’68’, such as the ‘disease’ of ‘relativism’,
which ‘has led to an inability among the cultural elites of Europe to stand up for what
is right, or even to stand up for their own.’80 Anti-feminism is another strong theme
here, as in one article by Liberty GB and Pegida UK leader Paul Weston:
Imagine a naive but well intentioned liberal couple opening the doors of
their house to a Muslim refugee family in a moment of sanctimonious
virtue. Imagine the female householder as a progressive feminist type
who has put her advertising account executive career (Tarquin darling,
super news! We’ve just landed the Heinz baked bean contract!) before
the apparently onerous task of providing the next generation. Imagine
the Muslim family have four children who in turn go on to have four
children each. Who will eventually own the house? And as goes the
ownership of the house, so goes ownership of the village, the town, the
city and eventually the nation.81
Some locate the pathology deeper down. For example, the now-defunct blogCon-
servative Swede suggests that the last time that ‘political leadership worked’ and that
‘European civilization was not suicidal’ was ‘[i]n the old days, before the age of the
French Revolution.’82 Consequently, Enlightenment secularism is often a key target.
Ye’Or’s canonical text on Eurabia, for instance, describes Europe’s ‘evolution from a
Judeo-Christian civilization... into a post-Judeo-Christian civilization that is subser-
vient to the ideology of jihad and the Islamic powers that propagate it’ (Ye’Or, 2005,
p. 9). According to one post on The Brussels Journal blog, it is not just ‘the fact that
non-religious people tend not to have as many children as religious people, because
many of them prefer to “enjoy” freedom rather than renounce it for the sake of chil-
79http://4freedoms.com/group/gays/forum/topics/douglas-murray-what-are-we-to-do-about-
islam [Last accessed 25th August 2017].
80http://4freedoms.com/group/gays/forum/topics/douglas-murray-what-are-we-to-do-about-
islam [Last accessed 25th August 2017].
81https://libertygb.org.uk/news/immigration-altruism-and-national-suicide [Last accessed 25th
August 2017].
82https://conswede.blogspot.co.uk/2007/06/catholicismanectdotal-conservatism.html [Last ac-
cessed 29th September 2017].
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dren’, but also that secularism cannot furnish a rationale for political sacrifice (we are
very close here to the Schmittian critique of liberalism):
Secularists, it seems to me, are also less keen on fighting. Since they do
not believe in an afterlife, this life is the only thing they have to lose.
Hence they will rather accept submission than fight.83
From this perspective, the collapse of faith ‘is the real cause of the closing of civilization
in Europe. Islamization is simply the consequence. The very word Islam means “sub-
mission” and the secularists have submitted already. Many Europeans have already
become Muslims, though they do not realize it or do not want to admit it.’84
In some cases, the argument becomes explicitly anti-democratic. For instance, the
Gates of Vienna blog raises the suspicion that since ‘all modern Western democratic
states are exhibiting varying degrees of the same morbid symptoms... the disease is
inherent in democracy itself, and not in its particular forms, or the quality of its polit-
ical leaders.’85 Socialism, the blog argues, ‘is not something extraneous to democracy’
but results from the inevitable extension of the democratic ideal into new fields such as
the workplace, education and health. Hence ‘the democratic process leads inexorably
to the modern welfare state’, and the ‘smothering blanket of social welfare’ requires
ever-greater taxation and erodes the incentive to have children to take care of you in
old age.86 Eventually, ‘the bureaucratic leviathan chafed at its final limitation: the
nation state’.87 As time has progressed, this ‘inexorable logic’ has led to the erosion of
national borders and distinct national identities, to the adoption of universal human
rights, and the development of multinational institutions such as the EU and the UN.
‘To fulfil the global plan, our nations must be destroyed by incorporating people from
alien cultures so as to dilute our separate national identities and remove the last barrier
to the worldwide hegemony of the socialist superstate.’88
The blog Conservative Swede perhaps pursues this countermodern logic furthest in
83https://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/1609 [Last accessed 29th September 2017].
84Ibid.
85https://gatesofvienna.net/2009/06/converting-manna-to-gall/ [Last accessed 29th September
2017].
86Ibid.
87http://gatesofvienna.net/2009/07/drawing-the-line/ [Last accessed 29th September 2017].
88Ibid.
174
arguing that liberalism, with its ‘demand that one abnegate oneself by treating one’s
own people and identity as no more valuable than that of the Other... is, of course,
secularized Christianity’ and that Christianity and liberalism are essentially ‘the same
thing’.89 Moreover, the blog notes that ‘Christianity is a Jewish invention’, that ‘Jesus
was a Jew, St. Paul was a Jew’ and that Christianity was a result of their ‘monotheistic
God’ being ‘exported around the world’.90 Before this ‘the Romans had their Gods,
the Greeks theirs, and the Germanic people theirs. With the spread of Christianity
their national Gods, having the same ethnicity as themselves, was replaced by a foreign
God’:
As religion evolves, God(s) become less and less personal and more and
more abstract. The polytheistic Gods were more personal, with more hu-
man flaws. And you were able to oppose them or ignore them–there were
always other ones. Monotheismmade the singleGodmore distant as well
as perfect (so how could he be opposed?). Follow this development in the
tangent direction and you will end with a God that has lost all personal
characteristics and become fully abstract–a mechanical God. A hierarchy
of principles, with the principle of goodness at the top. Leading to a so-
ciety where people adore mechanical saints such as the United Nation or
International Law, which they consider unopposable.
Adding to this the background of having imported a foreign God, and
denounced your former national Gods, is there any surprise that this un-
dermines nationalism and leads to universalism?91
It is unlikely to be a coincidence that the same writer, who laments the fact that ‘[m]y
Gods have been stoled (sic) from me and I miss them’ also describes ‘the current in-
carnation of the West’ as being ‘terminally ill’,92 gesturing to ‘palingenetic’ (Griffin,
1993) potentialities.
89https://conswede.blogspot.co.uk/2007/05/christian-ethics-to-be-or-not-to-be.html [Last ac-
cessed 29th September 2017].
90https://conswede.blogspot.co.uk/2007/05/jewish-god-anti-semitism-and-oedipus.html [Last ac-
cessed 29th September 2017].
91Ibid.
92https://conswede.blogspot.co.uk/2007/04/power-configuration-of-wilsonian-west.html [Last ac-
cessed 29th September 2017].
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Conclusion
One irony of the Eurabia narrative, as Bruce Pilbeam has noted, is the amount of
philosophical space that its proponents share with the Islamic religious right (Pil-
beam, 2011, p. 161). Cultural relativism, secularism and feminism would all pre-
sumably rank highly on Bin Laden or Al Baghdadi’s lists of the ‘evils’ of Western
modernity and liberal democracy. In some cases this philosophical affinity is even
tacitly acknowledged:
I’m a conservative–I’m not entirely on board with the Islamist program
when it comes to beheading sodomites and so on, but I agree Britney
Spears dresses like a slut: I’m with Mullah Omar on that one.93
More importantly, if socialism and the ‘smothering blanket’ of the feminised wel-
fare state result from the inevitable extension of liberal democratic ideals, and if liber-
alism and democracy are themselves outgrowths of Christian ethics, and if Christian
ethics is itself a product of Jewish monotheism, and if, moreover, the emergence of
the ‘socialist superstate’ is part of a global ‘plan’ to ‘destroy our nations’ and ‘dilute our
separate national identities’, then it is not difficult to see where this line of argument
might potentially take us. Indeed, as we will see in the next chapter, in some cases it
leads precisely to a form of conspiratorial anti-Semitism in the form of ‘cultural Marx-
ism’, a concept derivative of the Nazi idea of Kulturbolschewismus or ‘cultural Bolshev-
ism’, although it is not always clear if those using the term are aware of its genealogy.
Of course, not all of the figures discussed in this chapter would follow this line of
reasoning to that conclusion, and it is perfectly possible to oppose postmodernism,
cultural relativism or feminism without endorsing conspiratorial anti-Semitism. Yet
the path is there to be taken. The potentiality to do so is indicated by the suspicion
voiced by one commentator on the Gates of Vienna blog: ‘I too cannot believe that it
is mere coincidence that merely all westerna (sic) nations are collapsing at the same
time and for the same reason. This must be orchestrated’.94
93https://www.steynonline.com/7428/it-still-the-demography-stupid [Last accessed 29th Septem-
ber 2017].
94http://gatesofvienna.net/2009/09/barking-up-the-wrong-tree/ [Last accessed 2ndOctober 2017].
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Chapter 7
The ‘Red-Green Axis’: on
counterjihadist demonology
‘We Americans’ face a substantive problem of national identity
epitomized by the subject of this sentence. Are we a ‘we’, one people
or several? If we are a ‘we’, what distinguishes us from the ‘thems’
who are not us? Race, religion, ethnicity, values, culture, wealth,
politics, or what? Is the United States, as some have argued, a
‘universal nation’, based on values common to all humanity and in
principle embracing all peoples? Or are we a Western nation with
our identity defined by our European heritage and institutions? Or
are we unique with a distinctive civilization of our own, as the
proponents of ‘American exceptionalism’ have argued throughout
our history? [...] These questions remain for Americans in their
post-September 11 era.
Samuel Huntington, ‘Who Are We?’
Tell me your enemy and I tell you who you are... The enemy is our
own question in living form.
Carl Schmitt
For much of the post-Cold War period, the Western political imagination has been
dominated by progressive and optimistic views of the future. Most famously, Fran-
cis Fukuyama’s speculative neo-Hegelian metahistorics heralded a utopian political
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eschatology in which the global triumph of liberal democracy and capitalism would
mark the ‘End of History’ (Fukuyama, 1992). In contrast, the apocalyptic and fatal-
istic philosophies considered in the last chapter imply a permanent, agonistic struggle
between particular ethnocultural groups, one that is both inevitable and ineliminable.
The best-known version of this view of post-Cold War history, the ‘clash of civiliza-
tions’ thesis, is primarily associated with Samuel Huntington (2002), who, like Os-
wald Spengler, wished to replace the ‘empty figment’ of Fukuyama’s ‘one linear history’
with ‘the drama of a number of mighty cultures’ (Spengler, 1938, vol. 1, p. 21), or,
as Huntington called them, ‘civilizations’. Unlike the National Socialist racial philo-
sophy of history, the ‘clash of civilizations’ is not strictly a vision of planetary biological
warfare, but as we will see, there are important ambiguities in the way ‘civilizations’
are conceived.
In the ‘clash of civilizations’ narrative, which is central to the counterjihadist polit-
ical imagination, the end of the Cold War has heralded the re-emergence of a mil-
lenial conflict between ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’. For Huntington, ‘Islam’ has replaced
the Soviet Union as the West’s primary geopolitical adversary. It will be argued that
the civilizationist political ontology stems from two, related, impulses: the need for
an alterity against which to define a sense of ‘Western’ identity, now that it can no
longer be defined by its opposition to the communist East; and the need to solve the
problem of international political order, which otherwise threatens to collapse into
chaos. Huntington’s vision of a world divided into civilizations offers a third, essen-
tially Schmittian, vision of post-Cold War political order, distinct from the ‘Kantian’
vision of ‘Old Europe’ (France and Germany) based on the ‘constitutionalisation of
international law through the United Nations and the International Criminal Court’,
and the ‘Hobbesian’ vision of the Clinton and Bush administrations based on a view
of the US as ‘world-police in charge of a pax americana’ (Palaver, 2007, p. 69).
The argument advanced in this chapter is not that the flourishing of anti-Muslim
hatred over the past quarter of a century can be explained solely through the disap-
pearance of the West’s long-standing geopolitical adversary, the Soviet Union, and its
replacement by an Islamic enemy. Fred Halliday is surely right to express skepticism
about commentators who ‘think they are clever’ by ascribing contemporary hostil-
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ity toward Muslims to the end of the Cold War, and to emphasise a much longer
and more complex history (Halliday, 1999, p. 895). Instead, I advance the weaker
claim that for those on the anti-democratic right likeHuntington, who famously com-
plained of an ‘excess’ of democracy, their political philosophies have a structural need
for an external enemy, and for some but not all of these people, ‘Islam’ has increasingly
come to fill that role.
More specifically, the ‘clash of civilizations’ idea is recognisably a version of the
Schmittian friend-enemy distinction, which, it was argued in chapter 3, is itself a
reworking of the ancient scapegoat mechanism. As Chip Berlet and Matthew Ly-
ons have argued, the narrative form of scapegoating is the conspiracy theory (Berlet
and Lyons, 2000). Hence, alongside the more sober, academic versions of the ‘clash’
narrative associated with conservative academics like Samuel Huntington and Bern-
ard Lewis, we find within the counterjihad discourse a number of demotic and con-
spiratorial forms, based on the suspicion voiced at the end of the previous chapter:
that Western capitulation to Islamisation ‘didn’t just happen’ and that it ‘must have
been orchestrated’. There are three conspiracy theories that have been especially im-
portant within the counterjihad movement: the conspiratorial version of the Eurabia
thesis, the idea of a Muslim Brotherhood ‘project’ to infiltrate the US government,
and the notion of leftist subversion of traditional identities and forms of social au-
thority through the dissemination of ‘cultural Marxism’. All of these will be critically
explored within this chapter, but ‘cultural Marxism’ will be treated in slightly greater
detail as it has a longer, more complex and more interesting genealogy. All three con-
spiracy theories allege, in slightly different forms, the existence of a ‘Red-Green Axis’
or a ‘Marx-Mohammed Pact’.
Moreover, all of these conspiracy theories can be seen as part of a longer polit-
ical tradition that Richard Hofstadter famously called the ‘paranoid style’ (Hof-
stadter, 1996). Hofstadter traces the tradition of political paranoia back to the late-
eighteenth-century moral panic over the influence of the Bavarian Illuminati, a hu-
manistic and rationalistic society that was accused of being the secret, occult force
behind the French Revolution. A similar obsession with conspiracies animated the
anti-Masonic and anti-Catholic movements of the nineteenth century, classical anti-
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Semitism and the ‘red scare’ of the mid-twentieth. Conspiracism and paranoia have
flourished oncemore in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, especially in
the US, in the context of the apocalyptic and millenarian visions discussed in the pre-
vious chapter. Consequently, the Eurabia, Muslim Brotherhood and cultural Marxist
conspiracies discussed in this chapter must be seen as part of a wider conspiracist mi-
lieu, that includes for instance the ‘NewWorld Order’ and 9/11 ‘Trutherism’. Import-
antly, it also includes ‘Birtherist’ paranoia about the birthplace and faith of America’s
first black president, which Donald Trump has done much to amplify. The chapter
begins by discussing the intellectualised version of the ‘clash’ thesis as developed by
Huntington, emphasising its recognisably Schmittian logic, before turning to its para-
noiac and conspiratorial forms.
‘A global Dark Ages’
The idea of a ‘clash of civilizations’ between Islam and the West is ubiquitous within
the counterjihadmovement. One of my interviewees insisted that coexistence was im-
possible saying ‘it’s just two parallel cultures’,1 whilst one of the speakers at an EDL
demonstration that I witnessed in Dudley in February 2015, stated: ‘Islam is at war
with the West. We know it, Muslims know it.’2 The term ‘clash of civilizations’ ap-
pears to owe to the historian Bernard Lewis in a 1990 article forTheAtlanticmagazine,
entitled ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage’ (Lewis, 1990). Surveying a variety of develop-
ments, from the attack on the US embassy in Islamabad in 1979 to the fatwa pro-
nounced against Salman Rushdie a decade later, Lewis described the reawakening of
a primordial enmity in language that would not seem out of place in H.P. Lovecraft’s
Cthulhu Mythos:
It should by now be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement
far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that
pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps
irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-
1Interview 5, counterjihad activist and organiser, male, UK.
2Fieldnotes, February 2015.
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Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of
both. (ibid.)
Counterjihadists similarly speak of a primordial enmity between Islam and the West.
Gates of Vienna claims that we are in ‘the newest phase of a very old war’, part of a
‘conflict of cultures’ that has ‘endured for more than a millennium’,3 while Bat Ye’Or
speaks of ‘an incessant global jihad that targets the entire West’ (Ye’Or, 2005, p. 26):
The universality of jihad was proclaimed from the beginnings of Islam.
Jihad has been ordered not only against specific groups or for specific
groups or for specific times, but, like Muhammad’s mission... it is a uni-
versal injunction that will endure until the only religion remaining is that
of Allah... This ongoing striving “in the path of Allah” triggers the pro-
cess that Huntington has called “Islam’s bloody borders”; that is, Islam’s
continual expansion through attacks on its neighbours, in accord with the
Qu’ran’s command to “fight the unbelievers who gird you about”. (Ye’Or,
2005, p. 32)
Similarly, an article onBreitbart News describes ‘TheAncientWar Between the Judeo-
Christian West and Islam’ describing it as a ‘1500-year struggle between competing
cultural visions’.4
Whilst Lewis may have coined the term, it is in Huntington’s work that the ‘clash’
paradigm receives its most systematic and detailed treatment, where it has both a
descriptive and a normative aspect. The logic of Huntington’s normative argument is
unmistakably Schmittian, even though the German legal theorist is nowhere cited.
Echoing Schmitt’s fears that the breakdown of European international law after the
First World War would lead to a global civil war, Huntington feared that collapse of
the bipolar international order of the Cold War period would lead to ‘sheer chaos’.
Writing in the mid-1990s, he warned of:
...a global breakdown of law and order, failed states and increasing anarchy
in many parts of the world, a global crime wave, transnational mafias
3http://gatesofvienna.net/2004/10/the-newest-phase-of-a-very-old-war/ [Last accessed 2nd Oc-
tober 2017].
4http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2014/09/21/the-ancient-war-between-the-judeo-
christian-west-and-islam/ [Last accessed 28th September 2017].
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and drug cartels, increasing drug addiction in many societies, a general
weakening of the family, a decline in trust and social solidarity in many
countries, ethnic, religious, and civilizational violence and rule by the gun
prevalent in much of the world.
Left unchecked, these tendencies could lead to ‘an unprecedented phenomenon, a
global Dark Ages, possibly descending on humanity’ (Huntington, 2002, p. 321).
Like Schmitt, Huntington was acutely aware of the dangers of a moralistic uni-
versalism, so he does not think that the problem of political order can be solved by
uniting the world under a single nomos. Hence his deep scepticism of those, like
Fukuyama, who want to remake the world ‘in the image of the West’, which is ‘bey-
ond their declining power’, and the efforts of the George W. Bush administration
to promote liberal democracy abroad. This only distracts from the more crucial task,
which is to ‘preserve Western civilization in the face of declining Western power’.
Consequently, Huntington advocates ‘an international order based on civilizations’ as
‘the surest safeguard against world war’, which strongly resembles Schmitt’s advocacy
of a new nomos of the earth based on a division of the world into several independent
great spaces (Huntington, 2002, p. 311).
Whereas the German romantics and conservative revolutionaries had distin-
guished between universal Zivilization and the particularity of Kultur, this distinc-
tion vanishes in Huntington’s work: ‘a civilization,’ he tells us, ‘is a cultural entity’.
Moreover, religion is the ‘principal defining characteristic of civilizations’. Hunting-
ton insists that his civilizational taxonomy is not racial - ‘civilization and race are not
identical’ - but concedes that a ‘significant correspondence exists between the division
of people by cultural characteristics into civilizations and their division by physical
characteristics into races’ (2002, p. 42). Elsewhere he refers to a civilization as ‘an
extended family’ (2002, p. 156), which carries the implication of a ‘community of
consanguinity’ (Levinas, 1990b). To the extent that civilizationism has invited com-
parison with nineteenth-century racial theories, the comparison has not always been
flattering to Huntington. Paul Gilroy observes that whereas Gobineau, writing in
1854, ‘managed to identify ten civilizations’, Huntington, writing in the early 1990s,
‘could locate only seven’ (or possibly eight - Huntington was undecided on whether
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‘Africa’ constituted a civilization) (Gilroy, 2004, p. 25).
Whatever the ambiguities of Huntington’s definition, it is clear that a civiliza-
tion is a political entity in the Schmittian sense of that term: it is ‘the highest cul-
tural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short
of that which distinguishes humans from other species’ (Huntington, 2002, p. 43).
Moreover, Huntington follows Schmitt in seeking the ontological grounding of the
political in the distinction between friend and enemy. He quotes approvingly the ‘old
truths’ proclaimed by a character in a Michael Dibdin novel, that ‘[t]here can be no
true friends without true enemies’, and that ‘[u]nless we hate what we are not, we
cannot love what we are’. He goes on to argue that ‘we know who we are only when
we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against’. Hence
there is a naturalisation of political hatred in Huntington’s work: ‘[i]t is human to
hate’ (Huntington, 2002; see also Sokoloff, 2015).
A similar naturalisation of hatred can be found in one post on Gates of Vienna,
entitled ‘In Defense of Hatred’,5 which sets out a long list of enemies:
I hate the fanatics of the Great Islamic Jihad, the ones who brought down
the Twin Towers, the ones who behead people on video and kill innocent
women and children without compunction. I hate the brutal totalitarian
dictatorships that enable the Jihad, the regimes like those in Iran, Syria,
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Cuba, North Korea, and Zimbabwe.
I hate those barbaric bastards inMuslim societies who terrorize, mutilate,
and brutalize women, and do it all with the blessing of their religion.
I hate the fellow-travellers in the West, the dhimmis and the wannabe
jihadis, who facilitate the terrorists, who interfere with and pick at and
ankle-bite the efforts of our brave soldiers in the war against the Great
Jihad.
‘And above all’, the blog continues, ‘I hate socialists of all kinds’ because ‘their smug,
self-righteous zeal has undermined and threatened the very existence ofWestern civil-
ization’.6
5http://gatesofvienna.net/2005/06/in-defense-of-hatred/ [Last accessed 28th September 2017].
6Ibid.
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As these sentiments imply, the idea of a civilizational ‘clash’ arises from the at-
tempt to resolve a perceived crisis in American identity. In Huntington’s case, this
is already evident in The Clash of Civilizations, where he claims that ‘the real clash’
is between ‘the multiculturalists and the defenders of Western civilization’ (2002, p.
307). It becomes even more explicit in his final work, the polemical tract Who Are
We? The challenges to America’s national identity. These challenges include ‘ideologies
of multiculturalism and diversity’, which threaten America’s ‘Anglo-Protestant cul-
tural core’, and the ‘massive influx’ (Huntington, 2004, p. 4) of migrants from Latin
America, which is leading to the ‘Hispanization’ of cities like Miami, and - in an es-
pecially dramatic rhetorical flourish - may even portend a reconquista of the southern
United States. Post-ColdWar identity crises are not only affecting the United States,
in Huntington’s view, and their ‘simultaneous appearance in the United States and
so many other countries suggests that common factors are also likely to be at work’
(ibid.). For Huntington, this ‘global identity crisis’ stems from ‘the emergence of a
global economy, tremendous improvements in communications and transportation,
rising levels of migration, the global expansion of democracy, and the end both of
the Cold War and of Soviet communism as a viable economic and political system’
(Huntington, 2004, p. 13).
Huntington’s views on Islam and Muslims must be seen in the context of these
anxieties about a crisis of American (and, more generally, Western) identity, his claim
that an external enemy ‘reduces conflict within a country’, and his observation that
‘the dissolution of the Soviet Union’ had deprived the US of its ‘external “other”’. In-
deed, for Huntington, Islam was merely reassuming its long-held position as the main
external enemy to theWest, a position that the Soviet Union had only temporarily oc-
cupied:
SomeWesterners, including President Bill Clinton, have argued that the
West does not have problems with Islam but only with violent Islamist ex-
tremists. Fourteen hundred years of history demonstrate otherwise. The
relations between Islam and Christianity, both Orthodox and Western,
have often been stormy. Each has been the other’s Other. The twentieth-
century conflict between liberal democracy andMarxist-Leninism is only
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a fleeting and superficial historical phenomenon compared to the con-
tinuing and deeply conflictual relation between Islam and Christianity.
At times, peaceful coexistence has prevailed; more often the relation has
been one of intense rivalry and of varying degrees of hot war. [...] Across
the centuries the fortunes of the two religions have risen and fallen in a
sequence of momentous surges, pauses, and countersurges. (Huntington,
2002, p. 209)
Consequently, ‘Islam’ occupies a central position within Huntington’s argument for
the importance of political enmity, as it had done for Schmitt. In the Concept of the
Political, Schmitt had claimed that ‘[n]ever in the thousand-year struggle between
Christians and Moslems did it occur to a Christian to surrender rather than defend
Europe out of love toward the Saracens or Turks’ (Schmitt, 2007b, p. 29). Similarly,
Huntington points to the fact that the ‘rules of the nations of Christendom for deal-
ing with each other were different from those for dealing with the Turks and other
“heathens”’ to support his case that ‘identity at any level - personal, tribal, racial, civil-
izational - can only be defined in relation to an “other,” a different person, tribe, race,
or civilization’ (Huntington 2002, p. 129; see also Palaver, 2007, p. 72).
Towards the end ofTheClash of Civilizations, Huntington sums up his indictment
of multiculturalism and universalism as follows:
Multiculturalism at home threatens the United States and the West;
universalism abroad threatens the West and the world. Both deny the
uniqueness ofWestern culture. The global monoculturalists want to make
the world like America. The domestic multiculturalists want to make
America like the world. A multicultural America is impossible because
a non-Western America is not American. A multicultural world is un-
avoidable because global empire is impossible. (Huntington, 2002, p.
318)
Despite the searing criticisms that have been levelled at Huntington’s civilizational
taxonomy, his arguments remain grounded in a naturalistic epistemology in which
the explanans takes the form of an abstract quality or process (notwithstanding the
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occasional polemical attack on ‘Davos Man’ or the Clintons). The ‘global identity
crisis’ is caused by economic, technological and demographic changes, and the renewed
clash between the West and Islam is its consequence. In contrast, in the conspiratorial
forms of the ‘clash’ narrative it is the product of the machinations of sinister forces.
‘A house burned down’
The conspiratorial version of the ‘clash’ thesis is neatly summarised in a document
published in February 2016 by Unconstrained Analytics, which describes the Islamic
threat to the West through the vivid metaphor of ‘a house engulfed in a crucible of
flames’. One of the co-founders of Unconstrained Analytics is ‘Team B II’ mem-
ber Stephen Coughlin, who served as an intelligence analyst to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in the George W. Bush administration before his contract was ended in 2008.
Coughlin subsequently became a Senior Fellow at Frank Gaffney’s Center for Secur-
ity Policy and published a book entitled Catastrophic Failure: Blindfolding America in
the face of jihad, which has been very influential in US counterjihadist circles. Un-
constrained Analytics brands itself as a counterterrorism consultancy, specialising in
the analysis of ‘an enemy’s threat doctrine unconstrained by bias, preconceptions and
influence operations coming from the same’. The Unconstrained Analytics document
is entitled Burning Down the House: A strategic overview of the threat, the CVE, and
strategic incomprehension in the War on Terror.7 It is laid out in the unmistakeable style
of management consultants, and contains several diagrammatic ‘exhibits’ that repres-
ent the metaphor of the burning house in visual form. One of these is reproduced
as figure 7.1. I want to dwell on this image awhile, as it perfectly encapsulates the
counterjihadist diagnosis of Western capitulation to Islam in its conspiratorial form.
In the centre of the diagram is a house, engulfed by flames, labelled ‘USA/West’.
Encroaching on the house from the right of the image is a sphere, much larger than the
house, bearing the word ‘Islam’ many times over, from which there extend three burn-
ing prongs enveloping the ‘USA/West’: ‘jihad ’, ‘dawah’ and ‘ummah’, all of which em-
anate from a single trunk root of ‘sharia’. To the left of the house is another large sphere
7http://unconstrainedanalytics.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Strategic-Overview-Coughlin-
010216.pdf [Last accessed 28th September 2017].
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Figure 7.1: ‘A House Burned Down’: diagram from Unconstrained Analytics public-
ation Burning Down the House: A strategic overview of the threat, the CVE, and strategic
incomprehension in the War on Terror. Source: unconstrainedanalytics.org.
containing the repeated phrase ‘cultural Marxism’. Within this sphere, three separate
arrows labelled respectively ‘Alinskyism’, ‘political correctness’ and ‘post-modernism’
fuse into the single arrow of ‘internal vulnerabilities’, which extends towards the house
from the left. Overlapping both the ‘culturalMarxism’ sphere and the ‘internal vulner-
abilities’ arrow is an oxygen cylinder, its nozzle directed towards the burning house.
It is worth examining each of these elements in turn, drawing on the explanations
offered in the text of the document.
According to the Unconstrained Analytics document, America is threatened from
without by ‘Islam’, which prosecutes its war through three ‘lines of operation’: the
ummah, the worldwideMuslim community, represented by organizations like the Or-
ganization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)’; dawah, the proselytizing or preaching of
Islam, associated with groups like the Muslim Brotherhood; and jihad, the Islamic
notion of war, represented by groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS (p. 4). The document
describes the war as first and foremost one of ideas, that will ‘play out primarily in
the information battlespace’ (p. 10). Consequently, the threat of salafi-jihadist viol-
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ence is downplayed: Al-Qaeda and ISIS are best understood as ‘strategic distractions’
(p. 2). ‘Jihad ’ is therefore positioned at the bottom of the diagram to indicate that
the jihadist prong of the Islamic threat is subordinate to the proselytizing mission of
‘dawah’, which is ‘the main effort in the expansion of Islamic power’ (p. 13):
While dawah carries with it the mission of ‘preaching’ Islam to gain con-
verts, it is also associated with the ideological subversion elements of civil-
ization jihad, or ‘stealth jihad’ as it’s sometimes called. (p. 13)
This ‘stealth’ or ‘civilization’ jihad ‘seeks victory against the United States through
ideological subversion directed at senior leadership and media elites’ (p. 2). The ‘war
of muscle’ will not begin in earnest until ‘after the war of wills has been won’; that
is, not until ‘the subject population is determined to be sufficiently subverted and de-
moralized through dawah’ (p. 10). The effect of treating ummah, dawah and jihad as
independent but functionally interrelated ‘lines of operation’ is to collapse any distinc-
tion between Islam, Islamism and jihadism: ‘[t]o say the threat arises out of Islam is
to say that it emanates from shariah’ (p. 8).
Because ummah, dawah and jihad operate ‘according to their own functional ori-
entation to Islam that reconciles through a common understanding of Islamic law’,
they do not need ‘formal chains of command’ in order to ‘interoperate successfully’ (p.
3). If a form of organic thinking is implicit in the functionalist language used here,
then elsewhere in the document it is explicit: ‘While the Soviet Union was a spider,’
whose appendages would become useless if its head were cut off, Islam is a ‘starfish’,
any of whose severed parts can grow into another ‘fully functional starfish’ (p. 4). At
the same time, the description of the sharia as the ‘source code’ that defines these re-
spective functions suggests that the organism has an other-wordly, cybernetic nature.
It may call to mind the 2004 remake of the 1970s TV show Battlestar Galactica, a
thinly-disguisedWar onTerror parable in which the robotic cylons have re-engineered
themselves in a biological, humanoid form, and hidden a number of sleeper agents
within the human population. These secret cylon agents are programmed to think
they are human until triggered to execute their destructive mission. Similarly, if the
ummah, the worldwide Muslim community, constitutes one ‘line of operation’ that
‘executes along its own functional orientation to Islam’ which is programmed into the
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‘source code’ of sharia, then all Muslims are agents of the conspiracy against theWest,
whether they are conscious of this or not.
The ‘issues in any society that reflect discord and division’ give rise to ‘a fourth line
of operation’, whereby
...agents of subversion in the dawah mission ingratiate themselves with,
and thenmimic, domestic strife leaders and their issues in the host society
so as to gain access to the ‘disenfranchised,’ disenchanted or otherwise
vulnerable elements within any population. (p. 26)
Three sources of domestic strife are identified in the diagram reproduced above. The
first, ‘Alinskyism’, is a reference to Saul Alinsky, the American Jewish community
organiser whose ideas influenced the New Left, and whose work was the subject of
Hillary Rodham Clinton’s senior thesis at Wellesley College in 1969. The second,
‘political correctness’, refers to ‘subversion campaigns’ waged through ‘lexicon battles
that impose vocabularies in direct support of favored narratives through relentless re-
petition and intimidation’ (p. 14). The immediate objective of these subversion cam-
paigns is ‘the control of narratives that undermine successful prosecution of the War
on Terror’, but ultimately their aim is ‘the subordination of free speech canons to Is-
lamic speech standards’ (pp. 14-15). Examples include the ‘hate speech’ concept and
the ‘creation of the term Islamophobia, which joins homophobia, racism and sexism
in the diversity and victimization narrative’ (p. 26).
The third source of domestic strife, ‘postmodernism’, refers to the way that the
Islamic war against America is ‘dependent on pre-existing postmodern influences fo-
cused on the deconstruction of America’ (p. 26). Postmodernism is problematic be-
cause it does not accept a singular truth; consequently its ‘denial of facts as a basis for
analysis’ creates the impression of a world ‘so complex’ that it reinforces the ‘strategic
incomprehension’ alluded to in the title of the document (p. 27). The argument that
‘the Islamic campaign is masked in postmodernist guise designed to disarm’ leads to
the rather surprising conclusion that the enemy ‘plans to win this war on the altar of
postmodernism’ (p. 32). Together, these sources of domestic strife - postmodernism,
political correctness and Alinskyism - ‘are the early oxygen that fuel the flames that
envelop’ (p. 27).
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The language of the document is overtly conspiratorial: there is ‘an actual align-
ment of effort’ (my emphasis) between dawah entities such as the Muslim Brother-
hood and ‘ideologies that trend left - most notably Alinskyist, related cultural Marxist
and postmodern movements’ (the concept of ‘cultural Marxism’ is something we will
look at in more detail below). Consequently, the two enemies - external and internal
- and the four lines of operation all blur into one:
Where the people burning in the house see three players [ordinary
Muslims, peaceful du‘āh and violent jihadis], it is long overdue to un-
derstand them as one. Where people see civilization jihad disassociated
from assaults from the left, it is time to recognize alliance. (p. 1)
The conclusion is grim. ‘The house not only can burn down, it will if action is not
immediately taken to put out the fire. That house is America and our way of life
is smoldering ready to take flame’ (p. 31). There is an obvious and rather chilling
implication here: the first thing you do if you want to put out a flame is cut off its
oxygen supply.
The Unconstrained Analytics document usefully sets out the overall framework of
counterjihadist conspiracism and the relationship between the internal and external
enemies. The remainder of this chapter turns to consider its more specific discursive
constructs: ‘Eurabia’, ‘civilization jihad’ and ‘cultural Marxism’.
‘The Eurabia Code’
One key discursive frame is the conspiratorial version of the ‘Eurabia’ thesis. The ver-
sion of the Eurabia narrative promoted by Bat Ye’Or and her disciple Fjordman is
decidedly conspiratorial. Its key thesis, according to an essay by Fjordman entitled
‘The Eurabia Code’, is that ‘the Islamicization of Europe didn’t happen merely by acci-
dent but with the active participation of European political leaders’ (emphasis mine).8
In her 2005 book on Eurabia, Ye’Or invoked the idea of a primordial enmity between
Islam and the West, whilst lamenting European capitulation:
8http://chromatism.net/fjordman/eurabiacode.htm [Last accessed 28th September 2017].
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For over a millennium, following the seventh-century Muslim military
offensives against Byzantium, European powers instinctively resisted ji-
had — militarily when necessary — to protect their independence. The
response of post – Judeo-Christian Europe of the late twentieth century
has been radically different. Europe, as reflected by the institutions of the
EU, has abandoned resistance for dhimmitude, and independence for in-
tegration with the Islamic world of North Africa and the Middle East.
(Ye’Or, 2005, p. 10)
In a 2006 interview with the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Ye’Or claimed:
This is a matter of a total transformation of Europe, which is the res-
ult of an intentional policy. We are now heading towards a total change
in Europe, which will be more and more Islamicized and will become
a political satellite of the Arab and Muslim world. The European lead-
ers have decided on an alliance with the Arab world, through which they
have committed to accept the Arab and Muslim approach toward the
United States and Israel. This is not only with respect to foreign policy,
but also on issues engaging European society from within, such as im-
migration, the integration of the immigrants and the idea that Islam is
part of Europe. (cited Schwartz, 2006, not paginated; emphasis mine)
Ye’Or identifies as the key agent of this conspiracy the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD),
a programme established by the European Community during the 1973 oil crisis,
largely at French instigation. Whilst the EAD is ‘totally unknown to Europeans... its
occult machinery has engineered Europe’s irreversible transformation through hidden
channels’ (Ye’Or, 2005, p. 268).
A key dimension of this occult project is the EAD’s promotion of a ‘deliberate
cultural transformation of Europe’ by, among other things, encouraging ‘a deliberate,
privileged influx of Arab and other Muslim immigrants into Europe in enormous
numbers’.9 One commentator on theGates of Vienna blog speculates that the ultimate
aim is the creation of a ‘United States of Europe’:
9http://chromatism.net/fjordman/eurabiacode.htm [Last accessed 28th September 2017].
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Muslim immigration has been a deliberate policy of importing people
who will (mostly) not work, who will (mostly) not integrate, and there
is a purpose behind this. They are known to be a luxury i.e. they cost
money to keep. Therefore, follow the money. Why would governments
continue (at increased rates) to import these costly foreigners? The only
explanation I can think of, is that the muslim immigrants are effectively
being paid to be here in order to destroy national identities, in order to
make the United States of Europe come about more easily.10
For believers in the Eurabia thesis, Brussels is an Islamist Occupation Government
in all but name, just as for American neo-Nazis Washington is effectively a Zionist
Occupation Government. Moreover, as we saw in the previous chapter, the Eurabia
literature emerged in the context of the fissures that opened up over the Iraq War.
Hence it will not be a surprise that France, a key part of the ‘Old Europe’ that defied
the US over Iraq is cast as the villain of the piece: ‘France’s stand at the UN Security
Council just before the Iraq war earned President Chirac the gratitude of the Arab
and Muslim world’ (Ye’Or, 2005, p. 24).
A number of writers have noted similarities between the Eurabia conspiracy the-
ory and classical anti-Semitism (e.g. Fekete, 2012; Bangstad, 2013). The late Robert
S. Wistrich, head of the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Anti-
semitism at theHebrewUniversity of Jerusalem, acknowledged these similarities in an
interview with Haaretz in 2006, whilst also pointing out some important differences.
Wistrich had invited Ye’Or to a conference ‘to discuss whether the phenomenon of
multiculturalism was beneficial for the Jews’. Afterwards, he told the newspaper:
At the conference I said half-joking that it was possible to call this ‘the
protocols of the elders of Brussels.’ However, unlike ‘The Protocols of the
Elders of Zion,’ which is a total (sic) forgery, here we have documents and
here we have a question of interpretation. (cited in Schwartz, 2006, not
paginated)
Wistrich emphasised that he did not agree with all of Bat Ye’Or’s conclusions, but he
10http://gatesofvienna.net/2011/11/a-brief-history-of-the-transatlantic-counterjihad-part-v/ See
comment by ‘Anonymous’ on November 30th 2011. [Last accessed 28th September 2017].
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did think that ‘some of the processes she describes are correct’ (ibid).
The main differences between Eurabia and the Protocols, which Wistrich’s com-
ments allude to, concern their epistemic status and authorial intent.11 Whereas the
secret gathering of the Elders of Zion was entirely fictitious, Ye’Or’s EAD is a real
organisation. Moreover, she does offer some possible reasons for the actions she im-
putes to it, for example the desire of European leaders to secure a share of Arab oil
wealth. Furthermore, she provides evidence to support her thesis, in the form of ref-
erences to primary source materials (some of which are reproduced as appendices to
her book) and to academic literature. Her work is also extensively footnoted. All of
this suggests that she is writing for an educated, literate readership, who are prepared
to wade through a three-hundred-page book written in dry academic prose. As Wis-
trich suggests, whether or not you accept Bat Ye’Or’s conclusions depends on whether
you think her interpretation of the documents is remotely plausible. Whilst it would
require a real effort to suspend one’s disbelief for all 300 pages, she has not entirely
abandoned the real world in favour of pure fantasy.
One of my interviewees, a UK-based anti-fascist activist, argued that counterjihad
street groups like the EDL have been a key conduit by which the arcane theories of
Ye’Or and her fellow-travellers are disseminated to a wider audience. What the EDL
and other street movements have done, according to my interviewee, is to take casual
anti-Muslim prejudice and ‘turn it into what we would call counterjihadism’:
They provide this information, this language, these conspiracy theories...
There’s very few people who turn up fully rounded on an English Defence
League [demonstration], and on their very first one, and think ‘well it’s
because there’s a secret Marxist plot using liberals to flood Europe with
Muslims for rapid demographic change, and it was all laid out by the
Muslim Brotherhood in a document in 2009’, right? They don’t come
in like that. They come in because they’re pissed off and they’re angry
about something, it could be becauseMuslims havemoved into their area,
11Here I would like to acknowledge forthcoming work by Dr Reza Zia-Ebrahimi, which compares
Eurabia and the Protocols, an early version of which was presented at the Pears Institute for the Study
of Antisemitism at Birkbeck College, Universty of London, on 16th March 2017. I have drawn on Dr
Zia-Ebrahimi’s remarks in this paragraph.
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whatever. And then once in there, they are brought into an echo chamber,
and it’s really interesting how you see these people harden throughout
the years... they come in on a kind of general feeling or general anger
and the more they read, the more they learn, increasingly they brush off
wider sources of information until they sit within this bubble, this echo
chamber, this confirmation bias, where the only thing they listen to or
read is sources from within this movement... and they start to read blogs
like Gates of Vienna. Now very few of them will go and read Bat Ye’Or,
but if you read out the general conspiracy theory of Eurabia, they would
all have understood it and heard it.12
‘Civilization Jihad’
A second, distinct, conspiracy theory, heavily promoted by the Center for Security
Policy among others, is of a Muslim Brotherhood ‘project’ to infiltrate and overthrow
the US government through a ‘civilization’ or ‘stealth’ jihad (the two terms are used
interchangeably). The ‘civilization jihad’ conspiracy draws on a document written in
1991 by a man named Mohammed Akram, entitled ‘Explanatory Memorandum on
the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America’, which was found by the
FBI during a raid on a residential property in Virgina in 2004. In it, Akram asserts that
‘the Ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood] must understand that their work in America is a
kind of grand jihad in eliminating and destroying theWestern civilization fromwithin’
(cited in Shipler, 2015, not paginated). He also includes ‘a list of our organizations and
the organizations of our friends’, one of which is the Council on American Islamic
Relations (CAIR), seemingly implicating Islamic civil society groups and ordinary
Muslims in the ‘civilization jihad’ conspiracy.
The idea that the document can be interpreted as a conspiratorial blueprint for a
‘stealth jihad’ against the West has, however, been discredited by the Bridge Initiative
at Georgetown University and by the Pulitzer-Prize-winning author David Shipler.
First, the memorandum’s author, Akram, does not appear to have occupied a senior
12Interview 12, anti-fascist activist, male, UK.
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position in the Brotherhood, being listed in some sources as a ‘secretary’ for the group.
Second, the tone of the document is aspirational, framed by Akram as expressing his
‘hopes, ambitions and challenges’, and saying of the Muslim civil society groups that
he lists as potential ‘friends’: ‘Imagine if they all march according to one plan!!!’.13
There is no evidence that the Brotherhood’s leadership ever read or debated, let alone
acted upon the memo, indeed the memo even contains a plea from Akram to his
seniors ‘not rush to throw these papers away due to yourmany occupations andworries.
All that I’m asking of you is to read them and to comment on them’ (cited in Shipler,
2015, not paginated). Moreover, researchers at Georgetown found very few references
to the document on Arabic-language websites, suggesting a limited circulation.14
The lack of any evidence to confirm the theory has not, however, prevented its
heavy circulation by the CSP, the Horowitz Freedom Center and Breitbart, among
others.15 One of its most vocal proponents has been the former FBI agent JohnGuan-
dolo, whose group Understanding the Threat runs training courses for law enforce-
ment officials. Guandolo accuses Muslim civil society organisations like CAIR, the
Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the North American Islam Trust (NAIT)
and the Muslim Student Association (MSA) of being Brotherhood front groups, de-
scribing them as ‘suit-wearing jihadis’ who are ‘no less dangerous than ISIS soldiers
on the battlefield’.16 The ‘civilization jihad’ conspiracy theory received a more public
airing in January 2016 when Republican presidential candidate Ben Carson raised it
during a debate.17 Key public figures who have had their loyalties questioned include
Hillary Clinton’s aide Huma Abedin and, of course, Obama himself, whose faith and
loyalties have repeatedly been called into question, not least by Donald Trump.
Belief in the ‘civilization jihad’ conspiracy theory is the prime impetus behind ef-
forts to get the Brotherhood designated a foreign terrorist entity, a campaign that
has been led by the CSP, ACT for America and other groups. Within the Trump
13http://bridge.georgetown.edu/civilization-jihad-debunking-the-conspiracy-theory/ [Last ac-
cessed 28th September 2017].
14Ibid.
15http://imagine2050.newcomm.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/MB-Designation_CNC.pdf
[Last accessed 28th September 2017].
16Ibid.
17http://bridge.georgetown.edu/civilization-jihad-debunking-the-conspiracy-theory/ [Last ac-
cessed 28th September 2017].
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administration this agenda has been heavily promoted by former National Security
advisor Mike Flynn among others. The plan appeared to be in abeyance at the time
of writing, probably due to the enormous diplomatic problems it would cause with
Muslim-majority countries where the Brotherhood is seen as a legitimate part of civil
society and often has links to government organisations. However, even if the exec-
utive branch drops the idea, the designation could alternatively come about through
legislative action in Congress. Ted Cruz, who has spoken at ACT’s conference and
had CSP staff working as advisors on his presidential campaign is the latest of a series
of right-wing legislators to introduce a bill to this effect.18
‘They were to a man, Jewish’
A third distinct conspiracy theory, with a very different genealogy, is that of ‘cultural
Marxism’, an idea that is invoked in the following post on Gates of Vienna, which en-
dorses the arguments of Huntington, Ye’Or and others that the ‘real clash’ of cultures,
and hence the real enemy, is internal to the West:
We agree with Fjordman and many others that the Jihad is just a symp-
tom, and that the enemy lies within. This war is a civil war within the
West, between traditional Western culture and the forces of politically
correct multicultural Marxism that have bedeviled it for the last hundred
years. It is being fought in the back halls and cloisters of the culture, with
untenured nobodies like me wielding a salad fork against the broadswords
and maces of the fully-armored knights of the media and the academy.19
Unlike ‘Eurabia’ and the ‘civilization jihad’, ‘cultural Marxism’ is not specific to the
counterjihad and circulates much more widely across the EuroAmerican far right. It
draws on the older Nazi idea of Kulturbolschewismus or ‘cultural Bolshevism’, a term
that expressed the idea of modern art as corrupt and degenerate, a threat to German
culture and morality, because it was of ‘Semitic inspiration’ (Goggin, 1991, p. 86).
As we will see, ‘cultural Marxism’ also has anti-Semitic connotations and is actively
18http://imagine2050.newcomm.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/MB-Designation_CNC.pdf
[Last accessed 28th September 2017].
19http://gatesofvienna.net/2006/09/the-emperor-is-naked/ [Last accessed 28th September 2017].
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promoted by neo-Nazis as a way of disseminating conspiratorial anti-Semitism to a
wider audience, but it is not always clear whether those using the term are aware of its
unsavoury genealogy. Nevertheless, it marks one of the points where counterjihadism
and neo-Nazism coalesce.
The ‘cultural Marxism’ conspiracy theory emerged from ultraconservative and
white nationalist milieux following the end of the Cold War as a more-or-less dir-
ect response to the disappearnce of the ‘red menace’ of Communism ( Jamin, 2014;
Richardson, 2015). In essence, the theory casts the emergence of a global, cosmopol-
itan, multicultural and egalitarian society (George H.W. Bush’s ‘New World Order’)
as the outcome of a deliberate plot to undermine traditional identities and forms of
social authority such as the nation, the nuclear family and Christianity. The archi-
tects of this conspiracy are the (mainly Jewish) emigré intellectuals of the Frankfurt
School of critical theory, who fled to the US from Nazi Germany during the 1930s.
Recognising that the proletariat could no longer be considered a viable agent of re-
volutionary change, the theory claims, these intellectuals instead sought to mobilise
new constituencies in service of their ideal, egalitarian society: notably, ethnic minor-
ities, women, sexual minorities and immigrants. In so doing, they translatedMarxism
from economic into cultural terms, replacing the older Marxian preoccupation with
economic exploitation with a new focus on racial oppression, patriarchy and homo-
phobia. Consequently anti-racism, feminism and LGBT rights (bracketed together as
‘political correctness’) were invented as sticks with which to beat white men, who have
become the new victims. If the Frankfurt School theorists were the original architects
of the ‘cultural Marxist’ conspiracy then its main agents have been the ‘68-ers’ who
came under the spell of Herbert Marcuse during the 1960s, and who now allegedly
control all of America’s key cultural and political institutions: the government, the
education system and the mass media. As Jérôme Jamin has argued, it can hardly
be coincidental that no sooner had the Cold War ended, ‘there emerged a literature
claiming that the fight was still not over’ and that ‘the threat had passed from the
economic to the cultural arena’ ( Jamin, 2014, p. 89).
One of the first to make such a claim was Michael Minnicino in a 1992 essay in
the magazine Fidelio, a publication of the Schiller Institute (Minnicino, 1992). The
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Schiller Institute is part of the idiosyncratic LaRouche movement, which emerged
as a breakaway faction of the US student movement during the late 1960s be-
fore subsequently pivoting to the far right. The National Committee of Labour
Caucuses (NCLC) was founded in 1968 by a Trotskyist student organiser, Lyndon
H. LaRouche, Jr., but underwent a radical political transformation during the 1970s.
Between 1973 and 1974, LaRouche ordered a series of violent attacks of rival left-
wing groups and allegedly forced his followers to undergo ‘ego-stripping’ exercises of
psychological humiliation to prove their loyalty. A climate of paranoia gripped the
organisation as rumours swirled that the CIA and British intelligence services had in-
filtrated it in order to kill LaRouche. By the mid-1970s, the LaRouche organisation
had evolved into a cultic but highly disciplined far-right movement revolving around
the personality of Lyndon LaRouche (Berlet and Lyons, 2000, pp. 273-74).
The LaRouche movement’s worldview revolves around a novel conspiratorial the-
ory of history of breathtaking scope and ambition. It subsumes elements of the Illu-
minati, world-Jewish and international-communist conspiracy theories as ‘mere frag-
ments’ of a much larger plot. The investigative journalist Dennis King, who has writ-
ten a book-length study of the LaRouche movement, describes this conspiracy theory
as ‘perhaps the closest thing to a system of total multidimensional paranoia ever in-
vented in the United States’ (King, 1989, pp. 274-75). According to LaRouche (La-
Rouche, 1978), history is a cosmic battle between a good, ‘humanist’ faction associated
with Plato, and an evil, ‘oligarchical’ faction associated with Aristotle. The former in-
cludes figures such as Mozart, Beethoven, Shakespeare, Gottfried Leibniz, Friedrich
Schiller (hence the name of the Institute that published Minnicino’s essay), Erwin
Schrodinger, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Mohammed and Jesus. The latter includes
figures such as Francis Bacon, John Locke, Bishop Berkeley, Jeremy Bentham, Al-
dous Huxley, Adolf Hitler, Ken Kesey, the Beatles, Henry Kissinger and the Ayatol-
lah Khomeini. Whilst the Platonists are committed to metaphysical absolutes and
the pursuit of truth and beauty, the Aristotelians, by elevating the empirical over the
metaphysical, are the source of materialism and moral relativism. Whilst the Platon-
ists are committed to urbanisation, technological progress, and cultural excellence, the
Aristotelians dream only of thwarting these things. They aim to plunge the world into
198
a ‘new Dark Ages’ with oligarchical rule eventually extended over the entire planet,
for reasons that are left obscure. The locus of the oligarchical conspiracy has shifted
throughout history: it started out in ancient Babylon, subsequently shifted to Rome,
moved to Venice in the early modern period, and has more recently been centred
on Britain’s royal House of Windsor. The conspiracy consists of a spectrum of pro-
jects designed to depopulate the planet and pacify the global populace through birth
control, the environmental movement and the entertainment industry. Narcotics are
another key tool with which the Windsor oligarchy controls the global populace, ac-
cording to LaRouche, hence the unlikely emergence of the figure of Queen Elisabeth
II as the prime mover behind the international drugs trade.
The LaRouchian conspiracy theory simultaneously mobilises and disavows classic
anti-Semitic tropes. LaRouche dismisses the idea of an ‘international Jewish conspir-
acy’ as a ‘concoction of mixed facts, half-truths (sic) and fantasies’, one of a number
of mythologies propagated by British intelligence as part of their campaign of misdir-
ection (LaRouche, 1978). These popular conspiracy theories, which also include the
idea of an ‘international communist conspiracy’, are designed to turn the credulous
away from all searches ‘for the secrets of those “inner elites” which have in fact run the
world’s affairs during approximately three thousand years of known history’ (ibid.).
But LaRouche also claims that the entire Jewish religion is itself a ‘hoax’ propagated
by the Aristotelian faction, one that has been reworked repeatedly throughout his-
tory ‘always under the supervision of non-Jews’, and he views the Old Testament as a
‘barbarism’ from which humanity had to be freed by Christ and his apostles. He also
frequently associates prominent Jews such as Henry Kissinger and the Rothschilds
with the oligarchical conspiracy, although it is typically ambiguous whether Jews are
active conspirators or merely unwitting agents of the oligarchs.
Michael Minnicino’s essay on ‘cultural Marxism’ is part of this broader La-
Rouchian conspiratorial discourse. Entitled ‘The New Dark Age: the Frankfurt
School and “Political Correctness”’ (Minnicino, 1992), Minnicino’s essay begins with
a dramatic story of Western decline. The populations of North America andWestern
Europe, Minnicino claims, ‘now accept a level of ugliness in their daily lives which is
almost without precedent in the history of Western civilization’:
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Our children spend as much time sitting in front of television sets as they
do in school, watching with glee, scenes of torture and death which might
have shocked an audience in the Roman Coliseum. Music is everywhere,
almost unavoidable - but it does not uplift, nor even tranquilize - it claws
at the ears, sometimes spitting out an obscenity. Our plastic arts are ugly,
our architecture is ugly, our clothes are ugly. (Minnicino, 1992, p. 4)
Minnicino attributes the decline of the West to ‘a formal political conspiracy to pop-
ularize theories that were specifically designed to weaken the soul of Judeo-Christian
civilization’ (ibid., p. 5). The ‘pervasive psychological hold’ of the mass media and
entertainment industries was ‘purposefully fostered to create the passivity and pess-
imism which afflict our populations today’ (ibid., p. 5). So successful has this project
been, that the formal conspiracy has become superfluous: it is now ‘embedded in our
culture’ and has ‘taken on a life of its own’ (ibid., p. 5). University campuses have been
‘overwhelmed by Comintern-style NewAge “Political Correctness”’, evidenced by de-
mands to drop ‘Dead European Males’ from the syllabus in favour of ‘Third World,
female, or homosexual authors’ (ibid., p. 5). Consequently, since the fall of the Soviet
Union, these campuses have come to represent ‘the largest concentration of Marxist
dogma in the world’ (ibid., p. 5).
Minnicino identifies as the ‘single, most important organizational component of
this conspiracy... a Communist thinktank called the Institute for Social Research
(I.S.R.), but popularly known as the Frankfurt School’ (Minnicino, 1992, p. 5). The
members of the School, according to Minnicino, represented the ‘Bolshevik intelli-
gentsia’.
We will have to face the fact that the ugliness we see around us has been
consciously fostered and organized in such a way, that a majority of the
population is losing the cognitive ability to transmit to the next genera-
tion, the ideas and methods upon which our civilization was built. The
loss of that ability is the primary indicator of a Dark Age. And, a new
Dark Age is exactly what we are in. (ibid., p. 5)
Noting that history provides an ‘unequivocal’ lesson about what must be done in such
a situation, Minnicino issues a ‘palingenetic’ (Griffin, 1993) exhortation: ‘either we
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create a Renaissance—a rebirth of the fundamental principles upon which civilization
originated—or, our civilization dies’ (ibid., p. 5).
The ‘cultural Marxist’ theme was taken up and developed around the turn of the
millennium by a number of right-wing authors, including a retired US Navy Com-
mander, Gerald L. Atkinson; Raymond V. Raehn, also a former US Navy pilot; and
John Fonte, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. However, it was in the essays of
William S. Lind, head of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress
Foundation (FCF), that the ‘cultural Marxist’ conspiracy theory received its most sys-
tematic treatment. The Free Congress Foundation (recently renamed the American
Opportunity Foundation) was founded in 1977 by Paul Weyrich, who had also estab-
lished the Heritage Foundation four years earlier. Weyrich, an influential right-wing
strategist, promoted cultural conservatism as the basis of right-wing political mobil-
isation. He is credited with coining the phrase ‘moral majority’, which he later helped
turn into a key organisation of the Christian right under the leadership of televangelist
Jerry Falwell. The editor of Jihad Watch, Robert Spencer, was an Adjunct Fellow at
the FCF during the early 2000s.20
Lind’s 2004 edited collection ‘Political Correctness’: a short history of an ideology
(Lind, 2004), which includes essays by Raehn, Atkinson and others, is perhaps the
most influential and frequently-cited text within the cultural Marxist genre, develop-
ing the central themes of Minnicino’s earlier essay whilst taming some of its wilder
excesses. Like Minnicino, Lind begins his chapter ‘What is “Political Correctness”?’
with a dramatic story of American decline. He invokes the 1950s as ‘a good time’,
when people ‘did not bother to lock their doors... ladies devoted their time and effort
to making good homes’ and ‘rearing their children well’, when children ‘grew up in
two-parent households’, and when entertainment ‘was something the whole family
could enjoy’ (ibid., p. 4). ‘If a man (sic) from America of the 1950s were suddenly
introduced into America in the 2000s’, Lind suggests, ‘he would hardly recognise
it as the same country’ (ibid.). In particular, he would be ‘in immediate danger of
getting mugged, carjacked or worse, because he would not have learned to live in con-
stant fear’. Lind attributes America’s decline, to which the ‘fall of Rome was graceful
20https://www.jihadwatch.org/about-robert [Last accessed 28th September 2017].
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by comparison’ (ibid., p. 5), to its conquest by the ideology of ‘political correctness’
(ibid.). ‘Political correctness’, Lind claims, ‘is in fact cultural Marxism - Marxism
translated from economic into cultural terms’ (ibid., p. 5). Cultural Marxism shares
orthodox, economistic Marxism’s ultimate aim: ‘a society of radical egalitarianism
enforced by the power of the state’ (ibid., p. 6).
Following Minnicino, Lind argues that the political hegemony of ‘cultural Marx-
ism’ is due to the subversive infuence of the Frankfurt School of critical theory. In
these writings, the terms ‘Frankfurt School’ and ‘cultural Marxism’ stand in for a wide
variety of left-wing philosophies that are broadly critical of classical Marxism; con-
sequently not all of those that Lind and his co-authors associate with the ‘Frankfurt
School’ were formally members of the Institute for Social Research. Two things link
the key figures discussed in the Free Congress Foundation pamphlet: they were all
either anti-fascist or Jewish intellectuals, and many were both. Gramsci was languish-
ing in a Fascist jail when the ISR was established in 1923; Benjamin was a German
Jew who committed suicide whilst trying to escape the Nazis; Adorno, Horkheimer
and Marcuse were all Jewish; Reich, although not a member of the Institute, was an
Austrian Jew who wrote a major book onTheMass Psychology of Fascism. In case any-
one had missed the point, Lind takes care to note that not only were the members of
the Frankfurt School all Marxists, ‘they are also, to a man, Jewish’.21
Other essays in the edited volume expand on Lind’s basic themes. The univer-
sity campus figures throughout these writings as a key battleground in the ‘culture
war’. Many college campuses have come to resemble ‘small, ivy-coveredNorth Koreas’
(Lind, 2004, p. 7) where political correctness has all but eliminated free speech and
free thought. The militant students of the 1960s have now become ‘tenured radicals’
and launched a devastating assault on the curriculum in the name of ‘multiculturalism’.
Antifeminism is another key theme. The final substantive chapter in Lind’s edited
collection is an essay by Gerald L. Atkinson on ‘Radical Feminism and Political Cor-
rectness’, which laments the ‘feminization of American culture’. Although Atkinson
acknowledges that the feminist movement long predates critical theory, he neverthe-
less argues that ‘radical feminists have embraced and been embraced by the wider and
21https://www.academia.org/the-origins-of-political-correctness/ [Last accessed 2nd October
2017].
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deeper movement of cultural Marxism’ (p. 3). The feminization of American culture
has consequently advanced rapidly since the 1960s, and ‘continues to intensify’. As a
result, men have been transformed into a ‘touchy-feely subspecies’ and even the U.S.
military, ‘the last bastion of male domination’, is now ‘under assault’ (p. 3).
In 1999, five years before Lind’s edited collection, the FCF released a documentary
film entitled Political Correctness: the Frankfurt School,22 which Lind himself narrated.
The film included interviews with a number of prominent conservatives including Ro-
ger Kimball and David Horowitz, whose Freedom Center is a key site of the coun-
terjihad movement and which sponsors Robert Spencer’s Jihad Watch. However, the
most interesting figure to appear in the 1999 FCF film is undoubtedly the late Laszlo
Pasztor, euphemistically described in Lind’s voiceover as ‘a leader of the Hungarian
resistance against the Communist takeover of Hungary afterWorldWar II’ (see figure
7.2). Pasztor was in fact a former member of the Hungarian Nazi party, the Arrow
Cross, having served as a leader of its youth group and later as part of the Hungarian
diplomatic mission to Berlin during the brief period of ArrowCross government from
October 1944 toMarch 1945, and was imprisoned for five years after the war as a Nazi
collaborator (Bellant, 1988).
Pasztor was one of a number of East European Nazi sympathisers and collaborat-
ors who travelled to the US after the war under the auspices of the Displaced Persons
Commission and became active in Republican politics, hoping that a Republican ad-
ministration would intervene militarily to free Eastern Europe from Soviet control,
rather than pursuing a strategy of ‘containment’. Others included Ivan Dochev of
the Bulgarian National Front who had met Hitler and Rosenberg in Berlin in 1934,
Nicholas Nazarenko of the World Federation of Cossacks for the Liberation of Cos-
sackia, Florian Galdau, a member of the Romanian Iron Guard who loudly accused
the Democratic Party of being a front organisation for the KGB, and Walter Melian-
ovich of the Belorussian-American Federation, who charged that the Democrats only
cared about ‘the Black and Jewish vote’ (ibid.).
The shared concern that linked these figures with the Republican leadership was
anti-Communism, and they were long tolerated within the GOP due to their ability
22https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EjaBpVzOohs [Last accessed 2nd October 2017].
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Figure 7.2: Stills from the Free Congress Foundation film Political Correctness: the
Frankfurt School. Top: David Horowitz, bottom: Laszlo Pasztor. Source: YouTube.
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These  screenshots  of  the  Free 
Congress  Foundation  film  ÔPolitical  
CorrectnessÕ  have  been  removed  
as the  copyright  is  owned  by  
another  organisation.
to translate anti-Soviet sentiment among East European emigré communities into
votes for the Republican party. Speaking in May 1985 to the Republican Heritage
Groups Council (RHGC), under whose auspices the fascist exiles operated, then-
President Ronald Reagan, whose 1980 campaign slogan ‘Make America Great Again’
anticipated that of Donald Trump in 2016, thanked his audience for their help in
arresting American decline:
A few years ago, most of us had a great aching in our hearts about Amer-
ica. As we picked up themorning papers, there was never any telling what
new setbacks or international humiliation awaited us. And that’s not even
to mention what was happening here at home – economic decline, end-
less increases in crime, and a deepening social discontent stemming from
overly intrusive government, the loss of basic values, and stifled economic
opportunity.
Well, together, you and I offered the American people a way out of all
of this. And just as we always knew they would, they took us up on the
offer. Now we’ve turned away from the days of defeatism and malaise;
America’s back where she belongs – the champion of peace and freedom
throughout the world.23
In return, RHGC members enjoyed access to GOP officials and to policymakers
within successive Republican administrations.
Pasztor was not the FCF’s only link to Nazi and anti-Semitic circles. In Septem-
ber 2002, the Southern Poverty Law Center reported that William Lind had given ‘a
well-received speech’ at ’a major Holocaust denial conference put on by veteran anti-
Semite Willis Carto in Washington, D.C.’, where he spoke to ‘some 120 “historical
revisionists,” conspiracy theorists, neo-Nazis and other anti-Semites’. According to
the report, Lind’s speech ‘identified a small group of people who he said had poisoned
American culture’, the Frankfurt School, on which point he made ‘a powerful con-
nection with his listeners. “These guys,” he explained, “were all Jewish”.’24
23http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=38646 [Last accessed 2nd October 2017].
24https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2002/ally-christian-right-
heavyweight-paul-weyrich-addresses-holocaust-denial-conference [Last accessed 2nd October
2017].
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The theme of ‘cultural Marxism’ has since been promoted by, for instance, the
‘paleoconservative’ and perennial presidential candidate Patrick J. Buchanan, who de-
voted an entire chapter of his 2002 book,The Death of the West: how dying populations
and immigrant invasions imperil our country and civilization (Buchanan, 2002), to an
analysis of the Frankfurt School. In Buchanan’s writings there is a close link between
the ‘cultural Marxist’ and ‘NewWorld Order’ theories: the ‘NewWorld Order’ is the
emerging globalist society whilst ‘political correctness’ is the means used by the ‘cul-
tural Marxists’ to bring about the NWO (Jamin, 2014, p. 92). A more recent video
than the FCF one, dating from 2011, is entitled Cultural Marxism: The Corruption
of America and features Buchanan, right-wing libertarian Ron Paul and conspiracy
theorists such as Edward Griffin and Edwin Vieira (Berlet, 2012, p. 569). Another
populariser of the term was the late Andrew Breitbart, founder of Breitbart News,
who claimed that ‘Cultural Marxism is political correctness, it’s multiculturalism, and
it’s a war on Judeo-Christianity’ (cited in ibid., at p. 569). Moreover, Breitbart saw
Obama’s election as the culmination of the ‘cultural Marxist’ plot: ‘He’s [Obama] a
Marxist... His life work, his life experience, his life writings, and now his legislative
legacy speak to his ideological point of view’ (cited in Mead, 2010, not paginated). It
has also been widely disseminated in websites linked to the Tea Party movement, and
crossed the Atlantic in the mid-2000s, entering the lexicon of the Austrian Freedom
Party from around 2004, the British National Party from around 2007, and later ap-
pearing in EDL Facebook posts and the UKIP Daily blog ( Jamin, 2014; Richardson,
2015). Meanwhile, on its website, the British counterjihadist party Liberty GB boasts
that ‘[n]o comparable party has delineated a clear vision of our current predicament as
stemming from the multi-decennial dominance over the country of Cultural Marxist
ideology’.25
In early versions of the ‘cultural Marxism’ conspiracy theory, such as those ofMin-
nicino and Buchanan, it was not explicitly linked to anxieties about Muslims and Is-
lam. This began to change in the mid-late 2000s. On the occasion of the London
bombings in 2005, Lind wrote a blog post entitled ‘The Marx-Mohammed Pact’26 in
25https://libertygb.org.uk/q-a [Last accessed 2nd October 2017].
26https://web.archive.org/web/20050723021323/http://www.military.com/Opinions/
0„Lind_072105,00.html [Last accessed 2nd October 2017].
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which he accused Western governments of having imported ‘millions of immigrants
who are deeply hostile to the traditional cultures of their new homelands’. Whilst
Muslims ‘are not the only immigrants who harbor such hostility... at present they
seem the most likely to act on it.’ The problem, however, was that the ‘cultural Marx-
ists’ were ‘forbidding the West to defend itself from Islamic immigration.’ And Lind
was clear on what the solution should be:
Europe, and the United States, need to stop more Islamics (and, in the
U.S., Hispanics) from coming, and at least some of the Islamics now in
residence must go... If we dare rip down the camouflage nets cultural
Marxism has erected to blind us, we see Europe has two real choices: an
infinity of Londons or second expulsion of the Moors.27
In a blog post about the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, Lind speculated about the cultural
Marxists’ motivations for allying with Islam, given that ‘if the Islamics took over, they
would cut Marxists’ throats even before they cut the throats of Christians and Jews.’
His answer was that ‘cultural Marxism will ally with any force that helps it to achieve
its goals, destroying Western culture and Christianity.’28
Conspiracy theories were generally absent from my interviews with counterjihad
activists, perhaps reflecting the stigma that is attached to conspiracy belief. The one
exception to this was an interview with a UK-based counterjihad blogger, in which
he articulated what is recognisably a version of the cultural Marxist conspiracy theory.
The exchange is worth quoting in full:29
Interviewee: ...the reason why people like me are having such a hard
time is because people of the left-wing persuasion - socialists, commun-
ists, Trotskyists - have sort of realised that they can tap into the - in quotes
- ‘revolutionary potential’ of Muslims in the West, and they’re hoping to
use them for their own ends. So no matter what I say, what my friends
say, these isolated groups on the Trotskyist, communist and left-wing,
they have this fantasy where they can bring about - this sounds a bit sort
27Ibid.
28http://www.theamericanconservative.com/2009/11/19/the-roots-of-political-correctness/ [Last
accessed 2nd October 2017].
29Interview 10, counterjihad blogger, male, UK.
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of like fantasy time - but they think they can skew things to their own
ends, they can tap into these violent and revolutionary perspectives of
other people in the Islamic community, and they can point them in the
right direction - and the right direction is leftist revolution - and that
to me is why everything is so extreme, everything is going in the wrong
direction. But you’re in the London School of Economics, aren’t you?
Me: Yes, that’s right, yeah.
Interviewee: Well... I don’t know what the current state of the London
School of Economics is, but my bet is that you may well be trying to find
out who your enemies are.
Me: Well, you’re attributing things to me. I certainly wouldn’t put it like
that.
Interviwee: You don’t need to answer that one.
Me: But if we could just go back a bit, you seemed to be saying that there
was some kind of active design on the part of communists or Trotskyists
or-
Interviewee: Yeah?
Me: -whoever, to... I mean, to what purpose or for what ends? And how
are they going about doing that?
Interviewee: Well I don’t class all left-wingers in that way.
Me: Right.
Interviewee: I have a word which many people also have - “democratic
socialists” - I don’t class them in that conspiratorial lens. But I’ve read
various articles where the group or the writer has said we can tap into
the revolutionary potential of Muslims. And I can send you quotes upon
quotes in that general sphere. Is that the question you were asking me?
Me: Yeah. I mean, well, yes. That is the question I was asking. It’s just
interesting cos-
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Interviewee: I’m not one of these psychopathic people who has a dis-
taste for anybody who’s left wing.
I decided to push a bit more on this line of conversation, and put it to the interviewee
that Muslims, as a diasporic religious group, could hardly constitute a revolutionary
class in the Marxian sense:
Interviewee: Well yeah, exactly. But it’s happening. It also happened in
- I don’t know about your global history - Algeria, Egypt, Pakistan, erm...
there have been these very close - sorry, Iran 1979 - it’s happened many
times, where Marxist groups have tried to ally themselves with Islamic
groups, or even Muslim fundamentalist groups, because they thought
they could tap into it, and turn it in the right direction. And it never
worked, and it never happened. It didn’t work in Algeria, it didn’t work in
Iran, it didn’t work in Pakistan, it didn’t work in Afghanistan, just doesn’t
happen. It’s just, how to say? If someone’s impoverished, or oppressed,
these left-wing groups can point the finger at these people and bring them
around to the right, proper consciousness, not false consciousness.
Me: Oh, I see what you mean.
Interviewee: Just does not work. Not that I’m trying to suggest any-
thing that does work, because that wouldn’t be very...
Me: No, no. Okay. No, that’s interesting, it’s not an argument I’ve heard
before.
Interviewee: No, you must have heard that before.
Me: Well, not specifically in relation to Muslims, or not specifically in
relation to Muslims in the West.
Interviewee: Tapping into the [inaudible] of oppressed groups.
Me: Yeah, in a general sense, yes.
Interviewee: Really? That shocks me.
Me: No, I said I have heard that argument obviously in a general sense,
but-
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Interviewee: But not about Muslims specifically?
Me: -it was interesting the way you were applying it to Muslims in the
West.
Interviewee: Mmm.
Many of those who today use the term ‘cultural Marxism’, including those within
the counterjihad movement who view themselves as strongly pro-Israeli and philo-
Zionist, seem ignorant of the etymology of the term. By contrast, neo-Nazis are fully
aware of its history and significance, and have recognised its potential for disseminat-
ing conspiratorial anti-Semitism to a wider audience. For example, one contributor to
stormfront.org, a key neo-Nazi and white supremacist web forum run by the former
leader of theAlabamaKlan, DonBlack, describes its usefulness in the following terms:
The issue of the Frankfurt School is IMHO [in my humble opinion] per-
fectly suitable to awaken mainstream conservatives to the Jew question.
Conservatives are incessantly moaning about declining morals, destroyed
families, vanishing values, the attacks on tradition and Christianity and
so on. But they usually think, all this “just happened”.
This is the ideal moment when a WN [white nationalist] can say (No,
not: “Those filthy Jews did all that!”) but: “All that was put forward de-
liberately. It’s an ideology, it’s in fact a modification of Marxism. Have
you heard about the Frankfurt School?” Even wikipedia-articles about the
issue or i.e. Critical Theory are very explicit and will suffice for an intel-
ligent WN “first grader” to realize that all he moans about, did not just
“happen”.30
The same commentator goes on to describe how the Frankfurt School conspiracy the-
ory contributed to their own ‘awakening’:
Talking about the Frankfurt School is ideal for not naming the Jews as
a group (which often leads to a panicky rejection, a stubborn refusal to
30Comment by ’Lady_Nostalgia’, 21st August 2010. https://www.stormfront.org/forum/t633959-
3/ [Last accessed 1st June 2017].
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listening anymore and even a “shut up”) but naming the Jew by proper
names. People will make their generalizations by themselves - in the pri-
vacy of their own minds. At least it worked like that with me. It was my
lightbulb moment, when confusing pieces of an alarming puzzle suddenly
grouped to a visible picture.
Learn by heart themost important proper names of the Frankfurt School-
ers - they are (except for a handful of minor members and female
“groupies”) ALL Jews. One can even quite innocently mention that the
Frankfurt Schoolers had to leave Germany in 1933 because “they were to
a man, Jewish.” as William S. Lind does.31
Perhaps most significantly, a post on William Lind’s personal blog, dated 16th
April 2016, shows him proudly handing a copy of his and Weyrich’s co-authored
2008 bookThe Next Conservatism to the then-frontrunner for the Republican presid-
ential nomination: Donald J. Trump. I cannot claim to have read this book, and I
do not know if Donald Trump has either. But if he did, then according to the pub-
lisher’s website, he would have learned that the ‘decay’ of American culture ‘over the
past half-century’ didn’t ‘just happen’, that ‘much of our degradation was deliberate’,
that it was ‘the work of the poisonous ideology of cultural Marxism, AKA “Political
Correctness”’, and he would have been taken ‘on a fascinating historical tour of the ori-
gins of Political Correctness in the infamous Frankfurt School, a gathering of heretical
Marxists whose goal from the outset was the destruction of Western culture.’32
Conclusion
The extent to which ‘Islam’ can serve as a new alterity against which a sense ofWestern
(civilizational) and white (ethnic) identity might be reinvigorated in a post-ColdWar
context is open to question. One person who doubts its efficacy is the Russian theorist
of ‘neo-Eurasianism’, Alexander Dugin, who observes that the period since the fall of
the Cold War has been ‘the most important moment’ in the history of the Western
31Ibid.
32See http://www.staugustine.net/our-books/books/the-next-conservatism/ [Last accessed 4th June
2017].
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Figure 7.3: William Lind presents a copy of his and Paul Weyrich’s co-
authored book The Next Conservatism to Donald Trump, April 2016. Source: ht-
tps://archive.fo/kFtSa.
liberal democratic order, because Western liberalism has ‘defeated its enemies, but at
the same time it has lost them’. Writing in 2014, in the context of the Ukraine conflict,
Dugin argued that Russia is, in the long run, the only plausible external enemy for the
West and therefore anticipated renewed geopolitical confrontation between the two:
Radical Islam, such as represented by al-Qaeda, was another candidate
for this role, but it lacked sufficient stature to become a real enemy. It was
used, but only on a local scale. It justified the intervention in Afghanistan,
the occupation of Iraq, the overthrow of Gaddafi, and started a civil war
in Syria, but it was too weak and ideologically primitive to represent the
real challenge that is needed by liberals.33
Dugin’s comments may seem less prescient in a context where figures in the Trump
33https://openrevolt.info/2014/03/11/alexander-dugin-the-war-on-russia-in-its-ideological-
dimension/ [Last accessed 2nd October 2017].
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administration, up to and including the president himself, repeatedly speak of a global
conflict between Islam and the West, and where the new administration has sought
more cordial relations with Putin’s Russia.
Perhaps the only other plausible alterity against which Western identity could be
redefined is China. Writing in 2006, and anticipating that obsession over the ‘green
menace’ may eventually run its course, Matt Carr suggested that ‘it may not be long
before US foreign policy hawks announce a new threat to European “values” posed by
the alien representatives of a hermetically sealed Confucian culture, incapable of in-
tegration or assimilation and intent on absorbing the remants of Eurabia into another
empire from the East’ (Carr, 2006, p. 18). Moreover, there is of course a long history
of Sinophobia that could be drawn on here, going back to the nineteenth-century
‘yellow peril’. Indeed, Trump’s repeated assertions that global warming is a ‘Chinese
conspiracy’, one in which roughly ninety-nine percent of the US scientific community
would presumably need to be complicit, points towards other possible configurations
of the internal and external enemies. At the time of writing, however, it seems as
if the ‘green menace’ of Islam will continue to fulfil this role for the EuroAmerican
antidemocratic right for the foreseeable future.
The importance of the paranoid fantasies discussed in this chapter should not be
underestimated, and they are by no means confined to the political fringes. Based on a
detailed analysis of the 2016 American National Election Study (ANES) pilot survey,
political scientist Philip Klinkner has shown that economic status did little to explain
support for Trump and that resentment towards minorities, including African Amer-
icans andMuslims, was muchmore important. More specifically, Klinkner found that
there was one variable that correlated with Trump support an overwhelming eighty-
nine percent of the time among white respondents.34 Consequently, if a voter was
white and you wanted to know if they were a Trump supporter, you should ask them
just one, simple question: ‘Is Barack Obama a Muslim?’.
34https://www.vox.com/2016/6/2/11833548/donald-trump-support-race-religion-economy [Last
accessed 30th September 2017].
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Chapter 8
‘Our Ancient Heritage’: the new
political theology
Distilling is beautiful. First of all, because it is a slow, philosophic,
and silent occupation, which keeps you busy but gives you time to
think of other things, somewhat like riding a bike. Then, because it
involves metamorphosis from liquid to vapor (invisible), and from
this once again to liquid; but in this double journey, up and down,
purity is attained, an ambiguous and fascinating condition, which
starts with chemistry and goes very far. And finally, when you set
about distilling, you acquire the consciousness of repeating a ritual
consecrated by the centuries, almost a religious act, in which from
imperfect material you obtain the essence, the usia, the spirit.
Primo Levi
Tradition is the illusion of permanence.
Woody Allen
The diagnosis of Western civilizational crisis, decline and subversion by enemies
within and without engenders a number of urgent political imperatives that impress
themselves upon the present: that we must rediscover absolutism in defence of our
values and way of life; that we must promote our culture and traditions; that we must
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put our people first; that we must secure our borders; that we must protect our chil-
drens’ future; and that we must do all of this now, before it is too late. To the extent
there is a single, organising theme, it is that ‘we must take care of our own’. Implicit
within these imperatives are a number of political tendencies: a (re-)sacralization of
politics (Gentile, 1996), a (re-)territorialization of the world, a (re-)invention of tra-
dition (Ranger and Hobsbawm, 1983). All of these imperatives follow more or less
directly from the diagnoses described in the previous chapters.
This final empirical chapter argues that together these tendencies form the outlines
of a novel ‘countermodern’ or ‘traditionalist’ political theology, one that has important
affinities with older countermodern ideologies (‘classical’ Fascism, Nazism, Revolu-
tionary Conservatism, the NewRight) but is not a simple continuation of any of these.
The new political theology is not based on any one, single mobilising myth, but rather
consists in several overlapping efforts in collective myth-making that coexist in uneasy
tension: the myth of the ‘Judeo-Christian West’, the myth of a ‘Christian Europe’,
and the myth of a modern, Enlightened West that has transcended the tradition and
superstition of the Islamic world. The contradictory ideas contained within them are
reconciled (to the extent that they can be, or need to be) through the idea that En-
lightenment, modernity, liberal democracy, gender equality and sexual freedom are
all products of the Hebrew and Greek intellecutal heritage and consequently part of
the unique ‘gifts’ of ‘Western civilization’. Moreover, all of these guiding myths co-
exist with a multiplicity of national and local cults of tradition. This chaotic amalgam
reflects the polytheistic nature of myth, in which there is no singular truth, but rather
multiple different narratives and stories that can never be synthesised into a unified,
coherent whole (Bottici, 2007).
The chapter will explore the key features of the new political theology: its mytho-
logies, its symbolic universe, its heroes, its rituals and other performative repertoires.
The new political theology is not a purely pagan one; rather its ‘central tendency’ -
to borrow statistical language - is perhaps best described as a pagan or sacrificial ver-
sion of Christianity, not unlike the Schmittian political theology, in which ‘the most
high God reigns but the national deities govern’ (cited in Palaver, 2007, at p. 80). It
encompasses ‘Judeo-Christian civilizationism’ and ‘Christian nationalism’ as well as
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avowed forms of ‘white nationalism’ and racial paganism, all of which are critically
discussed.
The urgency of acting now, before the clock strikes midnight, before the fuse runs
out, before the conspiracy succeeds confers on the enacted forms of the new political
theology their defining characteristic: that they are pre-emptive. As Nicholas de Gen-
ova observes apropos of Pegida Dresden, pre-emption ‘is plainly the deep rationale of a
movement dedicated to counteracting “Islamization” in a country where Muslims ac-
count for a mere 5% of the population’, and especially somewhere like Dresden, ‘where
only 2.5% of the population are foreign-born, and a meager 0.1% are Muslim’ (de
Genova, 2015, p. 7). Hence throughout this chapter the temporal dynamic remains
emphatically futural, even where the discursive and aesthetic content of the theology
evokes the archaic, the antiquarian or the mythological. Importantly, specific forms
of political action are always theologically or ideologically underdetermined. Some
tendencies are non-violent, reformist ones that work largely within the law and the
democratic political system in order, for instance, to secure tighter immigration re-
gimes or promote the teaching of ‘our’ history and traditions within classrooms. Other
tendencies have a survivalist logic: cancel your newspaper subscriptions, turn off the
TV, homeschool your children and prepare for the catastrophe. However, the logic
of pre-emption can also turn violent.
The forms of violence engendered by the new political theology are quite var-
ied, ranging from symbolic, if unpleasant, acts such as the destruction of the enemy’s
symbols (burning the Koran) or the desecration of their sacred spaces (leaving a pig’s
head on the site of a mosque), through the small-scale street fights and acts of petty
vandalism that have often accompanied grassroots counterjihad protest events, up to
pre-meditated acts of lethal violence. As Charles Tilly has argued, violence typic-
ally ‘increases and becomes more salient in situations of rising uncertainty across the
boundary’, because ‘people respond to threats against weighty social arrangements
they have built on such boundaries’ (Tilly, 2003, p.77). According to Arjun Ap-
padurai, the ‘forms of such uncertainty are various’:
One kind of uncertainty is a direct reflection of census concerns: how
many persons of this or that sort really exist in a given territory? Or, in the
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context of rapid migration or refugee movement, how many of ‘them’ are
there now among ‘us’? Another kind of uncertainty is about what some
of these megaidentities [‘Europe’, ‘the West’] really mean... A further
uncertainty is about whether a particular person really is what they claim
or appear to be or to have historically been. Finally, these various forms
of uncertainty create intolerable anxiety about the relationship of many
individuals to state- provided goods – ranging from housing and health to
safety and sanitation – since these entitlements are frequently directly tied
to who ‘you’ are and thus to who ‘they’ are. Each kind of uncertainty gains
increasing force whenever there are large-scale movements of persons,
when new rewards or risks attach to large-scale ethnic identities, or when
existing networks of social knowledge are eroded by rumour, terror, or
social movement. Where one or more of these forms of social uncertainty
come into play, violence can create a macabre form of certainty and can
become a brutal technique (or folk discovery-procedure) about ‘them’ and,
therefore, about ‘us’. (cited in Sidel, 2007, pp. 138-39)
Consequently, the chapter concludes with a consideration of the relationship between
the new political theology and Anders Breivik’s murder of seventy-seven people in
central Oslo in July 2011, which he justified in his ‘manifesto’ by appealing to several
of the discursive frameworks discussed in the previous chapters, including ‘Eurabia’
and ‘cultural Marxism’.
‘Taking care of your own’
The counterjihadist response to the ‘terror of history’, like that of the countermod-
ern philosophers discussed in chapter 3, has no political foundation other than the
repeated affirmation of the Self, through the conscious appropriation and repetition
of a determinate cultural heritage. The affirmation of the Self, and the particularistic
political ontology to which it gives rise, is laid out in some detail in an entry on the
Gates of Vienna blog entitled ‘Taking Care of Your Own’, which describes ‘a hierarchy
of caring, in the form of a series of concentric circles’:
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At the center of all the circles is the one you care most about — yourself.
Next comes the nuclear family, then the extended family, then the clan,
then the tribe, and then the nation. Beyond the nation are the whole
human race, other species, and finally the cosmos at large.
You could call these “relationships of obligation”, and your obligations
form a declining gradient as they move outwards. The extended family
demands less of an obligation than the nuclear family, the nation less than
the tribe. Your obligation to other species is to use them as food or raw
materials. To the cosmos at large you have no obligation at all. 1
Loyalty to one’s own kind was also a key theme of the speeches at the Pegida UK
rally in Solihull described in the introduction to this thesis. For instance, the group’s
deputy leader Anne Marie Waters suggested that ‘David Cameron has pretty much
made a choice’:
He has decided that strangers from faraway lands aremore important than
we are. That is what he’s decided. That’s his decision and this is going
to have to be ours. We are sick and tired of importing people who hate
us. We are sick and tired of importing people who want to destroy us,
our way of life, our ancient heritage, our beautiful Britain. We are sick of
it. Throw them out David Cameron, we’ve had enough of this, we really
have.2
Rejecting criticism from the Left, Waters went on to say that:
[W]e will not pretend to not love Britain in order to win over traitors,
who don’t care about this country anyway... we will not pretend that we’re
not here for Britain, that we’re not here for Europe, we’re here for the
Western world, we are here for our culture and our way of life. 3
A repeated theme is that ‘taking care of one’s own’ is not ‘racist’ but innocently patri-
otic: ‘we’re not what you would call racist, we’re not racist, we’re people who care about
1http://gatesofvienna.net/2008/10/taking-care-of-your-own/ [Last accessed 27th September
2017].
2Fieldnotes, February 2016.
3Fieldnotes, February 2016 (emphasis mine).
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our own country, we don’t have any hostility to other races’.4 However, the desire to
ensure a ‘future for our children and our grandchildren’ expressed by another speaker
at the Pegida UK event,5 or the ‘declining gradient’ of care described on the Gates of
Vienna blog, starting with the Self and moving through the nuclear family, extended
family and so on surely implies a ‘community of consanguinity’ (Levinas, 1990b, p.
69), even if a strictly biological racism is disavowed.
‘Taking care of one’s own’ means, in part, unashamedly celebrating ‘our traditions’,
‘our heritage’ and ‘our way of life’: the repetition of a cultural heritage. A frequent
complaint from interviewees was of the insubstantiality of ‘indigenous’ traditions and
cultures:
We are so assured of our own identity, and the fact that we invented many
institutions, that unlike many countries, then the word England or Eng-
lish doesn’t actually feature in them. So our national football association is
simply called the Football Association. Everybody else’s countries’ foot-
ball associations have the name of the country in it, as does rugby [...]
And many of the other institutions, because we are such good organisers
then- y’know, we’ve created many institutions and within England then
we don’t tend to put the word in. There are some exceptions like the
English National Opera and the English Ballet, and y’know, but you’ll
see many of our institutions, where the cultural institutions don’t actually
have the word England or English in them.6
Another insisted that: ‘Every school should celebrate St George’s Day, every child
should celebrate St George. We’re in England, there should be one day that we’re
allowed to celebrate who we are’.7
‘Taking care of one’s own’ also means becoming absolutist in defence of ‘our’ val-
ues and way of life, ignoring the siren song of moral or cultural relativism and the
temptation to accommodate the political demands of Muslims and other ‘strangers’.
At a conference in honour of Pim Fortuyn in 2006, in which, as we saw in chapter
4Interview 2, party political activist, male, UK.
5Fieldnotes, February 2016.
6Interview 7, party political activist, male, UK.
7Interview data, September 2015.
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6, he diagnosed ‘relativism’ as the ‘underlying disease of the West’, Douglas Murray
urged Europeans to ‘become absolutist – absolutist in defence of our societies, our
traditions, our heritage, culture, freedoms and democracies’:
There is only one way to destroy relativism, and there is only one way to
conquer the rise of Islamic militancy and that is to be uncompromising
and absolutist. If people want certainty then let us give it to them here.
Ignorant people will still say, ‘Ah, but I’m not sure what European culture
is’. Well that’s their fault, not the fault of European culture.8
‘Becoming absolutist’ meant, on a practical level, making life ‘harder across the board’
for Muslims in Europe:
Europe must look like a less attractive proposition. We in Europe owe -
after all - no special dues to Islam. We owe them no religious holidays,
special rights or privileges. From long before we were first attacked it
should have been made plain that people who come into Europe are here
under our rules and not theirs. There is not an inch of ground to give on
this one.9
What was meant by ‘making life harder’ was largely left to the audience’s imagination,
although Murray did suggest ‘pulling down’ mosques that were deemed to have be-
come ‘centres of hate’, and also argued that ‘Muslims in Europe who for any reason
take part in, plot, assist or condone violence against theWest (not just the country they
happen to have found sanctuary in, but any country in the West or Western troops)
must be forcibly deported back to their place of origin’.10 Following the speech, the
UK Conservative party leadership dissociated from Murray and his Centre for Social
Cohesion. Later Murray qualified his position, claiming that he ‘realised some years
ago how poorly expressed the speech in question was’ and claimed that his‘ opinions
have also altered significantly’.11
8http://4freedoms.com/group/gays/forum/topics/douglas-murray-what-are-we-to-do-about-
islam [Last accessed 25th August 2017].
9Ibid.
10Ibid.
11https://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2011/10/douglas-murray.html [Last accessed 27th
September 2017].
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Cultural absolutism expresses itself in the political demand that there be ‘one law
for all’ (Americans, Britons, Germans or the like) and that there should be no polit-
ical or legal accommodation of the cultural and religious sensibilities of Muslims and
other minorities. Legal monism was the main priority for one of my interviewees, a
UK-based female counterjihad activist, when I asked her what in her view needed to
change:
What we need, we need one very simple thing, but it will change
everything. And that very simple thing is to enforce the law. That is
all we need to do. We have got to start treating everyone the same...
Justice is very far from colour blind. We take into consideration people’s
religions, and cultures, and backgrounds, and skin colours when deciding
whether or not to prosecute them for a serious crime. This is a disgraceful
situation to be in. Everyone needs to be treated the same.12
The same question put to another interviewee, a male party political activist in the
UK, elicited a very similar response:
I think the first thing that needs to change is that we need to have one law
system in England, and there has to be respect for English law, without
any exceptions. And we have to stop making exceptions for minorities,
and we also have to start showing less tolerance and being - y’know -more
assertive to actually preserve our English culture.13
Another interviewee spoke of the importance of ‘fully integrating those people who
are here, and turning them into British people, turning them into English people.
And being quite insistent about that, and those who refuse to integrate, well they can
pack their bags and go.’14
It is not difficult to see how ‘making life harder’, ‘showing less tolerance’ or ‘assert-
ing our culture’ might slide into the kind of street-level harassment and victimisation
ofMuslims and other minorities that has been a persistent feature of protests by coun-
terjihad street movements. The same interviewee who insisted on the need to be more
12Interview 6, counterjihad activist and politician, female, UK.
13Interview 7, party political activist, male, UK.
14Interview 2, party political activist, male, UK.
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assertive in protecting English culture went on to suggest that ‘if somebody is wearing
an article of clothing then they should be made to feel uncomfortable if it doesn’t ac-
tually fit into English culture’, describing this as ‘what you call peer pressure’: ‘walking
around looking like Darth Vader in our streets, without your face showing is just not
what we do in England. And if you want to fit in and integrate, then you shouldn’t
do it.’15
A shared sense of the need to protect and promote ‘our culture’ and ‘our way of life’
does not imply any consensus about the substantive content of that culture or the lived
modalities of that ‘way of life’. When I asked interviewees what they meant by, say,
‘Britishness’ or ‘Western culture’ there was a marked tendency to fall back on appeals
to instinct, common sense or folk knowledge:
We’ve had these discussions about what is British culture, and of course
it’s not something you can put into a sentence. You know, it’s a mixture
of high art and low art. It’s about the kind of personality, the English
personality, it’s about the English sense of humour. It’s about - you know
- our relationship to animals and to one another and the institutions we
have, our love of freedom, our church - theChristian church has obviously
been very influential. There’s a whole complex of factors that go together
to make up the English - specifically - identity, and this notion of nation
and of a national culture. And you can’t put it into a sentence but we all
know instinctively what it is - at least British people do.16
Here ‘culture’ is transported into the realm of the ineffable, the instinctual: ‘not some-
thing you can put into a sentence’. Similar dilemmas about how to imagine ‘our’ his-
tory were evident in the terminology used by other interviewees, such as ‘Hellenistic,
Judeo-Christian traditions’,17 or another’s suggestion that ‘our culture is based upon
Christian principles, and also pagan festivals and things’.18 The confusion is also en-
capsulated in Ye’Or’s tortured description of Europe as ‘a Judeo-Christian civilisation,
with important post-Enlightenment secular elements’ (Ye’Or, 2005, p. 9).
15Ibid.
16Interview 2, party political activist, male, UK.
17Interview 8, politician, female, UK.
18Interview 7, party political activist, male, UK.
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‘Holger Awakens’
In an American context, the mobilising myth is often of the ‘Judeo-Christian West’,
an exemplary case of an ‘invented tradition’ (Ranger and Hobsbawm, 1983) and a
term that is much used, for instance, by former Trump strategist and Breitbart News
editor, Steve Bannon. The idea of a unique ‘Judeo-Christian tradition’ has a long and
complex history (Goldman, 2011) but it acquired its contemporary political contours
within the US religious right of the 1950s, when America’s ‘Judeo-Christian’ culture
was contrasted with the Soviet Union’s ‘Godless Communism’. Later, under the in-
fluence of Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority, this morphed into an exhortation to return
to Judeo-Christian values perceived to have been undermined by liberalism and secu-
larism, and was closely connected with Christian evangelical support for Israel. More
recently, the idea of America as the bearer of a unique Judeo-Christian tradition has
become intimately bound up with claims to American exceptionalism, and especially
since 9/11, it has become an exclusionary term signifying that Muslims cannot be full
members of the US social contract (ibid.).
The idea of a Judeo-Christian ‘tradition’, the theologian Arthur A. Cohen argued
in an important essay of 1969, is, however, a historical nonsense and a theological
impossibility:
The ancient world expected a redeemer, The Jews expected a redeemer to
come out of Zion; Christianity affirmed that a redeemer had come out of
Zion, but that he had come not for Israel but for all mankind. Judaism
denied that claim, rejected the person of that redeemer, called his claim
presumption and super-arrogation, denied his mission to them. (Cohen,
1969, not paginated)
The same point has been put somewhat more bluntly by the Orthodox Jewish theolo-
gian Eliezer Berkovits: ‘Judaism is Judaism because it rejects Christianity and Chris-
tianity is Christianity because it rejects Judaism’ (cited in Goldman, 2011, not pa-
ginated). Whilst Judaism and Christianity have a ‘common sacred history’, ‘similar’
ethical values, an ‘overlapping’ eschatological vision and ‘analogous’ normative insti-
tutions, this did not, Cohen argued, legitimate the creation of a “Judeo-Christian
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tradition”’:
We can learnmuch from the history of Jewish-Christian relations, but the
one thing we cannot make of it is a discourse of community, fellowship,
and understanding. How then do we make of it a tradition? (Cohen,
1969, not paginated)
The notion of a ‘Judeo-Christian tradition’ is pernicious in Cohen’s eyes insofar as it
at best trivializes, and at worst erases, the long history of Christian anti-Judaism and
neatly absolves the Christian churches of ethical responsibility for their more recent
acquiescence in the crimes of the Nazi and Fascist regimes. Moreover, whilst the
idea of a ‘Judeo-Christian tradition’ may sound nominally progressive, its more subtle
implication was of an attack on Enlightenment, born, Cohen conjectured, of the need
shared by conservative American Christians and Jews ‘to reinforce themselves in the
face of a common disaster’: secularisation (ibid.).
In a European context, where the politics of religion is quite different, the mobil-
isingmyth is more often of a ‘Christian Europe’, which is at least implicitly, and some-
times avowedly, anti-Semitic. For instance, theHungarian primeminister Viktor Or-
bán, lionized by some within the counterjihad, has appealed to the ‘Christian-national
idea’, which was the ruling philosophy of the Horthy period (1920-1944) in which
context it signalled Jewish exclusion from Hungarian public life (Fekete, 2016a). Pe-
gida UK and Liberty GB leader Paul Weston quotes approvingly Orbán’s words:
Today mass migration is taking place around the globe that could change
the face of Europe’s civilisation. If that happens, that is irreversible.
There is no way back from a multicultural Europe. Neither to a Christian
Europe, nor to the world of national cultures.19
The growing salience of Christian motifs and symbols within the discursive and aes-
thetic repertoires of the European far right was remarked by one academic comment-
ator as early as 2008 (Zuquete, 2008). Examples included the then-Front National
leader Jean-Marie Le Pen’s opposition to mosques on the grounds that they ‘threaten
19https://libertygb.org.uk/news/immigration-altruism-and-national-suicide [Last accessed 27th
September 2017].
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the Christian identity’ of France, the Lega Nord ’s characterisation of the removal of
a painting of the 1571 Battle of Lepanto from the Italian parliament as ‘an attack
against the Christian identity of the country’, and the BNP’s claim that in suggesting
that the law might make ‘reasonable accommodation’ for matters of religious con-
science, the Archbishop of Canterbury was ‘betraying Britain’s Christian heritage in
order to appease Islam’ (2008, pp. 325-26).
Today, the emphasis on Christian identity is especially marked within the BNP-
offshoot Britain First. At a rally that I observed in Luton in July 2015, its deputy
leader, Jayda Franzen, ended her speech with a dramatic religious flourish:
This, I am very proud to say as a Christian, this is a Christian country.
Britain is a Christian country. And in this sign [brandishes cross] we will
conquer. Rule Britannia! 20
This Christian identity politics likely reflects the influence within Britain First of Jim
Dowson, a former BNP fundraiser, ex-Calvinist minister and evangelical Protestant
with links to the anti-abortion UK Life League and to militant pro-life networks
across Europe (Allen, 2014). Opposition to Islam is described by Dowson explicitly
as a form of religious warfare. In a rare interview with the UK’s Channel 4 News in
2014, Dowson told the programme: ‘One thing I agree with Mr [Anjem] Choudary
on: there is such a concept as a just war, a holy war. He calls it jihad, we call it a
crusade’:
Interviewer: Is that how you see it? You see yourself involved in a holy
war?
Jim Dowson: Absolutely, absolutely. Oh absolutely, without any shadow
of a doubt. This is a war.
Interviewer: But your rhetoric is identical to theirs in that respect isn’t
it?
Jim Dowson: It maybe is, but we’re right, they’re wrong.21
20Fieldnotes, June 2015.
21https://www.channel4.com/news/britain-first-far-right-anti-muslim-extremists-mosques [Last
accessed 27th September 2017].
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Readers will doubtless be reminded of the Evolian mobilisation of the idea of ‘holy
war’, and of Derek Holland’s pamphlet on the ‘Political Soldier’, that martial figure
who is seized by ‘a spiritual and religious ideal’.22
The myths of a ‘Judeo-Christian West’ and of a ‘Christian Europe’ both depend
on the erasure, or at least suppression, of a long history of Muslim presence in Europe
(Aktürk, 2012). Some lesser-known aspects of this history, such as the Muslim king-
dom on Sicily between the ninth and eleventh centuries, or the Muslim settlement in
parts of southeastern France from the late ninth century onwards, are typically glossed
over. However one exception to the idea of Europe’s ‘( Judeo-)Christian’ identity, the
700-year-long Moorish civilization on the Iberian peninsula, is too glaring to ignore
and has to be addressed directly. Hence, Ye’Or devotes an entire chapter of her 2005
book on Eurabia to dispelling the myth of ‘The Andalusian Utopia’ (2005, pp. 163-
75), which, she argues, has been inculcated as part of the Eurabian project in order
to legitimise the Muslim presence in contemporary Europe: ‘Islam, in this view, had
a historical legitimacy in Europe; it was not a foreign hostile intruder imposed by
war and conquest’ (2005, p. 163). The Christian and Jewish ‘dhimmi’ populations
of Al Andalus enjoyed ‘occasional periods of tolerance’ according to Ye’Or, but overall
‘Andalusian history is one of cruelty, war, and slavery’ (2005, p. 166). It is not my
intention to defend the idea of an Islamic ‘golden age’ or of an ‘Andalusian utopia’,
which, it should be clear by now, depend on a theory of history to which I do not sub-
scribe. However, something other than disinterested scholarship evidently lies behind
Ye’Or’s revisionist history: as Sindre Bangstad has noted, she is ‘centrally interested
in advancing the ahistorical notion of a “common [historical] condition of Jews and
Christians [under Islam]” to generate support for Jewish–Christian alliances in sup-
port of Israel in the present’ (Bangstad, 2013, p. 372), which is also, of course, a key
function of the myth of a singular ‘Judeo-Christian’ tradition.
It is not sufficient to elide the historical Muslim presence in Europe, however:
the myths of the ‘Judeo-ChristianWest’ and ‘Christian Europe’ can only be sustained
if considerable energy is also invested in bleaching European intellectual history to
remove the stain of Islamic cultural contamination. For instance, Brigitte Gabriel of
22Available online at http://www.gornahoor.net/library/PoliticalSoldierA4.pdf. See pp. 9-10. [Last
accessed 22nd September 2017].
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ACT for America has claimed that:
When you hear about all the contributions of Islam to the world, algebra
and all that, did you know that the people, the inventors who contrib-
uted that to the world, were not Muslims, but non-Muslims who were
conquered by Islam as Islam swept through Europe and Spain and the rest
of theMiddle East? And those inventions were from brains that were not
Muslim brains. And that’s the history of Islam, all over. (cited in Lean,
2012, at p. 104)
Gabriel’s words are notable not only for the slippage from cultural to a biological re-
gister from ‘the contributions of Islam’ to ‘Muslim brains’. They also rehearse a clas-
sical anti-Semitic trope in which Semitic peoples are ‘culture bearers’, fundament-
ally incapable of creative activity. As Sener Aktürk has argued, ‘Muslims and Jews
have been “Europeans” for centuries, and... to claim otherwise may imply an intel-
lectual kinship, however passive, with those who condoned mass murders of Jews
and Muslims in Europe, symbolized by the mass graves of Auschwitz and Srebrenica’
(Aktürk, 2012, p. 3).
The tendentious myths of the ‘Judeo-Christian West’ and ‘Christian Europe’ are,
of course, disputed by more mainstream Jewish and Christian voices. A recent article
on patheos.com, an online religious discussion site, warns of the growing danger of
‘far-right Christian paganism’:
There is no place for nationalism in Christianity, only patriotism. No
Christian can ever simply put America first, because so many other rela-
tionships have a claim: family, church, community. Christianity is global,
so while I am an American (what else could I be), I cannot only be an
American. I must also recognize eternal value in other nations and ideals
and that my own nation will not last.
No human nation can.
Augustine had it right: we are ultimately subjects of the City of God.23
23http://www.patheos.com/blogs/eidos/2017/01/coming-problem-far-right-paganism/ [Last ac-
cessed 9th August 2017]
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From the perspective of a strict monotheistic universalism, there can be no place for a
political theology in which ‘the most high God reigns but the national deities govern’.
Besides Judeo-Christian ‘civilizationists’ and Christian nationalists, the new polit-
ical theology also encompasses some nominally pro-Enlightenment figures and tend-
encies. For instance, one of my interviewees claimed that ‘I would classify myself
as coming from an Enlightenment, 18th century perspective’,24 whilst a canonical
‘history’ of the counterjihad on the Gates of Vienna blog describes the movement as
being ‘in the classical liberal tradition’.25 Moreover, some within the counterjihad
movement regard pro-war liberals and leftists such as Christopher Hitchens, David
Aaronovitch andNormanGeras as potential allies.26 But where Enlightenment ideas,
values or figures, are invoked, they are often mobilised in a way which suggests that
Enlightenment means something other than a ‘permanent critique of ourselves’ (Fou-
cault, 1991b). Instead, there is a marked tendency to treat Enlightenment in precisely
the way that Foucault insists we should not: as ‘a theory, a doctrine... a permanent
body of knowledge that is accumulating’ (ibid., p. 50). Dan Hind (2007) has coined
the term ‘folk Enlightenment’ to describe this tendency to ossify and mythologise the
complex philosophical and political phenomenon of Enlightenment, a term that came
to my mind as I listened to one of the speakers at the Pegida UK demonstration in
Newcastle in February 2015:
NowVoltaire, this old, er- philosopher said that it’s very easy to knowwho
is controlling you, all you have to do is look at who you are not allowed to
criticise. Now we all know who we’re not allowed to criticise, it is Islam.
You mention it, you’re Islamophobic.27
A similarly reflexive and uncritical invocation of Enlightenment was evident in the
immediate aftermath of the attack on Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, when a tweet
went viral that stated “‘I do not agree with what you have to say, but I’ll defend to the
death your right to say it.” -Voltaire’, attributing to ‘this old philosopher’ something
24Interview 10, counterjihad blogger, male, UK.
25http://gatesofvienna.net/2011/12/a-brief-history-of-the-transatlantic-counterjihad-part-vii/
[Last accessed 27th September 2017].
26See for instance the comment by ‘JohnM’ on this entry on Gates of Vienna:
http://gatesofvienna.net/2006/09/the-emperor-is-naked/ [Last accessed 27th September 2017].
27Fieldnotes, February 2015.
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he never said (which is not to argue that the sentiment was wrong). The selective
mobilisation of Enlightenment here seemingly confirms the Schmittian diagnosis over
that of Weber: that grand narratives of a disenchanted and Enlightened modernity
are powerful political myths rather than neutral descriptions of modern politics (Yelle,
2010).
Implicit in the idea of the ‘Judeo-Christian West’ or a ‘Christian Europe’ (and,
in a slightly different way, in the secular myth of a modern, enlightened West as a
‘space of exception’ marked by its exclusion of the superstitious and the primitive) is
a ‘sacralization of imagined territory’ (Bhatt, 2012, p. 316). This sacralization has
an intellectual foundation in Huntington’s work, which, as we saw in the previous
chapter, expressed a very Schmittian desire for a re-territorialization of the world, one
in which the political geography of ‘Western civilization’ is imagined as coextensive
with that of medieval Christendom:
The fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and ideolo-
gical boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and blood-
shed. The Cold War began when the Iron Curtain divided Europe polit-
ically and ideologically. The Cold War ended with the end of the Iron
Curtain. As the ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cul-
tural division of Europe between Western Christianity, on the one hand,
and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other, has reemerged. The
most significant dividing line in Europe... may well be the eastern bound-
ary of Western Christianity in the year 1500. (Huntington, 1993, pp.
29-30)
This new political mythology also contains the elements of a sacred history, replete
with tales of disaster averted and Europe or the West triumphant, along with some
resonant ‘palingenetic’ (Griffin, 1993) themes. Symbolically important events for the
counterjihad groups include the Frankish defeat of the Umayyad army at the Battle of
Tours in 732, the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, the naval Battle of Lepanto in 1571, the
Reconquista of the Iberian peninsula in 1492, and the defeat of the Ottoman siege of
Vienna in 1683 (‘the other September 11th’).28 It also includes a pantheon of heroes
28http://gatesofvienna.net/2006/09/the-other-september-11th/ [Last accessed 27th September
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such as the Frankish King Charles Martel (‘Charles the Hammer’), King Ferdinand
of Spain, Charlemagne, and Jan III Sobieski, the Polish king and leader of the army
that defeated the Ottoman siege of Vienna.
One of the most important symbolic figures is the Danish folk-hero Holger
Danske (‘Holger the Dane’) who, according to legend, fought with Charlemagne
against the Saracens and is described in the following terms on Gates of Vienna:
But the fairest sight of all is the old castle of Kronborg, and under it sits
Holger Danske in the deep, dark cellar which no one enters; he is clad in
iron and steel and rests his head on his stalwart arm; his long beard hangs
down upon the marble table where it has become stuck fast; he sleeps
and dreams, but in his dreams he sees everything that comes to pass in
Denmark. Every Christmas Eve an angel of God comes to tell him that
all he has dreamed is true, and that he may go back to sleep again, for
Denmark is not yet in any danger! but if it should ever come, then old
Holger Danske will rouse himself, and the table will break apart as he
pulls out his beard! Then he will come forth, and strike a blow that shall
be heard throughout all the countries of the world.29
The resurrection of Holger Danske in the West’s hour of need is not the only palin-
genetic theme within the counterjihad discourse. For instance, the logo of the ‘910
Group’, the International Civil Liberties Alliance precursor whose name evokes the
day before September 11th 2001, is of a fiery pheonix rising out of the ashes of the
World Trade Center with the words ‘rebirth’ and ‘resistance’.30 Palingenetic themes
are also implicit in speculations about a ‘Second Renaissance’,31 a ‘rebirth of faith in
the West’32 or suggestions that ‘the spirit of the West... is awakening in its hour of
need’.33 Meanwhile the performative repertoire of the Dresden Pegida movement
2017].
29https://gatesofvienna.net/2007/03/holger-the-guardian-of-the-west/ [Last accessed 27th
September 2017].
30https://gatesofvienna.net/2011/09/rebirth-and-resistance/ [Last accessed 27th September 2017].
31https://fjordman.blogspot.co.uk/2005/11/second-fall-of-rome.html [Last accessed 27th Septem-
ber 2017].
32http://gatesofvienna.net/2005/02/the-enemy-within-part-iii/ [Last accessed 27th September
2017].
33https://gatesofvienna.net/2007/03/holger-the-guardian-of-the-west/ [Last accessed 27th
September 2017].
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includes what Nicholas de Genova memorably describes as such ‘lurid crypto-fascist
millenarian mantras’ as “‘Germany is awakening. For our fatherland, for Germany, it
is our country, the country of our ancestors, descendants and children!”’ (de Genova,
2015, pp. 5-6)
Many of the symbols of the new political theology have been commodified by
counterjihad groups in order to generate revenue. Grassroots groups like the EDL
often have informal uniforms in the form of t-shirts, hoodies and hats embroidered
with crosses, flags and the like. Online one can purchase, for instance, Holger Danske
mugs, t-shirts, badges, buttons and bumperstickers.34 Another design adapts the pop-
ular slogan of solidarity with the victims of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, turning it into
a motto of identification with the Frankish king: ‘Je Suis Charles Martel’.35
On ‘HallowedGround’
These new political mythologies are acted out or performed in a variety of different
ways. In a Western European context, where counterjihad groups have not generally
enjoyed access to formal political power, disruptive protest by grassroots organisations
is one of the main ‘repertoires of contention’ (Tarrow, 2011). The performative and
aesthetic repertoires of grassroots counterjihad protest groups often mobilise archaic
symbols of national, subnational and supranational belonging that are symptomatic
of a ‘sacralisation of politics’ (Gentile, 1996). For instance, the EDL organised events
around St George’s Day, celebrating the patron saint of England, and Remembrance
Day, commemorating Britain’s war dead. Popular chants at EDL events included
‘Keep St George in my heart, keep me English’ (evoking images of a sacred nation
and feelings of national belonging) and ‘We’re the infidels of the EDL, and we’re
coming down the road’ (evoking ideas of religious or civilizational antagonism to-
wards ‘Islam’) (Busher, 2012). As we saw in chapter 5, the group’s emblem (figure
8.1) incorporates a red cross, associated with both St George and the Knights Tem-
plar, and the motto ‘in hoc signo vinces’ (‘in this sign you will conquer’), which has
34https://gatesofvienna.net/2007/05/your-one-stop-shop-for-viking-oriented-merchandise/ [Last
accessed 27th September 2017].
35https://www.blazingcatfur.ca/2016/07/14/i-want-this-t-shirt/ [Last accessed 27th September
2017].
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Figure 8.1: English Defence League emblem and motto.
complex historical associations including with Emperor Constantine I’s conversion to
Christianity (Busher, 2012; Gardell, 2014). EDL demonstrations often created the
visual effect of a sea of St George Cross flags, many of them adapted by local EDL
divisions to incorporate heraldic designs and local symbols of antiquity and belonging.
For instance, at a (tiny) EDL demonstration that I observed in London’s Hyde Park
in Jul 2016, the EDL Essex division carried a St George’s Cross that incorporated
within it the county flag of Essex, three seaxes on a red background; seaxes being short
swords used by the Saxons, the words ‘Saxon’ and ‘seax’ sharing the same etymology.36
The jarring appearance of the rainbow flag, a symbol of the recent and precarious
political emancipation of LGBT persons, alongside such archaic symbols of heredity,
medieval warfare and the EuropeanDarkAges is rendered possible by the refiguring of
gay rights and womens’ rights as inhering features of a timeless Western civilizational
inheritance that today stands threatened by Islamic ‘totalitarianism’ (Bhatt, 2012).
Whilst it would be a mistake to view the counterjihad movement’s engagement with
queer politics as a simple case of ‘pinkwashing’, as I suggested in chapter 2, it is clear
that its commitment to LGBT rights is often wafer-thin. For instance, at an EDL
demo that I observed in Dudley in February 2015, one of the speakers simultaneously
mobilised and disavowed homophobia as he projected his own evident disgust for
36Fieldnotes, July 2017.
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homosexuals onto Muslims:
They talk about us being homophobic, the EDL being anti-gay. Anti-
gay? Think about what Islamwants to do to ‘em. Every gay will be fucking
stoned! To be honest, I think you’d need to be stoned to do that, but that’s
a different stoned.37
Protest events by grassroots counterjihad groups frequently incorporate ritualistic
elements. Group rituals that I have personally been witness to include performances
of patriotic songs and observations of periods of silence, in one case to commemorate
a local activist who had passed away, and in another case to commemorate the victims
of a terrorist attack.38 One of the most striking and enduring examples of a group
ritual is Pegida’s regular Monday ‘evening strolls’ in the centre of Dresden, which were
consciously intended to evoke the historic ‘Monday demonstrations’ at the end of the
Cold War in late 1989, incorporating for instance the slogan of popular resistance
against the East German regime, ‘Wir sind das Volk’ (‘We are the People’). Over
time, the group augmented its performative repertoire with novel rituals of its own
devising such as a Pegida ‘anthem’, a regular one minute’s silence for victims of jihadist
terror attacks, and the conclusion of each event with an announcement of the number
of participants (Virchow, 2016, p. 545). The atmosphere of the Dresden events was
what Stephen Lennon seemed to be hoping to reproduce when he told the crowd at
the inaugural Pegida UK event that, unlike the EDL, Pegida would not tour the UK:
We’ve found a winning formula, we’ve found somewhere we are free to
walk and oppose the Islamisation of Europe. We will come back here
again, and again, and again.39
The effect was not quite the same, however, in a rainy trading estate in Solihull. That
the UK Pegida events lacked the atmosphere, drama and spectacle of the Dresden
gatherings is surely one of the reasons why the UK group could not emulate the mo-
bilising power of its progenitor.
37Fieldnotes, February 2015.
38Fieldnotes, February 2015 and July 2015.
39Fieldnotes, February 2016.
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Mosque developments have been one of the main targets of protest activity by
grassroots counterjihad groups, whose opposition to such projects has often invoked
ideas of ‘sacred space’, in Mircea Eliades’s sense of somewhere invested with an ex-
traordinary quality that marks it out from, ordinary, ‘profane’ space (Eliade, 1959).
One EDL demonstration that I observed in February 2015 had been called to protest
against a new mosque development in Dudley, a large town and former centre for the
coal and iron industries located just outside Birmingham, which has been visited on
many occasions by the EDL, Britain First and other groups. The mosque develop-
ment, which had been put forward by Dudley Muslim Association as a replacement
for the existing Dudley Central Mosque on Castle Hill, had eventually been approved
in November 2014 following a planning application process that had lasted almost ten
years.40 During the lengthy process, objections had been raised about mundane issues
such as the building’s size and design, and the nature of the parking arrangements.
What was striking, however, as I listened to the speeches at the EDL demon-
stration was the very specific nature of their objections, which implied an idea of
England as sacred territory and of Dudley, which occupies a geographically central
position within England as well as an important place in the history of the nation’s
nineteenth century industrialisation, as a unique, special place. One speaker invoked
these ideas using an organic metaphor: ‘Dudley is the heart (sic) of the Midlands, it is
not Islamabad. Yer not building yet another mosque.’41 Another speaker argued that
practical issues with the development were only of secondary importance:
The reason that we should object is not really so much down to the plan-
ning aspect, although things like the size of the building, the height of
the minaret, the parking restrictions, the traffic flow, the inconvenience
to the residents, they’re all important things. But there’s one more thing
which is much more important than that, and it’s to do with whether we
should be allowing any mosques at all in this country.42
Another was more blunt: ‘Top and bottom of it, this is our England, this is not Islam’s
40http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/dudley-mega-mosque-plans-
approved-after-8087707 [Last accessed 28th September 2017].
41Fieldnotes, February 2015.
42Fieldnotes, February 2015.
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England, and they will not fucking take it.’43
The idea of Ground Zero as ‘sacred space’ was explicitly invoked by opponents of
the Park 51 development in lower Manhattan in 2010: ‘The souls cry out. You can’t
build there. It is hallowed ground’ (cited in Kilde, 2011, at p. 302). The figuration
of the former site of the World Trade Center as ‘sacred space’ within the American
national imaginary was intimately related to the idea of it as a cemetery, the final
resting place for many victims whose remains have never been found, as well as the
fact that for many Americans it was symbolic of a loss of a sense of security. For local
residents, it was also tied up with the grotesque disfiguration of a familiar part of the
local landscape (ibid., pp. 299-300). The discovery amidst the wreckage of two joined
I-beams in the shape of a cross, which one Roman Catholic priest quickly declared to
be a sign fromGod, also marked Ground Zero as sacred in the strict Eliadian sense of
the site of a hierophany, an eruption of the divine into ordinary, profane space (ibid.,
pp. 300-01).
The idea of Ground Zero as a ‘sacred space’ was by no means confined to Stop
Islamization of America (SIOA) and its supporters, but was shared very widely across
the American political spectrum fromPresidentObama to neoconservative comment-
ator Charles Krauthammer. As Jeanne Kilde has suggested (Kilde, 2011), opposition
to the building of a Muslim community centre proximate to (not ‘at’) Ground Zero
on the basis that the latter was ‘hallowed ground’ shows how easily those who have
no association with ‘hate groups’ or ‘the far right’ can be led by a certain logic into
anti-democratic and repressive postures. In many cases, even those who were insist-
ent on the legal right of the project to go ahead nevertheless suggested that it would
be more ‘sensitive’ to find another location. Not only did this imply a sense of collect-
ive Muslim guilt for 9/11 but it also showed how quickly supposedly ‘fundamental’
American values of religious freedom and private property could be jettisoned due to
the perceived need to protect one of the nation’s ‘sacred spaces’ from defilement by a
visible symbol of ‘Islam’.
Time, as well as space, was fundamental to the Ground Zero mosque contro-
versy, Lee Pierce has argued, in two related senses (Pierce, 2014). First, the timing of
43Fieldnotes, February 2015.
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Ground Zero’s figuration as a site of national trauma was significant. The rhetoric of
national trauma that was a prominent feature of the debate over the Park 51 develop-
ment, Pierce notes, was largely absent from public discourse in the weeks and months
after 9/11 when patriotic support for the ‘War on Terror’ and military intervention in
Afghanistan tended to predominate. The discourse of 9/11 as a traumatic event only
emerged much later, in the context of military failure in Afghanistan and Iraq and
the scandal at Abu Ghraib. Secondly, within the debates over Park 51, Ground Zero
often figured as temporalised space, governed by a non-linear temporality in which
9/11 wasn’t simply a tragic event in ‘the past’ but a form of collective trauma that was
still being lived and would go on being lived indefinitely. For instance, in a document-
ary film produced and directed by Pamela Geller, entitled The Ground Zero Mosque:
SecondWave of the 9/11 Attacks, one of the interviewees explained that ‘I am still trying
to find the remains of my son’ (cited in Pierce, 2014, p. 57). In another documentary
produced by the Christian Action Network, entitled The Untold Story of the Ground
Zero Mega-Mosque, one of the protestors suggested that if the development were to
go ahead, ‘it will be like 9/11 all over again for these families. The pain will be the
same pain’ (ibid., p. 59).
Whilst 9/11 figures within the counterjihadist political theology as an especially
tragic hierophany, a dramatic interruption in the profane order (the day when ‘our
world changed for ever’44), it is not the only such experience and in contexts outside the
US other events sometimes figure more prominently. For instance, one activist with
the International Civil Liberties Alliance describes how the Jyllands-Posten cartoons
affair contributed to his own revelatory experience:
My own epiphany (sic), the event that unplugged me forever from ‘The
Matrix’ of political dogma, was the Danish Cartoon crisis. At the time
I was involved in the politics of the left and, as such, I would approach
the work of the Counterjihad from a left wing perspective. My principal
concern at the time was the threat that radical Islam posed to freedom
of expression. The reaction to the cartoons and the apparent lack of re-
sponse from the Government and the Police to do anything about it is
44http://www.actforamerica.org/confronting_terrorism [Last accessed 28th September 2017].
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what forced me to become active in this cause. I felt fear that my cul-
ture was under threat, just like the Muslims claimed to be happening to
theirs in the aftermath of 9/11. It appeared, and still appears, that Islamic
norms trump Western norms in countries like Great Britain, and when
concessions have to be made it is always the West that has to make them.
(cited in Bhatt, 2012, p. 315)
The metaphor of being ‘unplugged from the Matrix’, is significant here. ‘Taking the
red pill’, which alludes to the choice between a blue pill (leading to a life of blissful
ignorance) and a red pill (leading to full and traumatic knowledge of the illusory nature
of the received reality) offered to the lead character in the Wachowski’s 1999 science
fiction film The Matrix, has become a figurative expression within the Alt-Right for
shaking off the illusions of ‘political correctness’, seeing the world ‘as it really is’ and
becoming ‘racially conscious’.
In the narratives of UK counterjihadists, the London transport bombings of 2005
and the murder of the Fusillier Lee Rigby in Woolwich in South London in 2013
(which, as we saw in chapter 5, stimulated a brief revival of EDL activity in the sum-
mer of that year), often figure as tragic hierophanies. For example, in one blog entitled
Everything Changed After Woolwich, the writer describes how after the 2005 London
transport bombings he was ‘angry about it but was elsewhere, and otherwise engaged,
and I went back to sleep,’ but after the killing of Lee Rigby in 2013 ‘I decided that this
time I would not be going back to sleep again and started to notice what had changed
in Britain over the last twenty years’.45
Whilst mosque developments have been a target for American counterjihad
groups, as well as for their European counterparts, the federal structure of the US
state has long offered a wider set of ‘political opportunities’ (Tarrow, 2011) even before
the Trump presidency created spaces for counterjihadist influence over the executive
branch of the national government. State legislatures have been a focus for efforts
to enact the ‘American Laws for American Courts’ (ALAC) legislation described in
chapter 5, whose stated intention is ‘to prohibit the application of foreign law when
it would violate fundamental constitutional rights such as due process and equal pro-
45https://ecawblog.wordpress.com/about/ [Last accessed 28th September 2017].
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tection’.46 ALAC seeks to prevent the ‘infiltration’ of the American court system
by ‘foreign laws and foreign legal doctrines’, including ‘international law’ as well as
‘Sharia-centric legal systems’, which together constitute one of the ‘greatest threats to
American values and liberties today’.47 Themotivation is the need ‘to preserve unique
American values of liberty and freedom’ enshrined in the ‘unique document’ written
‘[s]ome 235 years ago’ by ‘America’s forefathers’, whose significance was that it freed
the US ‘from the clutches of a foreign power’.48 However the ultimate purpose of the
legislation was, according to its architect, David Yerushalmi, ‘heuristic’: it aimed ‘to
get people asking this question, “What is Shariah?”’ (cited in Elliott, 2011). Much of
the grassroots ‘muscle’ for this initiative has been provided by local ACT for Amer-
ica chapters. As of June 2017, ALAC provisions had been adopted by twelve US
states: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee and Texas.49
That similar language is evident in Trump’s January 2017 ‘Muslim ban’ execut-
ive order, which speaks of the imperative of excluding from the country ‘those who
do not support the Constitution, or those who would place violent ideologies over
American law’,50 should not be surprising given that administration figures with close
links to the US counterjihad movement were involved in drafting the legislation. In
the language of the executive order, the desire for cultural and legal monism is fused
with the imperative of excluding certain bodies - as the bearers of ‘violent ideologies’
- from certain spaces, a racialised logic of bordering and boundary-making. The sole
journalistic article that I am aware of that discusses the influence of specifically coun-
terjihadist ideas on the Trump administration (rather than those of the ‘Alt Right’ or
‘far right’ more generally), emphasises that the executive order ‘made no sense as a
counterterrorism policy: ‘No immigrant from one of the seven targeted countries has
ever killed anyone in a terrorist attack on US soil’:
46http://www.americanfreedomlawcenter.org/press-release/american-laws-for-american-courts-
public-policy-initiative-advances-in-state-legislatures-as-aflc-leads-citizens-awareness-drive/ [Last
accessed 31st July 2017].
47http://publicpolicyalliance.org/about/ [Last accessed 28th September 2017].
48http://publicpolicyalliance.org/legislation/american-laws-for-american-courts/ [Last accessed
28th September 2017].
49https://www.adl.org/education/resources/profiles/act-for-america [Last accessed 31st July 2017].
50https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/27/executive-order-protecting-nation-
foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states [Last accessed 28th September 2017].
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That’s because the real motivation was rooted in counter-jihadist logic.
The movement’s thinkers have, for years, advocated a similar ban on
Muslim immigration. They look to Europe and see Muslim immigrants
creating a continent ridden with terrorism and nearly lost to Islamist sub-
version. TheMuslim ban only makes sense when seen as part of their plan
to prevent America from going down the same path — by keeping out as
many Muslims as possible. (Beauchamp, 2017)
Another key field of political intervention for US counterjihad groups has been
the education system, one of the key sites of socialisation, cultural reproduction and
the transmission of tradition. ACT for America and other organisations have been in-
volved in various ‘textbook reform’ initiatives in US states including Tennessee, Texas,
Pennsylvania, California and South Carolina, with the aim of changing what is taught
about Islam within social studies classes for sixth to twelfth graders (ages 11-18).51 In
2011, ACT published a report entitled Education or Indoctrination? The Treatment of
Islam in 6th through 12th Grade American Textbooks.52 On its website, ACT explains
its political interest in the education system in terms reminiscent of the conspiracy
theories discussed in chapter 7:
Long ago America’s enemies realized a direct war with the United States
would be difficult if not impossible to win. As such they began to focus
on tearing down our culture so we would collapse from within. The most
powerful way to destroy America’s culture is through manipulating our
education system and so for the past several decades America’s enemies
have been, very successfully, infiltrating andmanipulating our educational
system.
ACT for America believes our schools should be educating our students
- not indoctrinating them. We believe it is critical that students receive
quality education and education that recognizes, rather than denigrates,
the exceptional nature of our nation. Students must be better taught
51https://actforamerica.nationbuilder.com/textbookreform [Last accessed 28th September 2017].
52Available online at: https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/themes/57365ca5cd0af55ea6000001/-
attachments/original/1483921270/Education_or_Indoctrination_Executive_Summary.pdf?-
1483921270 [Last accessed 28th September 2017].
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about civics, the Constitution, and our true history. Ultimately, ACT
for America recognizes the danger of an uneducated populace that be-
lieves America is somehow an amoral endeavor; these people will neither
fight for nor even care when their country is attacked. 53
Implied in this statement is a philosophy of education in which the role of schools is
not to encourage free thinking or critical inquiry, but to ‘educate’ students about the
‘exceptional nature of our nation’ and ‘our true history’, with the aim of ensuring that
they are prepared to fight (and potentially sacrifice themselves) for their country when
the time comes. The section of ACT’s website where the Education or Indoctrination?
report is available to download also includes an online form to fill in tomake donations
to the textbook reform campaign.54
One US state that has been a focus of activism to prevent ‘Islamic indoctrination’
in its public schools is Tennessee, whose population is predominantly made up of
evangelical Christians, many affiliated with the Southern Baptist Convention, but
which also has a large population of Kurdish Muslims who sought sanctuary there
from Ba’athist Iraq in the early 1990s. In 2008, the Islamic Center of Columbia,
around fifty miles from the state capital of Nashville, was burned to the ground by
three white men who drew swastikas and wrote ‘white power’ on the walls. More
recently, in 2010, there was a concerted campaign against plans to expand the Islamic
Center of Murfreesboro, a suburb of Nashville.
Local campaign groups including Citizens Against Islamic Indoctrination and
the Tennessee Pastors Network,55 an evangelical Christian organisation that recently
purchased billboards reading
Why Support President’s Immigration Ban? 19 Muslim Immigrants
Killed 2,977 Americans. 9/11/200156
have been active in campaigning for changes to the state education standards. As one
report notes, should the campaign succeed
53http://www.actforamerica.org/education [Last accessed 5th January 2017].
54https://actforamerica.nationbuilder.com/textbookreform [Last accessed 27th August 2017].
55https://tnpastors.net/ [Last accessed 28th September 2017].
56http://www.newschannel5.com/news/billboard-supporting-travel-ban-stirs-controversy [Last ac-
cessed 28th September 2017].
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it will become optional to teach seventh-graders in Tennessee about the
Prophet Muhammad; the differences between Sunni, Shia and Sufi sects;
the Golden Age of Islamic enlightenment; and the interfaith connection
and cultural exchanges between Islam, Christianity and Judaism— all of
which are in the current standards. (Harvard, 2016)
The paranoia informing this campaign is perfectly encapsulated in an anecdote shared
by one of my interviewees, a Muslim civil rights activist based in Tennessee, who
recalled an encounter that he had had with a representative of the Pastors Network:
I asked him ‘what’s going on with the schools, why are you so concerned?’.
And he told me that he had heard from one of his parishioners, that their
daughter said, ‘did you know there’s another God besides Jesus that can
grant you eternal life?’, and then her daughter dropped down and fell into
prostration like a Muslim does. And I looked at him, and I was like, ‘she
learned this in a public school?’. And he said ‘yes’. And I said, ‘was it
a Muslim teacher?’. He said, ‘I don’t think so’. I said, ‘were there any
Muslims in the classroom?’. He goes, ‘it’s a rural town in Tennessee, I
don’t think so’. I was like ‘you believe this?’. I don’t remember what he
said. But to me, it was that mythology that was happening.57
To the extent that the transmission of ‘our’ culture and heritage is equated with
the biological reproduction of a specific population then the counterjihad discourse
becomes virtually indistinguishable from older Nazi racial discourses. An idea of bio-
logical fatality was invoked by Iowa Congressman Steve King, who is sympathetic to
ACT for America, in a much-discussed tweet in March 2017, in which he expressed
his admiration for Geert Wilders:
Wilders understands that culture and demographics are our destiny. We
can’t restore our civilization with somebody else’s babies.58
The argument here is about breeding more of a certain kind of people, and is different
from the universalist arguments about the ‘right to life’ more commonly expressed
57Interview 18, Muslim civil rights activist, male, US.
58https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/12/us/steve-king-white-nationalism-racism.html [Last ac-
cessed 28th September 2017].
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by the US religious right (Durham, 1998, p. 99). It bears emphasis that the person
making it is a serving US congressman, and not a member of a fringe neo-Nazi group.
The pre-occupation with natality and fecundity, which is a direct consequence of
the diagnosis of demographic decline and submersion that was described in chapter
6, is more pronounced amongst the neo-Nazi-influenced groups at the fringes of the
counterjihadmovement. At a Britain First rally that I observed in Luton in June 2015,
party leader and former BNP activist Paul Golding invited the crowd to imagine the
future for white Britons twenty years from now, when they had been submerged under
the rising ‘green tide’, urging them to engage in pre-emptive procreation:
Paul Golding: Now fast forward twenty years and we all know that the
immigrant populations here, the Muslims etcetera have got a very high
birthrate, whereas our people prefer to go out and get drunk, and to have -
you know - careers, etcetera, etcetera. But we’ve lost that touch - y’know
- the healthy underpinnings of this world. We need to produce the next
generation. And I’m looking specifically at the young men here, and the
young women. Cos you’ve got to get out there and you’ve gotta produce
the next generation of our people.
Jayda Franzen: Don’t do it now though.
Paul Golding: Not now.
Jayda Franzen: Not right now.
[Laughter]
Paul Golding: If you think about it logically, if you think about your
grandparents, how many kids and children they had compared to how
many you’ve got. I’ll bet there’s a vast, vast difference. And if we don’t
produce the next generation of our people, there won’t be a Britain left.
Our country’s facing extinction.59
On the webpage of the EDL splinter group the North West Infidels, the fixation
with fecundity is even more pronounced. Here the biological reductionism implicit
59Fieldnotes, June 2015.
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in the desire to ‘protect our children’, the idea that ‘culture and demographics are
our destiny’ and that ‘we can’t restore our civilization with somebody else’s babies’ is
rendered transparent as it is transfigured into the infamous ‘14 words’ of the convicted
neo-Nazi terrorist, David Lane, that have become a universal call to action for neo-
Nazis and white nationalists across the world:
Wemust secure the existence of our people and a future for white children.
Lane, who founded the Norse neo-paganWotansvolk and the underground neo-Nazi
terrorist group ‘The Order’, as well as being a theoretician of ‘leaderless resistance’, a
strategy oriented towards violence by individuals or very small cells (Michael, 2009),
would surely have approved of the symbols of avowed white nationalism and racial
paganism displayed on the NWI webpage (see figure 8.2). They include celtic crosses,
white pride emblems and advertisements for a ‘white rights day’ organised to demand
‘equal rights for whites’.
There are often tensions between ‘mainstream’ counterjihad groups and the avowed
white nationalism of the neo-Nazi-influenced groups that exist on the fringes of the
movement. For instance, one of my interviewees, the former senior English Defence
League organiser, clearly felt a philosophical affinity with Britain First but expressed
misgivings about their motivations:
Interviewee: I agree with Britain First on their stance about when it
comes to Islam, and the things that they’re saying and doing, I find it
hard to really argue with them. But I know the driving force behind it is
a lot more. Like, publicly than what they’re saying. Britain First, it is the
BNP in my eyes.
Me: It comes from more of a fascist kind of tradition?
Interviewee: Yeah, well they don’t allow other flags at their demon-
strations... they wouldn’t allow a Jewish flag, they wouldn’t allow a rain-
bow flag, they wouldn’t allow anything like that on their demonstrations.
Someone tried to pull one of them out they’d get told to leave and re-
moved. Now, other than that being the fact that they are fascist, then
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what’s the reason for that? Know what I mean? And I know that for a
fact they’re not allowed any of those flags.60
Yet the same interviewee also suggested that the EDL had acted as a stepping stone
for some of its members who later became active within the neo-Nazi milieu:
Interviewee: I’ve watched myself with young kids join the EDL, one
lad [name redacted] in particular, and erm... he’s now with the NWI, and
when I met him when he was just a kid, seventeen-
Me: The NWI?
Interviewee: North West Infidels.
Me: Oh yeah.
Interviewee: Fuckin’ assholes, man. I met him when he was seventeen,
he was just a normal kid, he’s now a skinhead giving Hitler salutes.
Me: Right.
Interviewee: I’ve watched that, and I was just like fuckin’ hell man.
Like, so the EDL... it acted as a stepping stone for him... and it’s radic-
alised him.61
Consequently we are forced to reckon with both the political distance and the philo-
sophical proximity between the counterjihad movement and neo-Nazism. Most
counterjihad groups, as I showed in chapter 5, did not emerge from the neo-Nazi
milieu. But we also need to ask how much difference there is in practice between
the professed desire of counterjihad groups to protect and promote ‘our way of life’
and ‘our traditions’ and the NWI’s exhortation to ‘be proud of your heritage and your
culture’, ‘to celebrate and promote it’ and to ‘never apologise for loving your race’ .
The relationship between US counterjihad groups and the organised white nation-
alist movement in North America is similarly ambiguous. For instance, in September
2015, Frank Gaffney of the Centre for Security Policy invited Jared Taylor, a key
figure in the American white nationalist movement, onto his Secure Freedom Radio
60Interview 5, counterjihad activist and organiser, male, UK.
61Interview 5, counterjihad activist and organiser, male, UK.
245
programme. The invitation was prompted by an article that Taylor had penned for his
website, American Renaissance, which claims to be ‘the Internet’s premier race-realist
site’. Taylor’s article, entitled ‘Is This the Death of Europe?’,62 discusses at length the
Syrian refugee ‘crisis’, describing the refugees as ‘an army of aliens come to occupy and
transform Europe’ and lamenting the fact that the Europeans ‘do not have the nerve
to kill in order to survive’.
During the course of the ten-minute interview, Gaffney heaped praise on Amer-
ican Renaissance, calling it ‘a wonderful online publication’63 and describing Taylor’s
article as ‘an important new piece’ (it is unclear whether Gaffney was familiar with the
content of American Renaissance beyond the article they were discussing, or whether,
as he later claimed, he was merely being polite to his guest). He echoed Taylor’s char-
acterisation of the flow of refugees as an ‘invasion’, and described ‘Germanness’ and
‘Europeanness’ as ‘casualties’ of Angela Merkel’s open-door refugee policy. He also
encouraged Taylor to speculate on the potential for violence arising from ‘the infusion
into these countries of large numbers of people who don’t assimilate, many of them
Muslim who bring with them a Sharia ideological program that is antithetical to the
culture and civilization and polities of those European nations.’64
Following the interview, Gaffney was sharply criticised by the Southern Poverty
Law Center and other civil rights groups,65 prompting him to remove the interview
from his website. A statement issued by Gaffney claimed that he was ‘unfamiliar’
with Taylor’s views onmatters beyond the refugee crisis, and that he ‘did not discuss or
endorse them’.66 Taylor’s politics should, however, have been evident to Gaffney when
he read out on air a list of Taylor’s recent publications, which include White Identity:
Racial Consciousness for the 21st Century and Shadows of the Rising Sun. Taylor, in turn,
issued a strong rebuke to Gaffney, claiming that he was ‘surprised’ to hear that the
62https://www.amren.com/features/2015/09/is-this-the-death-of-europe/ [Last accessed 28th
September 2017].
63https://www.amren.com/news/2015/10/transcript-frank-gaffney-interviews-jared-taylor/ [Last
accessed 28th September 2017].
64Ibid.
65https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2015/09/30/anti-muslim-activist-frank-gaffney-
interviews-white-nationalist-jared-taylor-his-radio-show [Last accessed 28th September 2017].
66https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2015/10/07/don%E2%80%99t-be-fooled-frank-
gaffney%E2%80%99s-backtracking-about-white-nationalist-jared-taylor [Last accessed 28th
September 2017].
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recording of their ‘cordial’ conversation had been removed from Gaffney’s website.
Taylor noted that his views on race ‘should have been clear in the article’ they were
discussing, and lamented ‘yet another success by people who despise you–and me–to
stamp out the public exchange of views they don’t like.’67
‘A declaration of pre-emptive war’
Anders Breivik’s massacre of seventy-seven people in two separate terrorist attacks
in Oslo on 22nd July 2011 - the first targeting Norwegian government buildings in
downtown Oslo, the second targeting a Labour Party youth camp on the island of
Utøya around forty kilometres from the capital - is indicative of the potentiality for the
new political theology to inspire acts of extreme violence. It would be a simplification
to claim that Breivik was acting out a raw form of the counterjihad ideology, as some
journalistic commentary implied at the time. The political journey taken by Breivik
had involved a period of membership in the nativist Norwegian Progress party, which
he left because it was insufficiently radical, before he became active on neo-Nazi web
forums such as Nordisk (Nordic) and Stormfront (Fekete, 2012; Gardell, 2014). The
1,500-page ‘manifesto’, entitled 2083: AEuropeanDeclaration of Independence, emailed
by Breivik to more than 1,000 chosen recipients around ninety minutes before he went
on his murderous rampage, was in reality a compendium which Breivik had compiled
from heterogeneous sources, often without attribution or acknowledgement. It in-
cludes copious material lifted from counterjihad writers and bloggers including Bat
Ye’Or, Robert Spencer and, especially, Fjordman. But Breivik’s sources also included
far-right-wing Christian evangelical theology, the manifesto of the ‘Unabomber’ Ted
Kaczynski, neo-Nazism, and the American ‘white power’ movement, the latter itself
being essentially a fusion of American white supremacism and European neo-Nazism
(Gardell, 2014). Breivik blended all of these into an idiosyncratic personal philosophy
that has affinities with many of the political tendencies discussed in this thesis, but
which is difficult to unambiguously place in any single category.
Despite Breivik’s chaotic assemblage of a heterogenous range of materials, the
67https://www.amren.com/news/2015/10/open-letter-to-frank-gaffney/ [Last accessed 28th
September 2017].
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prevalence of many of the discursive frames explored in this thesis - ‘Eurabia’, ‘cul-
tural Marxism’, ‘Christian Europe’ - within his ‘manifesto’ is striking. The surtitle of
Breivik’s compendium, 2083, is the symbolic year of the four-hundredth anniversary
of the Ottoman defeat at the gates of Vienna, whilst its subtitle, A European Declar-
ation of Independence, is taken from the title of an essay by Fjordman, which Breivik
reproduces. The opening pages of 2083 are a direct cut and paste of William Lind’s
edited volume Political Correctness: A Short History of an Ideology. Breivik subscribes
to Ye’Or’s conspiratorial version of the Eurabia hypothesis, and to the idea of the
Muslim Brotherhood ‘Project’. Breivik’s symbolic repertoire, which is permeated by
romantic myths of the chivalric male warrior, that Heideggerian ‘knight of anticipat-
ory resoluteness’ (Aho, 2007), will also be familiar: the image of a red Templar cross
that adorns the front of 2083 is reminiscent not only of the organisational insignia
of the European defence leagues, but also of the costumes of the BNP protestors
who gathered outside Parliament after 9/11 (figure 4.4), and of the cover of Derek
Holland’s pamphlet The Political Soldier (figure 4.3). Breivik sometimes used as his
pseudonym the name of a twelfth-century Norwegian king, Sigurd Jorsalfar (‘Sigurd
the Crusader’), and signed his manifesto ‘AB Justiciar Knight Commander, cell 8
Knights Templar Europe’.
The overwhelming desire expressed in Breivik’s manifesto, as a number of com-
mentators have stressed (e.g. Aktürk, 2012; Gardell, 2014), is for a ‘return’ to the
mythical past of a monocultural, patriarchal Christian Europe, purified of the influ-
ence of ‘cultural Marxists’, feminists and Muslims, among other cultural ‘contamin-
ants’. AsMattias Gardell has argued, the ‘stunning violence’ of 22nd July must be seen
as ‘a hyper-masculine performative act’ intended to inspire a heroic vanguard of warri-
ors to rise up and purify the collective European body politic of its enemies within and
without (Gardell, 2014, p. 129). Moreover, pre-emption was the ultimate rationale
of Breivik’s murderous rampage: the third and final ‘book’ of 2083, which describes
in some detail the potential modalities of lethal violence to resist the ‘Islamisation of
Europe’, is, significantly, entitled ‘ADeclaration of pre-emptiveWar’ (emphasis mine).
Breivik was quite critical of counterjihad authors like Fjordman, Robert Spencer, Bat
Ye’Or, and Andrew Bostom for being too afraid to discuss radical measures such as
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Figure 8.3: Front cover over Anders Breivik’s ‘manifesto’ 2083: A EuropeanDeclaration
of Independence.
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This  image  of  Anders  BreivikÕs  
ÔmanifestoÕ  has  been  removed  as 
the  copyright  is  owned  by  another  
organisation.
the mass deportation of Muslims from Europe because it would ‘damage their reputa-
tional shields’. In his view, if these authors were left to continue their lengthy online
debates for a further forty years without concrete action this ‘would have a devastating
effect on Europe’, and consequently he concluded that if the counterjihadists ‘are to
[sic] scared to propagate a conservative revolution and armed resistance then other
authors will have to’ (Berwick, 2011, p. 753).
Whilst counterjihad activists sought to distance themselves from Breivik, their
explanations and rationalisations of his actions were often very revealing. Pamela
Geller, for example, stressed that she was ‘not condoning the slaughter in Norway’
and that she abhorred violence ‘except in regard to self defense’, but went on to say
that the children targeted by Breivik were ‘future (sic) leaders of the party responsible
for flooding Norway with Muslims who refuse to assimilate, who commit major viol-
ence against Norwegian natives, including violent gang rapes, with impunity, and who
live on the dole’.68 Former EDL financier Alan Lake wrote on his 4Freedoms website
that Breivik ‘did this attack to protest against the way that Islam is taking over large
parts of Europe. By attacking the leftist politicians that are enabling this, the chickens
have actually come home to roost’ (cited in Fekete, 2012, p. 32). Three things stand
out here: the pre-emptive logic of killing ‘future leaders of the party responsible for
flooding Norway withMuslims’; the sense of inevitability and fatality conveyed by the
idea of ‘chickens coming home to roost’ and, perhaps above all, the sense that the chil-
dren murdered by Breivik somehow deserved their fate because they were ‘enabling’
the Islamic ‘takeover’ of Europe and the ‘flooding’ of Norway by Muslim migrants -
or, at least, they would have enabled it had they been allowed to live out the rest of
their lives.
A similar pre-emptive logic was in evidence during my interview with the former
senior EDL activist, the only time that any of my interviewees directly raised the
subject of Breivik:
I just think that when you ’ad the Irish conflict, the UDA formed and the
UVF formed in response to the republican terrorists, I think that unfor-
68https://pamelageller.com/2011/07/summer-camp-indoctrination-training-center.html/ [Last ac-
cessed 2nd October 2017].
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tunately in Europe that’s what you will see. I dunno at which stage it will
happen. I think there was three bombings a week or something when it
happened in Ireland, which is a lot of bombings, that’s a fuck of a lot of
conflict before something formed. I think that... well you’ve already seen
Breivik. But I think things like that will become more commonplace.
That’s not me wishing it, by the way, because I don’t want my words to be
said well he wants there to be a big massive war. Well I don’t want there
to be I honestly- I wouldn’t have dedicated my life to doing what I’ve
done if I didn’t think that. I’ve only done that because I’m so fearful for
my kids’ future. I think well, hold on, in twenty years time when you’re
my age, I don’t want you to be fightin’. You know what I mean? I don’t
want my son to be fighting this. I’d rather do it myself.69
He stopped, looked at me and started laughing loudly: ‘You think I’m nuts, int’ ya?’.
Conclusion
During the course of this thesis, we have seen that the counterjihad brings together or-
ganisations and individuals from a variety of quite different political backgrounds, in-
cluding right-wing Christian evangelicals, religious Zionists, white nationalists, and,
at themovement’s fringes, avowed neo-Nazis and racial pagans. A key question should
be: what has enabled these syntheses and the convergences, when the political tend-
encies involved are quite different in their ideological and discursive content?
The fundamental argument of this thesis is that these tendencies, for all their spe-
cific political differences, are united at a philosophical level through their shared at-
titude of countermodernity. More specifically, the heterogeneous organisations and
individuals discussed in this thesis converge on two key things: first, a shared horror
and dismay at the processes of social, cultural and demographic change for which the
term ‘Islamisation’ stands in metonymically; and, second, insofar as ‘Islamisation’ or
‘the jihad’ is ‘just a symptom’ and the real enemy ‘lies within’, also a shared hatred of
the ‘spirit of ’68’ that is deemed to have enabled ‘Islamisation’, and against which their
69Interview 5, counterjihad activist and organiser, male, UK.
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counterrevolutionary energies are directed. This does not imply complete unanimity
concerning the symptoms, causes or remedies, and there are many internal disagree-
ments within the counterjihad movement. However, it has been enough to enable
cooperation between a broad spectrum of groups across Europe and North America
who have come to view themselves as part of a common political project.
In the concluding chapter, I want to return to the question I raised in the introduc-
tion, and reflect on the theoretical and political stakes involved in invoking ‘fascism’
today, in a context quite different from that in which the term was originally coined.
In doing so, I also want to consider the specific nature of the ‘fascism-producing crisis’.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion: Fascism, Past and
Pending
If we still think of the totalitarian governments that ruled Europe
before the Second World War we can easily say that it would be
difficult for them to reappear in the same form in different historical
circumstances. [...] Nevertheless, even though political regimes can
be overthrown, and ideologies can be criticized and disowned,
behind a regime and its ideology there is always a way of thinking
and feeling, a group of cultural habits, of obscure instincts and
unfathomable drives. Is there still another ghost stalking Europe
(not to speak of other parts of the world)?
Umberto Eco
When Umberto Eco penned these words in the pages of the New York Review of
Books in 1995, writing about the potential reemergence of fascism in Europe must
have seemed to many of his readers like idle speculation. To be sure, political sci-
ence had begun to take an interest in the new far-right parties and movements that
had emerged across the continent during the 1980s and 1990s (see e.g. Ignazi, 1992;
Mudde, 1995). However, these remained marginal political phenomena and most
sober analyses concluded that the necessary conditions for the emergence of fascism,
or something like it, were simply absent (Griffin, 2000). Yet re-reading Eco’s essay
today, much of it seems prescient, especially his insistence that ‘we no longer need the
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Piazza Venezia in Rome or the Nuremberg Stadium’, and that there lay in the future
(his future, perhaps our present) ‘a TV or Internet populism, in which the emotional
response of a selected group of citizens can be presented and accepted as the Voice of
the People’ (Eco, 1995, p. 8).
In this thesis, I have argued that contemporary EuroAmerican political mobilisa-
tions against Islam and Muslims share with interwar fascisms an ‘attitude of counter-
modernity’, that they can all be seen as ‘countermodern political theologies’, and that
their counterrevolutionary temporal structure justifies their collective characterisation
as ‘far right’. Moreover, I have suggested, although not yet argued the case, that salafi-
jihadi paramilitia groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS can also be seen as ‘countermodern
political theologies’ belonging to the Islamic religious far right. But to return to a
question I raised in the introduction: does this justify the use of ‘fascism’ as a generic
term to characterise some, or all, of these phenomena? In this concluding chapter, I
want to reflect on the theoretical and political stakes involved in invoking ‘fascism’ to
describe phenomena remote in time and space from Mussolinian Italy and Hitlerite
Germany. In so doing, I also want to reflect on the specific nature of the ‘fascism-
producing crisis’.
One of the longest-standing and clearest answers to these questions is the Marxian
one. Marxists have long viewed fascism as a form of petty-bourgeois reaction that
arises during structural crises of capitalism, and whose social function is the reconsol-
idation of bourgeois rule. However, historical research has cast doubt on this analysis,
suggesting, for instance, that Nazism had a broad cross-class appeal that included the
petty bourgeoisie, but also the working classes and members of the aristocracy (Eley,
2016, p. 102). For similar reasons, I do not think that class-based, economistic ana-
lyses will take us very far in understanding the resurgence of the far right that we are
witnessing across Europe and North America today. As I have tried to show in this
thesis, the counterjihad movement is a transnational, cross-class phenomenon, with
intellectual, political and activist wings. The same is true of other contemporary far-
right movements, such as the ‘Alt-Right’. Many of the key leaders and spokespeople
for these movements are university-educated and certainly not working class. Stud-
ies that stress the working class basis of the contemporary far right are often based
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on analysis of individual, grassroots movement organisations and typically ignore the
broader intellectual, political and activist networks within which they are embedded.
Moreover, the emphasis on social class ignores the glaring fact that it is primarily eth-
nic and not class solidarities that are being mobilised by today’s insurgent ultra-right,
for instance in the phenomenon of ‘patriotic Europeanism’. I would argue that this
is the case even where the antagonisms and enmities that these movements feed off
are not strictly ‘racial’ ones, and even where whiteness is obfuscated through appeals
to ‘Judeo-Christian’ or ‘Christian’ identity.
More recently, a self-proclaimed ‘new consensus’ has emerged within the liberal
historiography of fascism, based on the conviction that a ‘generic fascism’ (or ‘fas-
cist minimum’) can be identified based primarily on comparative analysis of inter-
war European fascist regimes and movements, and that fascism is an ideological phe-
nomenon (most often defined as a form of revolutionary nationalism) (see e.g. Eat-
well, 1996; Griffin, 2002; Payne, 2000). The most influential definition of the ‘fascist
minimum’ to have emerged from this literature is Roger Griffin’s ‘palingenetic ultra-
nationalism’ wherein ‘palingenesis’ refers to a myth of national rebirth (Griffin, 1993).
Recent liberal historiography has the considerable merit of attempting to understand
what fascists actually think, believe and do, rather than dismissing fascist ideology
and culture as mere ‘superstructural’ window-dressing. Moreover, it has been much
more willing than the Marxian tradition to recognise the genuinely cross-class ap-
peal of fascism. However, the field of liberal ‘fascism studies’ has been obsessed with
taxonomic categorisation, and often bogs down in tedious terminological and typolo-
gical debates. ‘Palingenetic ultra-nationalism’ and the like may or may not be useful
as heuristic devices, but one will search this literature in vain for a theory of fascism of
comparable elegance to the Marxian one.
More importantly, I think we need to ask whether the continuities we seem to
sense between the new far-right tendencies emergent today and the ones that flour-
ished in interwar Europe are primarily to be found at the ideological level. Long ago,
Emmanuel Levinas insisted that ‘the bloody barbarism of National Socialism’ was not
caused by ‘some accidental ideological misunderstanding’ but stemmed from a more
deep-seated possibility of ‘elemental Evil’ into which we can be led by logic, and against
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which liberalism was an insufficient guarantee (Levinas, 1990b, p. 63). ‘Hitlerism’
was not, for Levinas, primarily an ideological phenomenon but ‘an awakening of ele-
mentary feelings’ (ibid., p. 64), those ‘obscure instincts and unfathomable drives’ al-
luded to by Eco (1995) in the epigraph to this chapter. A similar argument has been
made more recently by Paul Gilroy, who suggests that the phenomena grouped to-
gether as ‘fascism’ are not manifestations of a shared political ideology but of ‘some-
thing anterior to it which challenges the rules and assumptions of modern politics’
(Gilroy, 1996, 72). Likewise, Peter Osborne has argued that ‘fascism is no merely
political form - one among a series of alternatives to be listed in the catalogues of
comparative politics as competing forms of organization or rule - but a manifestation
of deep-rooted historical, or even metaphysical, tendencies or possibilities of the age’
(Osborne, 1995, p. 160). From this perspective, placing fascism alongside liberalism,
conservatism and socialism as forms of modern political ideology is a kind of category
error.
I would argue that what ultimately marks fascism out as something exceptional is
its recourse to and routinisation of violence. In this, I am in agreement with Geoff
Eley, who has forcefully insisted on violence as the conclusive differentiator between
fascism and conservatism (Eley, 1990). Reflecting on interwar Germany and Italy,
Eley has written:
To put it bluntly, killing socialists rather than just arguing with them, or
at most legally and practically restricting their rights, amounted to the
most radical of departures. The brutality of this break can hardly be ex-
aggerated. (Eley, 2016, p. 97)
This is a line that has been transgressed with depressing frequency in recent years. It
was definitively crossed in Oslo on 22nd July 2011, when Anders Breivik murdered
seventy-seven members of a Labour Party youth camp in cold blood. And it was also
crossed more recently in Charlottesville, Virginia, on 12th August 2017, when a car
was deliberately driven into a crowd of civil rights activists, killing one and injuring
several others. How does someone come to do such a thing? Put simply, they must
come to see socialists (and feminists, anti-racists, pacifists and the like) not simply as
political foes but as an existential threat.
257
This thesis has tried to describe the logic that might lead someone to this point:
from a diagnosis of some imagined community as being in a state of crisis and impend-
ing catastrophe, to the displacement of blame onto internal and external scapegoats,
and finally to a survivalist logic of bordering, boundary-making and cultural purifica-
tion. Consequently, I want to suggest that when we invoke the term ‘fascism’, what
we are ultimately trying to describe - the intuition that we are trying to circumscribe -
is the tendency to enact a form of sacrificial violence that aims to reconsecrate the bound-
aries of some imagined community by purifying it of the enemies within and without.
From this perspective, fascism is an especially radical form of countermodern political
theology, differentiated by its recourse to violence in the quest for a pure or prim-
ordial form of biocultural fraternity. This tendency is likely to flourish in moments
of rapid sociopolitical change, when assumed group identities, territorial boundaries
and forms of social authority come to be contested, and various forms of social un-
certainty are exacerbated. However, because ‘crises’ are always (contrary to Marxist
understandings) discursively produced and never objectively ‘given’, it can also emerge
in times and spaces where the putative material ‘preconditions’ are seemingly absent,
and where there is no widespread consensus concerning the existence of an economic
or political ‘crisis’. The small but violent neo-fascist and neo-Nazi groups that long
existed on the margins of post-war European societies in conditions of relative peace
and prosperity are testament to this.
What has changed over the past few years, I would suggest, is that the sense of
crisis and decline, and the inability to imagine the future as one of unfolding progress,
have ceased to be marginal conditions within the populations of Europe and North
America. This is only partly related to the fallout from the 2007-08 financial crisis,
nor can it be seen as a simple response to anxieties about ‘terrorism’. To be sure, the
economic dislocations of the past decade have provided the far right with a favourable
climate in which to operate, as has the post-9/11 security environment. However, the
emergence of political mobilisations against Islam, and the resurgence of the far right
more generally, long predate the crisis of 2007-08 and draw on discursive frameworks,
such as the ‘clash of civilizations’ that had emerged well before 9/11. These new far-
right political mobilisations have occurred in the context of the breakup of the bipolar
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Cold War political order, new flows of migrants and sanctuary-seekers into Europe
and North America, and the political assertion of settled Muslim and other minority
populations in the West. Moreover, they must also be seen as long-term responses
to the ‘Spirit of ’68’, against which the counterrevolutionary energies of the contem-
porary far right are directed. It is not primarily economic crises that are productive of
fascism, I would argue, but rather crises of identity.
The period of ‘globalisation’ since the end of the Cold War has, observes Arjun
Appadurai (2006), also been one of large-scale ethnocidal violence towards minorities
the world over. Where the lines between ‘us’ and ‘them’ have always been fuzzy, they
have become increasingly blurred due to large-scale population movements and the
increasing velocity of cross-border flows of information, commodities and capital. In
this context, minority populations have become a major site for displacing anxieties
about blurred identities, altered power relations and compromised sovereignties. This
has, Appadurai suggests, given rise to new forms of scapegoating and new impulses
towards cultural purification.
Importantly, the pessimistic, apocalyptic and conspiratorial narratives that have
emerged in this context, and which seek to impose explanatory power over these
complex process of social change, have often done so organically. For instance, the
‘Eurabia’ narrative about the ‘Islamisation’ of the West first emerged as a form of
folk-explanation for the political fissures that opened up within Europe, and between
Europe and the US, in the context of the Iraq war. Whilst some intellectual versions of
the narrative drew on older traditions of cultural pessimism, for instance the writings
of Oswald Spengler, the Eurabia thesis was largely the original construct of ultra-
conservative writers and journalists. Similarly, Huntington’s imagined ‘clash of civil-
izations’ is predicated on a form of ontological hatred reminiscent of Schmitt’s friend-
enemy distinction, but Huntington did not arrive at it by simply recycling Schmitt.
Moreover, the intuitive appeal of the ‘clash’ paradigm can be attributed to its recog-
nition that, contrary to Fukuyama, we are very far from being at the ‘end of history’
(Appadurai, 2006, p. 116). The discursive frameworks of the ‘clash of civilizations’,
‘Eurabia’ and ‘cultural Marxism’ have been disseminated in book form, in newspapers
and journals, and, crucially, in a multiplicity of online spaces through blogs, YouTube
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videos and the like. What I am suggesting here is the potential for new pessimistic,
fatalistic and conspiracist philosophies to generate new fascistic solidarities, quite in-
dependently of any direct intellectual influence from older ideologies and movements.
Put differently, one of the things that is missing from bothMarxian (structuralist) and
liberal (culturalist) approaches is the political agency of the fascists.
Thinking about fascism in this way can, I think, rescue the concept from its pro-
vincialisation as a form of radical nationalist ideology harnessed to the bureaucratic
power of the modern state, and from its trivialisation as a form of petty-bourgeois
social reaction. Moreover, from this perspective, I would argue that it is not only
those contemporary political movements that openly associate themselves with ‘clas-
sical’ Italian Fascism and German National Socialism to which the concept might
potentially apply. During and since the 2016 US presidential campaign, the ques-
tion of whether Trumpism can be regarded as ‘fascist’ has been the subject of fierce
debate, and a number of influential historians and scholars of fascism have weighed
in.1 To the extent that ‘fascism’ continues to be associated with specific ideological
doctrines, these interventions have tended to discount Trumpism as ‘fascist’. For in-
stance, if fascism is identified with an interventionist state and corporatist economics,
then Donald Trump and Steve Bannon are not fascists: they have directed consid-
erable energy into dismantling the administrative, regulatory and welfare states, on
the basis that they primarily benefit undeserving minorities. However, if fascism is
understood in terms of its temporal structure and its propensity for violence, then
Trumpism must be considered as at the very least tendentially fascistic. Its counter-
revolutionary temporality is inscribed in its slogan ‘make American great again’, and
its reflexive recourse to violence was evident at campaign rallies where violence was
routinely directed against political opponents and journalists, often at the urging of
Trump himself.
The counterjihad movement has been one of the key tributaries of the new ‘white
nationalism’ for which Trump is now the most important political figurehead. It has
not, however, been the only one. Other key movements and ideologies that have fed
1See, for instance, the interview with the historian Robert Paxton in Slate:
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/interrogation/2016/02/is_donald_trump_a_fascist_-
an_expert_on_fascism_weighs_in.html [Last accessed 1st October 2017].
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into the new white nationalism include the Alt-Right and the ‘identitarian’ move-
ment, as well as older ones such as the European New Right and resurgent forms of
avowed fascism and Nazism. What has been striking over the period of study has
been the convergence of these different tendencies: whereas at the beginning of the
project it was relatively easy to distinguish between, say, the counterjihad movement
and the Alt-Right, these boundaries have become increasingly blurred over time. As
I have tried to show, this convergence has been enabled by the movements’ common
countermodern political philosophy, and their shared antipathy towards the ‘spirit of
’68’.
The large-scale increase in social uncertainty that has resulted from ‘globalisation’
has not, however, only or even primarily affected Europe and North America; con-
sequently the resurgence of the ultra-right and of ethnocidal forces is not confined
to those geographies. The more expansive understanding of fascism suggested here
therefore invites consideration of whether the concept might be useful in apprehend-
ing contemporary political movements and regimes outside EuroAmerica, whose form
is not that of ‘white nationalism’. In contrast, the understandings of ‘fascism’ within
Marxian theory and liberal historiography remain profoundly Eurocentric ones, in
which fascism is annexed to specific phases in the history of capitalist economic devel-
opment or modern nation-building. Within those frameworks, the cross-pollination
of ideas between interwar European fascist movements and far-right Hindu and Is-
lamic religious movements, or, later, between European neo-fascisms and revolu-
tionary nationalisms in Libya or Iran, are typically glossed over, and putative ‘non-
Western’ cases of ‘fascism’ are often ignored or elided (Bhatt, 2001, esp. pp. 124-25).
There is not space here to discuss all of the myriad far-right movements and re-
gimes flourishing across the globe today to which my expanded concept of ‘fascism’
might usefully be applied. I do however want to briefly comment on one application
that is especially relevant in the context of this thesis: the neologism of ‘Islamofas-
cism’. The term seems to have been coined by the Scottish writer Malise Ruthven
around 1990, and was subsequently popularised by neoconservatives and pro-war lib-
erals after 9/11. It is also a term frequently used within counterjihad circles, for in-
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stance in the Horowitz FreedomCenter’s ‘Islamo-Fascism AwarenessWeeks’.2 A key
problem with the term, as I see it, is that it is unclear whether it is intended to apply
to political Islamists (for instance, the Muslim Brotherhood), national jihadists (such
as Hamas), or to salafi-jihadism (such as Al Qaeda) where the resonances with fascism
seem to me to be strongest. This confusion is not only confined to the writings of
polemicists like Christopher Hitchens:3 even so scrupulous a scholar as Jeffrey Herf
uses the term in very expansive and indiscriminate way.4
I am personally sceptical about the application of the term ‘fascism’ to salafi-
jihadist ideology. I would certainly argue that salafi-jihadism is a form of ‘counter-
modern political theology’ as I have defined it in this thesis: as Herf correctly ob-
serves, faith and technicity were fused together to lethal effect on 11th September
2001, when ‘Al Qaeda-trained engineering students flew jets into the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon’ (Herf, 2010, not paginated). Moreover, there are a number
of more specific philosophical continuities between salafi-jihadism and European fas-
cism, for instance their shared anti-Semitism, homophobia, anti-feminism and cults
of masculinity. Their aesthetic repertoires, invoking images of medieval warfare, are
also strikingly similar. However, it seems to me that there are equally important dif-
ferences, especially between their political aims and their forms and rationalisations
of political violence.
One key difference is that whereas historical fascisms have sought to preserve a
plurality of particular nomoi, salafi-jihadism aims at the construction of a global Ca-
liphate and hence the unification of the planet under a single nomos. Similarly, whereas
fascisms have sought to protect and to celebrate a particular this-worldly cultural and
civilisational inheritance, the salafi-jihadi theological imagination is animated in part
by fantasies of the destruction of, or exit from, the temporal world. To put this more
concretely: when Anders Breivik went on his murderous rampage, he did not do so
because he expected thereby to gain access to the material and carnal rewards of an
other-worldly Paradise, but because he thought the people he was killing were part of
2http://www.horowitzfreedomcenter.org/about [Last accessed 27th September 2017].
3http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2007/10/
defending_islamofascism.html [Last accessed 27 September 2017].
4https://newrepublic.com/article/74354/killing-the-name [Last accessed 27 September 2017].
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a conspiracy to bring about the ‘Islamisation of Europe’. There is an important differ-
ence between fighting to preserve a particular historical community and geographical
territory, and fighting to cleanse the planet of unbelief (Bhatt, 2013).
A stronger parallel can perhaps be found between European fascisms and radical
black nationalisms, such as the Nation of Islam, which Paul Gilroy has argued can be
seen as forms of ‘black fascism’ (Gilroy, 2000). Unlike the theological imaginations of
the salafi-jihadists, the political visions of Elijah Muhammad or Louis Farrakhan are
very much linked to specific biological populations and particular worldly territories,
and their logic has been a separatist one. In chapter 4, we saw the strange alliances to
which this could occasionally give rise. As Gilroy notes, what brought together Gar-
vey’s UNIA and the Klan in the early 1920s ‘was land: a sovereign territory, a national
homeland to legitimate their aspirations. The whites have their country; blacks can
and must have one too’ (ibid., p. 74).
Implicit in the more expansive conceptualisation of fascism that I am suggesting
here is a similarly expanded idea of anti-fascism: one that is not only concerned to
fight a permanent rearguard action against the possible recurrence of historical fas-
cisms, but also permanently attuned to the emergence of new fascistic potentialities
that are not necessarily ideologically or organisationally linked to past forms. As Gil-
roy has put it, we need to recognise that fascism is always still ‘somehow pending’
(Gilroy, 2000, p. 89). The difficulty of anticipating the emergence of new forms of
fascism has arguably led to some ‘blind spots’ within anti-fascist activism. One of my
interviewees, a UK-based anti-fascist activist, complained that parts of the anti-fascist
movement had been slow to recognise the danger posed by the transnational networks
described in this thesis because many of the actors involved, especially the suave and
sophisticated representatives of US advocacy groups, did not resemble their idea of
what ‘fascists’ are supposed to look like. Consequently, whilst counterdemonstrations
were unfailingly organised against the street-level activities of groups like the EDL, no
effective strategy had been formulated to oppose the wider movement or to counter its
narratives. Secondly, as we saw briefly in chapter 2, in mobilisations against counterji-
had street groups like the EDL, parts of the anti-fascist movement have been willing
to form tactical alliances with authoritarian and anti-democratic representatives of the
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Muslim community to whom the term ‘fascist’ might at least arguably be applied.
Moreover, the new fascistic potentialities and actualities emergent today differ
from historical ones not only at the discursive level, but also in their organisational
forms and tactical repertoires. This can be seen especially in the innovative use of new
media technologies by many far-right groups. In this context, there are difficult ques-
tions to be asked about anti-racist and anti-fascist tactics and strategies. In a context
of finite resources, where is time and energy best expended: in counterdemonstrations
against street-level mobilisations by far-right groups, or in interventions in the online
spaces through which fascist ideas and tactics are disseminated? How do you begin
to counter the conspiratorial narratives circulating in these milieux when you yourself
are viewed as part of the conspiracy, and consequently anything you say is likely to be
discounted? There are no easy answers to such questions.
In his first postwar memoir of his time in Auschwitz, If This is a Man, Primo Levi
observed that ‘[m]any people - many nations - can find themselves holding, more or
less wittingly, that “every stranger is an enemy”’:
For the most part this conviction lies deep down like some latent infec-
tion; it betrays itself only in random, disconnected acts, and does not lie at
the base of a system of reason. But when this does come about, when the
unspoken dogma becomes the major premiss in a syllogism, then, at the
end of the chain, there is the Lager [death camp]. Here is the conception
of the world carried to its logical conclusion; so long as the conception
subsists, the conclusion remains to threaten us. (Levi, 1987, p. 15)
During the time I have been engaged in this research project, Britain has voted to
leave the European Union following a referendum campaign that mobilised barely-
concealed racial resentments, an American president has promised and then partly
enacted a ban on Muslim migration to the US, and Eastern European nations have
militarised their borders in order to stem the flow of refugees seeking sanctuary from
the bitter conflict in Syria. Shortly before I was due to send this thesis to be printed
and bound, news came in that the Alternative für Deutschland, a party whose official
position is that ‘Islam is not part of Germany’, had come third in the September
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2017 German federal elections with thirteen percent of the vote. To me, at least, it
seems that the conception described by Levi is very much alive and well, and that the
conclusion - however improbable a dénouement it may be - does indeed still linger to
threaten us.
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Appendix A
Appendix: Websites Analysed
Table A.1: Counterjihad movement websites (category 1)
URL Description Organisation type Country In-Degree Out-Degree Betweenness
http://1389blog.com/ 1389 Blog online space US 4 108 16313.605
http://www.4freedoms.ning.com/ 4 Freedoms (.ning.com) online space UK 1 10 567.67
http://4freedoms.com/ 4Freedoms (.com) online space UK 2 0 1.736
http://www.actforamerica.org/ ACT for America research and advocacy US 6 0 77.433
http://actforamericahouston.wordpress.com/ ACT for America - Houston chapter research and advocacy US 3 0 2.375
http://www.allenbwest.com/ Allen B.West individual US 3 0 5.428
http://1159pmgmt.blogspot.com/ AlmostMidnight in theWest online space Canada 2 0 0
http://alwaysonwatch3.blogspot.com/ Always onWatch: Semper Vigilans online space US 4 0 0
http://www.americanfreedomlawcenter.org/ American FreedomLawCenter research and advocacy US 3 0 0
http://publicpolicyalliance.org/ American Public Policy Alliance research and advocacy US 2 0 0
http://www.americansagainsthate.org/ Americans Against Hate political movement US 3 0 0.914
http://www.andrewbostom.org/ Andrew Bostom individual US 7 0 8.746
http://www.answeringmuslims.com/ AnsweringMuslims online space US 5 0 0
http://www.anti-cair-net.org/ Anti-CAIR research and advocacy US 6 0 2.24
http://www.arabistjansen.nl/ Arabist Jansen individual Netherlands 1 0 0
http://atlasshrugs2000.typepad.com/ Atlas Shrugs online space US 12 9 597.646
http://islammonitor.org/ Australian IslamistMonitor online space Australia 2 0 0
http://www.barenakedislam.com/ Bare Naked Islam (.com) online space US 1 77 7790.439
http://barenakedislam.wordpress.com/ Bare Naked Islam (.blogspot.com) online space US 5 0 4.591
http://www.blazingcatfur.ca/ Blazing Cat Fur (.ca) online space Canada 2 0 0
http://blazingcatfur.blogspot.com/ Blazing Cat Fur (.blogspot.com) online space Canada 3 0 0
http://www.blogwrath.com/ Blogwrath online space Canada 2 0 0
http://fawstin.blogspot.com/ Bosch Fawstin individual US 3 0 0
http://paxeuropa.de/ Bürgerbewegung Pax Europa (Pax Europa CitizensMovement) political movement Germany 0 4 11.669
http://www.pro-deutschland-online.de/ Bürgerbewegung proDeutschland (-online.de) political party Germany 1 1 4
http://www.pro-deutschland.de/ Bürgerbewegung proDeutschland (.de) political party Germany 1 0 0
http://www.pro-koeln.org/ Bürgerbewegung pro Köln political movement Germany 0 2 4
http://www.pro-nrw.net/ Bürgerbewegung pro NRW (North-RhineWestphalia) political party Germany 0 0 0
http://www.carolineglick.com/ Caroline Glick individual US 5 0 5.26
http://cavatus.wordpress.com/ Cavatus’s Blog online space Sweden 2 0 0
http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/ Center for Security Policy research and advocacy US 6 0 13.595
http://cairunmasked.org/ Center for Security Policy - CAIRObservatory research and advocacy US 2 0 0
http://counterjihad.com/ Center for Security Policy - counterjihad.com research and advocacy US 3 0 0
http://www.shariahfinancewatch.org/ Center for Security Policy - Shariah FinanceWatch research and advocacy US 4 0 15.398
http://shariahinamericancourts.com/ Center for Security Policy - Shariah in American Courts research and advocacy US 2 0 0
http://shariahthethreat.org/ Center for Security Policy - Shariah: TheThreat to America research and advocacy US 4 0 3.784
http://www.politicalislam.com/ Center for the Study of Political Islam research and advocacy US 8 0 35.651
http://www.cspipublishing.com/ Center for the Study of Political Islam - Publications research and advocacy US 4 0 82.578
http://www.citizenwarrior.com/ CitizenWarrior online space US 5 0 1.32
http://civilusdefendus.wordpress.com/ Civilus Defendus online space US 2 0 0
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Table A.1: Counterjihad movement websites (category 1) continued.
URL Description Organisation type Country In-Degree Out-Degree Betweenness
http://civilusdefendus.files.wordpress.com/ Civilus Defendus (mirror site) online space US 2 0 0
http://www.clarionproject.org/ Clarion Project research and advocacy US 7 0 1.031
http://www.obsessionthemovie.com/ Clarion Project - Obsession the Movie daughter US 2 0 0
http://concess.blogspot.com/ Concessions to Islam online space US 2 0 0
http://conswede.blogspot.com/ Conservative Swede online space Sweden 2 0 0
http://counterjihadreport.com/ Counterjihad Report online space US 1 104 12734.615
http://theenglishdefenceleagueextra.blogspot.co.uk/ Counterjihad: beyond the EDL online space UK 0 5 100.323
http://www.creepingsharia.wordpress.com/ Creeping Sharia online space US 7 47 3378.537
http://www.crescentofbetrayal.com/ Crescent of Betrayal online space US 2 0 0
http://www.danishdefenceleague.dk/ Danish Defence League political movement Denmark 0 0 0
http://www.trykkefrihed.dk/ Danish Free Press Society research and advocacy Denmark 2 0 2.185
http://www.sappho.dk/ Danish Free Press Society - Sappho magazine research and advocacy Denmark 2 0 0
http://www.debbieschlussel.com/ Debbie Schlussel individual US 2 0 0.534
http://dttj.blogspot.com/ Defeat the Third Jihad online space US 2 0 0
http://www.defendthemodernworld.wordpress.com/ Defend the Modern World online space UK 2 0 0
http://www.deusvult.info/ Deus Vult Caritatem (God Wants Love) online space n/k 2 0 0
http://www.dhimmitude.org/ Dhimmitude (Bat Ye’Or) online space Switzerland 3 0 0
http://www.dianawest.net/ Diana West individual US 5 0 1.049
http://www.englishdefenceleague.org/ English Defence League political movement UK 6 0 568.969
http://www.enzaferreri.blogspot.com/ Enza Ferreri individual UK 2 0 0
http://www.europenews.dk/ Europe News online space Denmark 9 2 384.044
http://en.europenews.dk/ Europe News (English-language version) online space Denmark 4 8 188.889
http://de.europenews.dk/ Europe News (German language version) online space Denmark 2 3 526.968
http://ecawblog.wordpress.com/ Everything Changed After Woolwich online space UK 2 0 1.864
http://www.fdl.fi/ Finnish Defence League political movement Finland 0 1 0
http://fjordman.blogspot.com/ Fjordman online space Norway 3 0 0.911
http://floridafamily.org/ Florida Family Association political movement US 2 0 0
http://www.fdesouche.com/ François Desouche online space France 2 0 43.156
http://freedomdefense.typepad.com/ Freedom Defense Initiative research and advocacy US 3 0 5.069
http://gatesofvienna.net/ Gates of Vienna (.net) online space US 9 0 11.25
http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.com.au/ Gates of Vienna (.blogspot.com.au) online space US 0 1 0
http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.com/ Gates of Vienna (.blogspot.com) online space US 8 79 12194.445
http://www.halalchoices.com.au/ Halal Choices online space Australia 2 0 0
http://www.davidhorowitzfreedomcenter.org/ Horowitz Freedom Center research and advocacy US 2 0 0
http://www.horowitzfreedomcenter.org/ Horowitz Freedom Center (alternative url) research and advocacy US 5 28 1420.597
http://www.blackbookoftheamericanleft.com/ Horowitz Freedom Center - Black Book of the American Left research and advocacy US 2 0 0
http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/ Horowitz Freedom Center - Discover the Networks (.org) research and advocacy US 10 0 26.364
http://www.discoverthenetworks.com/ Horowitz Freedom Center - Discover the Networks (.com) research and advocacy US 2 0 0
http://www.frontpagemag.com/ Horowitz Freedom Center - Frontpage Magazine research and advocacy US 20 20 3829.778
http://www.frontpagemagazine.com/ Horowitz Freedom Center - FrontPage Mag (alternative url) research and advocacy US 4 0 0
http://archive.frontpagemag.com/ Horowitz Freedom Center - FrontPage Magazine (archive) research and advocacy US 7 0 2.343
http://horowitzfreedomcenterstore.org/ Horowitz Freedom Center - Online Store research and advocacy US 2 0 0
http://www.restorationweekend.org/ Horowitz Freedom Center - Restoration Weekend research and advocacy US 2 0 0
http://www.stopthejewhatredoncampus.org/ Horowitz Freedom Center - Stop the Jew Hatred on Campus research and advocacy US 2 0 0
http://www.stopthejihadoncampus.org/ Horowitz Freedom Center - Stop the Jihad on Campus research and advocacy US 3 0 0
http://www.truthrevolt.org/ Horowitz Freedom Center - TruthRevolt research and advocacy US 3 0 0
http://www.rights.no/ Human Rights Service research and advocacy Norway 2 0 48.25
http://english.savefreespeech.org/ In Defense of Free Speech online space Austria 2 0 0
http://www.ibloga.blogspot.com/ Infidel Bloggers Alliance online space US 4 0 1.089
http://www.libertiesalliance.org/ International Civil Liberties Alliance research and advocacy multiple 7 28 2208.759
http://www.internationalfreepresssociety.org/ International Free Press Society research and advocacy Denmark 2 0 0
http://www.d-intl.com/ International Free Press Society - Dispatch International research and advocacy Denmark 5 0 24.716
http://iranaware.com/ Iran Aware (.com) online space US 3 0 0
http://iamiranaware.wordpress.com/ Iran Aware (.wordpress.com) online space US 2 0 0
http://ironburka.blogspot.com/ Iron Burka online space n/k 3 0 0
http://islamineurope.blogspot.com/ Islam in Europe online space n/k 3 0 2.111
http://www.jamieglazov.com/ Jamie Glazov individual US 2 0 0
http://www.jihadwatch.org/ Jihad Watch online space US 26 0 1417.279
http://joshuapundit.blogspot.com/ Joshua Pundit online space US 3 0 1.385
http://www.justifythis.blogspot.com/ Justify This online space UK 2 0 0
http://kitmantv.blogspot.com/ Kitman TV online space n/k 2 0 0
http://smallresistance.wordpress.com/ Klein Verzet (Small Resistance) online space Netherlands 3 0 0
http://allianceffl.wordpress.com/ L’Alliance FFL political movement France 2 0 38.413
http://www.lawandfreedomfoundation.org/ Law and Freedom Foundation research and advocacy UK 3 0 3.205
http://www.libertygb.org.uk/ Liberty GB political party UK 3 25 1352.295
http://librabunda.blogspot.com/ Librabunda online space UK 3 0 1.089
http://www.lisistrata.com/ Lisistrata online space Italy 2 0 0
http://loganswarning.com/ Logan’s Warning online space US 3 0 3.324
http://www.meforum.org/ Middle East Forum research and advocacy US 8 0 23.506
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Table A.1: Counterjihad movement websites (category 1) continued.
URL Description Organisation type Country In-Degree Out-Degree Betweenness
http://www.campus-watch.org/ Middle East Forum - Campus Watch research and advocacy US 2 15 167.031
http://www.danielpipes.org/ Middle East Forum - Daniel Pipes research and advocacy US 10 28 1590.885
http://www.islamist-watch.org/ Middle East Forum - Islamist Watch research and advocacy US 4 0 2.948
http://www.legal-project.org/ Middle East Forum - The Legal Project research and advocacy US 5 0 3.658
http://www.militantislammonitor.org/ Militant Islam Monitor online space US 5 0 0
http://missioneuropakmartell.wordpress.com/ Mission Europa Netzwerk Karl Martell political movement Austria 1 0 0
http://moneyjihad.wordpress.com/ Money Jihad online space US 4 0 0
http://www.mosquewatch.blogspot.com/ Mosquewatch online space US 2 0 0
http://muslimstatistics.wordpress.com/ Muslim Statistics online space nk 4 0 5.818
http://norwegiandefenceleague.com/ Norwegian Defence League political movement Norway 0 2 31.373
http://occidentalsoapbox.blogspot.com/ Occidental Soapbox online space US 2 0 0.65
http://pamelageller.com/ Pamela Geller individual US 11 0 125.951
http://callofthepatriot.blogspot.com/ Patriot’s Corner online space US 2 0 0
http://pegida.de/ Pegida political movement Germany 0 0 0
http://www.pegidauk.org/ Pegida UK political movement UK 1 0 0
http://www.pi-news.org/ Politically Incorrect (English-language edition) online space Germany 4 37 3856.942
http://www.pi-news.net/ Politically Incorrect (German-language edition) online space Germany 8 0 128.095
http://www.prophetofdoom.net/ Prophet of Doom online space US 4 0 0
http://www.pvv.nl/ PVV (Party for Freedom) political party Netherlands 1 2 6.435
http://www.geertwilders.nl/ PVV (Party for Freedom) - Geert Wilders political party Netherlands 2 3 232.278
http://www.pvvdenhaag.nl/ PVV (Party for Freedom) - Hague branch political party Netherlands 2 0 107.502
http://www.wildersproces.nl/ PVV (Party for Freedom) - Wilders process political party Netherlands 2 0 180.712
http://www.qsociety.org.au/ Q Society of Australia political movement Australia 4 0 0
http://www.raymondibrahim.com/ Raymond Ibrahim individual US 9 0 69.889
http://www.rightsidenews.com/ Right Side News online space US 6 0 1.699
http://ripostelaique.com/ Riposte Laique online space France 2 10 1222.119
http://www.worldthreats.com/ Ryan Mauro individual US 2 0 0
http://www.svp.ch/ Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People’s Party) political party Switzerland 0 0 0
http://sitasecure.wordpress.com/ Sensibilisation a l’Islam Tous Azimuts political movement France 1 0 0
http://shariaunveiled.wordpress.com/ Sharia Unveiled online space US 3 0 0
http://shariaunveiled.files.wordpress.com/ Sharia Unveiled (mirror site) online space US 1 0 0
http://www.shariawatch.org.uk/ Sharia Watch UK research and advocacy UK 3 0 1.864
http://www.snaphanen.dk/ Snaphanen online space Denmark 4 0 43.904
http://mappingsharia.com/ Society of Americans for National Existence - Mapping Sharia research and advocacy US 2 0 0
http://www.standupamericanow.org/ Stand Up America Now political movement US 2 0 0
http://sioeeu.wordpress.com/ Stop Islamisation of Europe political movement Denmark 0 14 135.038
http://siaddk.wordpress.com/ Stop Islamiseringen af Danmark (Stop Islamisation of Denmark) political movement Denmark 2 4 34.39
http://www.siotw.org/ Stop Islamization of the World political movement US 0 23 681.772
http://www.sian.no/ Stopp Islamiseringen av Norge (Stop Islamisation of Norway) political movement Norway 0 8 36.49
http://sultanknish.blogspot.com/ Sultan Knish online space US 3 0 0
http://www.sverigedemokraterna.se/ Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats) political party Sweden 0 0 0
http://swissdefenceleague.wordpress.com/ Swiss Defence League political movement Switzerland 1 51 4457.635
http://www.nicedoggie.net/ The Anti-Idiotarian Rottweiler online space US 3 0 2.185
http://www.brusselsjournal.com/ The Brussels Journal online space Belgium 6 0 11.801
http://www.thehotgates480bc.blogspot.com/ The Hot Gates 480BC online space US 2 0 0
http://themuslimissue.wordpress.com/ The Muslim Issue online space US 2 0 0
http://www.thereligionofpeace.com/ The Religion of Peace online space US 17 63 6906.975
http://www.handbookforinfidels.com/ The Savvy Kafir online space US 2 0 0
http://layijadeneurabia.com/ The Sixth Redoma (old Jihad in Eurabia). online space Spain 3 0 0
http://thestoryofmohammed.blogspot.com.au/ The Story of Mohammed online space Australia 2 0 0
http://www.theunitedwest.org/ The United West research and advocacy n/k 3 0 35.607
http://tommyrobinson.co.uk/ Tommy Robinson individual UK 0 0 0
http://tulisanmurtad.blogspot.com/ Tulisan Murtad (Writing Apostate) online space n/k 2 0 0
http://www.tundratabloids.com/ Tundra Tabloids (.com) online space Finland 9 0 28.401
http://tundratabloid.blogspot.com/ Tundra Tabloids (.blogspot.com) online space Finland 2 0 0
http://turbanbomb.blogspot.com/ Turban Bomb online space Denmark 2 0 0
http://www.understandingthethreat.com/ Understanding the Threat research and advocacy US 2 0 0
http://urbaninfidel.blogspot.com/ Urban Infidel online space US 3 0 0.914
http://www.uriasposten.net/ Uriasposten online space Denmark 1 30 1581.338
http://verite-valeurs-democratie.over-blog.com/ Vérité, Valeurs et Démocratie (Truth, Values and Democracy) online space France 1 0 0
http://www.vlaamsbelang.org/ Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) political party Belgium 1 0 0
http://vladtepesblog.com/ Vlad Tepes online space Canada 9 0 30.811
http://www.westerncivilizationandculture.blogspot.com/ Western Civilization and Culture online space UK 2 0 0
http://sheikyermami.com/ Winds of Jihad online space Australia 6 0 8.458
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Table A.2: Supporters, enablers and sympathisers (category 2)
URL Description Category In-Degree Out-Degree Betweenness
http://www.aish.com/ Aish HaTorah (Fire of the Torah) Pro-Israel 2 0 0.29
http://www.alisina.org/ Ali Sina Heterodox Muslims 3 0 21.015
http://aclj.org/ American Center for Law and Justice Religious right 4 0 1.32
http://www.aifdemocracy.org/ American Islamic Forum for Democracy Heterodox Muslims 6 0 2.078
http://www.americanthinker.com/ American Thinker Right-wing blog / online space 11 21 990.7
http://www.amilimani.com/ Amil Imani Heterodox Muslims 9 0 87.96
http://www.answering-islam.org/ Answering Islam Religious right 5 0 2.664
http://backspin.typepad.com/ Backspin blog Pro-Israel 2 0 2.185
http://bwcentral.org/ Bear Witness Central Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 1.207
http://www.breitbart.com/ Breitbart News Conservative media 21 0 439.986
http://www.britainfirst.org/ Britain First White nationalist and other far right 2 0 0
http://www.canadafreepress.com/ Canada Free Press Conservative media 5 0 1.739
http://thecanadiansentinel.blogspot.com/ Canadian Sentinel Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 0
http://www.cis.org/ Center for Immigration Studies Nativist / anti-immigrant 2 0 3.12
http://www.christianaction.org/ Christian Action Network Religious right 5 0 1.97
http://www.cbn.com/ Christian Broadcasting Network Religious right 3 0 8.317
http://www.classicalvalues.com/ Classical Values Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 0
http://theconservativetreehouse.com/ Conservative Tree House Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 2.376
http://www.dcclothesline.com/ D.C. Clothesline Conspiracy theorists 2 0 0.837
http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/ Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party) Nativist / anti-immigrant 0 0 0
http://www.dendanskeforening.dk/ Den Danske Forening (The Danish Association) Nativist / anti-immigrant 2 0 0
http://diversitymachtfrei.blogspot.com/ Diversity Macht Frei Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 0
http://www.document.no/ Document.no Conservative media 3 7 414.635
http://directorblue.blogspot.com/ Doug Ross @ Journal Right-wing blog / online space 3 0 1.385
http://downeastblog.blogspot.com/ Downeast Blog Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 0
http://drybonesblog.blogspot.com/ Dry Bones Pro-Israel 3 0 0.65
http://enemiesforeignanddomestic.com/ Enemies Foreign and Domestic Conservative media 2 0 1.385
http://www.faithfreedom.org/ Faith Freedom International Heterodox Muslims 8 0 261.713
http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/ Family Security Matters National security 8 0 46.569
http://faustasblog.com/ Fausta’s Blog Right-wing blog / online space 3 0 0
http://formermuslimsunited.org/ Former Muslims United Heterodox Muslims 3 0 0
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/ Foundation for Defense of Democracies National security 2 0 8.539
http://www.freerepublic.com/ Free Republic Right-wing blog / online space 5 0 6.615
http://freedomoutpost.com/ Freedom Outpost Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 0.749
http://www.freedomszone.com/ Freedom’s Zone Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 0
http://www.frp.no/ Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party) Nativist / anti-immigrant 0 0 0
http://www.gadiadelman.com/ Gadi Adelman National security 4 0 0
http://galliawatch.blogspot.com/ GalliaWatch Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 0
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/ Gatestone Institute National security 13 9 975.312
http://hinduexistence.org/ Hindu Existence Religious right 3 0 8.607
http://www.independentsentinel.com/ Independent Sentinel Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 0
http://www.infowars.com/ Info Wars Conspiracy theorists 2 0 0
http://www.islamreview.com/ Islam Review Religious right 4 0 1.02
http://www.islam-watch.org/ Islam Watch Heterodox Muslims 8 43 3089.931
http://israelmatzav.blogspot.com/ Israel Matzav Pro-Israel 2 0 0
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/ Israel National News Pro-Israel 10 0 23.647
http://www.israellycool.com/ Israellycool Pro-Israel 2 0 0
http://www.israpundit.com/ Israpundit Pro-Israel 2 0 0.914
http://www.juliagorin.com/ Julia Gorin Conservative media 2 0 0
http://www.keywiki.org/ KeyWiki Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 1.385
http://khalas.wordpress.com/ KHALAS! Heterodox Muslims 3 0 1.739
http://ladyliberty1885.wordpress.com/ Lady Liberty 1885 Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 0
http://www.maggiesnotebook.com/ Maggie’s Notebook Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 0
http://www.steynonline.com/ Mark Steyn Conservative media 3 0 0
http://www.melaniephillips.com/ Melanie Phillips Conservative media 2 0 0
http://www.memri.org/ MEMRI (Middle East Media Research Institute) Conservative media 12 7 1944.47
http://donate.memri.org/ MEMRI - Donate Conservative media 2 0 0
http://www.memrijttm.org/ MEMRI - Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor Conservative media 3 0 0.554
http://www2.memri.org/ MEMRI - main site mirror Conservative media 2 0 0
http://subscribe.memri.org/ MEMRI - Subscription service Conservative media 2 0 0
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Table A.2: Supporters, enablers and sympathisers (category 2) continued.
URL Description Category In-Degree Out-Degree Betweenness
http://www.memritv.org/ MEMRI - TV Monitor Project Conservative media 8 6 980.492
http://memri.convio.net/ MEMRI - User home page Conservative media 2 0 0
http://memrireports.tumblr.com/ MEMRI - Women’s Studies Initiative Conservative media 2 0 0
http://www.middle-east-info.org/ Middle-East-Info.org Pro-Israel 4 0 1.739
http://www.moonbattery.com/ Moonbattery Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 0
http://newsbusters.org/ MRC NewsBusters Conservative media 3 0 3.001
http://www.nationalreview.com/ National Review Conservative media 16 0 207.54
http://neveryetmelted.com/ Never Yet Melted Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 0.534
http://www.newenglishreview.org/ New English Review Right-wing blog / online space 9 15 812.074
http://no-pasaran.blogspot.com/ No Pasaran Right-wing blog / online space 3 0 0
http://www.noisyroom.net/ NoisyRoom.net Right-wing blog / online space 2 36 2581.54
http://northwestinfidels.wordpress.com/ North West Infidels White nationalist and other far right 0 0 0
http://pjmedia.com/ PJ Media Conservative media 12 0 61.722
http://pajamasmedia.com/ PJ Media (alternative url) Conservative media 7 0 20.593
http://politicalvelcraft.org/ Political Vel Craft Conspiracy theorists 2 0 2.376
http://powerandcontrol.blogspot.com/ Power and Control Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 1.385
http://www.prisonplanet.com/ Prison Planet Conspiracy theorists 1 0 0
http://www.red-alerts.com/ Red Alerts Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 0
http://refugeeresettlementwatch.wordpress.com/ Refugee Resettlement Watch Nativist / anti-immigrant 6 0 1.32
http://www.renewamerica.com/ Renew America Religious right 3 0 1.091
http://rightwingdeathbogan.blogspot.com/ RightWingDeathBogan Right-wing blog / online space 3 0 1.385
http://www.sezession.de/ Sezession White nationalist and other far right 1 0 0
http://sistertoldjah.com/ Sister Toldjah Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 0
http://www.smalldeadanimals.com/ Small Dead Animals Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 1.385
http://www.soerenkern.com/ Soeren Kern Conservative media 2 0 0
http://steynian.wordpress.com/ Steynian Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 0
http://www.wintersoldier2008.typepad.com/ Summer Patriot, Winter Soldier Right-wing blog / online space 3 0 14.896
http://astuteblogger.blogspot.com/ The Astute Bloggers Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 0
http://www.eutimes.net/ The European Union Times White nationalist and other far right 2 0 0
http://www.thegatewaypundit.com/ The Gateway Pundit Right-wing blog / online space 6 0 11.142
http://www.investigativeproject.org/ The Investigative Project on Terrorism National security 12 0 37.84
http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/ The Jawa Report National security 6 0 9.402
http://www.therebel.media/ The Rebel Media Conservative media 2 0 1.221
http://www.theblaze.com/ TheBlaze Conservative media 6 0 6.224
http://www.thomasmore.org/ Thomas More Law Center Religious right 3 0 0
http://www.trevorloudon.com/ Trevor Loudon Conservative media 3 0 1.385
http://truthandcons.blogspot.com/ Truth & Consequences Right-wing blog / online space 2 0 1.385
http://www.vdare.com/ VDARE White nationalist and other far right 2 0 8.856
http://www.voiceofthecopts.org/ Voice of the Copts Religious right 3 0 2.376
http://www.shoebat.com/ Walid Shoebat Heterodox Muslims 7 0 17.908
http://www.weaselzippers.us/ Weasel Zippers Right-wing blog / online space 4 0 2.376
http://www.wnd.com/ World Net Daily Conspiracy theorists 10 0 35.243
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/ World Net Daily (alternative url) Conspiracy theorists 2 0 0
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Appendix B
Appendix: Research Statement
About the Research Project
This research project is exploring the recent emergence and development of political
movements set up to oppose radical Islam in Europe and North America. This in-
cludes anti-Jihad, anti-Sharia and anti-halal groups.
The purpose of the research is to explore how these new movements can be un-
derstood in sociological terms. Areas of particular interest include:
• The aims and objectives of the movements;
• Activists’ and supporters’ motivations for getting involved;
• How movements are organised and the relations between them; and
• Their political and ideological views and how these can be understood.
The research will explore these issues through an analysis of organisations’ campaign
materials and websites, as well as interviews with activists and supporters.
The research is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).
About the Researcher
Ed Pertwee is a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology and Centre for the
Study of Human Rights at LSE. He has previously studied at Birkbeck College, Uni-
versity of London; the University of Cambridge; and the University of York. His
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research interests include issues related to religion, race and ethnicity in the UK and
beyond.
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